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This Master's thesis is a history of apprenticeship in New Zealand. Apprenticeship has 
traditionally been the main route for entry into the skilled trades. At one level apprenticeship is 
a way of training people to do a particular job. The apprentice acquires, in a variety of formal 
and informal ways, the skills necessary to carry out their trade. The skills involved with each 
trade, tied inextricably to the technology that is used, are seen as the 'property' of the 
tradesperson. Learning the technical aspects of the job, however, is only a part of what goes on 
during an apprenticeship. The apprentice is also socialised into the customs and practices of 
the trade, learning implicitly and explicitly the hierarchies within the workplace, and gaining 
an appreciation of the status of his or her trade. Apprenticeship must also be viewed in the 
wider context of the relationship between labour and capital. The use of apprenticeship as an 
exclusionary device has implications for both worker and employer. Definitions of skill, and 
the ways in which technological advances are negotiated, are both dependent on the social 
setting of the workplace, which is mediated by social arrangements such as apprenticeship. 
This thesis thus traces the development of apprenticeship policies over the years, and 
examines within a theoretical context the debate surrounding those policies. Several themes 
emerge including the inadequacy of the market to deliver sustained training, the tension 
between educators and employers, and the importance of a tripartite accord to support efficient 
and equitable training. Apprenticeship has proved to be a remarkably resilient system in New 
Zealand. This thesis identifies factors that have challenged this resilience, such as changes in 
work practices and technology, and the historically small wage differentials between skilled 
and unskilled work. It also identifies the characteristics that have encouraged the retention of 
apprenticeship, such as the small-scale nature of industry in New Zealand, and the latter's 
distinctive industrial relations system. It is argued that benefits to both employer and worker, 
and the strength of the socialisation process embodied in apprenticeship, will ensure that some 
form of apprenticeship remains a favored means of training young people for many of the 
skilled trades. 
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PREFACE 
My mother delights in informing me that I come from an 'apprenticeship' family. 
Mum served her time as a tailoress; her father and one of her brothers were engineers, and 
another brother a carpenter. I am considered 'lucky' enough to have married an electrician . .It 
is quite clear that my brother, who is 'in' computers, and myself, as a university student, while 
both worthy ofa degree of pride, do not quite have 'real' jobs. To Mum, to have served an 
apprenticeship, and to have a skilled trade, is a 'Good Thing'. My interest in this topic is thus 
both at a personal and an academic level. In this thesis, I want to explore apprenticeship in 
New Zealand and to ask why an institution that has its roots in medieval Europe has persisted 
in a modem society. I want to examine both the economic and social implications of 
apprenticeship as a means of training young people. In order to do this, it is necessary to trace 
the historical development of the apprenticeship system, and to look at the changes and 
continuities in that system. This thesis thus offers'a detailed survey of apprenticeship policy in 
New Zealand. 
In the first chapter, I define apprenticeship and discuss its historical precedents and 
significance. The wider context of industrial relations in New Zealand is discussed, as is the 
form that apprenticeship has taken in other countries. The second chapter examines some of 
the theoretical perspectives that inform this thesis. The remainder _of the thesis charts in 
chronological order the changes in New Zealand's apprenticeship policy. Chapter Three looks 
at how the apprenticeship system became formalised in New Zealand through the award 
system that was developed under the labour legislation of the 1890s. It shows how 
apprenticeship became an issue as work practices changed at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and how it was one of the factors under contest within the arbitration system as the 
labour movement gained strength. Chapter Four traces the lead up to the development of a 
'modem' apprenticeship system in 1923, and the pressures that the Depression and World War 
Two placed upon that system. 
The years of the post-war boom were the height of apprenticeship in New Zealand, 
with a burgeoning economy and acute labour shortages ensuring that entering a skilled trade 
was the first option for around 30 per cent of male schoolleavers throughout the late 1940s 
and 1950s. Chapter Five thus examines the changes to the legislation and administration that 
governed this growing number of apprentices. Chapter Six traces the pressures for reform to 
the apprenticeship system that mounted as the 'golden weather' ended and New Zealand faced 
v 
growing economic pressure. Chapters Seven and Eight examine the gradual dismantling of 
much of the economic and social basis for apprenticeship, as neo-liberalpolicies were 
developed and took hold. Chapter Nine looks at women and apprenticeship, concentrating in 
particular on the efforts made by 'second-wave' feminists to ensure more equal participation 
by women in the workforce. Chapter Ten assesses the framework for industry training put into 
place by the 1990 National government. The concluding chapter, Chapter Eleven, draws out 
several themes that run through the preceding chapters, and attempts to account for the 
resilience of the apprenticeship system. 
I would like to thank many people who have helped me in one way or another with this 
thesis. Lincoln University, and the Human Sciences Division in particular, has provided 
academic and financial support. The camaraderie and support of staff and fellow post-
graduates has been an essential component of my work in the last two years (you all know 
who you are!). My grateful thanks to Alison Kuiper and Alison Kagen, for giving so freely of 
their experience, knowledge and support. I thank my associate supervisor, Bob Gidlow, for his 
thoughtful comments. And to Jim McAloon, my supervisor, my immense gratitude for his 
unstinting generosity with his time, knowledge and enthusiasm. 
At a personal level, I would like to thank Janet Calder for guiding me through my 
undergraduate years and Sharon Barnard for my weekly dose of sanity. My friends have been 
sounding boards, interview subjects, and a wonderful 'support-crew'; thank you all. My long-
suffering family have been waiting for this for quite a while; thank you for your patience (to 
Tim, my dad, who couldn't quite wait that long, thank you for the many dinner-table 
'discussions', for giving me a love of learning, and for always being so proud of me). To my 
'girlies' , Bridget, Caitlin and Hannah, and to my best friend and husband, Steve - you are the 
wind beneath my wings. 
I' I ~' . . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE INSTITUTION OF APPRENTICESHIP: WHAT IS IT, WHERE DID IT COME 
FROM, AND WHY STUDY IT? 
The apprenticeship system in New Zealand has traditionally been the main route for 
entry into the skilled trades. It is surprising that a system that evolved in pre-industrial times 
has retained its relevance in a modem capitalist society. This resilience can be accounted for 
by factors within the apprenticeship system, and by the way in which apprenticeship has suited 
(often for different reasons) both worker and employer. In this first chapter, then, I define 
apprenticeship, and describe the early roots of the institution. I provide a brief summary of 
labour history in New Zealand, which illustrates the lack of any study that focuses specifically 
on apprenticeship, and sketch the wider picture of industrial relations in New Zealand. The 
current apprenticeship situation is discussed and I outline the development of apprenticeship in 
some other countries. The chapter ends with a rationale for studying apprenticeship; an 
explanation of how this institution can serve as a lens to focus on some of the crucial elements 
of New Zealand society. 
Definition of Apprenticeship 
-
The institution of apprenticeship has evolved greatly from its origins. A useful starting 
point is the following definition provided by Gospel: 
a method of employment and on-the-job training which involves a set of reciprocal 
rights and duties between an employer and a trainee (usually a young person): the 
employer agrees to teach a range of skills, usually of a broad occupational nature; in 
return the apprentice agrees to work for an extended period at a training wage which is 
low compared with the qualified workers' rate, but which rises periodically as the 
apprenticeship nears completion ... productive work and on-the-job training [may] 
alternate with off-the-job training in an educational institution often partly financed by 
the state.} 
While this definition sets out the mechanics of apprenticeship, it only hints at the complexity 
of the institution. Deeper understandings of the idea of 'skill', and of the hierarchical nature of 
apprenticeship, will be explored later in this thesis. 
1 Howard Gospel, "The Revival of Apprenticeship Training in Britain?," British Journal of Industrial Relations 
36, no. 3 (1998) : 436. 
The Language of Apprenticeship 
It is only comparatively recently that much of the terminology of apprenticeship that 
originated in medieval times has ceased to be used.2 As these terms will be used in this 
research, some explanation is in order: 
Indentures: legally binding agreement attaching an apprentice to a master for a specific 
number of years (originally as an unpaid worker).3 
Journeyman: a person who has served their apprenticeship and is a fully qualified employee; 
derived from the French 'Journee' (a day) because journeymen were paid daily.4 
Master: a journeyman with his own business, employing apprentices and other journeymen. 5 
Premium: a sum of money paid by the family or guardians of a young person to a master, to 
secure an apprenticeship. 
Early History of Apprenticeship 
2 
The concept of apprenticeship goes back to the civilisations of ancient Egypt and 
Babylonia.6 In Britain, the early roots of apprenticeship had developed in the medieval guilds, 
associations that were granted monopoly rights by municipal by-laws or royal charter to 
produce a commodity. The guilds were responsible for regulating standards, practices and 
prices relating to the commodity. They were powerful organisations in many towns, playing 
an important role in civic life. Guilds maintained their exclusiveness by restricting the right to 
produce a commodity to their members, who needed to have served an apprenticeship with a 
master. Apprenticeship was traditionally domiciliary, with the youth (usually male) living-in 
with the employer, who agreed to teach the trade in return for productive labour.7 The 
influence and strength of craft guilds gradually waned, undermined by urban growth and 
industrialisation, and by the 18th century their importance had been considerably reduced. 8 
2 It is clear that contemporary concerns about the use of sexist language will prove a challenge in this thesis. The 
language of apprenticeship is male, and, until comparatively recently, this was an accurate reflection of the 
almost exclusively male nature of the institution. Thus, particularly in the earlier chapters, I will use 
'journeyman(men)' or (occasionally) 'journeywoman(women)', rather than the anachronistic 'joumeyperson'. 
The term 'tradesperson' came into usage in the 1970s; thus, I will not note as sexist the use of'tradesman(men), 
before that time. 
3 Collins Dictionary of Sociolr:p. 2nd ed., s.v. "craft apprentice." 
4 Hutchinson Encyclopedia. 3 ed., s.v. "journeyman". 
5 Ibid. 
6 Vocational Training Council (VTC). Current Developments in Apprenticeship. (Wellington: VTC, 1975), 13. 
7 Howard Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training: A British, American, Australian Comparison," 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 32 (1994) : 505-523. 
8 M. Daunton, Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain 1700-1850 (Britain: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
:-, .. :' 
3 
The British state also played a role in the control of apprenticeship. The 1563 Statute 
of Artificers aimed to control the movement of labour throughout the country, requiring that 
many types of workers should be hired for at least one year. This statute also established a 
national system of apprenticeship, regulated by legal indentures, as an alternative to guild 
control. While these apprenticeship clauses were abandoned in practice in many trades long 
before the repeal of the statute in 1814, apprenticeship survived in many of the crafts, and as a 
means for parishes to deal with orphan and pauper children. To meet their responsibilities 
. under the Poor Law, parish authorities could place destitute children with an employer, who 
would supply board, lodging and a small wage, in return for a premium of between three to 
five pounds. This practice was often a source of cheap labour. 9 
Apprenticeship nevertheless remained an important facet of some professional and 
commercial occupations, and of the established crafts. Daunton claimed that "the struggle over 
apprenticeship was central to trade disputes in the 1800s and 1810s".10 The breakdown of the 
guild system, and the lack of any incentive for the. state to maintain apprenticeship, meant that 
journeymen themselves became the main pillars of the apprenticeship system, as unions of 
craft workers grew in strength and importance. I 1 As industrialisation increased "artisans could 
no longer follow the traditional sequence, from apprentice, to journeyman, and then to the 
status of master and married man". 12 Journeymen thus had good reason to support the 
apprenticeship system in order to limit the labour supply and thereby maintain their wages. 13 
They also wished to preserve their 'property right' in their skill. 
Employers sought the ability to take on more apprentices to reduce skilled wages and 
to subdivide jobs to allow cheaper, semi-skilled labour to be employed. 14 There were, 
however, also advantages to employers from the apprenticeship system. Restrictions on the 
number of apprentices were an effective means to exclude competitors and keep prices high. 
There were also financial benefits to be gained from older apprentices; the apprentice was 
trained and basically able to perform the work of a journeyman, but still was only paid 
apprentice wages. 15 Thus, despite the erosion of apprenticeship in many skilled trades, 
particularly in London and other large urban areas, apprenticeship remained a defining issue in 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 276. 
11 V. Griffin. "Getting a Good Trade ... " Apprenticeship, Industrial Relations & the Labour Market. Discussion 
Paper No.8. (Brisbane: Business Research Centre, North Brisbane College of Advanced Education, 1981), 11. 
12 Anna Clark, The Stnlggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class (London: 
University of Cali fomi a Press, 1995),5. 
13 Griffin, "Getting a Good Trade ... ", 11. 
14 Daunton, Progress and Poverty, 276. 
15 Griffin, "Getting a Good Trade ... ". 
-';,.-.; 
the relationship between labour and capital. 16 Hobsbawm argued that in Britain in the 1850s 
and 1860s there was in most industries "a tacit system of arrangements and accommodations 
between masters and skilled labour which satisfied both sides", apprenticeship being one of 
those arrangements. 17 
Palmer summarised studies that traced changes in apprenticeship in Canada in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. IS These indicated that significant changes in work 
relations had begun by this time, and that apprenticeship was moving from an intimate, 
personalised form of training to a more impersonal, economically-based relationship. One 
symptom of this change was an increased number of desertions by apprentices "as masters 
accumulated capital, stepped up production demands because of market considerations, and 
hired increasing numbers of apprentices to do the heavy and often unskilled labour needed in 
the shop". 19 New forms of apprenticeship emerged after the 1860s, as new technology 
engendered new skills and trade groupings. Palmer argued that: 
4 
apprenticeship became less craft training supplemented by moral and educational 
supervision and more a form of bound labour ... the protections once offered by masters 
disappeared, but the proprietary and authoritative aspects of apprenticeship remained.2o . 
The 1860s and early 1870s were the peak of the strength of craft unionism in 
nineteenth century Britain. Skilled workers rode the economic wave that the expansion and 
stabilisation of British industrial capitalism created, able to counter the growing effects of 
mechanisation because of a strong demand for skilled labour. However, the depression that 
began in the mid 1870s "threw into bold relief long-term structural transformations in 
industry".21 New technologies and the rationalisation of production meant that the nature of 
work changed, and definitions of skill had to be renegotiated. The strength of many of the craft 
unions gave them the power to restrict the use of new machinery to their members, and to 
ensure that serving an apprenticeship was still the only route to many occupations, regardless 
of how the skill levels may have altered. This, then, was the shape of the apprenticeship 
system that was exported to the new colony of New Zealand in the mid nineteenth century. 
16 R. Harrison & J. Zeitlin, Divisions of Labour. (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1985). 
17 E.J. Hobsbawm, "Artisan or Labour Aristocrat?," Economic History Review (1984),356. 
18 Bryan D. Palmer, Working-class Experience (Canada: Butterworth & Co., 1983), 29. 
19 Ibid., 29. 
20 Ibid., 29. 
21 Ibid., 33. 
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New Zealand Labour History 
This study must be viewed in the wider context of the labour history of New Zealand. 
While apprenticeship receives a mention in many works that examine this area, it is often only 
a peripheral concern, with the issues not being fully developed. The skilled trades, and the 
protection of the exclusive nature of those trades, are often discussed. What is not considered 
so fully is the role of the apprenticeship system in maintaining that exclusivity, and in 
socialising the young worker into the mores and expectations surrounding the trade. 
Literature that examines the labour legislation enacted in the 1890s' Liberal 
government's burst of reforming zeal tends to concentrate on the idea of New Zealand as a 
'social laboratory'. Primary sources confirm that apprenticeship was certainly an issue 
throughout this period, but it is often only dealt with implicitly in the literature. Holt's 1986 
Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand, the definitive analysis of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act i 894, barely mentions apprenticeship, although apprenticeship conditions 
were regulated on an award-by-award basis from the late 1890s. 
The new century brought fundamental changes in work practices, and the reactions to 
these changes have proved a fertile ground for New Zealand labour historians. Olssen (The 
Red Feds, 1988) and Richardson (Coal, Class and Community, 1995) have examined the 
evolution of sectors of the union movement. The concurrent growth of a political labour 
movement has been the subject of works by Gustafson (Labour's Path to Political 
Independence, 1980), and several theses, including Plumridge's 'Labour in Christchurch: 
Community and Consciousness, 1914-1919' (1979), Nolan's 'Jack McCullough: Worker's 
Representative on the Arbitration Court' (1985) and McAloon's 'Working Class Politics in 
Christchurch 1904-1914' (1986), much of which is summarised in Olssen (,The Origins of the 
. Labour Party: A Reconsideration', 1987). 
Labour history in New Zealand has tended to focus largely on institutions, particularly 
the arbitration system, and organisations.22 Authors such as Bert Roth have written union 
histories, and some articulate biographies of those involved in the labour movement have been 
penned. Recent developments, however, emphasised the importance of the 'cultural' aspect of 
labour history, and Martin and Taylor attempted to redress the balance with their edited 
collection, Culture and the Labour Movement: Essays in New Zealand Labour History (1991). 
In Building the New World (1995), Olssen embedded in the culture of the Dunedin suburb of 
22 J. Martin & K. Taylor, eds., Culture and the Labour Movement (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1991); 
Melanie Nolan and Pat Walsh, "Labour's Leg-iron? Assessing Trade Unions and Arbitration in New Zealand," in 
Trade Unions, Work and Society, ed. Pat Walsh (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1994), 25. 
!c __ '.-___ :_c 
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Caversham the story of how the skilled workers of Caversham organised their daily working 
lives, and of how they retained the exclusiveness of their trades through their defence of the 
apprenticeship system. Recognition of the role of women in labour history has also been 
encouraged by the wider focus of' cultural' works. Women were not often prominent in labour 
organisations; marginalised in fact, and in the reporting of that fact. But when labour history is 
widened to examine the social setting, then studies such as Nolan's Breadwinning: New 
Zealand Women and the State (2000) result. 
At the intersection of the institutional and the cultural approach to labour history is an 
examination of what actually happens in the workplace. The reality of working-class 
experience has been analysed in E.P. Thompson's masterful work on the English working 
class, and by David Montgomery in the USA and Bryan Palmer in Canada.23 It is in the 
workplace that macro-level ideas and understandings are translated into daily lived 
experiences. For example, Hill and Gidlow's 1988 study of the introduction of new 
technology into the printing industry showed how the notion of skill was negotiated and 
reconstituted at the point of production, bounded by the organisational power of the union and 
employer groups involved, and reinforced by cultural understandings of gendered roles.24 A 
study of the apprenticeship system has the potential to offer similar understandings; 
apprenticeship has been both a powerful component of the institutional side of labour 
relations, and an important vehicle for reproducing the social relations of the workplace. 
Industrial Relations in New Zealand 
Regulation of apprenticeship in the new colony was essentially on an informal basis, 
with the first legislation being the Master and Apprentice Act 1865. The provisions of this 
Act, which largely dealt with apprenticing destitute children, became outdated as New Zealand 
moved out of the colonial phase towards the end of the nineteenth century. Attempts to revise 
apprenticeship legislation were made, but the administration of apprenticeship became 
subsumed in the bigger picture of industrial relations, with apprenticeship regulated on an 
award-by-award basis from 1894. By the time that specialist apprenticeship legislation was 
passed in 1923, the institution was firmly entrenched within the system of compulsory 
arbitration, and was a crucial component of the negotiating process. It is thus necessary to 
23 E.P. Thompson, The Making oj the English Working Class (England: Pelican Books, 1968); David 
Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (Cambridge University Press, 1979); Bryan D. Palmer, Working-
class Experience (Canada: Butterworth & Co., 1983). 
24 Roberta Hill and Bob Gidlow, From Hot Metal to Cold Type (WeIIington: DSIR Publishing, 1988). 
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understand the shape of industrial relations in New Zealand to grasp the role of 
apprenticeship, and to understand why it persisted. 
Bloxall argued that New Zealand and Australia developed a distinctive framework for 
industrial relations because of: 
7 
the need to shape a stable economic system in the face of the typical difficulties 
encountered by agricultural or commodities exporters, disillusionment with the social 
consequences of strike action and a faith in the value of state initiatives in creating 
fairer societies (which) led to a willingness to substitute free collective bargaining with 
a system of state registration of unions and final resolution of disputes through 
compulsory arbitration.25 
Thus, in New Zealand, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration (IC&A) Act, advocated by 
William Pember Reeves, was passed in 1894. Under the Act, the country was divided into 
districts, each with a conciliation board, which was the first port of call for any industrial 
disputes. As disputes were settled, the results were incorporated into awards that applied to all 
workers in a particular industry in the district, and were ratified by the Arbitration Court. If the 
dispute could not be settled at conciliation, the case went to the Arbitration Court, where a 
binding ruling would be made. Support for this process was by default, rather than from 
preference, and came from an uneasy coalition of unionists, who had been roundly defeated in 
the 1890 maritime strike; rural interests, who wished to see troublesome urban unions quelled; 
and employers, who lacked the political power to insist upon a different system. 26 
There were many ramifications of compulsory arbitration. The union movement was 
fragmentary, with a few large unions and many small unions, usually organised on an 
occupational and regional basis. 27 This can be illustrated by union names; the New Zealand 
Carpenters, Joiners, Joiners' Machinists, and (except Otago & Southland) Plasterers and 
(except Auckland) Bricklayers and Related Trades Industrial Union of Workers, for instance. 
While union members were sometimes granted employment preference, the unions were 
restricted by the Act in what they could do for their members. They were permitted to 
represent only on 'industrial matters', limited by the court to wages, hours and conditions of 
25 Peter Bloxall, "Towards the Wagner Framework: Change in New Zealand Industrial Relations," The Journal of 
Industrial Relations 32 (1990) : 523. 
26 Len Richardson, "Parties and Political Change," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), 207. 
27 John E. Martin, "The Removal of Compulsory Arbitration and the Depression of the 1930s," NZJH, 28 (1994), 
143: Nation-wide unions were permitted by the IC&A Amendment Act 1936. 
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work. The right to strike was severely restricted, and (after 1939) the Minister of Labour 
ld d · . 28 cou ereglster a unIOn. 
The decisions of the Arbitration Court were based on precedent. Initially, the Court 
had largely legitimised existing conditions, winning the unions' favour by reinforcing 
favourable proportions of apprentices to journeymen and establishing 'closed shops' in some 
awards. Declining wages and the "growing legalism and delays of the Court" in the early 
twentieth century, however, led to increasing union disillusionment with the arbitration 
system. 29 This was expressed most clearly by the formation in 1909 of the radical Red 
Federation, which advocated industrial action outside the arbitration system. The defeat of the 
'Red Feds' in the 1912 Waihi mine strike, however, led radical unionists to an uneasy 
coalition with skilled workers' unions that resulted in the growth of an independent labour 
movement. The fact that craft unions remained the "most enduring and staunchest defenders of 
arbitration" reinforced the deep-seated ambiguity with which the union movement regarded 
the arbitration system.30 
Despite the ambiguity with which arbitration was regarded, attacks on the system by 
other parties could rouse and unite the union movement. Attempts by rural interests 
throughout the late 1920s to substantially amend the system were strongly resisted by unions, 
including the Alliance of Labour, which was traditionally opposed to arbitration. Changes to 
the IC&A Act through the Depression were also hard fought by unions and the Labour 
members of parliament. The IC&A Act was amended in Apri11932, with conciliation 
remaining compulsory, but arbitration to be used only if both parties agreed. Compulsory 
arbitration was restored in 1936, together with compulsory union membership for those 
covered by awards. 31 
The post-war years saw the increasing bureaucratisation of the union movement. Full 
employment and the blanket coverage of arbitration system meant little differentiation 
between wages for skilled and unskilled work: "the arbitration system (delivered) a 
compressed wage structure and a high degree of uniformity in wage increases,,?2 There was 
sufficient support for the system to withstand the bitterness of the 1951 watersiders' dispute 
28 Melanie Nolan and Pat Walsh, "Labour's Leg-iron? Assessing Trade Unions and Arbitration in New Zealand," 
in Trade Unions, Work and SOCiety, ed. Pat Walsh (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1994), 13. 
29 Richardson, "Parties and Political Change", 211. 
30 Nolan & Walsh, "Labour's Leg-iron?", 23. 
31 Martin, "The Removal of Compulsory Arbitration and the Depression of the 1930s". 
32 Nolan & Walsh, "Labour's Leg-iron?", 22. 
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and, until the 1960s: "the arbitral system suited a sequence of changing coalitions of interest 
sufficiently to retain its dominance. Then it began to fall apart".33 Unions that were powerful 
numerically or through market position wished to extend this power with second tier 
bargaining outside the system. The ability of the arbitration system to moderate the effect of 
the labour market on wages was no longer regarded as desirable by less militant unions and 
craft unions became disillusioned with arbitration throughout the 1960s as margins for skill 
were eroded. Thus, "unions started their slow walk away from the arbitration system in the 
1960s".34 Dissatisfaction came to a head with the 1968 nil wage order, which sealed the fate of 
the arbitration system and "acted as a stimulus for the first substantive reform of the legal 
framework", resulting in the Industrial Relations Act 1973.35 
Industrial relations in New Zealand were thus marked by the handing over to the state, 
via the arbitration system, of much of the power (actual or potential) of the parties involved, 
limiting their strategic options. Judgements of the fairness and value of that covenant varied 
according to time and circumstance.36 The tension between the security offered by the system, 
and the desire by some unions to exercise their power outside of arbitration, was a constant 
theme of industrial relations in New Zealand. The relativity of wages between occupations 
became one of the mainstays of the arbitration system, building a historically constructed 
'code' that often defied the need for wages to be responsive to changes in particular industries, 
or skill levels in particular occupations.37 For similar reasons, the regulation of apprenticeship 
wages and conditions provided a crucial bargaining point for unions and employers, and the 
debates and negotiations that took place over apprenticeship were often symptomatic of deeper 
concerns that were unable to be articulated in the circumscribed industrial arena. 
It is no coincidence that as pressure mounted on the arbitration system from the 1960s, 
the apprenticeship system also began to be questioned. The move from centralised and 
prescriptive, to deregulated and voluntaristic industrial relations over the 25 years from 
(roughly) 1965 to 1991 was mirrored in the changes to apprenticeship over the same period. 
This period is characterised as a 'crisis of consensus' by Armstrong. 38 The post-war consensus 
may have been uneasy at times, but growing economic pressures, and a changing social ethos, 
33 Bloxall, "Towards the Wagner Framework", 524. 
34 Nolan & Walsh, "Labour's Leg-iron?", 36. 
35 Bloxall, "Towards the Wagner Framework", 526. 
36 Nolan & Walsh, "Labour's Leg-iron?", 10, 14. 
37 Ibid., 16. 
38 Nicola Armstrong, "State," in New Zealand SOciety, 2nd ed., ed. P. SpoonIey, D. Pearson & 1. Shirley 
(Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press Ltd, 1994), 121. 
unravelled commonly-held understandings of the role of the state in New Zealand society, 
and of how the relationship between labour and capital was best organised. 
The Contemporary Shape of Apprenticeship in New Zealand 
10 
Despite the common misconception that' apprenticeships are a thing of the past', the 
system is alive and well in New Zealand. Apprenticeship (or industry training) is administered 
by the Education and Training Support Agency (ETSA) (renamed Skill New Zealand in 1998) 
under the Industry Training Act 1992. Apprenticeship contracts have been replaced by a 
Training Agreement between each employer and apprentice, with wages and conditions 
determined according to the Employment Contracts Act 199139. The development and 
monitoring of training standards has become the function of the New Zealand Qualification 
Authority (NZQA), through a system of unit standards. Industry Training Organisations 
(ITOs) were gradually established from 1991 for both traditional apprenticeship industries, 
and other industries that could see the advantage of systematic training. At 30 June 1999 there 
were 52 recognised ITOs and 49,577 industry trainees.4o 
There are, however, wide variations in training provision between industries. Some 
industries have retained a high level of commitment to training. In recognition of the 
difficulties that smaller employers face in taking on apprentices, some industry training 
organisations have set up training companies, which 'employ' apprentices, seconding them out 
to various firms to achieve balanced on-job experience. Other industries, however, have 
adopted a 'head in the sand' approach, with an aging workforce, and little or no training taking 
place. This is particularly a problem in areas where the government provision of services has 
been withdrawn, such as the telecommunications industry. Large government departments 
have been often been replaced with former employees who now subcontract to small 
administrative units. Tight margins and lack of continuity of work give little incentive to take 
on trainees. Access to training is also circumscribed for some groups. Despite the high 
numbers of industry trainees, as at 30 June 2000 only 20 per cent of those trainees were 
female. 41 This figure includes hairdressing apprentices, and is indicative of the relatively 
insignificant growth in the breadth of women's labour force participation (see Chapter 9, 
pp.207-208, for a more detailed discussion). In December 1999, only 10 per cent of industry 
39 This Act has recently been repealed, and replaced with the Employment Relations Act 2000. The implications 
of this change for apprenticeship are yet to be revealed. 
40 Education and Training Support Agency (ETSA), AmUlai Reports, 1991-1999 
41 Skill New Zealand, "Vital Statistics," Skills, September 2000, 15. 
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trainees were aged 16 to 19 and only 24 per cent were aged 20 to 24.42 Using these 
percentages as a guide, this means that of the 49,577 people taking part in structured industry 
training as at June 1999, only approximately 5000 were in the traditional apprenticeship age 
group (16 to 19). This compares with peaks of nearly 30,000 apprenticeship contracts in force 
during the mid 1970s. The Labour-Alliance government elected in 1999 hopes to address 
some of these issues with its Modem Apprenticeship programme. 
International Comparisons 
While the basis for the development of apprenticeship in New Zealand has been the 
British system, it is important for three reasons to examine the recent history of apprenticeship 
in other countries. First, comparisons with countries where apprenticeship either did not 
survive, or where its development has taken a different path to New Zealand, may allow the 
features about our society which both fostered apprenticeship, and contributed to its evolution, 
to be identified. Second, apprenticeship schemes in. other countries are sometimes held up as 
examples for New Zealand to follow. It is useful to understand how these schemes differ from 
ours, and also the differences in the countries where they are in place. Third, Thoms argued 
that in order to understand 'big picture' explanations of societal changes: 
it is necessary to appreciate that changes are mediated through the social structures 
which have emerged within nation states over time, leading to modifications to global 
processes and the emergence of varied forms of local resis~nce to change. 43 
The 'social structure' of apprenticeship has been used in varying ways in different countries to 
resist and modify processes that may seem to be imperatives, such as the deskilling of much of 
the workforce. 
In Britain, changes in the international economy in the mid 1960s exacerbated the 
decline of the manufacturing sector that had begun in the mid 1950s.44 This prompted 
criticisms of the traditional apprenticeship system. Its narrow, exclusive nature was seen as 
unsuitable for modem industries, and the notion of timeserving, rather than training to 
standards, was regarded as unnecessary and wasteful. Reforms were attempted, but were 
insufficient to counter the effects of rising unemployment in the mid 1970s. Youth training 
schemes introduced at this time had a contradictory effect on apprenticeship, supporting it 
42 Skill New Zealand, "Prime Minister Launches Modem Apprenticeships," Skills, April 2000, 3. 
43 David Thoms, Fragmenting Societies? (London: Routledge, 1992),274. 
44 Thoms, Fragmenting Societies?, 63. 
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through the provision of subsidies, but also undermining the system because of the 
provision of state-funded alternatives for training. 
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The market deregulatory approach of the Thatcher government had a "profound" effect 
on the British training system. 45 At the macro-economic level, many of the traditional 
apprenticeship industries were decimated throughout the 1980s. With regard to industry 
training, 'new right' policies saw the mandatory tripartite Industry Training Boards abolished 
and replaced with voluntary, employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils, reducing the 
opportunity for union involvement. There was downward pressure on youth wages. In 1986, 
moves began towards the development of a national qualification framework. From the 1960s, 
apprenticeship numbers showed a long-term downward trend, with dramatic falls in the early 
and mid 1990s.46 Gospel argued that Britain: 
found itself with a very mixed and uncertain system of skill formation: deteriorating 
occupational labour market training~ a move towards unregulated markets ... and a 
move towards greater state intervention in terms of funding and compulsion to take up 
training places, but without any commensurate compulsion on employers. 47 
Gospel claimed that the traditional apprenticeship system did not get a foothold in the 
United States because of the high levels of geographical mobility and employment 
opportunities. There was also less incentive to train because of the large numbers of skilled 
immigrants entering the country.48 For example, in the first decade of the twentieth century 26 
per cent of all carpenters were immigrants, a large enough number1:o discourage urban 
employers from training apprentices. Many skilled immigrants, however, did not practice their 
trade in their new home, working instead in factories: "the skill and knowledge required by the 
manufacturing occupations in which they were engaged were embodied not in their training 
but in the technical organization of the factory itself'.49 The predominance of mass production 
systems was thus another barrier to the retention of traditional craft trades. The union 
movement was also generally weaker in the United States than in countries where 
apprenticeship persisted; therefore an important institutional support for apprenticeship 
training was not in place. 50 
45 Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training", 509. 
46 Gospel, "The Revival of Apprenticeship Training", 438. 
47 Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training", 510. 
48 Ibid. 
49 David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
50 Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training", 510. 
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In Germany, the' dual system' of apprenticeship (Austria and Switzerland have 
similar systems) was developed as the existing apprenticeship system was modernised in the 
1960s.51 It involves training in both the workplace and at state-financed vocational schools. 52 
The dual system is used to both improve the skills ofthe work force, and as a buffer against 
youth unemployment. In the late 1970s, Germany kept its youth unemployment rate to five per 
cent or less, one of the lowest rates in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. 53 A 1993 study showed that five years after leaving 
secondary education,. only 1.9 per cent of a representative cohort were unemployed in 
Germany, compared with 8.2 per cent ofa similar cohort in the United States. 54 
Apprenticeship in Germany covers a wide range of occupations, with more than 350 
apprenticeships in existence, and a large proportion of each age cohort taking advantage of 
this. In 1991, for example, 72 per cent of the labour force had participated in an 
apprenticeship. The main features of the system are that it is company-based, voluntary and 
"generates, portable, occupation-specific skills". 55. 
While employers are not required to participate in the system, there is a strong ethos, 
backed by employers' organisations, encouraging them to do so. Workers are involved 
through trade unions and works councils. 56 This collective approach to training is underpinned 
by state support; "an institutional framework that creates an incentive structure able to resolve 
the standard market failure problems involved in generating marketable skills".57 As well as 
this tripartite commitment to apprentice training, flexibility within-the structure of the system 
itself has contributed to its resilience. High-quality apprenticeships, which offer employment 
security through highly portable skills, co-exist with low-quality apprenticeships in the 
Handwerk (crafts) sector. The system is organised at the regional level, with a co-operative 
approach to c~culum content and delivery. 58 There is scope for further training within 
industry, whereby tradespeople can study for Meister (master) certification. 59 
51 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEeD), Apprenticeship: Which Way Forward? 
(Paris: OECD, 1994). 
52 Rainer Winkelmann, Apprenticeship and After: Does it Really Matter? Discussion Paper No. 9508 
(Department of Economics, University of Canterbury, 1995). 
53 V Catherwood, Young People, Education and Employment Planning Paper No. 23 (New Zealand Planning 
Council, 1985). 
54 Winkelmann, Apprenticeship and After, 1. 
55 Ibid., 1. 
56 Gospel, "The Revival of Apprenticeship Training". 
57 Winkelmann, Apprenticeship and After, 1. 
58 Ibid. 
59 OECD, Apprenticeship: Which Way Forward? 
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Despite the evident strength of the dual system, it has come under pressure in recent 
years. Young people are less willing to enter certain types of apprenticeships, preferring in 
some cases university level programmes. Changes in the way work is organised means that the 
notion of an 'occupation', requiring specialised training, has become problematic. It is argued 
that apprenticeship discourages flexibility and prevents the development of new qualifications. 
Strong, stable intemallabour markets that provide security of employment are also under 
threat from economic restructuring and the shorter life cycles of some companies. 
Nevertheless, the Gennan dual system "provides a structure for the whole education system 
and organises the relationship between education (both general and vocational) and 
employment". 60 
Given the contribution of the Gennan apprenticeship system to the competitiveness of 
the country's industrial companies, and the oft-heard call for a more skilled work force in New 
Zealand, why has a similar system not evolved in New Zealand?61 Clearly, the population base 
and economic structure of the two countries are completely different. Taking this into account, 
however, there are still three major factors that underpin the German system that would be 
difficult to imagine happening in contemporary New Zealand. Firstly, the structuring of the 
education system around the dual system means that children are streamed early (at around the 
age often) into general or academic courses. 62 Secondly, the breadth of the dual system 
prevents a narrow definition of 'apprenticeship' as being associated with manual work, 
thereby removing possible class-based connotations of a 'trade' apprenticeship as a less 
attractive option than a 'profession'. Finally, the strength and persistence of the tripartite 
approach and the "laborious negotiations between the social partners, federal authorities and 
the educational authorities" would be difficult to translate to a contemporary New Zealand 
setting.63 This type of consensus depends upon a degree of government involvement, 
committed employers, and a labour movement with enough strength to be an effective partner 
in negotiations, all factors that have been compromised by the changes in New Zealand that 
have occurred during the last fifteen years. 
It is reasonable to assume that there would be similarities in the organisation of 
training between Australia and New Zealand, given the similarities in population size, 
economies and history. Indeed, Gospel's discussion of the path of apprenticeship in Australia 
60 Ibid., 12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Winkelmann, Apprenticeship and After, 2. 
63 OEeD, Apprenticeship: Which Way Forward?, 10. 
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could equally apply to New Zealand until recently. He argued that the apprenticeship 
system persisted in Australia because it suited both the product and labour market system of 
Australian employers. Relatively small product markets and the small-batch, jobbing nature of 
much of the work called for tradespeople with all-round skills. Although a large number of 
skilled migrants arrived in Australia, there was less mass immigration than to the United 
States, and skill shortages remained. The state was heavily involved in labour relations: 
the creation of a system of compulsory arbitration and legally binding awards served to 
restore and codiry'apprenticeship rules and make them legally enforceable on 
employers ... the awards system strengthened trade unions and thus provided further 
institutional support for apprenticeship 64 
In recent years, however, the Australian and New Zealand apprenticeship systems have 
followed different paths. While the Australian system has been subject to many of the same 
pressures as the New Zealand system, refonn of apprenticeship has "been very much driven 
by broader industrial relations and collective bargaining refonn".65 Australia, since the 
election of the 1983 Labor government, has favoured a corporatist approach, with the Price 
and Income Accord between unions and the government mediating industrial relations.66 
There is a high degree of government involvement in apprenticeship. The Commonwealth 
Rebate for Apprenticeship Full-Time Training (CRAFT) subsidy was introduced in 1970. 
Although its value and fonn have varied over the years, in general, employers receive a 
payment ($1500 in 1998) upon taking on an apprentice, and a similar further payment when 
the apprentice completes their time.67 There is a strong system of state technical institutions; 
Technical and Further Education (TAFE) colleges and the 1990 Training Guarantee Act 
compelled employers to spend a certain amount of their payroll on training.68 Attempts to 
further increase the range and flexibility of the apprenticeship system, and to move to a 
national qualifications framework, have recently been introduced, under the 1996-97 heading 
of Modern Australian Apprenticeship and Trainee System (MAATS) (renamed the New 
Apprenticeship System in 1997-98).69 Trade unions are closely involved in the development of 
the qualifications framework. Thus, Gospel argued that: 
64 Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training", 513. 
65 Ibid., 515. 
66 Thorns, Fragmenting Societies?, 120. 
67 A.M. Dockery, Keith Norris and Thorsten Stromback, "The Social Return to Apprenticeship Training", The 
Australian Economic Review 31, no.1 (1998) : 37. 
68 Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training", 515. 
69 Dockery et ai, "The Social Return to Apprenticeship Training". 
Australia has not gone down the free-market, deregulatory road ... the award system, 
supportive legislation and a tripartite approach to industrial relations generally have 
been significant supports (for the apprenticeship system). 70 
This brief survey has shown how a 'social structure' such as apprenticeship can be 
adapted and moulded by the wider social, economic and political environment, and how, in 
turn, understandings that are derived from that structure feed into and help shape the wider 
context. That apprenticeship, essentially a pre-industrial institution, has survived through the 
throes of industrial capitalism to (arguably) the post-industrial age, or (more defensibly) late 
capitalism, is astonishing. Equally interesting are the variations and accommodations to the 
system, and the state interventions of some very different countries, that have allowed the 
apprenticeship system to persist. 
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The goals of this thesis are thus to attempt to piece together the many references to 
apprenticeship in New Zealand into a coherent whole, to trace the changes in apprenticeship 
policy and to outline the economic, political and social background to those changes. At one 
level, then, apprenticeship is a way of training people to do a particular job. The apprentice 
acquires, in a variety of formal and informal ways, the skills necessary to carry out their trade. 
The skills involved with each trade, tied inextricably with the technology that is used, are seen 
as the 'property' of the tradesperson. Learning the technical aspects of the job, however, is 
only a small part of what goes on during an apprenticeship. The apprentice is also socialised 
into the customs and practices of the trade, learning implicitly and explicitly the hierarchies 
within the workplace, and gaining an appreciation of the standing of their trade. 
Apprenticeship must also be viewed in the wider context of the relationship between 
labour and capital. The use of apprenticeship as an exclusionary device has implications for 
both worker and employer. Definitions of skill, and the ways in which technological advances 
are negotiated, are both dependent on the social setting of the workplace, which is mediated by 
social arrangements such as apprenticeship. The call for a skilled workforce is an enduring 
theme of capitalism, yet it raises two questions, which are both in part directly relevant to a 
study of apprenticeship. First, how can the call for increased skill levels be reconciled with the 
indisputable deskilling of many occupations? And secondly, a skilled workforce costs money; 
who should pay for this, and in what way? 
70 Gospel, "The Survival of Apprenticeship Training", 517. 
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An examination of apprenticeship in New Zealand illuminates much about our 
society. The institution of apprenticeship did not survive in all the countries where it was 
originally practiced, nor was it always transferred to colonies of those countries. The culture of 
colonial New Zealand, however, with its artisan notions of egalitarianism, followed by the 
forward-thinking labour legislation of the 1890s, encouraged the retention of the practice and 
the eventual development of a modem apprenticeship system. The debates surrounding 
apprenticeship highlight wider social and economic issues, notably the system of industrial 
relations that developed in New Zealand and the role of the state in mediating between labour 
and capital. The aim of this research is thus to provide an historical survey of apprenticeship in 
New Zealand, tracing the development of government policies over the years, and examining 
within a theoretical context the debate surrounding those policies. 
18 
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON APPRENTICESHIP 
There is a dearth of theoretical work directly concerned with apprenticeship. It is 
therefore necessary to examine ideas related to apprenticeship that are often implicit in 
broader theoretical perspectives. This chapter thus first looks at some sociological 
understandings pertaining to apprenticeship that were developed in the late nineteenth century. 
Then the place of apprenticeship in a Marxist understanding of the relationship between 
capital and labour is discussed. In particular, Braverman's (1974) model of changes in the 
labour process, which extended Marx's ideas and applied them to twentieth century industrial 
capitalism, is explained and critiqued. Third, the broader Weberian perspective, which 
emphasises the "differentiation of labour and the limitations of the capitalist/worker 
dichotomy", will be assessed.! Fourth, apprenticeship as a socialisation process is discussed 
and, finally, some ideas about the purpose of education are examined. These theoretical 
perspectives are not set up in opposition to each other in this thesis; rather, together they may 
each help explain some of the facets of the apprenticeship system. 
A starting point is the late nineteenth century work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
Industrial Sociology. 2 The Webbs predicted the eventual demise of apprenticeship, based on 
their understanding of the evolution of trade unions due to social, economic and political 
changes, and developments in the productive process. Their argument was that the actions and 
policies of trade unions, which impacted directly on apprenticeship, were based on one of 
three assumptions. At one end of the spectrum was the assumption based upon the 'doctrine of 
vested interests'. This assumed that the skills and rewards of a trade formed a 'right', which 
should be recognised by law. As the state did not offer this protection, unions would use the 
'device of the restriction of numbers' to defend their rights. The mechanism used to restrict 
numbers was the apprenticeship system, with its lengthy period of indenture and proportion 
regulations to control the numbers entering the trade. 3 
According to the Webbs, as craft skills and abilities were eroded by the increase of the 
technical division oflabour, and growing mechanisation, the 'doctrine of supply and demand' 
began to inform union action. While restriction of numbers was still a valuable bargaining 
[ Olssen, BUilding the New World, 10. 
2 Griffin, 'Getting a Good Trade ... " 8. 
3 Ibid., 9. 
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tool, the strength of the union's position was detennined more by market forces. Therefore, 
it was to the union's advantage to have a greater number of members, leading to policies of 
inclusion, rather than exclusion. The' doctrine of a living wage' was the final assumption 
made by the Webbs. This was the view that wages and conditions must not fall below 
subsistence levels, and that this was only achievable by state intervention. Thus, the success of 
union pressure on the state to realise this aim depended upon numerical strength~ union tactics 
therefore would shift from exclusion to the' device of a common rule', a completely inclusive 
strategy that left little. room for an elite group of apprenticed skilled workers.4 
Indeed, it could be argued that the early history of New Zealand unions followed to 
some extent this evolutionary model, culminating in the rise of the encompassing 'labour' 
movement in the second decade of the twentieth century. Yet, the 'skilled worker' did not 
disappear, and apprenticeship remained the means to enter that category. The Webbs 
acknowledged that some groups of workers retained the ability to regulate their industries 
because of apprenticeship's "primary relationship with the Doctrine of Vested Interests", 
despite the union, in practice, being guided by other assumptions.5 Their claim was illustrated 
by the example of the restrictive practices of British boilennakers, which they argued could 
only be maintained in 'gigantic' establishments, with a certain type of employer. This type of 
industrial environment was clearly less of a factor in the New Zealand setting. It could be 
argued, therefore (supporting Gospel's claims about the shape of the apprenticeship system in 
Australia, discussed in the previous chapter) that in New Zealand, the role of the state in 
industrial relations, and the distinctive nature of the industrial sector, were key factors in the 
persistence of the apprenticeship system. 
A Labour Aristocracy? 
The idea of a select group of skilled workers, corresponding largely with the 
apprenticed trades, was used by thinkers such as Engels and Marx in the late nineteenth 
century to explain the lack of progress of the English working-class in "realising its 
revolutionary destiny".6 According to the concept, this privileged 'aristocracy' of workers 
was differentiated by such characteristics as higher wages, respectability, political moderation, 
distinctive leisure pursuits, and support for unionism and cooperative societies. This select 
group supposedly blunted working-class hostility to capitalism by providing a "conduit for the 
4 Ibid., 10. 
5 Ibid., 11. 
6 Olssen, Building the New World, 6. 
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transmission of 'bourgeois values'''. 7 The 'aristocracy of labour' theory has been critiqued 
both at the theoretical and empirical level. The idea is seen as having currency only in Britain 
prior to 1850, and of being particularly inapplicable to New Zealand because of the 
historically small wage differentials between skilled and unskilled work. 8 
Hobsbawm, while leaving aside an assessment of an 'aristocracy of labour' as such, 
analysed the world of British skilled tradesmen or artisans. He argued that the "characteristics, 
values, interests and, indeed, protective devices [of these workers], had their roots deep in the 
pre-industrial past of the "crafts" which provided the model even for skilled trades which 
could not have existed before the industrial revolution".9 The strength of the 'craft' ethic 
helped the exclusive nature of these trades to be maintained. There were, however, other 
factors than the solidarity of the trade that contributed to the privileged position of skilled 
workers. Hobsbawm argued that up until the Second World War, British industry relied to a 
certain extent on the objective manual skill of tradesmen; that skilled labour was an effective 
substitute for technological and management expertise; and that there was seen to be only 
limited benefit in attempting to eliminate skilled workers because the level of profit secured 
with their labour was acceptable. The ease with which the tradesman fitted into the economy 
of industrial capitalism, "once that economy decided to accept his modest claims to skill, 
respect and relative privilege" also helped. 10 But Hobsbawm made it clear on which side of the 
great divide of capitalism tradesmen found themselves: "artisan traditions and values in this 
country [Britain] became proletarianized, as nowhere else". II 
While it would be unrealistic to categorise skilled workers in New Zealand as forming 
any sort of' aristocracy', there is little doubt that they differentiated themselves from 'other 
workers. Olssen described the notion of the skilled trade as a 'moral' category in his detailed 
study of skilled workers in Caversham in the early decades of the twentieth century. He argued 
that skilled workers believed they had a property right in their skill and labour, with labour 
being the "fundamental source of value in society". 12 Fairness, respectability and 'civilised' 
behaviour characterised the skilled workers' view of themselves, and of their role in society. 
The relationship between employer and worker was reciprocal, rather than exploitative: 'the 
7 Collins Dictionary of Sociology. 2nd ed., s.v "labour aristocracy". 
8 Olssen, Building the New World, 7. 
9 Hobsbawm, "Artisan or Labour Aristocrat?", 355. 
10 Ibid., 362. 
II Ibid., 356. 
12 Olssen, Building the New World,227. 
idea of a trade also embodied the idea of a community of interests, an arena of reciprocal 
rights and duties, which defined a kind of partnership". 13 
21 
Alongside this notion of partnership, however, was a clear understanding of the 
difference between worker and employer. Illustrating this, McAloon cited William Tanner of 
Christchurch, a journeyman shoemaker who had emigrated from Britain. Speaking at a mass 
meeting of 2000 unionists during the 1890 Maritime Strike, Tanner defended "the existence of 
Unionism, which was the only safeguard of the artisan against the capitalist". 14 McAloon 
argued that British artisan radicalism had influenced the growth in New Zealand ofthe 
unionism of the 1880s: "unionism was to maintain living standards and, for skilled men and 
women, the standards of the trade. Workplace relationships had to reflect workers' 
independence and sense of their own worth". 15 Thus, the skilled worker clearly held, by both 
self-definition and actual skill levels, a privileged position. The extent to which this position 
was used within New Zealand to challenge the nature of capitalist relations or, conversely, to 
blunt the impact of capitalist domination by creating divisions within the working class, has 
fluctuated both historically and geographically. 
A Marxist Framework 
Much of this thesis is either informed by, or examines exceptions to, a Marxist 
understanding of economic and social relations. It is thus necessary to outline some of the 
major tenets of Marx's theories. Marx argued that the way that material production is 
organised is of fundamental importance in understanding human society. This 'mode of 
production' depends upon the point the society has reached in an evolutionary process of 
development. The mode of production has three components. The first of these is theforces of 
production, broad developments in human knowledge that affect productive activity; the 
second is the means of production, the technology that is used to produce, and the final 
component is the social relations of production. 16 
The technological and social aspects of production together form the labour process, 
which is comprised of purposeful activity (work); the object on which the work is performed; 
13 Ibid., 227. 
14 Jim McAloon, "Radical Christchurch," in Southern Capital: Essays in Christc/mrch History (University of 
Canterbury, 2000), 169. 
15 Ibid. 
16 D. Lee and H. Newby, The Problem of SOCiology (U.K.: Century Hutchinson Ltd., 1987). 
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and the instruments of that work. 17 Marx designated the mode of production as the 'base' of 
society, and he argued that it ultimately determines the cultural and ideological 
'superstructure' of the society. Marx used the dialectic, the process of contradiction and 
resolution, as the method of analysis of human social development. Each "mode of production 
contains inherent contradictions which produce its transformation and ensure the continuity of 
social evolution". 18 Thus, there is logic in the progression from one form of mode of 
production to another. 
Marx saw the chronological order of the progression through modes of production as 
beginning with a movement from tribal society to an ancient society based on slavery. 
Following this was feudalism, then capitalism, which would eventually be doomed by its 
internal contradictions and be transformed into socialism. The transformations between 
different modes of production are achieved through the struggle between classes. In the case 
of capitalism, it is brought about by the economic crisis that results from the inevitable decline 
in the rate of profit. Classes in capitalist society are.formed by the relationship of the "agents 
of production" to the surplus value created by production. 19 Thus, "classes ... are defined in 
terms of ownership (or non-ownership) of productive property which makes the taking of the 
surplus possible". 20 
This use of the notion of class, although materially determined, is relational rather than 
descriptive. A class is thus 'not a thing'; it is constructed out of its relationship with another 
class, based on the position of each in the production process. Thompson, in The Making of 
the English Working Class, emphasised the dynamic and symbiotic nature of class: 
class entails the notion of a historical relationship ... it is a fluency ... class happens 
when some men [sic], as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and 
articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as a~ainst other men 
[sic] whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. 1 
Marx saw these class relationships as being inherently antagonistic and exploitative; the 
conflict engendered "provides the driving force of social and economic development".22 Marx 
also argued that because in the capitalist system the means of production are controlled by a 
17 Collins Dictionary of Sociology. 2nd ed., S.v. "labour process". 
18 Lee & Newby, The Problem of Sociology, 119. 
19 Althusser & Balibar, 1968; cited in 1. Scott, Sociological Theory (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1995), 
163. 
20 Collins Dictionary of Sociology. 2nd ed., s.v. "class". 
21 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 9. 
22 Lee & Newby, The Problem of Sociology, 121. 
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minority, the majority who own only their labour power are alienated from the 
quintessential human characteristic of producing their means of subsistence. 23 
23 
Although class relationships are a feature of all modes of production, the bulk of 
Marx's work concentrates on those classes created by the capitalist mode of production. 
Capitalist society is distinguished from its predecessors by the fact that surplus labour, 
provided by propertyless workers through their labour power, is appropriated by the property 
owners through the creation of surplus value. This is defined as the "difference between the 
value of capital at the start of the capitalist production process and the additional value of 
commodities which ~re produced".24 The creation and extraction of surplus value is the 
"essential social mechanism which forms the key to capitalist development" and creates the 
"fundamental antagonism (conflict, contradiction) in capitalist class relations".25 For surplus 
value to be realised, the commodity that has generated it must be converted into exchange-
value, that is, what is produced is to be exchanged for other commodities, usually through 
money, rather than being used directly. Thus, production is no longer carried out merely to 
meet subsistence needs. Capitalist production allows the property owners to appropriate the 
excess value created by the labour of the workers.26 
The rate at which the surplus value is extracted determines the rate of exploitation of 
those who sell their labour. This level of exploitation is not, however, related to the value of 
the commodity, but rather to the value of the labour power. Marx's analysis of this process is 
known as the labour theory of value. Based on the ideas of Locke, Marx argued that labour is 
the source of all value: 
That labour alone is productive, who produces surplus value for the capitalist, and thus 
works for the self-expansion of capital. ... Hence the notion of a productive labourer 
implies not merely a relation between work and useful effect. .. but also a specific, 
social relation of production, a relation that has sprun~ up historically and stamps the 
labourer as the direct means of creating surplus value. 7 
The condition and control of the labour market is thus a critical facet of capitalist relations 
because the value of corrimodities is directly related to the amount of labour required in their 
production. When labour power is in tum sold as a commodity on the labour market: 
23 Grint, The SOCiology of Work, 91. 
24 Collins Dictionary of SOciology. 2nd ed., s.v. "surplus value". 
25 Lee & Newby, The Problem of SOCiology, 125-126. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, 509; cited in David Harvey, Limits to Capital, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1999), 104. 
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what is exchanged is the value of labour power for the means of subsistence 
necessary to keep the labour alive and functioning. Wages are related to this and not to 
the value of the commodity eventually produced ... it is the condition of the labour 
market ... which determines wages and thus the rate of exploitation. 28 
Because of the competitive nature of capitalism, each capitalist tries to undercut the 
other and secure a larger share of the surplus value once new markets become exhausted. This 
is mainly done through reducing the costs of production. Costs may be reduced by producing 
more efficiently through the development of new technologies or more stream-lined work 
practices, or they may be lowered by paying less for the labour power required. There are 
limitations on these measures, however. Technological advances are not unbounded and some 
developments may not be cost-effective. The reorganisation of work practices cannot always 
be imposed~ it requires negotiation. Wages cannot fall below subsistence leve1~ a dead work 
force is not of much use. Thus, "eventually, inexorably, the rate of profit will begin to fall",z9 
The conflict caused by the imperative to reduce costs is illustrated clearly by many of the 
debates, both historical and contemporary, about apprenticeship. 
The apprenticeship system can be seen as a 'cost', or barrier to 'efficiency', to the 
capitalist in three ways. First, there is the expense of paying (albeit at a reduced rate) a worker 
who is largely unproductive for a significant proportion ofthe apprenticeship. This expense is 
further increased by the need to have a tradesperson spend some of his or her productive time 
teaching the apprentice. Compounding this (depending on how the formal aspect of the 
apprentice's training is organised) there may be an expectation that the employer will fund or 
subsidise off-job training. Indeed, evidence from an Australian study suggests that, under the 
contemporary apprenticeship regime in Australia, 53 per cent of the costs of training 
apprentices are borne by the employer, 28 per cent by the state and only 19 per cent by the 
apprentice.30 Second, the exclusive nature of apprenticeship stands in the way of direct 
capitalist control of the cost of labour involved in production. The capitalist is forced to pay 
for a qualified worker regardless of the direct relevance of those qualifications to the skill 
required. 
Finally, the ethos of the trade, reinforced and reproduced through apprenticeship, 
ensures that skills and knowledge required to perform the trade are kept (to a varying degree) 
with the tradesperson: 
28 Lee & Newby, The Problem of SOciology, 127. 
29 Ibid., 130. 
30 Dockery et al, The Social Return to Apprenticeship Training, 37. 
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Such skills are anathema to capital. They can act as a barrier to the accumulation of 
capital ... and prevent the penetration of capitalist social relations of domination and 
subordination within production. These are the skills that have to be eliminated if 
capitalism is to survive. 31 
Thus, through traditional craft and artisan skills the capitalist is denied direct access to all of 
the components of the production process, and therefore knowledge of how costs can be 
reduced. Historically, the 'first principle' of craft unionism - exclusiveness, "was informed by 
a belief which held that legally-apprenticed men had an inviolable right to participate in 
making the rules which governed the work place".32 These included determining wages and 
prices, controlling the labour market by limiting the number of apprentices and demanding 
that the quality of craftsmanship be kept at the highest level. 
New technologies and the rationalisation of production, however, meant profound 
changes to work, which increased the ability of the capitalist to exercise control over the 
production process. This was done through deskilling: "a process of job degradation in which 
work is progressively fragmented, and stripped of its complexity, discretionary content and 
knowledge base".33 Alongside this process, however, was the increase of "managerial, 
conceptual and technical (engineering) skills" required to organise the new production 
methods.34 Thus, while deskilling clearly challenged the very heart of the apprenticeship 
system, there were "compensations and contradictions" within the process that were open to 
exploitation by organised groups of workers. 35 
Deskilling: Braverman Re-examines the Labour Process 
The process of deskilling is described in Braverman's (1974) seminal model of the 
development of industrial capitalism, which stimulated renewed interest in the labour process. 
Braverman argued that the distinguishing feature of industrial capitalism is the purchase and 
sale of labour power that begins the labour process. The worker must sell his or her labour 
power because the social conditions (engendered by "the extraordinary power of the tendency 
of capitalist economies to convert all other forms of labour into hired labour") mean that this is 
the only way to generate a livelihood.36 The capitalist must purchase that labour power in 
order to enlarge the amount of capital that they own. Braverman, following Marx, 
31 Harvey, Limits to Capital, 109. 
32 Harrison & Zeitlin, Divisions of Labour, 88. 
33 Collins Dictionary of Sociology. 2nd ed., s.v. "deskilling." 
34 Harvey, Limits to Capital, 108. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 53. 
distinguished between labour, which is bound to the individual, and labour power, the 
power to labour for an agreed period of time, which is able to be sold. It is the labour power 
that is the key to capitalist accumulation: 
26 
Human labor ... because it is informed and directed by an understanding which has been 
socially and culturally developed, is capable of a vast range of productive 
activities ... the capitalist finds in this infinitely malleable character of human labor the 
essential resource for the expansion of his [sic] capital. 37 
To harness this powerful resource, however, the capitalist must take control of the 
labour process. What has been bought is merely the potential to labour; the capitalist must use 
all the means at his or her disposal to channel that power in the most efficient way. Braverman 
argued that the tendency of capitalist development is to use new technologies to fragment 
skills, separating the conception and execution of production, and thereby allowing the 
capitalist to control every facet of the labour process.38 There are three interrelated elements to 
this deskilling process: the break down of craft work into its essential components; the 
mechanisation of as many of those tasks as possible; and the application of 'scientific 
management' to the execution of the tasks. 39 This allows management to have control of the 
workplace, removing autonomy and knowledge from the craft worker, and producing 
"increased output from a cheaper, more manageable, less skilled workforce".4o Braverman 
also argued that the labour involved in management itself was not immune from degradation 
and deskilling, and indeed, that the process may extend into the community and family life.41 
While Braverman's ideas offer a compelling explanation of many changes in modem 
society, the deskilling thesis has been thoroughly critiqued. First, the idea of unilateral 
employer control may ignore both worker resistance, and possible worker consent. This is 
illustrated clearly in Hill and Gidlow's 1988 study of technological upheaval in the printing 
industry.42 Second, state intervention and mediation must be taken into account. This is 
particularly important in the context of the New Zealand system of industrial relations (and it 
must be remembered that what the state chooses not to do is also a form of intervention). 
Third, "the assumption of universal, unilinear skill degradation" ignores the wide range of 
37 Ibid., 55. 
38 Ibid., 57. 
39 John Shields, "Deskilling Revisited: Continuity and Change in Craft Work and Apprenticeship in Late 
Nineteenth Century New South Wales," Labour Hist011' 68 (1995) : 1-29. • 
40 Terry Austrin, "Work," in New Zealand Society, 2n ed., edited by P. Spoonley, D. Pearson & 1. Shirley 
(Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press Ltd., 1994),239. 
41 Harvey, Limits to Capital, 110. 
42 Hill & Gidlow, From Hot Metal to Cold Type. 
structural and technological differences within and between industries. In hand with this, 
Braverman's notion of an increasingly homogenised workforce seems to overlook the 
"importance of labour market segmentation, the growth of intemallabour markets, and 
associated divisions within the working class".43 
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The linear and deterministic nature of Braverman's thesis has been also been 
questioned. For example, in his examination of the transformation to mechanised factory 
production, Penn questioned Braverman's deskilling model and argued that the process of the 
deskilling of the workforce was not as pervasive or as uncontested as Braverman had 
suggested. Organised resistance by certain occupational groups, notably those who had a 
strong history of craft unionism, allowed them to establish a "high degree of social control 
over the utilisation and operation of machinery". 44 Penn argued that mechanisms of social 
exclusion, such as apprenticeship, were used to give workers a degree of control over the 
supply of labour, and of the negotiation of the skill content required to operate new machinery. 
Thus, the notion of deskilling was not determined merely by technology, but was contested at 
the social level of the workplace, illustrating how the capitalist imperative to reduce 
production costs can be limited and controlled at the point of production. 
Social Closure: a Weberian Perspective on Apprenticeship 
Penn's work illustrates well the Weberian concept of social closure. Weber agreed 
with Marx in viewing economic interests as the primary determinant of social structure, but 
did not agree that this resulted in ultimately only two antagonistic classes formed by their 
relationship to productive property. Instead, Weber argued that there are a larger number of 
classes, which are determined by market relationships (including credentials and skills as well 
as property relations), and whose members share similar life chances. Thus, variables such as 
status and power also bind and differentiate classes. 45 These classes or groups will attempt to 
consolidate or improve their position and access to life chances by the process of social 
closure. This is defined by Parkin, a neo-Weberian, as: "the process by which social 
collectivities seek to maximise rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to 
a limited circle of eligibles".46 
43 Shields, "Deskilling Revisited", 1. 
44 R. Penn, "Skilled Manual Workers in the Labour Process, 1856-1964 1," in The Degradation of Work? Skill, 
Deskilling and the Labour Process, ed. S. Woods (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1982), 105. 
45 Collins Dictionary of Sociology. 2nd ed., s. v. "class" & "Weber". 
46 Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (Great Britain: Tavistock Publications, 1979), 
44. 
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There are two components to social closure; exclusion, whereby one group attempts 
to "secure for itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process 
of subordination", and usurpation, whereby the group excluded, the 'ineligibles', fights back 
in an attempt to regain some of the position conceded. Exclusion is not limited to an economic 
basis; ethnicity, gender or religion, for example, can all provide grounds for the process. 47 
Apprenticeship, then, is the means used by skilled tradespeople to maintain the exclusive 
nature of their group, and the justification for the exclusion is the notion of' skill' . 
Much of the debate about apprenticeship centres on the notion of skill, and of how that 
skill is acquired, maintained, reproduced, recognised and protected. The term is patently 
problematic, overlaid with historical, social and economic meanings that complicate 
understanding. Ideas about skill can be conceptualised as a continuum. At one end is the 
'technicist' approach, which informed Braverman's ideas, whereby "skill is regarded as an 
objective characteristic of technology and work organisation".48 Skills are thus able to be 
broken down into their essential components, and are quantifiable, with the dimensions of skill 
being seen as task range, task competency and discretionary content. One of the criticisms of 
Braverman's thesis argued that "the deskilling paradigm draws on an objectivist conception of 
'skill' which is said to overlook the social, cultural, ideological and, in particular, patriarchal 
dimensions of job definition and the division oflabour". The paradigm also overlooked the 
possibility of new, unchanged or increasing skill levels. 49 
At the other end of the continuum is the 'social constructionist' approach. The 'strong' 
version of this approach argues that the classification of an occupation as 'skilled' is arbitrary, 
decided by power of those within that occupation to have it classified as such. This power may 
come from exclusionary devices such as apprenticeship or from the gendered division of 
labour, whereby the patriarchal structure of society reinforces the definition of men's work as 
skilled and women's as unskilled. 50 The 'weak' version of the social constructionist approach, 
however, acknowledges that: 
47 Ibid. 
48 Shields, "Deskilling Revisited", 1-2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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... nearly all skilled jobs have some objective skill content but that it is strategic 
position within the production process combined with collective organisation which 
gains the occupation a skill label. According to this view, some so-called unskilled or 
semi-skilledjobs also have a significant skill content which goes unrecognised and 
unrewarded. 1 
Shields, however, rejects the objective/subjective dichotomy, arguing that the 'weak' version 
of social constructionism allows "recognition that far from being mutually exclusive 
categories, objective skill and skilled status and, more generally technology and the social 
division oflabour, exist in a dialectical and historical relationship".52 
The Function of Apprenticeship 
Apprenticeship can perhaps be best understood as a reciprocal system, where the 
balance between advantage and disadvantage is finely tuned through an on-going process of 
negotiation, both at the individual and societal level. This negotiation is clearly set within the 
framework of capitalist relations, but it is simplistic to consider apprenticeship merely as a 
tool used by employers to exploit, or by workers to attempt to thwart that exploitation. This 
type of understanding ignores the benefits that both parties accrue from the power associated 
with serving an apprenticeship, and of having a trade. Thus, while it is important to understand 
the deep processes that 'drive' apprenticeship, and the wider labour market, it is also useful to 
take a static view of the institution, and to see how apprenticeship functions and is 
perpetuated. 
Functionalist theory is one means of examining the strength and persistence of the 
apprenticeship system in New Zealand. It allows us to understand the way in which 
apprenticeship functions as a social system with a degree of order and stability. The way in 
which an apprentice is socialised into the trade is a crucial vehicle for the reproduction of this 
system. A social system such as apprenticeship can be thought of as having 'common values', 
which includes such things as norms, roles and institutions. 53 For a system to 'persist there 
must be a "shared basis of normative order" - normative choices must be made on the basis of 
shared values. 54 One of the basic elements of a social system is the role; the normative 
behavioural expectations attached to a particular social position. The role provides the link 
between the actor and the wider social institution. The role is specified as a "series of norms or 
51 C. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies (London: Heinemann, 1982), 9. 
52 Shields, "Deskilling Revisited", 3. 
53 Scott, SOCiolOgical Theory. 
54 Handel, Contemporary Social Theory (USA: Prentice Hall: 1993), 18. 
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verbal expressions of the rights and obligations of the actor", with sanctions, rewards and 
punishments also specified. 55 Roles, as a fundamental part of a social system, can serve 
'situational' or 'integrative' functions~ that is, they may either concern the relationship of the 
system to the environment, or work to maintain internal cohesion. 56 
The internal cohesiveness of the system is described as social integration. 57 As 
apprentices begins their 'time', they take on the role that is specific to their position in the 
system, performing the tasks that are necessary for the efficient running of the' system'. The 
actual tasks involved in the role will vary with the length of time served and the nature of the 
apprenticeship. Thus the apprentice may move from tea-maker to cheap labour to instructor of 
younger apprentices. These functions obviously differ, but all serve to maintain the integrity of 
the institution, and to ensure the 'common values' are perpetuated. A first-year apprentice, for 
example, will generally be expected to 'listen and learn', to be the 'gofer', to sweep the floor 
and to show respect to all who are senior. These expectations will be articulated, explicitly or 
implicitly, by employers, workers out of their time, and by more senior apprentices. This is 
known as socialisation: "the process through which people learn those means and ends of 
action that are enjoined by the common values of their society".58 By the second or third year 
the apprentice will have internalised some of these values and will both act upon them and 
pass them on to new recruits. 
The 'situational' level of analysis is described as system integration. Roles are seen as 
being formed into institutions, which become the fundamental 'parts' of the wider social 
system: the "overall stability [of the social system] depends upon the degree of integration or 
malintegration among its institutions".59 It is at this level that we can examine the institution of 
apprenticeship as a part of the bigger 'social system' of labour relations. The socialisation of 
apprentices into a particular view of how the employer-worker relationship functions ensures 
the continued integration of the apprenticeship system within the wider labour market. Pattern 
maintenance, the passing on of the' culture' of the trade, ensures that notions of skill and the 
value of the trade and its practices are perpetuated. Apprenticeship, therefore, can be seen as 
fulfilling some of the important 'functional needs' necessary for the labour market to exist and 
persist. 
55 Handel, Contemporary Social Theory, 19. 
56 Scott, SOCiolOgical Theory. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 45. 
59 Ibid., 46. 
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It is also possible to distinguish between manifest and latent functions; manifest 
functions being 'intended and recognised' consequences for the adjustment and adaptation of 
the system, and latent functions being unintended and unrecognised.60 This type of analysis is 
useful when applied to the apprenticeship system. For example, considering the relationship of 
apprenticeship to the wider system in which it is set, we can argue that the manifest function is 
to ensure a continued supply of well-trained workers. The latent function, however, could be 
seen as providing workers who do not question the worker/employer relationship too much, 
and who accept the 'common values', such as skill construction and the standing of the trade, 
with which they have been inculcated. Some of the manifest functions relating to the internal 
cohesion of the apprenticeship system are the passing on of skills, the fulfilling of a firm's 
obligation to the industry and ensuring a flow of tradespeople trained to the firm's 
specifications. The latent functions may include the passing on of attitudes towards senior 
tradespeople, employers, customers and work-practices; an understanding of unwritten 
hierarchies of respect. 
The strength of the socialisation process embodied in apprenticeship, and of the status 
ascribed through this process, becomes clear in discussion with apprentices, tradespeople and 
employers. The status of the 'skilled worker' is underpinned by the hierarchical nature of 
apprenticeship. These hierarchies operate at three levels; within the apprenticeship itself, 
between trades, and between the 'skilled' worker and other categories of workers. Within the 
apprenticeship, there is a clear distinction based on the time the apprentice has served. This is 
marked in several ways. The nature of the tasks given to newer apprentices is the most 
obvious. The boundaries are clearly set, with the apprentice needing 'permission', formal or 
implied, to move to the next stage. Tolich describes these tasks as forming part of a 'rite of 
passage' through the apprenticeship years. 61 Other rites that mark the progression up the 
hierarchy include being allowed to perform a skill 'for real' instead of practicing, and being 
given a degree of responsibility (albeit well supervised). In the trades with an examination 
structure, passing of the various stages is also a clear marker of progression. Perhaps the 
strongest mark of progression, however, is to have working 'under' you a younger apprentice. 
60 A. Swingewood, A Short History oj Sociological Ihought, 2nd ed. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1991). 
61 M. Tolich, "Breaking the Mould: External Forces Subverting the Racing Stable as a Total Institution," 
Australia and New Zealand Journal oj SOCiology, 31 (1995) : 100-114. 
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The second level of status concerns the rankings of various trades. Tradespeople 
have a finely tuned understanding, fluid and contestable, of where their trade 'fits' in the scale 
of things. This may be based upon a variety of criteria, both subjective and objective. The 
entrance requirements and the length of training are factors, as is the perceived technical 
difficulty of the training. Trades may be classified as 'clean' or 'dirty', with tradespeople in 
'clean' trades regarding themselves as superior to those in 'dirty' trades. The level of skill 
involved in the trade is also the subject of classification, with high levels of manual 
competency, or high t~chnical ability, being rated more highly than repetitive, mechanistic 
skills or skills more dependent on brute strength. The level of remuneration that tradespeople 
earn is another factor, but is generally not sufficient alone to confer status to a trade. 
The third level of status is that of 'having a trade'. To have a trade is to belong to an 
exclusive group. The identity of this group is forged through a long and sometimes thankless 
training~ there are financial sacrifices and members must accept a turn at the bottom of the 
heap. The cohesiveness of the group is maintained through camaraderie and humour~ members 
form bonds based on similar experiences as they move through the hierarchical layers. The 
integrity of the group is affirmed through a deep respect for the skills of the trade, and the 
technology surrounding those skills. In some ways, then, the apprenticed trades may 
complicate a Marxist understanding of class divisions based on the relationship to the means 
of production. If a worker has a 'property right' in his or her skill, then the distinction between 
worker and employer blurs, particularly in the New Zealand setting -where small enterprises 
prevail. 
Yet, in other ways the very strength of the socialisation process of apprenticeship 
reinforces and perpetuates capitalist relations. The apprenticeship system, although formed in 
pre-industrial times, has evolved to function within capitalist society. Thus, the roles and 
values of that system are imbued with the antagonisms and tensions inherent in the capitalist 
mode of production. Apprenticeship is clearly an example of the function of control in 
education and training~ it reproduces at one level the "skills necessary to maintain the means 
of production, and at another, [sustains] the affectual skills which underpin the social relations 
of production".62 Again, the hierarchical nature of apprenticeship provides a mechanism that is 
ideally suited to transmitting acquiescence and deference~ 'knowing your place' is one of the 
first lessons to be learnt, both within the trade and in the relationship between worker and 
employer. While much of the learning that takes place during an apprenticeship is informal or 
62 D. Gleeson & G. Mardle, Further Education or Training? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980),5. 
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carried out on-the-job, the formal component of training has become increasingly important. 
It is here that ideas about 'work' and 'education' intersect (and often collide). 
Some Thoughts About Education 
33 
Since the Second World War the formal educational component of many 
apprenticeships has greatly increased. Apprenticeship has moved over the last fifty years from 
being largely a labour market issue to, by the late 1980s, becoming an integral part of the 
education system. Higgins argued that the "maintenance of formal training pathways in skilled 
occupations ... has ge~erally been in the interests of both employers and workers".63 Employers 
get the benefit of a skilled workforce, and workers gain an important bargaining tool. The 
formal recognition of skills also helps workers to retain a privileged position compared with 
other workers: "the admission of new entrants into an occupational labour market through 
formalised training provides the basis for occupational closure and some control over skill 
definitions". 64 
recent times has been the 'skills discourse', the belief that "skill requirements in industrial 
societies are increasing in complexity due to technological change ... the need for unskilled 
labour declines as a corresponding demand for a more expert labour force increases".65 
Gleeson and Mardle (while their research is British, the findings are equally applicable to New 
Zealand) observed that "with recurring predictability government reports, research papers and 
academic texts have re-emphasised the functional necessity of synchronising the relations 
between further education, technical training and the occupational structure" (in spite of 
increasing levels of unemployment and lack of occupational choice ).66 
63 Jane Higgins, "Skills and Schemes: the Training Response to Youth Unemployment," Labour, Employment 
and Work in New Zealand, 6th Conference Proceedings (Wellington: Victoria University, 1994),201-202. 
64 Ibid., 202. 
65 Gleeson & Mardle, Further Education or Training? ", 4. 
66 Ibid., 3. 
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The origins of this 'skills discourse' are found in the broader theoretical assumptions 
within the 'human-capital' approach of Becker (1975). This theory argues that people 
rationally invest in their education to secure the best return from their abilities. Embodied 
within this theory are "liberal democratic and meritocratic ideals which equate the pursuit of 
economic advantage with that of equality of opportunity thereby acting as a legitimation of 
greater investment in education".67 Challenging the assumptions ofthis theory, however, is the 
indisputable deskilling of many existing occupations, coupled with the low skill levels 
required in many of the 'new' occupations created by technological advances. One 
consequence of these trends is credentialism: "an inflationary effect set in motion by the vast 
upgrading of skills and qualifications in society which bear little actual resemblance to the 
work performed".68 
Also calling into question the tenets of the human capital approach are limits to the 
extent to which people are able to make rational decisions. Choices are constrained by the 
resources and the amount of information that are available, and by the time frame that can be 
envisaged. There is also not an unlimited choice of occupations set before people; the 'myth' 
of the synchronisation between the educational system and the occupational structure "ignores 
the ways in which different forms of capital (economic, social and cultural) set limits to the 
types of employment available in the economy". 69 Thus, the ability of people to make 
'rational' educational and occupational choices is clearly influenced by the often irrational and 
historically specific "network of social relationships that structure the labour process and the 
labour market through activities such as employer recruitment practices, workers' strategies of 
occupational closure and control, the social construction of skill and so forth".70 
The second theoretical issue is the question of whether education is a public or private 
good. This has become particularly pertinent with the growing prominence of neo-liberal 
ideology during the last twenty years. Within the 'New Right' perspective: 
education is viewed primarily in economic terms: as a means of providing trained 
human resources to 'meet the needs of the economy', and as a commodity to be chosen 
and consumed by individuals. 71 
This view was illustrated clearly in the 1987 Treasury Briefing to the Incoming Government, 
67 Ibid., 4. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 5. 
70 Higgins, "Skills and Schemes: the Training Response to Youth Unemployment", 197. 
71 John Codd, "Educational Policy and the Crisis of the New Zealand State," in New Zealand Educational Policy 
Today, ed. Sue Middleton, John Codd & Alison Jones (Wellington: Allen & Unwin NZ, 1990), ix. 
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which attempted to discredit the idea of education as a public good. Treasury claimed that 
the economist's definition ofa public good was that it is 'non-exclusive, non-competitive, and 
non-positional (that its value does not lie in a restricted supply of the good)'. As education 
(according to Treasury) did not fall into those categories, it was merely another commodity 
and as such should be traded in the marketplace.72 There is thus a correlation between giving 
precedence to the economic goals of education and regarding that education as primarily a 
private good (although this is not a logical necessity, the goal ofa strong economy being 
surely as collectively desirable as that of an equitable and cohesive society). Although only the 
most hard-bitten Treasury analysts claimed that the state should not playa large role in the 
provision of compulsory education, many felt that post-compulsory education and training 
should certainly be exposed to the rigours of the market. 
There are two arguments against the idea of education as a private good. First, if the 
social role of education is acknowledged, including its place in personal enrichment and the 
development of citizenship, then education clearly remains an essential public good. 73 Second, 
education, and in particular, the acquisition of skills, is not something that is amenable to 
organisation through the market. Streeck argued that "market failure in skill formation is 
endemic and inevitable" for two fundamental reasons. At the level of the individual, basic 
work skills are generally acquired at a young age, when the long-term ramifications of choices 
are the most difficult to imagine, and the "deferral of gratification that is the essence of 
'investing'" is the most difficult.74 At the level of the firm, the free labour contract, whereby 
workers have the right to move freely between firms, taking with them expensively-acquired 
skills, means that "most firms will most of the time have a tendency to invest less in training 
than they should in their own interest".75 
There seems, therefore, to be clear case for some level of state involvement in the 
development of a skilled workforce. While the state must strike a balance between the need for 
economic efficiency, and social cohesion and equity, there are three reasons why the state is in 
a position to mitigate the market failures described above. First, the state is able to take a 
broader view of the costs and benefits of skill formation. Therefore, the notion of efficiency 
can be widened to include, for example, the social benefits of having young people in training 
72 Gerald Grace, "The New Zealand Treasury and the Commodification of Education," in New Zealand 
Educational Policy Today, ed. Sue Middleton, John Codd & Alison Jones (Wellington: Allen & Unwin NZ, 
1990), 27-39. 
73 Ibid. 
74 w. Streek, "Skills and the Limits ofNeo-liberalism: The Enterprise of the Future as a Place of Learning," 
Work, Employment & Society, 3 (1989) : 89-104. 
75 Ibid., 93. 
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rather than on income support. Second, the state can (to a debatable extent) consider the 
benefits from skill formation for both worker and employer and, finally, the state is able to 
take a longer-term view than either firms or individuals.76 
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Streek cautioned, nevertheless, that the state is not always the best provider of skills 
training: "the state provision of industrial training is neither attuned to the dynamics of the 
training process nor conducive to the kind of skills that are needed for successful upward 
restructuring".77 The reasons given for this are that first, many young people have had enough 
of the formal school setting by the time they begin training for a job. Second, many skills are 
more effectively learnt by 'doing' them in the reality of the work place. Finally, 
industrial training is not just the acquisition of manual or mental skills but it is also ... a 
process of socialization in work-related values, in a culture and community of work in 
which extra-functional skills like reliability, the ability to hold up under pressure, and 
solidarity with others working at the same tasks are highly regarded and rewarded. To 
internalize value orientations ... people need role models; ... work-related skills and 
orientations are acquired not from professional teachers but from more experienced 
peers in a place of work where technical competence can be blended into, and 
transmitted together with, attitudinal discipline and diligence?8 
Streek thus argued for the integration of education and training (another common theme in the 
following chapters), but placed this integration firmly in the world of work: "enterprises ... 
have to become places of learning in addition to being places of production ".79 If this is to be 
successful, however, there must be regulation, and this is where the role of the state becomes 
crucial: 
If society wants skills, enterprises have to be drafted and mandated by regulating 
agencies to produce them ... institutions are needed in Western societies that constrain 
the rational self-seeking behaviour of firms and make the enterprise do its duty as a 
cultural institution. Just as skill formation in individuals requires education, skill 
formation in firms requires regulation. 80 
This argument, however appealing, presupposes 'regulating agencies' that are both neutral and 
powerful, ignoring the reality that the tendency of capitalism is to concentrate power exactly 
where it provides the most advantage for capitalists. 
76 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Industry Training in Australia, Sweden 
and the United States (Paris: OECD, 1993),43. 
77 Streek, "Skills and the Limits ofNeo-liberalism", 98. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 99. 
80 Ibid., 100. 
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This chapter has thus surveyed some of the theoretical understandings that underpin 
the following chapters. While this is predominantly an historical thesis, a theoretical basis is 
essential to an understanding of the deeper processes underlying the changes and continuities 
in the apprenticeship system in New Zealand. Discussion about why and how individuals are 
to be trained to work occurs at the intersection of wider debates about work and education in 
society. The way in which those debates are structured reveals much about competing 
ideologies in New Zealand, and allows an understanding of how power is controlled, contested 
and manipulated between groups. The theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter will 
illuminate various aspects of what follows, each perspective providing different tools to assist 
in digging below the superficial changes in apprenticeship policy. 
38 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE EARL Y DAYS OF APPRENTICESHIP IN NEW ZEALAND: 
HOW JACK GOT TO BE AS GOOD AS HIS MASTER 
This chapter will trace the early history of the apprenticeship system in New Zealand. 
In tracing the progress of apprenticeship, it will become clear that much of the debate that took 
place reflected many of the wider issues that were prominent in New Zealand during this time. 
Indeed, apprenticeship was at the heart of some of the most highly contested social and 
economic issues of the day. Despite this, there was a surprising amount of consensus over 
many of the concerns about apprenticeship. This consensus, together with the prevailing social 
and economic background, allowed the development of a particularly 'New Zealand' 
resolution to the question of the role of the apprenticeship system in a 'modern' country. 
The Master and Apprentice Act 1865 
An understanding of apprenticeship in highly industrial Britain clearly has limited 
relevance to the early days of colonial New Zealand. The population of New Zealand at that 
time was largely rural, with only 33.8 per cent living in urban areas (of over 1000 people) in 
1861, and the bulk of the work force being engaged in primary production. l In fact, a desire to 
leave behind the class-based struggles of Britain was a factor in the decision to migrate of 
many of the settlers: "New Zealand was to be the classless utopia in which there would be 
found all of the benefits ofindustrialisation ... without any of its disadvantages".2 There was a 
perception that the egalitarian nature of the new colony; 'Jack being as good as his master', 
would mean a less confrontational relationship between employers and workers and, by 
extension, apprentices. Indeed, when the Master and Apprentice Bill was introduced in 1865, 
its main purpose was to enable destitute children to be apprenticed by charitable institutions. 3 
Even so, concern was expressed that the bill would tend to upset the existing relations between 
masters and apprentices. It was felt that the bill, in attempting to regulate apprenticeship, 
1 J. Graham, "Settler Society," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Rice (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1996),280. 
2 D. Hamer, "Sir Robert Stout and the Labour Question, 1870-1893," in Studies of a Small Democracy, ed. R. 
Chapman & K. Sinclair (Auckland: University of Auckland, 1963), 80. 
3 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), 1864 -1866. 
sought to introduce "a state of things which existed in England, and which could not be 
introduced in the colony, such as customs of trade". 4 
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The bill, which was passed on October 24, 1865, was an extension of the English law, 
adapted from legislation passed in Victoria.5 It made provision for government apprentices, 
but its main focus was to allow orphanages to bind children in their care to masters who had 
been approved by the Colonial Secretary. To facilitate this, indentures could be executed by a 
parent or guardian, or by two Justices of the Peace. Institutions could bind children above the 
age of twelve to any "farmer, householder, tradesman or any other person exercising any art or 
manual occupation" for up to five years. 6 The master was to provide "sufficient and suitable" 
food, clothing and bedding, and to ensure that the apprentice "attend divine service when 
practicable at least once on every Sunday and ... have particular attention paid to his morals"? 
Masters were able to resort to the law to punish defaulting apprentices, the penalty being up to 
three months imprisonment, and penalties were also specified for the mistreatment of 
apprentices. The master was obliged to set aside two pounds (or 30 shillings for females) for 
each of the last three years of the apprenticeship, and pay this to the apprentice at the expiry of 
the apprenticeship. 8 
A 'Settled' Society 
By the late nineteenth century, the 1865 Act had become outdated as the society in 
which it had been passed moved out of the settlement phase.9 Central government began to 
over-ride the strength of the provincial centres, helped by the ten-year expansionist spending 
programme that Vogel, first as Colonial Treasurer and, from 1873, as Premier, implemented 
throughout the 1870s. The programme, financed by heavy overseas borrowing, was designed 
to stimulate the economy through public works and immigration. 10 The resulting urbanisation, 
growth of state bureaucracy, industrialisation and the accompanying specialisation of work 
changed the social structure of New Zealand. The 1880s are characterised by Olssen as the 
beginning of a distinct phase in the shift from a pre-industrial to a modem society. 11 Thus, by 
4 Ward, NZPD, 1864-1866,657. 
5 Australia. 
6 New Zealand Statutes, 1865, Master and Apprentice Act, 142. 
7 Ibid., 142. 
8 Ibid., 144. 
9 John Martin, Holding the Balance (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1996). 
10 Raewyn Dalziel, "The Politics of Settlement", in The Oxford History oj New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. G. W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), 102-104. 
11 Erik Olssen, "Women, Work and Family: 1880-1926," in Women in New Zealand SOCiety, ed. P. BunkIe and 
B. Hughes (Auckland: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 159-183. 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century, "New Zealanders were stepping out of the 
spare, tough life of settlement. .. into a society which ... had in miniature the features of most 
other Western nations". 12 
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Industrialisation was encouraged by four factors. The volatility of returns for 
agricultural products made diversification attractive. Labour was cheap, readily available and 
included many skilled immigrants (See Figure 1 for migration figures). The internal market 
had grown over the expansionist 1870s and there was an increasing recognition that 
"secondary industry was now essential to the colonial economy". 13 Thus, over the first half of 
the 1880s, there was a marked growth in light industry. The industrial labour force expanded 
by 36.8 per cent between 1881 and 1886, increasing to 39,000 workers. 14 
Figure 1: Assisted and Net Migration, 1870-1890 15 
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12 Jessie Munro, The Story of Suzanne Aubert (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), 213 . 
13 W. Gardner, "A Colonial Economy," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996), 83. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Martin, Holding the Balance, 387. 
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The Long Depression 
Accompanying these changes, however, was a period of recession that began in 1879 
and lasted well into the 1890s. Increased competition forced employers to cut costs and the 
employment of women, girls and boys increased. 16 Poverty and its effects became visible in a 
manner that challenged the idea of New Zealand as a land of plenty. Increases in prostitution, 
drunkenness, sweated labour and slum dwellings were apparent. 17 There was widespread 
concern that the ills and divisions of the 'Old World' had come to New Zealand. One effect of 
these pressures was the growth of a fledging union movement as working people became 
united in the pursuit of higher wages and the need to improve working conditions. 
McAloon tells of the formation of the Christchurch Tailors, Tailoresses and Pressers 
Union in June1889. Four hundred people attended the initial meeting of the union, with the 
primary object being the abolition of sweating. The workers called for regulated hours, 
uniform wages and blanket union coverage of workers in the clothing trade. Apprenticeship 
conditions were another rallying call, with the union demanding a fixed ratio of apprentices, to 
ensure both that apprentices were properly trained and to protect the jobs of skilled workers. 18 
The bottom line of the union's demands was a closed shop and a log of standard prices. The 
union committee, comprising equal numbers of men and women in recognition of the need to 
organise women workers, reinforced the need for these measures to end sweating. The 
committee received the support of most employers; however, the refusal of the Kaiapoi 
Woollen Company to agree resulted in a three-week strike. CountryWide support for the 
union's demands pressured the company into conceding most of the points, and the strike was 
ended in November 1889. 19 
The role of women in this process, both as victims and as the agents of change, is of 
great importance, moving them for a short period from the periphery to the heart of labour 
issues, and emphasising the double-edged power of the apprenticeship system. The practice of 
'sweating' was first introduced into the clothing industry in the 1880s as contractors took on 
fixed price contracts from the large clothing manufacturers. Intense competition and the need 
to maximise their profits meant that the contractors forced down the rates paid to their largely 
female workforce. 'Sweating' soon became a generic term for all exploitation of workers, but 
16 Gardner, "A Colonial Economy". 
17 R. Nicholls, The Women's Parliament (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1996). 
18 Jimmy McAloon, "Working Class Politics in Christchurch 1905-1914" (MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 
1986), 10. 
19 McAloon, "Radical Christchurch". 
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it was women who were the most vulnerable to the practice. The high levels of 
unemployment ensured a pool of workers willing to take on work if the pay offered was not 
acceptable. Many women were out-workers, making up the various garments in their homes, 
often supplying their own needles and thread, and in many cases working at home in the 
evenings after completing a full day's work in a factory.20 Women employed in the clothing 
industry, the vast majority of women industrial workers (see Figure 2), earned little more than 
half the average wage of men. 21 
Figure 2: Percentage of Women in Clothing Trade in New Zealand as a Proportion of Total 
Number of Women in Industry, 1886-1936 22 
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The apprenticeship system itself could be exploited by employers to lower the cost of 
wages even further. 23 Women were taken on as apprentices, often with no pay, with the 
promise of a job in the future. When the women reached a level of competency that required 
payment, they were in many cases either sacked, or moved to a different area, with the 
employer claiming that they were still apprentices and therefore to be paid at a low rate or not 
20 Maryan Street, Scarlet Runners: Women and Industrial Action 1889-1913 (Wellington: Working Life 
Communications, 1993), 2. 
21 Ibid., 8. 
22 Ibid., 8. 
23 Ibid. 
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at all. Although the conditions that many women faced were mentioned at the first New 
Zealand Trades and Labour Congress held in Dunedin in 1885, it was not until late in 1888 
that the wider public were made aware of the shocking working conditions and exploitation to 
which the women were exposed. A sermon by the Reverend Rutherford Waddell, a 
Presbyterian minister in Dunedin, triggered an investigation by the Otago Daily Times. The 
subsequent outcry ensured that' sweating' would become a cause "which became the measure 
. of the newly developing colonial society: the wages and conditions afforded to women 
workers became the stan.dard against which the civilisation of the new colony was to be 
m~asured". 24 
The amelioration of those wages and conditions was very much in the hands of the 
Tailoresses' Union. The inaugural branch of the union was initiated at a fiery public meeting 
held in Dunedin on 7 June 1889. Along with the proposal to unionise was a call for a 
government commission of inquiry into sweating. The commission was duly formed, but 
much of its investigation found that where the various branches of the tailoresses' unions had 
been active, conditions had already improved immensely. Nevertheless, the commission still 
heard evidence oflong hours, poor working conditions, child labour and inadequate wages.25 
Illustration 1 portrays Harriet Morrison of the Dunedin Tailoresses' Union as St George 
slaying the sweating dragon. 
Illustration 1: 'The Sweating Crusade', New Zealand Observer, 25 January 1892 26 
24 Ibid., 1. 
25 Ibid., 15. 
26 Martin, Holding the Balance, 14. 
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The concerns about working conditions for women and children were exposed and 
highlighted by the report of the Sweating Commission, delivered in May 1890, which also 
revealed the weaknesses in the Master and Apprentice Act 1865. There was still provision for 
children to be apprenticed at the age of twelve, but no compulsion for the employer to teach 
the trade. Many apprentices were dismissed as soon as they had served their time, or put on 
piecework at the earliest opportunity. Although the Employment of Females and Others Act 
1881 had limited the hours of work for females and children under fourteen, boys aged 
between fourteen and eighteen could be expected to work adult hours without being paid an 
adult wage. Submissions to the commission told of 'boy-labour' in many different trades and 
gave evidence of widespread abuse of apprenticeship provisions. The commission 
recommended an improved system of indenture, fourteen years as the minimum age for 
employment and a maximum 48-hour week for fourteen to eighteen year OldS. 27 The aims 
were to ensure a 'living wage' and that trades were taught properly.28 
The Liberal Government 
The coalescing of organised labour and the emergent Liberal party into the 1891 
Liberal government provided the political means for many of the Sweating Commission's 
recommendations to be enacted.29 The Factories Act 1891 made a 48-hour week mandatory 
for young workers and placed other restrictions on their employment. The legislation, 
however, did not extend to smaller establishments employing fewer than three workers, 
allowing the exploitation of children to continue. This was addressed in the Factories Act 
1894, which also introduced a fourteen-year minimum age for employment and required 
workers aged under sixteen to have passed Standard Four. No legislative reform of the 
apprenticeship system itself was attempted until 1894, when William Pember Reeves 
introduced the first draft of the new Master and Apprentice Bill.30 Graham suggests that the 
delay in introducing apprenticeship legislation may have resulted from a feeling that 
"employers were already under sufficient pressure to reform their labour conditions".3l 
Indeed, the first reading of the bill on 26 June 1894 was accompanied by readings of the 
27 J. Graham, "Child Employment in New Zealand," NZlli 21 (1987) : 62-78. 
28 Olssen, Building the New World. 
29 Richardson, "Parties and Political Change", 197-225. 
30 Graham, "Child Employment in New Zealand". 
31 Ibid., 67. 
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Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Bill, the Factories Bill and the Eight Hours Bill, all 
radical labour legislation.32 
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Reeves's first attempt at apprenticeship legislation, based on a measure drafted by the 
1891 Conference of the Trades and Labour Councils; did not survive its first reading. 33 The 
Master and Apprentice Bill (No.2), drafted by the 'labour' members ofthe House, was more 
acceptable and was sent to the Labour Bills Committee after its second reading on 24 August 
1894.34 The main features of the bill were a minimum education qualification of a Standard 
Four pass before a young person could be apprenticed, maximum terms of three years for girls 
and five years for boys and a ratio limiting the number of apprentices to journeymen. The 
most controversial clauses specified a minimum starting wage of five shillings per week, and 
that no young person could be employed at any handicraft unless they were apprenticed under 
the ACt.35 Reeves saw the main object of the bill as that "an employer of boys or girls should 
not reckon so much on the amount of earnings he can get out of them, but that they should be 
instructed thoroughly in a trade". 36 
The report of the Labour Bills Committee is an eloquent synopsis of the concerns of 
employers, workers and the government of the day. There was general agreement that the 'evil 
of boy-labour' was resulting in low wages and contributing to the poor standard of 
workmanship of the colony's tradespeople. There was a consensus between all parties that 
some restriction on the number of apprentices to journeymen was essential to solve the 
problem of boy-labour. The employers' evidence, however, reveals doubts about the ability of 
the proposed legislation to achieve this without seriously damaging their businesses. John 
Blair, a printer, stated: "so far as my establishment is concerned, the provisions of this 
Bill... will simply close it...I could not carry out this law under any circumstances under these 
provisions.,,37 Blair's business was highly mechanised and he argued that an obligation to 
apprentice machine-hands was 'absolutely impracticable'. Employers thought the 
remuneration suggested for apprentices excessive, and argued that it would lead to employers 
demanding premiums from apprentices. There was also a concern about indenturing. It was 
32 NZPD, 1894,83. 
33 Bills Thrown Out, 1894; Olssen, BUilding the New World. 
)3 NZPD, 1894,85; Olssen, Building the New World. 
34 Bills Thrown Out, 1894. 
)5 Report of the Labour Bills Committee on the Master and Apprentice Bill (No.2), AJHR, 1894,1-13, 13. 
36 Ibid., 12. 
37 Ibid., 12. 
felt that compulsory indenturing was too restrictive, and that it could allow the apprentice to 
become complacent. 38 
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The Labour Bills Committee ran out of time for its deliberations in the 1894 session of 
the House. The bill was held over until the next year, but was not reintroduced in the 1895 
session. The change of leadership of the Liberal government to Seddon, combined with the 
considerable gains the party made in country areas in the 1893 election, meant that by 1894 
the Liberal party began "a slow but inexorable move to the rural right,,?9 This translated into a 
growing displeasure with Reeves, and his labour legislation, both from the country and his 
own Liberal party. Reeves's public image had altered from being the champion of the poor 
against the rich in the heady days of 1891 to, by 1895, that of a dangerous radical who would 
lead the urban unions against small capitalists, shop-keepers and small farmers. 4o Reeves 
managed nevertheless to secure enough support for his Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
(IC&A) Act 1894. The unlikely bedfellows of unionists, dispirited by their defeat in the 1890 
maritime strike, and country interests, who viewed the Act as taming the unions, allowed the 
Act to pass, despite the opposition of employers.41 The passing of the IC&A Act, however, 
essentially marked the end of radical labour reform. After bitter public controversy throughout 
1895, Reeves was appointed Agent-General in early 1896, and left the colony for London. 42 
Seddon took over the role of Minister of Labour from Reeves. Under his auspices, a 
Master and Apprentice Bill was introduced into the House in 1896, 1897, and 1898. On each 
occasion, the Legislative Council shelved it.43 The last mention oftlfe bill was in 1899, when 
the Hon. Mr McGregor moved in the Legislative Council that if the Bill was to be introduced 
in that session, it should be done early enough for the Labour Bills Committee to take 
evidence. The motion was defeated and the idea of apprentice legislation abandoned.44 There 
were several reasons for the failure of the legislation. Public opinion was still hostile to 
measures with Reeves's stamp on them.45 Howe points to the difficulties of getting any 
innovative labour legislation through Parliament if it seemed likely to affect employers too 
much, and uses the Master and Apprentice Bill to illustrate thiS.46 Graham argues that political 
38 Ibid. 
39 K. Howe, Singer in a Songless Land: A Life of Edward Tregear 1846-1931. (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 1991), 95. 
40 Keith Sinclair, William Pember Reeves (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). 
41 Richardson, "Parties and Political Change". 
42 Howe, Singer in a Songless Land 
43 NZPD,92-105. 
44 NZPD, 1899, 107. 
45 Sinclair, William Pember Reeves. 
46 Howe, Singer in a Songless Land 
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arguments against apprenticeship legislation had changed ground over the 1890s. She points 
to low wages, educational refonns and union activity as contributing to a decline in the 
number of apprentices. Some public opinion, reflected in the 1898 report of the Labour Bills 
Committee, saw compulsory indenture and limitation of apprentices as threatening to displace 
young people already in work and as restricting the employment opportunities of the 'rising 
generation' .47 It has also been suggested that Seddon was not unhappy with the status quo, and 
. was content to use the Upper House embargo to maintain it, whilst keeping up the appearance 
of legislating to improve working conditions. 48 
Apprenticeship Under the Compulsory Arbitration System 
No doubt all of these factors contributed to specialist apprentice legislation being 
abandoned. At a more pragmatic level, however, the pressure to reform apprentice conditions 
eased as the Arbitration Court, set up by the IC&A Act, began regulating the conditions of the 
skilled trades on a trade-by-trade basis. This level of flexibility met with a degree of approval 
from all parties concerned. The court adopted the key features of the 1898 bill, applying 
minimum wages, apprenticeship ratios and five to seven year apprenticeships to many of the 
skilled trades.49 Accompanying the court's rulings was a bottom-line wage for young workers, 
enacted in the Employment of Boys or Girls without Payment Prevention Act 1899. This 
ensured that any youth aged under eighteen who was employed in any factory or workroom 
was entitled to receive four shillings per week for females and five sliillings per week for 
males. It also outlawed the payment of premiums for employment. 50 
An examination of the initial awards of two of the skilled trades clearly shows how the 
Arbitration Court applied the principles of the Master and Apprentice Bill. The award for the 
Christchurch Tailoring Trade Industrial Union of Workers was settled on 1 November 1898. 
The award specified one apprentice to four journeymen or women. Male apprentices were to 
be bound for not less than five years, female coat makers for four years and female trouser and 
vest makers for three years. Male apprentices were to be paid 2s.6d for the first six months 
(this award was prior to the aforementioned 1899 Act), increasing at six-month intervals to 
£1.lOs in the last six months of the apprenticeship. This compared with a minimum wage for a 
journeyman tailor of £2.15s. Female apprentices also began on 2s.6d. This was increased at 
the rate of Is.8d per week at each succeeding six-month period, until the first six months of 
47 Graham, "Child Employment in New Zealand". 
48 J. McAloon, pers. comm., 1999. 
49 Olssen, Building the New World. 
50 Howe, Singer in a Songless Land. 
the third year, when the six-monthly increase became 3s.4d per week. This compared with a 
minimum wage of £ 1. 5 s for tailoresses. The award also forbade the use of the 'team system' 
and specified that all work was to be done on the premises. Provision was made for a 
Conciliation Board to be set up, composed of three workers and three employers. 51 
48 
The Christchurch Iron & Brass Moulders award, settled in 1900, secured a minimum 
wage for journeymen of Is.3d per hour. The proportion of apprentices to journeymen was to 
be one to three, with all apprentices to be indentured for six years. Apprentice wages were set 
at 6s per week, with a yearly rise of 5s per week, until the beginning of the sixth year, when 
the rise would be lOs per week. All piecework and sub-contracting were strictly prohibited, 
and preference was extended to union members. The award stated that only two classes of 
workers were to be recognised~ apprentices and journeymen. 52 
The legitimisation of the status quo worked mainly to the advantage of male workers, 
however. Although women entered the paid workforce in increasing numbers during this time, 
many of their 'favoured' occupations were not under the jurisdiction of the arbitration system. 
Figure 3 illustrates the different sectoral distributions of male and female workers in 1926; 
award coverage for women would have been mainly concentrated in the nineteen per cent 
involved in the secondary sector. 
Figure 3: Sectoral Distribution of Women and Men in the Labour Force, 1926 53 
Women: 1926 
Primary 5% 
Secondary 19% 
Ser\ice 76 % 
SI Book oj Awards, 1898, I, p.240 
S2 BookojAwards, 1900, II, p.183 
Men: 1926 
Ser\ice 39% Primary 36% 
Secondary25% 
S3 Lisa Davies, Women's Labour Force Participation in New Zealand: the Past 100 Years (Wellington: Social 
Policy Agency, 1993),89. 
Thus, although the percentage of all women in paid employment increased from 11. 1 per 
cent in 1874 to 20.7 per cent in 1921, female domestic workers, clerks and many shop 
assistants, who made up the bulk of female workers, were not covered by awards, nor did 
those occupations have apprenticeships. 54 
49 
The arbitration system proved to be something of a double-edged sword to those 
women to whom it did apply. Robertson argues that award regulations worked in the favour of 
women in that they promoted a uniform standard, and tended to legitimise the generally 
accepted norms of the occupation. The Tailoresses' awards, for example, provided a minimum 
standard rate that every employer was obliged to pay. There were, however, ways to get 
around such rules. For example, permits could be issued for workers to be paid under-award 
rates on the grounds of age, infirmity or incompetence. At one large factory, 76 (32 per cent) 
of the 234 mostly female workers were classified as 'incompetent'. The height of the use of 
this tool for the reduction of wages was in 1906: "this was the largest single assault on 
workers' wages in this period, and the victims were almost entirely women".55 Firms could 
also arrange for young female immigrant workers to be brought in, displacing more highly-
paid journeywomen. 56 Thus, often the arbitration system "systematised, structured and 
sustained the segmentation of the labour force", allowing male workers to protect their jobs, 
their skilled status and their pay rates from the threat of cheaper female labour. 57 
Although women were rarely directly excluded from an occupation, the butcher's 
unions being a notable exception, other strategies were used to restrict their employment. 
Some unions insisted on equal pay for women workers; the employers' reluctance to engage 
women when they had to be paid at the male rate was an effective exclusionary device. In 
some awards the number of women who could be employed in proportion to the number of 
men was restricted, and in others the type of work women were permitted to carry out was 
limited. In some cases, these restrictions were based upon protecting women from heavy work, 
but usually the restrictions focused on the skill involved in the job: "awards restricted women 
to repetitive work on highly subdivided tasks, to 'unskilled work",.58 Conversely, the award 
54 Stephen Robertson, "Women Workers and the New Zealand Arbitration Court," in Women, Work and the 
Labour Movement in Australia and AotearoaiNew Zealand, eds. Raelene Frances & Bruce Scates (Sydney: The 
Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, 1991), 30-41. 
55 Jim McAloon, "Rise of Political Labour in Christchurch," in Culture and the Labour Movement, ed. J. Martin 
& K. Taylor (palmerston North: The Dunmore Press Ltd, 1991), 148. 
56 Ibid., 149. 
57 Robertson, "Women Workers and the New Zealand Arbitration Court", 33. 
58 Ibid., 35. 
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system reinforced the association of women with unskilled work by generally regarding any 
work that women did as unskilled. 
The End of the 'Remarkable Consensus' 
, The initial success of the IC&A Act helped promote the ideology of'labourism' as a 
basic component of New Zealand society. 59 That is, the labour legislation of New Zealand 
. allowed "the pursuit of reforms within the existing forms and methods of..government and 
conventional collective. bargaining". 60 For the last part of the nineteenth century and the first 
decade of the twentieth, Grint's description oflabourism seems pertinent: "where conflicts 
generated at the point of production can be resolved ... through the bargaining of unions and 
employers then the conflict tends to remain contained and a disjunction is erected between 
industrial and political action".61 As changes in the definition of 'work' began to occur after 
1900, however, traditional notions of skill and work place control were challenged and the 
relevance of the arbitration system was increasingly questioned. 
50 
Holt's 'remarkable consensus' of the 1890s between employers and workers was thus 
broken by the emergence of factory methods of production, the idea of payment for time rather 
than task, and the increasing role of management in controlling the work process.· There were 
"two profound transformations occurring on work-sites around the country ... one involved the 
definition of work; the other who would control work".62 There was a wide variation in the 
ways in which work place changes manifested themselves. The relatIve strength ofthe unions 
involved, the location of the industry (both geographically and economically), the degree of 
technological innovation and the workshop culture all played a part in the way change was 
negotiated. For example, Olssen argued that workers in the state-owned railway workshops 
were "able to successfully resist many of the implications of the second industrial 
revolution".63 He claims that the unity and power of the workshop culture that allowed this 
resistance were largely attributable to the apprenticeship system. This system "socialised 
everybody on the shop floor into the practices, customs and conventions of the trade and the 
sub-culture of skilled men".64 
59 Erik Olssen, Building the New World (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), 199. 
60 K. Grint, The SOCiology o/Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 168. 
61 Ibid., 168. 
62 Erik Olssen, " The Origins of the Labour Party: A Reconsideration." NZJH, 21(1),1987 : 79-96. 
63 Erik Olssen, "Railway Workers and Scientific Management." in Culture and the Labour Movement, ed. J. 
Martin & K. Taylor (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press Ltd, 1991), 129. 
64 Ibid., l30. 
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McAloon argued, however, that trades that were not under the wing of the state 
often had less success in resisting managerial changes.65 Some of these issues are illustrated 
by changes in the Christchurch moulders' award. While the initial award specified indenturing 
of apprentices and imposed restrictions on their numbers, the 1902 award removed the need 
for indentures and lifted the apprenticeship restrictions in some parts of the trade, that is, in 
plate-moulding, range or agricultural implement work and core-making.66 The 1905 award 
included as a third class of worker 'under -rate men' (again based upon on the grounds of age, 
infirmity or incompetence) and allowed piecework by negotiation.67 In the 1908 award, the 
court ignored the union's request to prohibit all premium and bonus work, stating that: "if 
worked under fair conditions, [it] is in the interests of both employers and workers, and 
instead of being abolished should be encouraged".68 By 1912, the proportion of apprentices to 
journeymen was set at one to two, and a further new class of worker was added. 'Improvers' 
were in the first or second year after the completion of their apprenticeship. They were 
permitted to be employed at lId per hour for the first year, and 1s.3d for the second, compared 
with the minimum wage for a journeyman of Is.4112d.69 Thus, it can be seen that there was a 
gradual watering-down of the union's ideals. 
Unionists had welcomed the first round of Arbitration Court decisions. The awards 
generally legitimised existing conditions, as well as incorporating features that had been hard 
fought, such as apprenticeship restrictions. After 1900, however, the court became "slower and 
more parsimonious in its deliberations".7o The perception among unIonists was that real wages 
were falling, and that the court was favouring employers. Olssen argues that many of the 
accusations against the court were unfounded. Nevertheless, the perception was enough to 
unify workers, with the Arbitration Court becoming a "symbol...ofthe worker's subordinate 
position". 71 
A clear illustration of the roots of dissatisfaction is provided by Figure 4, which shows 
the minimum hourly rates of Canterbury moulders between 1900 and 1924.72 It can be seen 
that there was little movement in the hourly rate in the 1900s. In the 'Reasons' accompanying 
the 1902 award, the court stated: "conditions of trade are no better than in July 1899 .. .if 
anything less prosperous ... the union has therefore failed to establish a case justifying the Court 
65 McAloon, "Rise of Political Labour in Christchurch". 
66 Book of Awards, 1902, m. 
67 Book of Awards, 1905, VI. 
68 Book of Awards, 1908, VII, p.449. 
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increasing the minimum wage fixed in 1899". Again, in 1905: "we have not found reasons 
for altering the wages under this award. The evidence has satisfied us that the condition of the 
trade does not warrant thiS".73 
Figure 4: Minimum Hourly Rate, Canterbury Moulders, 1900-1924 74 
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The Growth of an Independent Labour Movement 
There was also a growing dissatisfaction of urban wage earners,with the Liberal party. 
While Seddon was able to retain the loyalty of many wage workers through his strength of 
personality and rhetorical gifts, he "paid little real attention to labour matters".75 The Old Age 
Pension Act 1898 was an attempt to appease workers, but other legislation was less 
favourable. Amendments to the IC&A Act generally penalised unions. An example of this was 
the 1898 amendment allowing 'under-rate permits'. While this was designed to allow old, , 
infirm or slow workers to work at a lower rate, in fact it was used to enable partially qualified 
workers to do the work of tradesmen. 76 The dissatisfaction was allied to an increasing 
perception that the arbitration system was not serving the interests of workers. This malaise 
72 Book of Awards, 1900-24, I-XXV. 
73 Book of Awards, 1902, Ill, p.492; 1905, VI, p.224. 
74 Book of Awards, 1900-1924. 
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provided a fertile breeding ground for the development of an independent labour movement. 
Growing union dissatisfaction with the Liberal party, fueled by the actions of the Arbitration 
Court, led to the establishment of the Political Labour League in 1904, and to the growth of a 
more radical labour movement, particularly among unskilled workers.77 The death of Seddon 
in 1906 dissolved the remaining shreds ofloyalty of many workers to the Liberal Party. 
The ongoing struggles over the definition and control of work played a large part in 
. unifying (and unionising) the 'working-class' of New Zealand.78 Divisions were clear in the 
1900s, between support for the radical 'Red Feds' who, through shunning the arbitration 
system, appealed to unskilled workers, and the craft unions whose sectional interests appeared 
to be better served by the existing system. Ironically, it was the defeat of the Red Feds in the 
1912 Waihi gold mine and 1913 Wellington waterfront strikes that paved the way for labour 
unity. These defeats discredited radical industrial action, but at the same time Massey's heavy-
handed reaction politicised moderate unionists, and "provided the final impetus towards the 
formation of a working-class party". 79 
Thus, by the outbreak of World War One in 1914, the wings of the labour movement 
were moving towards an uneasy coalition, united by a dislike of Massey. A common disgust 
with wartime profiteering and military conscription cemented the coalition and resulted in the 
formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in July 1916.80 The common ground between the 
skilled 'craft' unions, whose basis was the notion of exclusiveness, and the unions 
representing the numerical 'muscle' of unskilled workers, reflected the changes in the way 
work was organised. At a deeper level, ideas of class began to permeate the social structure; 
workers saw they had more in common than there were differences between them. These 
transformations were thrown into relief by the debates surrounding apprenticeship that 
resurfaced as the War ended.81 
This chapter has shown that as New Zealand moved from being a colonial settlement 
to a more urbanised, industrialised nation, the institution of apprenticeship became an integral 
part of the society. It was quite feasible that apprenticeship would not have persisted in New 
Zealand. The new settlers were determined to begin afresh, without the trappings of the 'old 
world'. New Zealand did not become a highly industrialised society, nor did it have large 
numbers of big workshops, conditions that could foster apprenticeship. Fundamental changes 
77 Richardson, "Parties and Political Change". 
78 Oissen," The Origins of the Labour Party: A Reconsideration". 
79 Richardson, "Parties and Political Change", 212. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Olssen, Building the New World. 
in the nature of work threatened the apprenticeship system, and apprenticeship could also 
have become a casualty of the rapprochement between craft and 'unskilled' unions. Yet, 
apprenticeship survived as a strong and largely 'taken-for-granted' component ofthe way 
work was organised. 
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There were five main reasons for this. First, the notion of apprenticeship was deeply 
embedded in the psyche of many of the colonists. It was an element of their 'cultural baggage' 
. that they chose to keep; not unquestioningly, b!-lt with recognition both that the new colony 
needed skilled workers, and that apprenticeship was a time-honoured way to initiate young 
people into work and adulthood. Second, the privations of the Long Depression of the 1880s 
made it clear that the training of workers must be organised with some degree of formality. 
The vulnerability of young people and women to exploitation during these years shocked the 
new society and reinforced the need for the sort of protection that the apprenticeship system 
(albeit less than perfect) could offer. Third, and partly as a consequence of the previous point, 
the labour legislation of the 1890s, particularly the compulsory arbitration system, cemented 
the apprenticeship system into place. The lack of specialist apprenticeship legislation in fact 
gave all parties to the system enough flexibility to maintain a degree of consensus, and to 
mould the system to the special needs of New Zealand. The circumscribed nature of industrial 
relations under the IC&A Act also gave apprenticeship a special significance in the bargaining 
process. Fourth, changes in the nature of work reinforced the importance of apprenticeship. 
The exclusionary nature of the apprenticeship system allowed the new work practices and 
changes in skill requirements engendered by technological advances to be negotiated (to 
varying degrees), rather than being imposed on workers. Finally, from the employers' point of 
view, the reasons suggested by Hobsbawm for the persistence of the apprenticed trades in 
Britain applied equally to New Zealand. The objective manual skill of tradesmen; the ability to 
substitute skilled labour for technological and management expertise; and the adequate profit 
levels secured with skilled labour meant an (albeit grudging at times) acceptance from 
employers of the importance of skilled labour and the apprenticeship system. 82 
82 Hobsbawm, "Artisan or Labour Aristocrat?", 362. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 'MODERN' APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM 
This chapter outlines the consolidation of the apprenticeship system in New Zealand 
during the years after the First World War. Both employers and unions recognised the need for 
. specialist apprenticeship legislation in order to formalise the system. The importance of 
technical education to cpmplement on-job training was acknowledged, and a network of 
voluntary apprenticeship committees was established. These committees, with employer and 
union representatives, became responsible for the day-to-day running of apprenticeship; the 
vehicle for the delivery of Arbitration Court decisions. While the members of the committees 
were not always in agreement over all issues, there was a consensus over the fundamental 
importance of apprenticeship. This consensus helped the apprenticeship system to survive the 
loosening of regulation during the Depression. The strength of the apprenticeship system also 
permitted the compromises required to supply the skilled manpower needed during the Second 
World War. 
New Zealand's contribution of personnel to the First World War resulted in a shortage 
of skilled workers and low numbers of apprentices. I This lack was compounded by the small 
differential between the wages for skilled and unskilled work, which called into question the 
worth of serving a long, poorly paid apprenticeship. Concern was expressed about 'blind alley 
jobs'; that is, unskilled jobs that commanded a higher hourly rate than skilled occupations, 
without the requirement of serving a long apprenticeship: 
those in important less-skilled occupations such as wharf labouring and mining 
obtained a higher hourly rate than most skilled labourers .. .it could take nearly a 
lifetime of work to make up the wages lost during an apprenticeship"? 
There was also a growing realisation of the need for formal training and technical education, 
particularly in new industries, such as electrical engineering and the chemical industry. The 
Department of Labour, "worried about the declining number of apprentices in certain trades 
and the Arbitration Court's unwillingness to grapple with the issue", began discussions in 
1915 with the Education Department's Director of Technical Education.3 
1 A1HR, 1919,1-12. 
2 Martin, Holding the Balance, 137. 
3 Olssen, Building the New World, 239. 
Apprenticeship was still governed by the hopelessly outdated Master and Apprentice 
Act 1865. Although this had been combined with the Government Apprentices Act 1872 to 
form the Master and Apprentices Act 1908, the nineteenth century conditions still applied.4 
The Act was tinkered with in 1920, when an Amendment was passed that allowed farm 
apprentices emigrating from England to be bound by an indenture signed by the High 
Commissioner in London. 5 The main issues, however, still remained unresolved. The 
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. Secretary of Labour, F.W.T. Rowley, drafted a bill in 1918 that broadly followed ideas 
submitted by the Wellington Trades and Labour Council. These ideas were largely based on 
apprenticeship measu;es adopted in Switzerland.6 Despite Prime Minister Massey's 
endorsement, the draft was shelved after resistance from the National Efficiency Board and the 
Employer's Federation. 7 
An updated Master and Apprentices bill was presented in 1920 by Frederick Bartram, 
the Labour Member of Parliament for Grey Lynn,8 after the Department of Labour had 
surveyed industries and inquired into the status of apprenticeship in other countries. 9 The bill 
provided for a more specific apprenticeship contract. Hours were limited to eight per day, with 
four hours permitted on Saturday. Only apprentices aged over eighteen were to work overtime. 
The employer was to allow not less than fifteen hours per week, within work time, for the 
apprentice to attend classes. The maximum term of the apprenticeship was to be three years, 
and there were to be yearly examinations. 10 The bill was a private member's bill, presented by 
an opposition member and as such was thrown out. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding the 
bill showed a great deal of consensus, with many of the provisions receiving support from 
both sides of the House. Bartram, in introducing the bill, pointed to the shortages of skilled 
labour resulting from the war, and argued for the need for apprenticeship to be more attractive, 
with a shorter term and higher payment. He claimed that this would also result in the diversion 
of young people from 'blind-alley' occupations: "one of the great reasons why the boys and 
girls refuse to get apprenticed to skilled trades is that they can get more money at unskilled 
labour".11 
4 Public Acts o/New Zealand, 1908-1935,5. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Martin, Holding the Balance, 412. 
7 Ibid., 137. 
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The push by the Department of Labour to achieve updated apprenticeship legislation 
was thus initially unsuccessful. It required the impetus provided by the economic downturn of 
1921-22 to make urgent a revamp of the apprenticeship system. Increased unemployment at 
this time highlighted the vulnerability of less skilled occupations. 12 The Minister of Labour, 
G.J. Anderson, convened a conference in May 1923, between representatives of employers, 
unions, and the Departments of Labour and Education. In his introductory speech, he 
. emphasised the importance of the apprenticeship system to building strong industries. He 
acknowledged, however, the transformed post-war world: 
The apprenticeships of the future will, it seems to me, have to be upon a different basis 
from those that have existed up to the present time. The altered conditions owing to the 
introduction of machinery, the competition between one country and another, and the 
utter impossibility of selling goods in this country or any other country when 
competing with another one in which the conditions are altogether different, have to be 
faced. 13 
There were several areas of strong disagreement between unions and employers at the 
conference, although both were grateful for the opportunity the conference provided for 
discussion. The unions wanted the proposed Act to override the arbitration system. They 
argued that specifying apprenticeship conditions via the award system had resulted in "very 
wide and very divergent rates of wages being paid ... from lOs to 30s a week in the first year, 
according to the particular industry". 14 Thus, the unions argued for regulation of apprentice 
wages, conditions and training at government, rather than industry, level. The question of 
training also aroused much debate, with employers generally opposed to the idea of 'daylight 
training', that is, classes to be attended during work-hours. There were also concerns about the 
ability of some employers to honour legislation that required them to train apprentices in all 
facets of a particular trade. The 'hard and fast' nature of the legislation was also questioned: 
what is the duty of a boy when he goes into the shop? The first thing ... that the boy has 
to do is to learn to sweep out that shop ... order and discipline are to the benefit of a boy. 
You will never succeed by laying down hard and fast rules. 15 
The Apprenticeship Act 1923 
The debate continued as a second conference was called in August 1923 to receive the 
report from the first conference. There was enough common ground between all parties at this 
12 Martin, Holding the Balance. 
13 Apprenticeship Question (New Zealand) (Wellington: Government Printer, 1923),4. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 Ibid., 17 
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point to enable the Apprenticeship Act 1923 to be passed reasonably quickly, with little 
discussion in the House. Members from both sides considered that the measure had received a 
stamp of approval from both the employer and labour representatives at the conference. 16 The 
Act "preserved the apprentice-based crafts but created a more flexible system for regulating 
training". 17 
The main features of the Act were first the establishment of voluntary district 
. apprenticeship committees for each industry, consisting of equal numbers of employer and 
worker representatives. 18 Second, the Arbitration Court was empowered to make orders 
regarding wages, hours and conditions~ the proportions of apprentices to journeymen~ the 
period of apprenticeship~ and the minimum age of apprentices in any industry. The court could 
also require employers to take on apprentices to ensure an adequate supply of journeymen. 
Third, the court controlled, through the Committees, the training and examination of 
apprentices, and could compel employers in a particular area to contribute to the costs of 
establishing a training institute for their industry in that area. The Act applied only to males, 
although there was provision to incorporate female apprentices on a case-by-case basis. 19 The 
first case of this was in 1926, when female apprenticeships for hairdressing were recognised.2o 
Female apprentices in the chemistry and baking trades were recognised in 1927.21 
The training provisions of the Act encouraged attendance at technical schools. 
Technical education had been offered in the main cities since the 1890s, but the provision was 
piecemeal and there was a constant struggle for funding and students.-The Manual and 
Technical Instruction Act 1902 provided more certain funding for technical education, with 
payments at every educational level for pupils who received instruction in approved crafts. 22 
The Wellington Technical School was established in 1905 and pioneered links with industries, 
particularly the plumbing and electrical industries. This provided a model for technical 
training under the Apprentices Act, and there was a "noticeable expansion in classes from the 
building and engineering trades in 1924 and subsequent years".23 Employers, who, in some 
cases, donated the equipment and material necessary for practical training, met some of the 
16 NZPD, 1923,202, p.646. 
17 Olssen, Building the New World, 239. 
18 Martin, Holding the Balance, 138. 
19 New Zealand Statutes, 1923,41. 
20 Martin, Holding the Balance, 138. 
21 AJHR, H-ll, 1928; Book of Awards, XXVII, 1927. 
22 Report of the Commission on Education in New Zealand (Wellington: Government Printer, 1962),379. 
23 1. Nichol, The Technical Schools of New Zealand: A Historical Survey (New Zealand: New Zealand Council 
for Educational Research, 1940), 217. 
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cost of training. For example, in Auckland, printing trade employers donated three linotype 
machines to the town's technical school. 24 
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The new Act was publicised by Rowley on a nation-wide tour. His aim was to explain 
the provisions of the Act, and to encourage the formation of local apprenticeship committees. 
The Secretary of Labour had been made the Registrar of Apprentices by the Act, with regional 
factory inspectors becoming District Registrars. The role of the Department of Labour in 
. placing apprentices was also strengthened, with schoolleavers filling in departmental forms, 
which were to be accompanied by school reports. The Department set up juvenile employment 
offices in the four main centres and in some smaller towns. These initiatives were suspended 
in 1926, however, because of declining interest from employers as economic conditions 
worsened.25 
Apprenticeship Committees 
By 1925, many apprenticeship committees had been formed, and committees covered 
almost all the industries in which apprenticeships were offered?6 Apprenticeship conditions 
for each trade were removed from the local award and set out in a separate apprenticeship 
award for each industry. For example, the Canterbury Engineering Trades Apprenticeship 
Order was made on 30 December 1924. It provided for an apprenticeship committee to cover 
engineering, boiler-making and moulding in the Canterbury Industrial Area. The minimum 
age was set at fourteen and the term of the apprenticeship at five years. Proportions of 
apprentices to journeymen were fixed for each branch of the trade, and minimum wages laid 
down. Compulsory attendance at classes was specified, with the employer to refund fees for 
apprentices who attended at least 75 per cent ofthe classes. Expectations for both apprentice 
and employer were made clear: 
The apprentice will diligently and faithfully obey and serve the employer as his 
apprentice for the prescribed term ... the employer will ... to the best of his power, skill 
and knowledge, train and instruct the apprentice ... as a competent journeyman in the 
branch or branches of the iron and metal working trade. 27 
The devolution of the responsibility for apprenticeship to the committees continued 
throughout the 1920s. The committees had two major concerns. First, the long-standing issue 
of the proportion of apprentices to journeymen remained contentious. The committees were 
24 Ibid. 
25 Martin, Holding the Balance, l38; 412. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Book of Awards, XXIII, 1924, p.941. 
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delegated the power to decide the appropriate proportion based on the industry's locality. 
This allowed a decrease in the proportion of apprentices in some areas as the trades became 
overcrowded. For example, in three districts of the electrical trade, the proportions changed 
from one apprentice to one journeyman, to one apprentice to two journeymen. 28 This power 
also meant that some employers were refused permission to take on apprentices because of 
their lack of teaching facilities or the instability of their business.29 This flexibility was further 
. increased with the Apprentices Amendment Act 1927, which cancelled any existing 
Arbitration Court orders fixing proportions. 3D 
The second main concern of the apprenticeship committees was technical training. 
Committees were consulted about the setting up and content of technical classes. It was hoped 
that coordination between the committees and the technical schools would ensure that the 
formal training would be complementary to workshop training, and that employers would 
therefore encourage their apprentices to attend the classes. 3! In 1925, the first action under 
Section 25 of the Apprenticeship Act 1923 was taken. This section permitted the Arbitration 
Court to order a levy on all employers in an industry's locality if the majority of the employers 
saw the need for technical training. Thus, all motor mechanics who employed apprentices in 
the Auckland area were ordered to contribute ten shillings per year for two years for each 
apprentice to allow the purchase of training equipment at the local technical colleges. 32 
The mid 1920s were an hiatus between the turmoil of the war years and the subsequent 
boom and crash, and the Depression. Olssen describes the economy of these years as 
"sputtering".33 Although there was a degree of unemployment, affecting mostly labourers and 
unskilled workers, there was a shortage of labour in the skilled trades, particularly in the 
building industry. A return prepared by the Department of Labour in 1924 showed that within 
the maximum proportions fixed by law another 8022 apprentices could have been employed 
on top of the 6901 already employed. 34 This can be explained in part by the relative stability of 
the size of the secondary sector of the economy, which employed just under a quarter of the 
workforce throughout the years 1911 to 1926.35 Industrial relations were also reasonably 
stable throughout these years, with the wages of many apprentices ,increasing during this 
28 AJHR, 1927, H-ll. 
29 AJHR, 1925, H-ll. 
30 New Zealand Statutes, 1927. 
31 AJHR, 1926, H-ll. 
32 AJHR, 1925, H-ll. 
33 Erik Olssen, "Towards a New Society," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996),280. 
34 AJHR, 1924, H-ll. 
35 Ibid. 
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time. 36 For example, the range of wages for baking and pastry cook apprentices increased 
from 26s.6d to 64s per week, to 30s to 80s per week, and the range for tailoring apprentices 
from 13s.6d to 47s.6d per week, to 15s to 55s per week.37 By 1928, there were 129 local 
apprentice committees, covering 28 industries. There were 10,227 apprentices under contract, 
and 29,943 journeymen, giving an average proportion of 1 apprentice to 2.9 joumeymen. 38 
By 1929, however, concern was expressed at the declining number of apprentices, and 
. the Secretary of Labour, F.W.T. Rowley, asked the District Offices of the Labour Department 
to ascertain the reasons for the drop-off in numbers. The reasons given varied considerably 
between trades. In motor engineering, for example, the lack of equipment and the number of 
'one-man' workshops were cited as being barriers to taking on apprentices. It was also felt that 
there was insufficient continuity of work to warrant many mechanics committing themselves 
to an apprentice. Representatives of the moulding trade argued that the trade was declining 
because of imports, and in the boot trade, the "odious" restrictions on the employment of 
apprentices were blamed. 39 
With unemployment increasing, and the building trades declining, the Department of 
Labour voiced concerns about "the large number of boys being unable to secure suitable 
employment".40 Conferences of interested parties held in the main centres throughout 1929 
recommended altering the educational system to give a bias in favour of rural life and 
encouraging young people to take up rural occupations. It was suggested that vocational 
guidance officers be appointed at schools, and that apprentice proporfion restrictions be 
relaxed to enable more young people to be employed in the skilled trades. The large number of 
young people entering "non-productive professional and commercial occupations" was also 
noted with concern.41 An example of this concern was a letter from W.S. Moxsom, the 
secretary of the Auckland Trades and Labour Council, to the Minister of Labour, W.A. Veitch, 
protesting against any attempt by Seddon Memorial College to place industrial training in the 
background so that the school could specialise in "high scholastic training".42 Moxsom argued 
that training for a professional occupation was already well catered for, as "shown by the 
overcrowding that is manifest in our legal and commercial offices" .43 
36 Holt, Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand, 171. 
37 AlliR, 1925, H-11. 
38 AlliR, 1928, H-ll. 
39 Department of Labour, Report on Apprentice Numbers, 26 August 1929, Box 106, 7/3110, National Archives 
(NA), Wellington. 
40 AlliR, 1929, H-11, 11. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Moxsom to Veitch, 12 August 1929, Department of Labour, Box 106, 17/25/254, NA, Wellington. 
43 Ibid. 
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Technical Education 
The issue of technical education was addressed at a national Apprenticeship 
Conference, which reported to the House in May 1929. The main thrust of the 
recommendations of the conference was to improve and formalise the training of apprentices. 
It was suggested that the Technical Schools Advisory Board be reconstituted, with the 
inclusion of four representatives of apprenticeship committees. This was recommended at the 
. local level with a representative of the combined local apprenticeship committees to be added 
to individual Technical.School Boards. The compulsory component of the apprentices' 
technical school training was to be free, and correspondence classes were recommended for 
country apprentices. The conference recommended that apprenticeship committees set up an 
examination system for each trade, with formal certification of the results.44 
A proposal that would end apprenticeship quotas was also discussed at the conference. 
The debate confirmed that the issues surrounding apprenticeship had changed little from those 
discussed in the 1890s, and indeed, the contemporary debate throws up much of the same 
rhetoric. The conference was chaired by Tom Bloodworth, a workers' representative, who 
argued that "apprenticeship should be the whole function of the State ... the training of 
apprentices should be taken out of the hands of private employers ... apprenticeship must be 
regarded as part of education, part of the work of training oneself for life".45 Mr Winsor, an 
employer's representative, argued that apprentice restrictions were limiting the prospects of 
young people gaining employment and forcing them into 'dead-end' Unskilled work. Mr 
Bradley, an employer's representative from Christchurch, derided the "suicidal policy" of 
importing cheaper goods from foreign countries.46 Jim Roberts, speaking for the union 
movement, raised the prospect of the abuse of the removal of quotas, which would result in 
young people taking the place of tradespeople. Mr Hayward, a Dunedin employer, countered 
this by claiming that a 'free-market' in the employment of apprentices would soon balance 
out, with little change in the resulting level of unemployment. The vote regarding the proposal 
was tied, with the chairman not prepared to give a casting vote. 47 
The conference was considered a success, with the Minister of Labour, W.A. Veitch, 
complimenting all the parties on the restraint and good will that had been exercised during 
discussion of ~ome of the more contentious issues. 48 The findings of the conference resulted in 
44 Apprenticeship Conference, AJHR, 1929, H-ll. 
45 Ibid., 11. 
46 Ibid., 11. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 18. 
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a report that was used to produce an amending Act in 1930. This Act aimed to improve the 
mechanics of the apprenticeship system and to facilitate better technical education.49 The fine-
tuning of the apprenticeship system, however, became less important as the effects of the 
worldwide depression began to bite in New Zealand. 
The role of the technical school was also one ofthe concerns of the Atmore Report, 
presented in 1930 by the Minister of Education, Harry Atmore. The timing of the report, at the 
. outset of the depression years, meant that its main recommendation of the unification of 
primary, secondary and technical schools into regional education authorities was not carried 
out. Nevertheless, the report highlighted the problems that the growth of secondary education, 
engendered by the free-place legislation of 1902-03, had raised. Despite that fact that the 
majority of secondary pupils found employment in industry, commerce or agriculture, the 
curriculum retained the academic bias of the days when secondary education was largely a 
preparation for university. Separate technical schools had been quickly set up in cities and 
large towns, offering a more practical curriculum. The demand for their services, however, 
meant that they gradually began to offer academic courses as well as technical training, 
causing the sorts of controversy highlighted in the correspondence regarding Seddon 
Memorial College. The Atmore Report called for the elimination of the differences between 
secondary and technical schools in all but the main centres, viewing this as "one of the last 
vestiges of objectionable social distinction". 50 
Arbitration under Threat 
As the 1920s drew to an end, the vulnerability of the New Zealand economy became 
clearer. The large public works programme of the Coates Reform government, funded by 
increased borrowing, had disguised structural problems in the New Zealand economy. A-
significant proportion of export earnings was used to service high level of overseas debt, 
making New Zealand particularly vulnerable to the price decreases for primary products. 51 
When the price of New Zealand's export staples fell in 1926 and 1927, the perceived rigidity 
of the arbitration system came under concerted attack from farming interests. The primary 
sector had not historically been greatly interested in the arbitration system because many 
agricultural workers were not unionised. However, Court judgements that gave wage rises to 
49 Martin, Holding the Balance. 139. 
50 Report of the Commission on Education in New Zealand. 1962,83. 
51 Tom Brooking, "Economic Transformation", in The Oxford History of New Zealand. 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996),252. 
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shearers in 1926, and freezing workers in March 1927, despite falling fann incomes, led to a 
sustained and vitriolic campaign against compulsory arbitration. Two papers from prominent 
academics,52 although not widely supported by urban employers, backed the attack and "thus 
the fanners' assault on the Court generated a far-reaching and general debate about the nature 
and value of the arbitration system".53 
The main points of the farmers' argument were first that the industrial legislation 
·produced awards that were rigid and incapable of taking into account individual or regional 
circumstances. Second, it was claimed that the inflexible nature of the Court's wage policy 
created a wage-price spiral. Manufacturers in 'sheltered' industries simply passed wage 
increases on with price increases, an option not open to fanners because international markets 
dictated their returns. This factor was the crux of the lack of support for the fanners' case by 
urban interests. Manufacturers saw the fanners' argument as an attack on their pricing policies 
and as a threat to policies that protected their industries. Although unions periodically 
expressed a distrust of the arbitration system, the fanners' attack on the system, clearly 
designed to reduce wages and lessen regulatory protection for workers, required the union 
movement to re-evaluate its support for compulsory arbitration.54 
In October 1927 the government introduced the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Amendment Bill. This was designed largely to appease fanning interests, with farming and 
dairy factories being exempted from the arbitration process. The bill also included clauses that 
had the potential to alter the amount of control that skilled workers hid over the labour 
process. There was a clause encouraging piecework, and provisions for either party to an 
award to apply for amendments to bring in "new methods ofwork".55 The bill proposed 
changes in the Court itself, with arbitrators to be chosen from within the industry concerned 
and the economic conditions of the industry to become a factor in the settling of awards. The 
pro-fanning intent of the bill drew strong opposition from both unionists and urban employers, 
and resulted in a watered-down version of the bill, which still failed to be passed in the 1927 
parliamentary session. In its place, a single clause was passed that exempted farming from any 
new awards for twelve months.56 Given the vehemence of the debate, the Prime Minister, 
Gordon Coates, called a conference to be held in 1928 to discuss the arbitration system. 57 
52 Professor A.H. Tocker, Canterbury College; Professor Murphy, Wellington. 
53 Holt, Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand, 169. 
54 Ibid., 172-3. 
55 Ibid., 175. 
56 Martin, "The Removal of Compulsory Arbitration and the Depression of the 1930s", 127. 
57 Holt, Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand 
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The National Industrial Conference, held in March 1928, was seen as a "national 
stock-taking of our industrial relations".58 The terms of reference for the conference were to 
discuss the effect of the current legislation on the welfare of the country and on the interests of 
employers and workers. Although Holt characterised the conference as "in some respects a 
remarkable affair", much of the debate was merely a restating of implacably held positions. 59 
The only major movement was a shift in the attitudes of urban employers. The strange 
. experience of finding themselves as bedfellows with unionists caused the Employers' 
Federation to attempt to. find common ground with farming interests. This process was 
successful enough that there was little chance of any consensus at the conference, and the 
Reform government abandoned its attempt at radical reform of the arbitration system. The 
situation was further diffused by a change of government in November 1928 to a Labour-
backed minority government headed by the United party's Sir Joseph Ward, and by improved 
export prices in 1928 and 1929.60 
The Depression 
The vulnerability of New Zealand to the world economy was again reinforced as the 
1929 Wall Street crash precipitated a period of severe depression. The United States recalled 
its overseas investments and the European economy contracted. Countries struggled to protect 
their domestic economies. New Zealand was heavily indebted after World War One, 
dependent on a narrow range of export commodities, and largely restficted to the British 
market. The downturn in international trade led to a 40 per cent drop in New Zealand's export 
performance, and the following economic crisis paved the way for a coalition between the 
United and Reform parties. The Coalition, led by G.W. Forbes, won the 1931 election, and 
began its "orthodox and somewhat dilatory response to the Depression".61 
58 National Industrial Conference, AJHR, 1928, H-35, 2. 
59 Holt, Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand, 180. 
60 Ibid., 184. 
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The crux of the Coalition's policy was to protect farmers' incomes. This was done 
by cutting farmers' costs through lowering interest rates and reducing freight and wage costs, 
and by increasing their income through devaluing the currency in January 1933. Public 
spending was slashed, with civil service salaries cut by ten per cent, and public works 
programmes deferred or shrunk in size. Pressure was again applied from rural interests for the 
government to abolish compulsory arbitration. While Forbes's government was 
. "unenthusiastic" about this, the Finance Act 1931 was passed to allowed the Arbitration Court 
to make general wage ()rders, and a general wage cut often per cent was issued in June 1931.62 
This reduction did not, however, apply to the wage rates for male and female apprentices.63 
The IC&A Act itself was amended in April 1932, with conciliation remaining 
compulsory, but arbitration to be used only ifboth parties agreed. Martin pointed to the mixed 
effect that voluntary arbitration had, arguing that some of the results of the suspension of 
compulsory arbitration may have occurred via the Court in any case, and that the worse hit 
sectors (such as farming, the building industry and public works) were outside of, or less 
central to, the arbitration system. Compulsory arbitration was restored in 1936, together with 
compulsory union membership for those covered by awards.64 
The deflationary policies of the Coalition government exacerbated unemployment and 
weakened the trade union movement. 65 Official unemployment increased from 3130 at 31 
March 1930, to 51,529 by 1 April 1933.66 Other estimates of unemployment put the number in 
July 1933 as high as 81,000, or twelve per cent of the workforce.67 Over the same time-span, 
the number of apprentices dropped from 9826 to 5594, reaching a low-point of3329 in 1935 
(See Figure 5). The building industry was especially hard hit. In 1935 over all the skilled 
trades, 48 per cent of the number of apprentices employed in 1932 remained, whereas in the 
building trades (bricklaying, carpentry, painting, plumbing and plastering), only 33 per cent of 
the 1932 apprentice numbers remained.68 
62 Martin, "The Removal of Compulsory Arbitration and the Depression of the 1930s", 128. 
63 Ibid., 129. 
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In 1932, "owing to the great difficulty that was being experienced by employers in 
finding employment for their apprentices during the present economic crisis" the Finance Act 
1932 made provision for contracts of apprenticeship to be amended, suspended or cancelled. 70 
Applications to alter the apprenticeship contract were made to the Arbitration Court on the 
behalf of individual employers. Orders made included wage reductions ranging from five per 
cent to thirty-three and a half percent. Rationing of work was also common, with apprentices 
working three out of four weeks, for example. In these cases, the Court instructed employers 
to employ apprentices on any additional work available on a proportional basis. Many 
informal arrangements were also made between employer and apprentice.7} In the two-year 
period up to 31 March 1934, 1295 applications were made for relief from the provisions of 
apprenticeship contracts. In the majority of cases (1154), contracts were amended to ration-
69 AJHR, 1928-1940, H-l1. (NB: Figures for new contracts entered into are only available from 1935). 
70 AJHR, 1932, H-ll, 6. 
71 Applications for Review of Court for Relief from Provisions, May - December 1932, Box 106, 17/25/334, NA, 
Wellington. 
work, or suspended (70), rather than cancelled (35).72 Thus, the decline in the number of 
apprentices during this time was largely due to fewer apprentices being taken on. 
68 
By 1934, the number of functioning apprenticeship committees had dropped from 105 
to 66. The Arbitration Court had ruled that if an award or industrial agreement was cancelled 
then the Apprentices Act ceased to apply to the industry and locality concerned. This decision 
was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court in 1935. Some ofthe apparently defunct 
. committees began working again, and the number soon rose back to 94. Strong concerns were 
expressed by the Department of Labour in 1935 regarding the decline in the number of 
apprentices. There were two problems identified~ firstly the lack of employment opportunities 
for 'boys', and secondly, the effect the small number of apprentices would have on the skilled 
trades in the future. The "extreme reluctance on the part of employers to take on apprentices 
under the existing provisions" was noted. 73 
Improvements in the international economy and the election of the visionary 1935 
Labour government saw an increase in the confidence of the country. 74 Attention was turned 
to increasing the number of apprentices, and to assisting young people who had missed the 
opportunity of serving an apprenticeship because of the economic conditions. The Statutes 
Amendment Act 1936 allowed the Minister of Labour to approve apprenticeship contracts for 
people aged eighteen years and over.75 It was argued that the optimum number of apprentices 
required was approximately 1O,000~ therefore there was a shortfall of nearly 5000. It was 
decided to launch an "intensive campaign" to attract older people to apprenticeships. This 
strategy, along with the improvements in apprentice numbers that had already began in 1937, 
would aid the recovery ofthe skilled trades. By July 1939, 1356 contracts had been approved 
under the Statutes Amendment Act, nearly half of these being in the carpentry and joinery 
trades.76 
An example of the importance of the recruitment and training of skilled labour, 
especially in the building trades, was Scheme No. 16. This was inaugurated in 1937 and 
offered short-term adult apprenticeships and traineeships in carpentry and bricklaying. The 
employers received a weekly subsidy, and the apprentices were provided with free tuition at a 
technical school, and assistance with the purchase of tools. There were 438 contracts in force 
under this scheme at 31 March 1939, although the actual number of apprentices who had been 
72 AJHR, 1933-1934, H-11. 
73 AJHR, 1935, H-11, 7. 
74 Brooking, "Economic Transformation", 252. 
75 New Zealand Statutes, 1936. 
76 AJHR, 1937-1939,H-11. 
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put through the scheme was greater than this. The discrepancy was caused by contracts 
lapsing as "certain of the more adaptable adult apprentices [were able] to command a 
journeyman's rate of pay before their full apprenticeship term had been served".77 The 
effectiveness of the scheme was also limited by the unwillingness of many building 
contractors to take on adult apprentices, and the time required to train some of them to the 
level of a journeyman. The decision was made in 1939 to supplement the scheme by importing 
. "building artisans from other parts of the Empire", with over 300 journeymen being brought in 
from Australia.78 The scheme was terminated in April 1940, as the pool of suitable recruits 
dried up with the outb~eak of war. 79 
World War Two 
The war had a major impact on the nature of industry in New Zealand. At the outset of 
the war, it appeared that the main contribution that the country would make, aside from its 
troops, would be the supply of food and clothing. With the fall of France and the entry of 
Japan into the war, however, the development of war-related industries became crucial to 
support the Allied effort. New Zealand could also no longer expect to import consumer goods, 
therefore local industries had fill the gap. The "still immature" manufacturing sector expanded 
and diversified, with the manufacturing work-force growing on average 3.25 per cent over the 
war years (compared with a population growth ofa little over one per cent).80 Despite this 
level of growth, there was an ongoing shortage of labour, which worsened as the rate of 
mobilisation increased. 
New Zealand's factories were generally small-scale, and scattered throughout the 
country. The pressure to produce high-quality military equipment required the co-ordination of 
many small units, "out-of-date machines had to be turned into precision tools, equipment had 
to be improvised, sometimes with the aid only of rough sketches from other countries, and 
operatives and technicians had to be trained to use unfamiliar machines".81 Factories were 
adapted to produce a wide range of military and support equipment. Over 500 ships were built 
during the war, with new shipyards built at Port Chalmers to construct steel minesweepers, 
and in Auckland to supply craft for the United States Forces. The Americans praised the 
77 AJHR, 1939, H-IIA, 10. 
78 Ibid., 11. 
79 AJHR, 1940, H-l1A. 
80 J. V.T. Baker, War Economy (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1965), 147. 
81 Prime Minister's Department, War Record (Wellington: Government Printer, 1946), 45. 
quality of the workmanship of New Zealand tradespeople. An officer of the United States 
Marine Corps was quoted as saying: 
It is my considered opinion that the quality of the work performed by apprentice-
trained artisans for the U.S. Marine Corps in New Zealand has been of a superior 
quality, unequalled elsewhere in the world.82 
One of the first requirements for the New Zealand war effort was the ability to direct 
70 
. manpower. The Labour Legislation Emergency Regulations 1939 gave the Minister of Labour 
"unprecedented and sweeping powers".83 The Industrial Emergency Council, a representative 
consultative body to advise on wartime working conditions in industry, was set up in 1939. 
The Council was headed by the Minister of Labour, P.C. Webb, and comprised equal numbers 
of worker and employer representatives. While employer organisations had argued that the 
Council should have 'blanket coverage', its briefwas to recommend variation orders to the 
awards of specific industries, according to circumstances.84 Although the government was 
reluctant to compromise its labour legislation, the scarcity of labour meant that inroads on the 
forty-hour week were necessary. The Hours Committee of the Industrial Emergency Council 
heard applications for longer hours, however, the need for employers to pay penal rates 
moderated the demand for extra overtime. Still, overtime in factories increased from four 
million hours in 1938-39 to over 17 million hours in 1943-44.85 As an example, workers in 
some munitions factories worked up to seventy-seven hours per week once Japan had entered 
the war.86 
The Apprenticeship Committee of the Industrial Emergency Council was "especially 
active".87 Suspensions of apprenticeship contracts during service were made under the 
Suspension of Apprenticeship Emergency Regulations 1939. These regulations were amended 
several times throughout the war. They allowed apprentices to revive their contracts within six 
months after their return from service. The time spent in service was to be counted as time 
served under the apprenticeship for the purpose of calculating wages, but the time away had to 
be made up at the end of the apprenticeship. If the apprentice had performed "trade work ofa 
similar class" while on service, however, this could be credited to the apprenticeship.88 Those 
apprentices in the last year of their contract had their call-up deferred until the apprenticeship 
82 Ibid., 48. 
83 Martin, Holding the Balance, 213. 
84 Ibid., 216. 
85 Baker, War Economy, 456. 
86 Prime Minister's Department, War Record, 48. 
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was completed, unless they were to perform their trade in service.89 Despite the wage 
protection offered, many apprentices were dissatisfied with their wage levels on their return 
from service. The temptation of well-paid unskilled worked was strong; thus employers were 
often forced to pay journeyman's rate to returning apprentices to retain them in the trade. 90 
The Apprenticeship Committee heard applications for new apprentices to replace those 
entering the anned services on a case-by-case basis. Individual employers petitioned the 
. Committee via their local apprenticeship committees. It was decided that there would be a 
four-month delay between an apprentice going into camp and being replaced with another 
apprentice. This measure caused some confusion at first, with the Employers' Federation 
requesting a shortening of the period, as they were under the impression that steps to replace 
an apprentice could only be taken after they had been gone for four months. However, the 
Apprenticeship Committee reassured employers that the process could begin as soon as the 
apprentice left thus making the total delay around four months. There was also provision for 
the delay to be shortened for 'special reasons' , at the discretion of the Committee.91 
The conditions governing apprentices were established by a Conference set up in 1942 
to consider the effect of military service on apprenticeship. The Conference comprised 
representatives from the Federation of Labour, the New Zealand Employers' Federation, the 
Armed Services, the Education and Labour Departments and the Rehabilitation Board. It was 
decided that until the full requirements of the armed services for manpower were met, "no 
general class of exemption for apprentices, s~dents or other trainees would be entertained".92 
It was acknowledged that industries would struggle with the need to train not only enough 
workers for their needs, but also sufficient to supply the armed forces. Thus, careful 
consideration of manpower requirements was called for. 93 
The first session of the Conference was charged only with making short-term policy. 
As the war progressed, however, the return of apprentices from active service required the 
representatives to reconvene. A second conference in September 1943 considered amendments 
to the Emergency Regulations governing the rehabilitation of apprentices. 94 The workers' 
representatives argued that all apprentices on discharge from the armed services should be 
paid at journeyman's rates, but should be required to make up the time remaining to be served. 
While the employers' representatives agreed in principle, they argued that the Rehabilitation 
89 AJHR, 1940, H-ll. 
90 Baker, War Economy, 506. 
9! Industrial Emergency Council Minutes, May 1941, WAll, Series 21, 56A, NA, Wellington. 
92 Report of Conference on the Effect of Military Service on Apprenticeships, October 1942, ME 26, A9, 3E. 
93 Ibid. 
Board should pay the difference between the appropriate apprentice rate and the 
journeyman's rate. 95 An agreement was reached that, in most cases, the employer would pay 
one third of the difference between the maximum apprentice rate and the journeyman's rate, 
and the Rehabilitation Board would pay the remaining two thirds.96 
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The Second World War exacerbated the shortage of skilled labour. The shortage was 
the most "widespread and serious in the engineering trades", with a 1940 report showing that a 
. further 400 tradesmen and 120 apprentices could be absorbed.97 Changes to the regulations as 
the war progressed allowed the Industrial Emergency Council to authorise an employer to take 
on a substitute apprentice for one in service, even if this would exceed the proportion clause. 
The chronic shortage of skilled tradesmen prompted the Auxiliary Workers Training 
Emergency Regulations in 1941, which set up short periods of intensive full·time training for 
selected workers who usually had some knowledge of the trade. Initially, the engineering 
industry was targeted, with 266 engineers trained and placed in the first intake. The Auxiliary 
Worker scheme was extended in 1943, with schools for instruction in carpentry and house· 
building set up in Mirimar, Petone, Auckland, Christchurch and Rotorua. These schools 
offered 18 weeks of theoretical instruction, followed by 18 weeks practical training. The 
scheme merged with the Trade Training Schools of the Rehabilitation Department in February 
1944.98 The Industrial Emergency Council was disbanded at its last meeting in J u1y 1945.99 
Apprenticeship Issues During the War 
The technical education of apprentices was a thorny issue during the war years. 
Employers and apprentices alike seemed to regard the formal educational component of the 
apprenticeship as less than important, given the circumstances. In September 1941, for 
example, the minutes of the Industrial Emergency Council recorded the unsatisfactory 
examination results of electrical apprentices. Employers were accused of taking little interest 
in their apprentices, as only 40 per cent had sat and passed their final examination. These 
concerns led to a conference of interested parties, which resulted in criticisms of the New 
Zealand education system and a suggestion that apprentices sit an examination at the end of 
each year, rather only one at the end oftheir apprenticeship. 
94 Industrial Emergency Council Minutes, September 1943, WAll, Series 21, 56A, NA, Wellington. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Baker, War Economy, 506. 
97 A.JHR 1941, H-11A, 11. 
98 A.JHR 1942-1945, H-11. 
99 A.JHR 1946, H-l1. 
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Thus, in March 1942, the Apprenticeship Committee of the Council was asked to 
consider ways to provide training facilities for those trades that were worst affected by this 
problem. lOo The North Canterbury Carpentry and Joinery apprenticeship committee considered 
the problem of night school attendance levels serious enough to prepare a letter to be sent to 
the parents or guardians of all apprentices. The 1944 letter informed the parents or guardians 
that the committee needed to "take action owing to the alarming drop in the number of 
. apprentices attending the evening classes at the Christchurch Technical College".101 
Disappointment was expressed at the lack of appreciation of the value of formal instruction, 
and parents or guardia~s were requested to encourage apprentices to attend evening classes. 102 
As the war progressed, the decline in the number of journeymen affected the number 
of apprentices able to be trained. The declining number of journeymen also raised debate 
about proportions. For example, in 1941 the Apprenticeship Committee considered an 
application from electrical employers in three districts to vary the proportion from one 
apprentice to two journeymen, to one to one. The employers argued that the application for 
relief was only partly due to wartime conditions, but the members of the Industrial Emergency 
Council felt that they were the correct body to adjudicate, given the serious shortage of skilled 
workers. There was little common ground in the representations made by the employers' and 
workers' advocates. The Committee pointed out to the employers that altering proportions 
would have little immediate effect. The employers argued, however, that it would allow 
journeymen to be spread more thinly, as in many cases two workers were required for ajob 
and current proportions meant that often this was two journeymen. The Apprenticeship 
Committee recommended that providing there was sufficient work and adequate training 
facilities, and the proportion did not exceed one to one, then applications for relief would be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. 103 
The War Ends 
The war years had permitted the consolidation and expansion of industry in New 
Zealand. While the Labour government had stabilised wages, costs and prices, and 
successfully reigned in inflation, manufacturers had: 
100 Industrial Emergency Council Minutes, March 1943, WAll, Series 21, 56A, NA, Wellington. 
101 Letter to the Guardians of Apprentices to the Carpentry and Joinery Trades, 1944, ME 26 A9, 3E. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Minutes of the Apprenticeship Committee of the Industrial Emergency Council, September 1941 , WAll, 
Series 21, 56A, NA, Wellington. 
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guaranteed markets, sure sales, a disciplined labour force with set wages and 
conditions, and price margins which provided uninterrupted profitability, capital 
growth, and resources for further investment. .. stabilization froze the employed sector 
while freeing the employer sector for guaranteed expansion.104 
Not all workers had been compliant with the demands of the war effort. The powerful miners, 
seamen and watersiders unions had remained largely outside of the stabilisation regulations, 
. with the watersiders and coalminers between them accounting for three-quarters of all working 
days lost during the war. lOS As the war drew to an end, the government faced increasing 
pressure from all groups of workers to relax the Stabilisation Regulations and improve wages. 
There was also pressure to ease manpower controls. More than 250,000 workers, or 40 per 
cent of the workforce, were in essential industries, with 175,000 workers under direction. 106 
The Labour government, re-elected in the 1946 election, was forced to move very cautiously. 
Inflationary pressures reined in through the war threatened to break out, and rationing and 
import controls were still considered necessary. 107 Throughout the late 1940s, New Zealand 
was simmering with expectations of just rewards for the deprivations of the war years. 
In this chapter, I have shown how the apprenticeship system moved from implicit 
regulation via the arbitration system, to become an allied institution, regulated by explicit 
legislation and governed by voluntary apprenticeship committees. There remained great 
debate over the details of apprenticeship. The constant preoccupation with the proportion of 
apprentices to journeymen was a reflection of the essentially exclusionary nature of the 
institution. Employers seemed to be content to work within the restrictions of controlled 
apprentice proportions, even if the detail was disputed, a tacit acknowledgment, perhaps, of 
the benefits that they also accrued from a restricted supply of skilled workers. Technical 
education was also the subject of much debate. There was a general acceptance that 
technological changes necessitated a more thorough theoretical training for apprentices. The 
questions of who should pay for this, and how it was best delivered, however, were less 
straightforward. Perhaps the most striking issue illustrated by this chapter is the vulnerability 
of the apprenticeship system to the economic state of the country. This fact defied political 
rhetoric, and attempts at intervention did little to smooth fluctuations in the supply of and 
demand for skilled labour. 
104 Robert Chapman, "From Labour to National," in The Oxford History of New Zealand. 2nd, ed. G.W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996),367-368. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
APPRENTICESHIP DURING THE POST WAR YEARS 
The post-war years in New Zealand were in many ways the height of the 
apprenticeship system. Full employment, a booming construction industry, and large 
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, government departments encouraged around thirty per cent of male schoolleavers to take up 
apprenticeships. This chapter shows how the 1945 Commission ofInquiry into Apprenticeship 
validated the apprenticeship system as the accepted way to train skilled workers. The findings 
of this Commission led to the increased bureaucratisation of the apprenticeship system, with a 
formalised network of national and local committees. Technical education became an essential 
component of apprenticeship, with attendant changes in the scope and delivery of that 
education. A crucial aspect of the post-war years was the small wage differentials between 
skilled and unskilled work, and the threat that this posed to the viability of apprenticeship. By 
the 1960s, the margins-for-skill debate began the disillusionment of skilled workers with the 
arbitration system. This chapter also discusses the Maori trade training schemes, which were 
developed as a means to ease the transition to urban life that many Maori were making. 
The post-war years saw the beginning of a lengthy and sustained period of economic 
growth for New Zealand. The country grew impatient with the cautious approach of the 
Labour government to lifting wartime restrictions and a National government was elected in 
1949. This government gradually lifted stabilisation measures, but was also conscious of the 
potential threat of inflationary pressures that had been held in check by the war. The economic 
boom was intensified in 1950 by the rise in wool prices resulting from the Korean War. Secure 
in the knowledge that Britain provided a stable market for agricultural goods, the country 
began a time of economic development geared to meet the needs of an expanding population. 
The rehabilitation of service-people carried on apace, with many of them being absorbed into 
the burgeoning construction industry. Full employment and high consumption were the 
hallmarks of a society ready to move into a new era of prosperity and security after the 
ravages of depression and war. 1 
There were, however, problems with the booming economy. The early post-war years 
were marked by a severe labour shortage, leading to high levels of labour turnover. There 
were also critical shortages of housing and electric power supplies, and many consumer items 
1 Chapman, "From Labour to National", 
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were also in high demand. The manufacturing sector had expanded rapidly during the war, 
and factories, as well as the building and construction industry, were the hardest hit by the 
labour shortages. Immigration (see Figure 6) was the favoured solution to the labour shortage, 
particularly to meet the insatiable demand for skilled workers: "the 'phone call to try to get a 
plumber or an electrician to repair some fault was an event a householder would regard with 
trepidation and little confidence".2 Immigration strengthened the growing urbanisation of New 
Zealand society, with new arrivals settling mainly in the major urban areas, especially 
Auckland. 
Baker argued that 1955 marked the end of the period of post-war recovery. By this 
time, most price controls had been lifted, building had largely caught up with demand, and 
shortages of consumer products, such as washing machines and refrigerators, had eased. 3 
Nevertheless, throughout these years construction and production continued to boom and the 
demand for skilled labour outstripped supply, despite high levels of immigration. It thus 
became crucial to attract apprentices, and to keep them in the trades. The apprenticeship 
system was placed on a more formal basis, and attempts were made raise the status of the 
trades, in order to stave off the attraction of high wages offered for unskilled work. 
Figure 6: Assisted Immigration & Net Migration, 1947-1965 4 
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3 Baker, War Economy, 532. 
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Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship, 1945 
As the war drew to a close, the Departments of Labour and Education convened a 
Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship.5 The Commission was chaired by Arthur Tyndall, 
Judge of the Court of Arbitration, and included amongst its twelve members C.E. Beeby, the 
Director of Education; E.B. Taylor, the Registrar of Apprentices; and various union, employer 
and technical education representatives. The Commission sat throughout the country to hear 
. evidence. Its members visited factories, workshops and schools, and interviewed both 
apprentices and those wbo hoped to become apprenticed. H.C. McQueen, the research officer, 
also made a case study· of forty apprentices for the Commission. 6 
The Commission's brief was to investigate vocational education and to examine the 
existing apprenticeship legislation. Working from the basis that the objectives of the post-war 
years would be increasing both the population and the standard ofliving of New Zealand, the 
Commission argued that "it is an inescapable fact that an adequate supply of efficiently trained 
artisans is essential to the industrial future of the Dominion".7 It was recognised that post-war 
immigration would be insufficient to supply the number of skilled tradespeople required, and 
that the apprenticeship system was the soundest means of providing a skilled workforce. The 
Commission also argued strongly that work and training were not separate processes, but that 
they must be integrated: "the representatives of industry and education must collaborate; their 
harmonious collaboration is vital to the national welfare".8 
The main thrust of the Commission's report was to strengthen-the administration of the 
apprenticeship system. It recommended the appointment of an Apprenticeship Commissioner, 
and four Deputy Commissioners of Apprenticeship to be based in the main centres. The 
Deputies, or their representatives, would become the chairperson of each local apprenticeship 
committee, providing administrative expertise to the voluntary committees. At the national 
level, it was suggested that there should be a Dominion Apprenticeship Committee for each 
broad-banded industry. These committees would consider details of training and examinations, 
wages and conditions, and the number of skilled workers required. This number was not easy 
to estimate because of difficulties in gathering details of the number of tradespeople already in 
the industry and in ascertaining the annual wastage of tradespeople. There was also an 
inevitable time lag in training an apprentice. 9 The committees were also charged with 
5 Ibid., 250. 
6 Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship and Related Matters, AJHR, 1945, H-I1B. 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 'New Zealand Apprenticeship Committees', Labour and Employment Gazette (LEG), 1(1), February 1951. 
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developing industry-wide Dominion apprenticeship orders. 10 The Commission found that 
one of the weaknesses in the apprenticeship system was the "multiplicity of local orders and 
the discrepancies between them". II 
The question of the most appropriate means of training apprentices received a great 
deal of attention from the Commission. It was recognised that there was a variation in the 
amount of theoretical knowledge required for each trade, and that problems had arisen when 
-apprentices were taken on who did not have the ability to cope with this type of knowledge. 
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The Commission pointed to a "regrettable lack of co-operation between industry and the 
(technical) schools in the matter of the education of apprentices". 12 It recommended a greater 
involvement of apprenticeship committees in the curriculum, staffing and equipping of 
technical schools. The debate about 'day-light' training was clearly heated, and the 
Commission stopped short of making a clear recommendation on this subject, suggesting 
instead that the relevant apprenticeship committee make a decision for each industry. It was 
also felt that decisions regarding examinations and the proposal to specify the term of 
apprenticeship in hours, rather than years, were better made at this leve1. 13 
A particularly interesting section of the Commission's report focused on the suggestion 
that apprenticeship be 'to the State' or 'to the industry' rather than to an individual employer. 
Those in favour of this concept argued that increased specialisation and subdivision of labour 
prevented many apprentices from getting an 'all-round' training with one employer. The 
disruption of training that occurred during the Depression was also cited as a good reason for 
state involvement. Apprenticeship to the state would give continuity of employment and 
smooth out the usual drop in apprentice numbers when economic conditions were bad. It 
would also allow long-term manpower planning. Apprenticeship to industry, funded by a 
compulsory levy on all employers, would prevent 'free-loading', that is, the practice by 
employers who did not train apprentices of 'poaching' skilled labour from those who did. 
While the Commission did not advocate such extreme action, it did recommend more use of 
'joint' apprenticeships, and suggested the transfer of apprentices to government departments if 
there was any difficulty with the initial employer. 14 
10 Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship and Related Matters. 
11 'New Zealand Apprenticeship Committees', LEG, 1(1), February 1951, 17. 
12 Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship and Related Matters, 10. 
13 Ibid_ 
14 Ibid_ 
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New Zealand Apprenticeship Committees and Apprenticeship Orders 
The Commission's recommendations were enacted in the Apprentices Amendment Act 
1946, and consolidated in the Apprentices Act 1948. A Commissioner of Apprentices, H.C. 
McQueen, who had been the Research Officer attached to the Commission, was appointed in 
June 1948. 15 New Zealand apprenticeship committees were set up in twelve industries, and 
this was extended to 22 in 1949. National apprenticeship orders replaced the often outdated 
local orders, and the setting of the wages of apprentices as a proportion ofjoumeymen's rates 
became universal. The principle of daylight training was approved in some industries, with 
daylight classes starting in 1949 in motor engineering. These involved four hours each week 
during the first three years of the apprenticeship. Block courses were also started for the 
baking industry, with apprentices from all over New Zealand spending four weeks at the 
Wheat Research Institute in Christchurch. The employer paid the apprentices' wages for this 
time, with the travel costs paid for by the Department ofLabour. 16 By 1951, seven industries 
had in place various combinations of block courses, daylight classes and compulsory evening 
classes. 17 
It would be unreasonable to expect that all employers would be in favour of daylight 
training, given that wages had still to be paid for the essentially unproductive time spent at the 
technical institute by the apprentice. Indeed, proposals by the New Zealand Master Builders' 
Association to cut down on the daylight training provisions in the industry's apprenticeship 
order provoked an open letter from the New Zealand Carpenters and Joiners Union to all 
branches of the union and the local apprentices committees. In this letter, written in the late 
1940s, the acting secretary of the union, W.F. Molineux, laid out the union's reply to the 
proposals. He argued that, in order to turn out skilled tradesmen, all apprentices must receive 
adequate technical training. If there was less training, tradesmen would have an inferior status, 
and employers would demand that they be paid less. The union argued for daylight training, as 
evening classes had proven to be "wasteful, inefficient and unsatisfactory".18 
The minutes of the New Zealand General Engineering and Blacksmithing 
Apprenticeship Committee for 1948 and 1949 provide a clear example of the debates and 
issues surrounding the implementation of the new Apprentices Act. The first problem the 
committee faced was specifying explicitly which branches of the industry were to be included 
15 Ibid. 
16 AlliR, 1950, H-11. 
17 'Apprenticeship Classes in Working Hours', LEG, 1(2), August 1951. 
18 New Zealand Carpenters and Joiners and Joiners Machinists Industrial Unions of Workers: Letter to Branches, 
Sub-branches and Delegates to Local Apprenticeship Committees, MB 26, A9, 3E. 
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in the new apprenticeship order. Part of this difficulty was caused by new technology; the 
classification of refrigeration engineers and servicemen, for example, raised concerns. The 
other difficulty pivoted upon the definition of a 'trade'. The Welding Institute, for example, 
was training workers in one skill, welding, but this was considered too narrow a training to be 
classified as a trade. Therefore, the committee decided that 'welding' per se could not be 
considered a branch of the industry. Mr McQueen, the Commissioner of Apprentices, ruled 
·that the basic test of whether something could be considered a branch of an industry was" the 
amount of time it takes to train a man". 19 
Apprentice wages were set as a proportion ofthe minimum hourly rate of a 
journeyman. This, along with a three-month probation period, became a standard for most 
apprenticeship orders. Table 1 shows the proportions of the minimum hourly rate: 
Table 1: Apprentice Wages, Engineering Trade, 1948 20 
Number of Hours Percentage of Minimum Journeyman's Wage 
1 st 1000 hours 23% 
2nd 1000 hours 29% 
3fd 1000 hours 35% 
4th 1000 hours 41% 
5th 1000 hours 47% -
6th 1000 hours 54% 
7th 1000 hours 59% 
8th 1000 hours 65% 
9th 1000 hours 71% 
10th 1000 hours 77% 
Two of the issues before the committee resulted in an impasse between the worker and 
employer representatives. The first was the measurement ofthe term of the apprenticeship. 
The employers wanted to retain the five-year term, while the workers pressed for the term to 
be measured in hours. They also called for a reduction in the hours for passing examinations, 
19 New Zealand General Engineering and Blacksmithing Apprenticeship Committee Minutes, December 1948. 
ABVT, 7254/2, NA, Wellington. 
20 Ibid. 
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and for any overtime hours worked to be credited against the term of the apprenticeship. 
The second contentious issue was, as always, the proportion of apprentices to journeymen. 
81 
The employers wanted a one-to-one proportion, while the workers fought for one apprentice to 
two journeymen. After much discussion, it was decided that there was no possibility of 
compromise on these issues, so the alternative proposals of the employers and the workers 
were set out side by side and sent to the Arbitration Court for a ruling on an award-by-award 
basis?l The question of technical education was also the subject of much debate. It was 
suggested that a prereqqisite of two years post-primary education be imposed, with fifteen 
years as a minimum age for an apprentice. Mr R. Jones, the Federation of Labour 
representative on the committee, argued that the degree of skill required in the metal trades 
had increased, and that apprentices needed the ability to absorb the requirements of the post-
war environment: "Tradesmen of the future must have the flexibility that they lack today". 22 
The New Zealand Engineering Industry apprenticeship order was ratified by the 
Arbitration Court in 1949. The branches of the industry were grouped into three classifications 
(shown in Table 2), with proportions varying dependent upon the group: 
Table 2: Engineering Industry Classifications, 1949 23 
Group A Group B Group C 
Fitting and Turning Aircraft Engineering Brass-finishing 
Pattern-making Aircraft Radio Engineering Engine-smithing 
Engineering Draughting Aircraft Instrument Engineering Farrier-smithing 
Copper-smithing 
Armature Winding 
Mill Wrighting 
The details of the order were generally more favourable to the arguments of the workers' 
representatives. The apprenticeship term was set at 10,000 hours, or 9000 hours for an 
apprentice aged seventeen or older who could present evidence of having completed three 
years post-primary education with engineering as a subject. The minimum age was set at 
fifteen, with two years of post-primary education, and a three-month probation period was to 
21 Ibid, February 1949. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Book of Awards, 49, Pt 4, 1949, p.3875. 
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be served. Provision was made for the apprentice to be ordered to attend compulsory 
evening or correspondence classes. Time spent at block courses and daylight training was to 
be paid for by the employer, and the hours spent at these classes within normal working hours 
was to be reckoned as time served. Apprentices who passed the examination at the end of the 
third year of the apprenticeship were to be paid five shillings per week extra, while those 
passing the examination at the end of the fourth year would receive an extra ten shillings per 
'week. Any overtime worked was to be credited as time served, but there were restrictions on 
overtime permitted. Apprentices aged under sixteen were not permitted to work overtime, and 
no apprentice could be compelled to work overtime or shift-work, or to work more than six 
hours overtime per week. 24 
The engineering apprenticeship order was typical of many other orders. The issues 
discussed above had proved thorny for many of the apprenticeship committees, and were the 
subject of strong advocacy at the Arbitration Court hearings. On the subject of the term ofthe 
apprenticeship, the majority of apprenticeship orders (twenty out of twenty-seven) fixed the 
term in 1000-hour periods, rather than years. This was seen as 'sensible'; stablising the term of 
apprenticeship regardless of possible variations in the length of the working week. The normal 
term for most apprenticeship was 10,000 hours, or five years. In certain industries, provisions 
were made in the orders to shorten the length of the apprenticeship, with various time credits 
given for holding School Certificate, related experience and examination passes. In most 
industries, overtime worked (with some restrictions as to the amount allowable) could be 
counted as part of the apprentice's term.25 Thus, by 1953, there were 27 New Zealand 
apprenticeship orders in force, with most of the subsequent amendments being less 
controversia1.26 The New Zealand apprenticeship committees were lauded in the Labour and 
Employment Gazette as: 
admirable examples of a combination of 'democracy and bureaucracy ... (an) 
arrangement which gives a body of laymen [sic] statutory powers and provides 
someone (the Commissioner of Apprentices) to act as an executive officer in the 
carrying out of those powers. 27 
24 Book of Awards, 49, Pt 4, 1949, p.3875. 
25 'The Term of Apprenticeship', LEG, 6(3), August 1956 
26 'The Making of Apprenticeship Orders', LEG, 3(2), August 1953 
27 'New Zealand Apprenticeship Committees', LEG, 1(1), February 1951, 18. 
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Local Apprenticeship Committees 
It is important to remember that a great deal of the administration of the 
apprenticeship system was carried out at the 'grass-roots' level ofthe voluntary local 
apprenticeship committees.28 These committees, which met up to nine or ten times a year, 
were established under the Apprentices Act 1923, and were chaired by the District 
Commissioner of Apprenticeship. They comprised equal numbers of employer and worker 
representatives (three of each), and a representative conversant with technical education in the 
local area.29 Their powers derived from three sources: the Apprentices Act 1948, 
apprenticeship orders and the Court of Arbitration. 
The main functions of the committees were to handle the mechanics of entering and 
completing an apprenticeship, to supervise both apprentices and employees, and to examine 
any requests for variations from apprenticeship orders. The committees also reported to, and 
were consulted by, the New Zealand apprenticeship committees after their establishment in 
1948.30 The day-to-day work of the committees included hearing applications for consent for 
an employer to take on an apprentice, applications for transfer of apprentices and termination 
of apprenticeship contracts. An employer required the prior consent of the committee before 
he or she was permitted to take on an apprentice. The onus was on the employer to satisfy the 
committee that he or she was a suitable employer, that the business was sound and likely to 
continue and that suitable teaching facilities could be provided? I 
The local apprenticeship committees also dealt with apprentices who had defaulted on 
the educational requirements of the apprenticeship.32 For example, the May 1965 minutes of 
the North Canterbury Carpentry and Joinery Industry Apprenticeship Committee recorded a 
number of cases of apprentices who were absent from day-release classes without explanation. 
The miscreants were each fined two weeks wages. 33 There were some problems with the local 
apprenticeship committees. They tended to be prescriptive, and concerned with maintaining 
the status quo. The extent of the coverage of the committees was also sometimes a cause for 
concern. They tended to be concentrated in the main centres,34 and in trades with a 
commitment to technical education.35 
28 'Apprenticeship: Administration at the Local Level', LEG, 14(3), August 1964. 
29 Commission of Inquiry into Vocational Training, 1965,64. 
30 'Apprenticeship: Administration at the Local Level', LEG, 14(3), August 1964. 
3! Book of Awards, 49, Part 4, 1949, p.3876. 
32 Commission of Inquiry into Vocational Training, 1965, 64. 
33 North Canterbury Carpentry and Joinery Industry Apprenticeship Committee Minutes, April 1965, MB 27, 
A24,3C. 
34 AJHR, 1939, H-11, 11. 
35 Martin, Holding the Balance, 138. 
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Nevertheless, the apprenticeship committees provided a forum for employers and 
unions to work together, with sectional differences usually put to one side. A fonner District 
Commissioner, who worked in Auckland during the industrial fennent of the early 1980s, 
recounted driving to an apprenticeship committee meeting. He picked up the union 
representative from the picket line, the employer representative from his office, took them to 
the meeting, which was non-confrontational and productive, and then dropped them back to 
their respective sides of the ongoing industrial dispute. The committees were viewed as 
independent bodies, and, had a degree of control and authority over the minutiae of 
apprenticeship that wo~ld be difficult to replicate today.36 Many of the members of the local 
committees served for long periods of time, and the work of the committees was regarded as 
extremely valuable. 37 
Apprentice Numbers 
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Throughout the 1950s, the number of apprentices gradually increased, although "the 
demand for apprentices [was] still far from satisfied".38 The New Zealand apprenticeship 
committee for each industry reinforced recruitment at the national level. The low-birth rates of 
the depression years, however, meant a smaller number of young people were available for 
employment, especially in the early 1950s.39 In some trades in particular, such as moulding 
and boilermaking, "the needs of the industry are by no means being met by the very limited 
number oflads [sic] willing to enter upon apprenticeship in them".40 Nevertheless, the 
proportion of those school-Ieavers entering apprenticeships grew steadily throughout the 
1950s, from 25.2 per cent in 1950 to 33.7 per cent in 1957.41 This rate was one of the highest 
in the world, but was still not sufficient to meet the demand in some industries.42 Figure 7 
shows the probable destination of male schoolleavers, illustrating that apprenticeship to one 
of the skilled trades was the favoured choice of schoolleavers, with farming the next most 
popular option. 
36 Kim Ulberg, Skill New Zealand, interview by author, 16 August 2000, 
37 AlliR, 1948,H-11,29, 
38 AlliR, 1954, H-ll, 23, 
39 'New Zealand Apprenticeship Committees', LEG, 1(1), February 1951. 
40 AlliR, 1948, H-ll, 30. 
41 'Apprenticeship Trends in NZ', LEG, 9(1), February 1959. 
42 'Apprenticeship Trends 1955-1965', LEG, 15(4), November 1965,43. 
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There was a steady increase in the number of apprentice contracts in force in each year 
from 1945, with the number of apprentices in the armed services gradually dropping as they 
returned to their trades (see Figure 8).44 The Labour and Employment Gazette (LEG) claimed 
that there were three reasons for the increase in the number of apprentices. Firstly, a trade was 
a "permanent asset", which gave the skilled worker security. Secondly, the rapid development 
taking place in New Zealand provided "great opportunities for those of a practical bent", with 
trade skills at a premium. Lastly, the Gazette acknowledged the role of the Apprenticeship 
Division of the Department of Labour in promoting apprenticeship.45 Because of the specific 
nature of the New Zealand economy at the time, the growth of the skilled trades was not 
uniform. Thus, trades that were essential to the construction industry, and those that supplied 
in-demand consumer goods and services, boomed. The carpentry and joinery trade accounted 
for nearly twenty-five per cent of the 3488 new apprentices in 1951, followed by motor 
43 AJHR, E-l, 1946-1956. 
44 'Apprenticeship in New Zealand', LEG, 12(2), May 1962. 
4S 'Apprenticeship Trends in NZ', LEG, 9(1), February 1959,21. 
engineering (16.6 per cent), electrical (8.9 per cent), engineering (8.8 per cent) and the 
furniture trade (8 per cent). 46 
Figure 8: Apprenticeship Numbers, 1945-1960 47 
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Apprenticeship Publicity 
Apprenticeship Weeks, an initiative of the Wellington Metal Trades Employers' 
Association, were held in the mid-1950s to publicise apprenticeship. In ~hristchurch, an 
Apprenticeship Week was held in November 1956. The week was organised by a committee 
elected from interested parties, with donations to cover costs being sought from both worker 
and employer groups. The aim of the week was not seen as a full-scale recruitment drive, 
rather it was to "encourage boys [sic] to take up a number of trades in those industries where 
the numerical strength of the skilled labour force has become unbalanced".48 Of particular 
46 'Apprentice Trends in New Zealand Industries ', LEG, 2(2), August 1952. 
47 AJHR, 1945-1960, H-ll; "In Armed Forces" refers to those apprentices still serving in the armed forces . 
48 New Zealand Carpentry and Joinery Industry Apprenticeship Committee Minutes: Report on Apprenticeship 
Week held in Christchurch, 5-11 November 1965, 1v1B 26, A9, 3E. 
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concern were the low numbers attracted to the related trades to carpentry and joinery: 
plumbing, electrical, plastering and bricklaying. The Commissioner of Apprenticeship, in an 
address to the Master Builders' Federation in March 1955, argued that the campaign to attract 
apprentices to the building industry had been too successful, and had disturbed the correct 
ratio between the trades.49 It was hoped that the week would also promote a higher social 
status for apprentices and further the acceptance of the importance of craftsmanship, stressing 
also the higher standards of skill required for modern industry. 50 
The week was marked with a large procession, incorporating three bands, 36 floats and 
500 apprentices. There were window displays, an exhibit at the Agricultural and Pastoral 
Show and a variety concert. The Mayor of Christchurch and Sir Arthur Tyndall, Judge of the 
Court of Arbitration, addressed this concert. The concert featured a play written and produced 
by an apprentice, Mr L.R. Bloxham, which portrayed an ordinary working day in an 
apprentice's life.51 An Apprenticeship Week held in Taranaki in 1958 was described as 
"successful in drawing attention to the place of apprenticeship and craftsmanship in the 
community".52 Apprentices who studied at the Southland Technical College built a miniature 
house, which was exhibited at the Royal Agricultural and Pastoral Show. Apprenticeship was 
also brought to the attention of the country by Bank of New South Wales travel scholarships. 
These scholarships were established in 1958, and gave a top apprentice in the building trade 
and the plumbing trade each a trip to Australia. The apprentices were encouraged to study new 
construction methods, and to bring the knowledge back to their employers, and the industry in 
general, in New Zealand. 53 
Technical Education 
The emphasis on the technical education of apprentices continued, with attendance at 
classes becoming the norm. The small number of apprentices in many scattered settlements 
made technical education problematic, and centralised courses were developed in response to 
this. Block courses were introduced for the building and automotive trades and increasing use 
was made of the Education Department's Technical Correspondence School.54 The school had 
developed from the study course unit of the Army Education and Welfare Service, which had 
49 'Apprenticeships in the Building Industry', LEG 5(2), May 1955, 34. 
50 New Zealand Carpentry and Joinery Industry Apprenticeship Committee Minutes: Report on Apprenticeship 
Week held in Christchurch, 5-11 November 1965, ME 26, A9, 3E. 
51 Ibid. 
52 AJHR, 1959, H-ll, 2l. 
53 'Apprentices' Scholarship', LEG, 15(4), February 1965. 
54 'Daylight Training of Apprentices', LEG, 5(1), February 1955. 
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run correspondence courses in technical and agricultural subjects for service personnel 
during the war. In 1946, the unit became the Technical Correspondence School, incorporating 
the few existing correspondence trade courses run from Wellington.55 
Changes in the post-war period had a profound effect on the technical high schools. 
The school leaving age was raised to fifteen in 1944, bringing into high schools many young 
people who would otherwise have finished their schooling at the primary level. The 
. introduction of School Certificate, with compulsory core subjects, required technical schools 
to move away from their purely vocational focus and offer some general courses. The 
compulsory vocational education component of the Apprenticeship Act 1948 meant that the 
technical schools were now obliged to conduct classes purely for apprentices in both the 
evening and, in some cases, during the day, while vocational instruction for intending 
apprentices became less relevant. Thus, the workload and scope of the technical schools 
changed dramatically. 56 
By 1953, daylight technical classes were operating in eleven trades in a variety of 
centres, and in 1954 nearly 6000 apprentices, 40 per cent of all apprentices, attended daylight 
training or courses. 57 In 1956, over 5000 apprentices sat examinations prepared by the New 
Zealand Trades Certification Board.58 The Board had been created in 1948 under the auspices 
of the New Zealand Trades Certification Act. The Act was initiated by a consultative 
committee set up by the Minister of Education in 1947, after the Commission of Inquiry into 
Apprenticeship had recommended the Education Department's technological examinations 
should be revised and more extensively used. The Trades Certification Board (TCB) met 
monthly and comprised representatives from the Education Department, worker and employer 
organisations, secondary and technical schools, and industry organisations. 59 The Plumbers, 
Drainlayers and Gasfitters Registration Board, the New Zealand Motor Trade Certification 
Board and the Electricians Registration Board, all of which were statutory bodies in existence 
when the TCB was set up, retained their power to set examinations and register the successful 
candidates in their respective trades.60 
55 Vocational Training Council, Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training in New Zealand: A Preliminary 
Report to the Vocational Training Council (Wellington: VTC, August 1974), AAOC, 3478, Box 8, NA, 
Wellington, 8. 
56 Report of the Commission on Education in New Zealand, 1962,380. 
57 Ibid. 
58 AJHR, 1956, H-ll. 
59 'Examinations for Apprentices', LEG, 4(3), August 1954. 
60 Vocational Training Council, Review of Apprenticeship: Discussion Paper (Wellington: VTC, 1978), 10. 
The second Labour government, elected in 1957, had a strong focus on both 
education and industrial development. The government organised a conference on technical 
education 1958, and appointed in 1960 a Commission of Education to assess the state 
education system.61 The conference on technical education was held in Lower Hutt in April 
1958. In his opening address, the Minister of Education, Phil Skoglund, argued that "the 
Department of Education and the business world should work together for one object - that 
was to increase the technical standing of the people of New Zealand and to ensure that New 
Zealand produced better tradesmen, better technicians and better technologists".62 
89 
The brief for the conference was to ascertain if there were any unsatisfied needs for 
technical education, and if so, to assess both the needs and the administrative machinery 
available to quantify them, and present those findings to the government. It had been 
suggested at an earlier conference that New Zealand should develop a tiered system of 
technical education, with local and regional institutes, and 'central' colleges that would cater 
for national courses. It was decided to develop the Hutt Valley Technical School into such a 
college. This was achieved by "the practical step of virtually closing all courses for girls in the 
day school (making) much needed space available for the development of further technical 
classes".63 The 1958 conference emphasised the need for industry to make its needs known to 
the technical schools: 
Industry ... is a somewhat loose aggregation of units which, with a few notable 
exceptions, lacks the means of assessing its own needs, or, having done so, of 
communicating them to the education service through an accredited mouthpiece. 64 
The commitment to technical education was strengthened with establishment of the 
New Zealand Council for Technical Education, set up by the Minister of Education in 1958. 
The Commissioner of Apprenticeship was made an ex officio member of the Council, and of 
the New Zealand Trades Certification Board, ensuring a "close liaison between apprenticeship 
work and the authorities concerned with technical education and apprentice examinations".65 
This liaison was cemented by attempting to have strong industry involvement in the 
development of examination prescriptions. Examinations were only instituted at the request of 
the industry involved, and employer and worker organisations worked closely with the 
61 Graeme Dunstall, "The Social Pattern," in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. G.W. Rice 
~Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996),467. 
2 Department of Education, Report of the Conference on Technical Education (Wellington: Department of 
Education, April 1958),6. MS Papers 4962, Alexander Turnbull Library (AT), Wellington. 
63 Ibid., 6. 
64 Ibid., 6. 
65 AJHR, 1959, H-ll, 21. 
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technical schools to ensure that the prescriptions were closely related to the need of the 
industry. As each new examination was developed, the Education Department abolished the 
old technological examination for that trade, although the Department still handled the 
machinery for setting the examinations. The examination format settled quickly into a system 
that is still used in many industries; First Qualification (at the end of the first or second year), 
Second Qualification, Trade Certificate (at the completion of the apprenticeship) and 
Advanced Trade Certificate (for study after the completion of the apprenticeship). Incentive 
payments were introduced in many trades. A typical rate in the early 1950s would have been 
an extra 2/6 shillings per week for passing First Qualification and an extra 5 shillings per week 
for Second Qualification.66 
Table 3 illustrates both the increases in the numbers of apprentices receiving some 
form of technical education, and the changes in the delivery of that education. The numbers 
receiving technical education had doubled over the decade. Day classes clearly fell out of 
favour during the 1960s, being replaced in the main with block courses of varying lengths. 
Correspondence courses also became a more popular option. 
Table 3: Numbers of Apprentices Receiving Technical Education, 1959-1969 67 
Type of Technical 1959 
Education 
Attending local day classes 3731 
Attending block courses 4616 
Attending compulsory 4098 
evening classes 
Taking technical 1972 
correspondence courses 
Total 14417 
66 'Examinations for Apprentices', LEG, 4(3), August 1954, 30. 
67 A.JHR 1959& 1969,H-ll. 
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The Building Industry 
The building industry is often regarded as a barometer of the well-being of the 
country's economy. Thus, with the post-war boom years, the industry rapidly expanded as the 
demand for housing, schools, hospitals and other construction soared. This demand, coupled 
with reduced numbers of young people available to take up apprenticeships, resulted in a 
chronic shortage of labour in the industry. The building industry accounted for 43.5 per cent of 
all new apprentices in 1952 and 45.9 per cent in 1954.68 Figure 9 illustrates clearly the 
connection between the state of the economy and the strength of the building industry, notably 
the 'slump' in the 1930s and the 'boom' in the post-war period.69 
Figure 9: Apprentices in the Building Industry, 1928-1954 70 
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Apprentice Wages 
A survey conducted by the Department of Labour in 1955 showed that actual rates paid 
to apprentices were not greatly above the minimum rated specified in apprenticeship orders. 
Five trades were surveyed, representing more than one third of the fifteen and a half thousand 
apprentices throughout New Zealand. The average margin above the minimum rate was 5.8 
per cent when the figures for all of the trades, and the differing periods of service, were 
combined.71 A significant decision made by the Court of Arbitration in June 1957 increased 
the proportions of the journeyman's wage paid to motor industry apprentices. The new scale 
commenced at 32 per cent for the first 1000 hours, compared with 23 per cent, and rose in five 
per cent increments. This meant that the mean payment over the whole of the apprenticeship 
period became 54.5 per cent, compared with 50 per cent under the old regime.72 
The New Zealand Engineering, Coach-building, Aircraft and Related Trades Industrial 
Union of Workers had argued in support of this claim that more attractive rates were necessary 
to encourage apprentices. They claimed that rates had fallen behind the ruling journeyman 
rates (as opposed to the minimum rates), and the wages of public sector apprentices and 
unskilled workers?3 The Union also argued that apprentices' starting wages should at least 
"adequately feed, clothe and shelter them without being subsidised by their parents".74 The 
application was clearly a test case for other industries, and as such had the support of the 
Federation of Labour. While the Arbitration Court declined to grant the full terms of the 
Union's application (which would have generated an average rate of 57.5 per cent of a 
journeyman's wage), it found that "the contentions of the union are broadly supported, 
particularly in regard to commencing rates".75 Thus, the scale agreed upon restored the 
differential between the commencing rates for apprenticed and unapprenticed workers that had 
existed in 1945?6 
Margins for Skill 
The comparative rates of apprentices and journeymen were not the only cause for 
concern. The 'margin for skill', that is, "the amounts by which the wage rates for indentured 
tradesmen or workers with equivalent trade skills and experience exceed wage rates for 
71 'Ruling Rates of Apprentice Wages', LEG, 6(1), February 1956. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Arbitration Court Order, NZ Motor Industry Apprenticeship Order, June 1957, MB 26, A9, 4A 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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unskilled workers", was a crucial component of maintaining the status and differentiation of 
the apprenticed trades.77 The post-war labour shortages had translated into relatively high 
wages for all sectors of the labour market, and there was a perception that traditional 'margins 
for skill' had been eroded. Two reasons were suggested for this change; first, the "levelling 
effect exercised on incomes by our egalitarian thinking in New Zealand", and second, the 
emphasis of trade union activity on lifting the incomes of the lowest paid workers, rather than 
maintaining margins for skilled workers.78 The parameters of the margin for skill were set by 
the Arbitration Court's Standard Wage Pronouncements. These indicated the wage levels the 
Court considered appropriate for skilled~ semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and "fixed a 
stable hierarchy of relative wages which became the central consideration in all wage 
bargaining .. . and enabled the Court to exercise a high degree of control over wage 
negotiations.,,79 Figure 10 shows the margins specified by the Standard Wage Pronouncements 
from 1919 to 1952. 
Figure 10: Percentage Margin between Skilled and Unskilled Rates Specified by Standard 
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Some trades had more success at retaining margins for skill. A study of the New 
Zealand Metal Trades Employees' Award from 1938 to 1962 compared the cash and 
percentage margins between fitters and engineering labourers. This showed that, while during 
the war and immediate post-war years the margins fluctuated, narrowing slightly overall, from 
1953 onward both the cash and percentage margins increased (see Figure 11).81 This was as 
the result of intense lobbying of the Court by the union, rather than any initiative of the Court 
itself. 82 The union representatives claimed that the reduction in percentage margins had led to 
skilled workers leaving the trades for well-paid unskilled work, and that the margins were 
insufficient to attract the required number of young people to the engineering trade. The union 
also claimed that with lesser margins, it would take up to nineteen years before the total wages 
of a tradesman who had served an apprenticeship would reach the total wages of someone who 
had left school and been employed as an unskilled worker. 83 
Figure 11: New Zealand Metal Trades Employees' Award, Minimum Award Percentage 
Margins between Fitters and Engineering Labourers, 1938-1962 84 
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Concern was also expressed about margins for skill in the rapidly growing electrical 
industry. Mr Goosman, the Minister in Charge of the State Hydro-electric Department, argued 
as he introduced the 1952 Electrician's Bill that "people who go to the trouble and time to 
undergo training and become skilled should have their skill recognised". 85 The Bill proposed, 
among other things, increasing the term of an electrician's apprenticeship from three to five 
years, differentiating in registration between electricians and electrical servicemen and making 
provision for limited registration. Mr Dudfield, the member for Gisborne, in the same debate 
claimed that young people were discouraged from entering the trade because of the lengthy 
apprenticeship, the high starting wages of unskilled work, and the arbitrary nature of the 
completion of the apprenticeship being reliant upon passing one final examination. He also 
deplored the "stupid stigma attaching to the wearing of overalls, the stupid stigma of looking 
down upon people working with their hands and the glorification of the 'white collar' 
. " 86 occupatIons . 
Maori Trade Training 
There is little doubt that the history of apprenticeship in New Zealand is predominantly 
a male, Pakeha, story. In the early 1950s, however, the rapidly growing Maori population 
came into consideration, both as a potential problem and as an under-utilised resource. The 
accelerating urbanisation of Maori, especially in the North Island, caused concern about 
possible crime and delinquency on the part of urban Maori. Many rura1 Maori were living a 
semi-subsistence existence, and there was a lack of employment opportunities for young 
Maori in country areas.87 However, the "almost insuperable difficulty" of finding 
accommodation prevented them from gettingjobs or training in townS.88 In line with the 
assimilationist ethos of the time, the Secretary of Labour, H.L. Bockett, planned to absorb the 
Maori population into full employment. This would not only aid Maori but would also help 
counter the severe labour shortage New Zealand was facing. To this end, hostels were set up in 
Auckland and Wellington in 1951 and in Rotorua in 1955. These hostels catered for Maori 
apprentices, mainly employed in carpentry and joinery, and in motor engineering.89 
Despite these efforts the situation was little improved by 1959. The Labour and 
Employment Gazette, in an article entitled 'Maori Carpenters from the Back-blocks', stated 
85 NZPD, 298, 19-24 August 1952, p.1751. 
86 Ibid, 1757. 
87 Martin, Holding the Balance, 264. 
88 'Special Hostels Help Maori Youths into Worthwhile Employment', LEG, 3(1), February 1953, 34. 
89 Martin, Holding the Balance, 266. 
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that of 1254 male Maori schoolleavers in 1959, only 187 (14.9 per cent) proposed to enter a 
skilled trade, compared with 25.5 per cent for schoolleavers as a whole. The isolation and 
limited employment opportunities of the 76 per cent of Maori who lived in rural areas was 
cited as the main reason for this, and in 1958 the Maori Affairs Department decided to open a 
carpentry training centre in Auckland. Accommodation, transport and tools were provided for 
the apprentices, with an intake of ten being selected from surrounding rural areas. The full-
time, two-year course was designed to allow the apprentices to "experience all aspects of 
carpentry and joinery and to permit them to acquire a full and balanced range of tradesmen's 
skills".9o (See Illustration 2). The Centre was pronounced a great success, with the intake 
being doubled in 1960). 
Illustration 2: "Skilled Maori Workers Engaged on the War Memorial Museum, Auckland" 
(February 1961) 91 
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The small numbers of recruits to the trade training schemes, however, could not 
disguise inequalities between Maori and Pakeha: "the quickening pace of social change 
heightened the awareness of disparities in housing, educational attainment, employment, and 
income".92 These disparities were highlighted by the 1961 Hunn Report, which pointed to 
Department of Education policies that had kept Maori poorly educated: "the report identified a 
'statistical black -out of Maori at the higher levels of schooling". 93 This translated to a 
concentration of Maori in unskilled occupations. The Hunn Report recommended 'integration' 
(as opposed to assimilation), a change of emphasis that easily incorporated the trade training 
schemes. 94 
Maori trade training schemes were described in 1967 as "a small manpower mobility 
scheme"; a sound model of how New Zealand's labour needs could be met from internal, 
rather than external migration.95 The Auckland centre had been expanded, with courses 
offered in plumbing, electrical wiring and motor mechanics, as well as carpentry. Training 
centres had also been opened in Christchurch and Wellington. There was a yearly intake of 
156, with the apprentices being employed by the Department of Maori Affairs and receiving 
normal apprentice wages. The problems that had been identified in the 1950s were no closer to 
being solved, however. The already high rate of urbanisation was increasing, but new 
'migrants' to the city were more likely to contribute 'raw labour' to the workforce than skill. 
Only ten per cent of Maori school-Ieavers took up apprenticeships, compared with about thirty 
per cent for all New Zealand male schoolleavers. 96 
The role of the trade training schemes, then, was to ease the transition for young Maori 
from isolated rural areas to the 'bustling' cities. The schemes aimed to "transform potential 
labourers into skilled tradesmen ... (providing them) with intensive theoretical and practical 
instruction ... and helping them to adapt to the complexities of city life".97 By 1966 more than 
600 Maori, predominantly from North Island rural areas, had passed through the centres, 
earning the general acclaim of employers and technical school staff. No doubt the centres were 
run with the best of intentions. The following passage, however, indicates the prevailing 
attitudes: 
92 Dunstall, "The Social Pattern", 477. 
93 Ranginui J. Walker, "Maori People Since 1950," in The Oiford History of New Zealand. 2ud ed., ed. G.W. Rice 
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it is important to remember that the ancestors of the present-day Maori were skilled 
craftsmen and that Maoris [sic] tend to be good with their hands. All that most of them 
need is the right training, encouragement and opportunity to develop into first-class 
tradesmen. When they find ajob in which they can be happy, Maoris [sic] tend to be 
loyal stable workers. 98 
Throughout the 1960s concerns were periodically expressed about the Maori trade 
training scheme. These concerns revolved around two main issues; the number of hours 
served, and the recruitment of apprentices. The 1963 minutes of the New Zealand Carpentry 
and Joinery Apprenticeship Committee recorded that the New Zealand Carpenters' Union was 
in favour of the provisions for an 8000 hour term for Maori trainees, with 4000 hours spent at 
a technical institute and 4000 on the job. In fact, the union considered that "the good results of 
the scheme justified its adoption for all apprentices".99 Some of the Builders' Associations, 
however, were concerned that the number of hours was not adequate, although this was not 
reflected in the ability of the apprentices to get jobs. 1OO For example, the minutes of the 
November 1961 meeting of the committee showed that all of that year's graduates had been 
placed with Auckland firms. Concern was expressed, however, that this could deprive 'local 
boys' of apprenticeships. 101 
The recruitment oftrainees was also an issue. In 1962, a letter to the Commissioner of 
Apprenticeships, H. C. McQueen, from the Secretary of the Christchurch Trades Hall, Frank 
Langley, accused the Maori Affairs Department of being "prone to disregard(ing) the 
conditions laid down by the New Zealand (Apprenticeship) Committee ... there could be 
favours for certain City boys at the expense ofthose from remote areas". 102 The May 1963 
minutes of the New Zealand Carpentry and Joinery Apprenticeship Committee expressed 
concerns about the admittance of 'city boys' to the Maori trade training scheme. It was felt 
that the scheme was designed expressly for rural Maori, or in special cases disadvantaged 
urban Maori, who would not otherwise have th~ opportunity to take up an apprenticeship.l03 
As late as 1970 the committee challenged a Maori and Island Affairs Department 
memorandum that pointed out that the 1969 National Development Conference had 
recommended that the Maori trade training scheme be open to urban as well as rural Maori. 
98 Ibid., 15. 
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The committee declared itself"not in favour of this proposal- urban Maori should enter 
apprenticeships through the normal channels". 104 
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The Maori trade training schemes were significant for three reasons. First, they set a 
precedent for targeted training schemes. Despite some of the questionable assumptions 
guiding the schemes, they dealt with the reality that many Maori were disadvantaged in the 
labour market. Second, the type of training offered by the schemes, a period of intensive 
theoretical education, followed by practical experience, would come to provide a model for 
later developments in the organisation of apprenticeship. Third, the schemes did provide a 
conduit to the urban, Pakeha world for a small number of Maori. Research into the long-term 
careers of graduates of the Maori trade training schemes would be very interesting, 
particularly (in terms of informal recruitment cycles) the number who went on to become self-
employed. 
Stability and a general consensus regarding apprenticeship training thus marked the 
post-war era. The finer details of apprenticeship orders may have been strongly contested, but 
there was little argument that it was the most appropriate way in which to ensure a skilled 
workforce. The 1962 Report of the Commission on Education labeled the changes in the 
apprenticeship system that had occurred in the late 1940s as "nothing less than revolutionary" 
and described them as "bold educational landmarks", especially the adoption of two years 
post-primary education as a minimum requirement for most apprenticeships. 105 Although 
some difficulties were identified with apprenticeship, it was generally agreed that the system 
was well suited to conditions in New Zealand. 106 
Economic and social changes from the mid 1960s, however, would highlight those 
difficulties inherent in the system. The length of time taken to train and the fixed nature of the 
skills taught would come to be seen as barriers to responsiveness to the demands of industry. 
The end of full employment would show the vulnerability of apprentice intakes to economic 
fluctuations, and the need for better planning would become a consistent theme. The two 
decades after the end of the Second World War thus cocooned the apprenticeship system. This 
allowed important changes to be made, such as the emphasis on technical education, but also 
meant that other aspects of the system solidified, and would prove impervious to change, 
regardless of increasing external pressures. 
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CHAPTERSJX 
THE END OF THE GOLDEN WEATHER: 1965-1977 
This chapter traces the effect on the apprenticeship system of the gradual umavelling 
of much of the economic and social stability that had been taken for granted during the two 
decades after the Second World War. The vulnerability of apprentice intakes to economic 
conditions had become a distant memory with a strong economy and full employment. Thus, 
when intakes dropped in the 1967-68 recession, and again in the late 1970s, intervention was 
called for to smooth the cyclic fluctuations. Technological changes, and the reality of 
increasing skill levels in some occupations, and the deskilling of others, highlighted rigidities 
in the apprenticeship system. Technical education assumed a greater importance, and debates 
about the most effective way to deliver that education occurred throughout the period. Change 
was slow, however, constrained by the climate of industrial relations, the reluctance of the 
government to commit extra funding, and the desire of many of the participants in 
apprenticeship to maintain the status quo. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the end of what has been characterised as a 'social 
democratic consensus'. 1 Full employment, a relatively high standard of living and the general 
acceptance of a high degree of state involvement both in the economy and in the provision of 
services marked this consens~s. The consensus was underpinned by a strong rate of economic 
growth, with little outward questioning of the basis of that economic security. Thus, when 
economic stability was threatened by Britain's entry into the European Common Market, the 
oil-price rises of the early 1970s, and inflation and rising unemployment (see Figure 12), the 
political scene also bec~me volatile. The breakdown of consensus was also evident in the social 
fabric of New Zealand society. Issues that had simmered largely below the level of public 
awareness came to the boil; women's rights and the growing assertiveness of Maori, for 
example. Successive governments thus attempted to maintain the 'consensus', while trying to 
cope with enormous pressures, both internally and externally. 2 
I Nicola Armstrong, "State," in New Zealand SOCiety. 2nd ed., ed. P. Spoonley, D. Pearson & 1. Shirley 
(Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press Ltd, 1994). 
2 Ibid. 
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The Commission of Inquiry into Vocational Training, 1965 (The Tyndall Commission) 
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A Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the Ministers of Labour and Education in 
1965 to inquire into vocational training. It was to report on the need for "change, expansion or 
new developments" in vocational training, in light of the expected population growth and 
economic development of New Zealand over the following twenty-five years.4 Sir Arthur 
Tyndall, Judge of the Court of Arbitration chaired the Commission, and its members were H.L. 
Bockett, the Secretary of Labour; one technical education representative; two employer 
representatives; and two union representatives. s H.C. McQueen serviced the Commission; thus, 
the positions of chair and secretary of the 1965 inquiry were filled by the same people who had 
run the 1945 Commission of Inquiry twenty years previously. The Commission met in 
Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington and Christchurch, visiting technical institutes and workshops 
in each city, before hearing submissions from over one hundred parties. 6 
3 Martin, Holding the Balance, 383 . 
4 Report o/Commission o/Inquiry into Vocational Training, (Wellington: Government Printer, 1965),2. 
5 Ibid. Both of the union representatives died during the course of the Commission's proceedings and had to be 
replaced. One of these was Frank Langley, the long-standing secretary of the Carpenters and Joiners Union in 
Canterbury . 
6 Ibid. 
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The introduction to the Commission's report highlighted the changes that new 
technology had brought to industry in New Zealand, and pointed to the growing demand for 
the 'recently evolved' class of worker, the technician. The Commission was generally happy 
with the way in which vocational training was delivered, and painted a picture of incremental 
changes and modifications to the system as being the most appropriate. It is interesting to 
compare their call for measured change with what occurred in the later years of the twentieth 
century: 
Perhaps changes .can be made more quickly than they have sometimes occurred. On the 
question of the rate of change we have some reservations. All changes in human 
institutions, other than those brought about by violent revolution, involve a process of 
persuasion applied to those affected by the changes. The most effective mode of 
persuasion is by demonstration that the change will work; New Zealanders are not 
often convinced by purely theoretical argument. Thus time is required for change. 7 
An example of submissions to the Commission was that of the New Zealand 
Carpenters and Joiners Union. The submission pointed to the unstable and chaotic state of the 
building industry, and argued strongly for industry planning. The union claimed that this was 
necessary to counter labour shortages, which had been exacerbated by the post-war 
construction boom, and the number of tradespeople seeking higher wages and job security in 
other areas. The union thus called for higher wages, both for tradespeople and apprentices, and 
for efficient and adequate training, with a suggestion that the Maori trade training concept of 
full-time training centres could be applied to the building industry as a-whole. The union was 
vehemently opposed to employers' demands to end the quota system: 
How can any country train the number of tradesmen needed by the industry without 
having a quota system and also a long term planned industry. The only alternative ... is 
an unlimited intake, ten men for nine jobs, and the employers' Utophia [sic] ofa pool 
of unemployed tradesmen, and the complete negation of the principle that young men 
must surely be entitled to expect some security in their chosen careers. 8 
Public sector apprenticeship was the subject of other submissions to the Commission. 
It was argued that the conditions for government apprentices were often 'old-fashioned' when 
compared with the private sector, with no time credits given for prior educational 
qualifications or examination passes, for example.9 While some government apprentices had 
similar syllabi to their private sector counterparts, there was a variation in the skills taught and 
7 Ibid., 9. 
8 New Zealand Carpenters, Joiners, Joiners' Machinists, and (except Otago & Southland) Plasterers and (except 
Auckland) Bricklayers and Related Trades Industrial Union of Workers, Submissions to the Commission of 
Inquiry into Vocational Training, 1965. MS Papers 4962, AT, Wellington. 
9 Report of Commission of Inquiry into Vocational Training in New Zealand, 1965,20. 
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examinations sat in some areas. 10 Indeed, some trades existed only in the public sector, the 
electrical fitters trained by the New Zealand Electricity Department, for example. 11 However, 
suggestions that government apprentices should be incorporated into the Apprentices Act were 
considered inadvisable by the Commission, because of the close links between that Act and 
the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, with wage negotiations for government 
employees occurring in a different forum from the Arbitration Court. 12 
The Commission was convinced that the current apprenticeship system was basically 
sound, with any suggested modifications able to be put in place through the existing 
legislation.13 One of the main concerns of the Commission was the high termination rate of 
apprenticeships and it recommended that New Zealand apprenticeship committees consider the 
length of term of apprenticeships to help counter this. 14 The submission made by the New 
Zealand Public Service Association also considered the period of apprenticeship to be too long. 
It argued for a substantial initial period of full-time training, with the use of specialist technical 
schools to compress the time taken to gain skills and knowledge. The Association called for 
free transfer of apprentices between employers to increase the breadth of training and better 
supervision of on-job training. The status of the trades should also be raised, according to the 
Association, with adequate margins for skill and rewards for merit. IS Following the 
Commission's findings, reduced terms were introduced in many trades (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Examples of Reductions in Apprenticeship Hours from 1965 t6 
Trade Term Before Term after Further 
1965 1965 Possible Credits 
Carpentry 10 000 hours 9000 hours 2000 hours 
Furniture 10 000 hours 8000 hours -
Engineering 10 000 hours 9000 hours 1000 hours 
Plumbing 12 000 hours 10 000 hours 
-
10 Apprenticeshipjor Tomorrow, AJHR, 1981, G-39, 19. 
11 VTC, Review oj Apprenticeship: Discussion Paper, 1978, 11. 
12 Report ojCommission oj Inquiry into Vocational Training in New Zealand, 1965,20. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
14 VTC, Current Developments in Apprenticeship, 1975, 19. 
Minimum 
Possible Term 
7000 hours 
8000 hours 
8000 hours 
10 000 hours 
15 New Zealand Public Service Association, Submissions to the Commission oj Inquiry into Vocational Training, 
1965. MS Papers 1721 Folder 3, AT, Wellington. 
16 Department of Labour, Report to the Vocational Training Council's Committee on Apprenticeship (Wellington: 
Manpower Planning Unit, Department of Labour, 1972),31. 
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The Commission also argued, however, that some trades could require even longer 
apprenticeship terms than previously offered because of the expansion of skills, and believed 
that "there must be a minimum period of actual workshop experience for each apprentice". 17 
The reasons given for this to a degree challenge the emphasis placed in later developments on 
competency, rather than time-serving. The Commission first argued that many apprentices 
were being trained in a maintenance and servicing capacity, rather than as actual 
manufacturing workers. Indeed, increasing levels of automation in factories caused the 
Commission to ask whether apprenticeship was necessary for production workers in some 
industries. Thus, if the main function of many apprentices was in servicing and maintenance, 
they needed sufficient workshop time to experience a variety of work, and to gain a wide range 
of skills. Second, the Commission acknowledged the social aspect of apprenticeship: 
Apart from what he learns by way of formal instruction, there are some things that he 
can acquire only by a process of "rubbing-off' from experienced men. Some things, 
too, must become second nature by repetition, a process that takes time. To these 
aspects of strictly trade training there must be added the need for an apprentice. .. to 
become an adult, physically and socially ... This process of growing up can go on most 
effectively in the real world of the workplace. 18 
The Commission was also concerned with improving the formal training components 
of apprenticeship, with calls for investigation into pre-apprenticeship courses (with the Maori 
trade training schemes being held up as a possible model) and improvements in the delivery of 
on-the-job training. It recommended that apprentice wages and lodging allowances be raised, 
and stressed the need for great care in the recruitment and selection of apprentices. The 
Commission was aware ofthe growing pace of technological change, and suggested a review 
and revision of the list of skills required for various trades. 19 
The Commission recommended the setting up of an independent organisation to co-
ordinate vocational training. The Vocational Training Council (VTC) was established by 
statute in 1968 and charged with advising government, industry and business organisations on 
the delivery and improvement of training practices. The VTC was also to have a role in 
manpower planning by assisting industries to forecast their future labour requirements. The 
Council was chaired initially by P. Laing, a former Commissioner of Works, and comprised 
employer, worker and educational organisation representatives. The main focus of the Council 
was at the industry level, with industries encouraged to form industry training boards to 
17 Report oj Commission oj Inquiry into Vocational Training, 1965, 12. 
18 Ibid., 12. 
19 Ibid., 15;21. 
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delineate occupational classifications and organise training programmes. Training boards 
were funded by incentive grants, first approved in the 1971 budget, rather than by the 
compulsory, levy-based system introduced in Britain with the Industrial Training Act 1964.20 
The first Industry Training Board (ITB) to be approved was the Contracting and Waterfront 
ITB in 1971, and there were 24 ITBs in place by 1974.21 
Margins for Skill: the Debate Continues 
Concern about tl,te compression of the percentage margin for skilled workers 
continued. Decreasing margins set by the Arbitration Court had worsened the erosion of 
margins for skill. This was compounded by award wages being increased by a monetary sum, 
rather than a percentage; the scarcity of semi and unskilled labour; and the "less aggressive 
bargaining approach of the craft unions"?2 Indeed, "the campaign to reverse the declining 
position of the skilled tradesmen became the central issue of concern to the craft unions during 
the 1960s".23 The means chosen by the Court to restore the margin for skill was payments for 
qualifications held by tradespeople. It was felt that as only the skilled trades had such 
qualifications, payment on this basis would enable recognition of skill without "triggering a 
relativity-based increase throughout the wage structure".24 
The issue of margins for skill was tested by a case brought before the Court of 
Arbitration in September 1965. While in the past individual unions had argued for increased 
margins for skill, this was the first time that a general submission, organised by the Federation 
of Labour, had been made. The submission was made at the behest of the Court, which 
claimed reluctance to make such a far-reaching decision on the basis of individual awards?5 
The submission requested that, rather than making a pronouncement on a minimum wage, the 
Court "express the appropriate wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers".26 It 
was suggested that this differential should be about 36 per cent. The Court expressed 
sympathy with the FOL's case: 
20 'The Role of the Vocational Training Council', LEG, 21(4), November 1971. 
21 L. Pearce & R. Stuart, "Impact of the Vocational Training Council and Industry Training Boards on New 
Zealand Industry," A paper presented to the Second National Industry Training Committees Conference (Sydney, 
July 1978). 
22 Walsh, "In Recognition of Skill: The Growth of Qualification Payments, 1960-1980", 83. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 84. 
25 Ibid., 85. 
26 'Arbitration Court Urges that Margins be Fixed by Negotiation', LEG, 15(4), November 1965, 32. 
Existing award margins are hardly sufficient compensation for the skilled worker 
and it is in the national interest that the inducement for qualifications and 
responsibilities be increased. It is also important that apprentices be attracted to the 
skilled trades. 27 
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The Court, however, in an "extraordinary about-face", declined the application, 
arguing that margins were better fixed on a case-by-case basis that took into account the 
context of the individual industry and changes within that industry. The workers' 
representative, Archie Grant, strongly dissented with this decision.28 The Court also took both 
unions and employers to task for not adhering to the principle that realistic margins should be 
related to "genuine skill and responsibility": 
In some cases the parties have insisted on artificial classifications of skill and have 
thereby prevented true margins for skill being created. Moreover, where improved 
methods of work have resulted in skilled operations being broken down into various 
less skilled operations suitable for semi-skilled or unskilled workers, there has been a 
tendency to insist that these less skilled workers be paid at skilled rates. The effect has 
been to downgrade the truly skilled worker and depress his [sic] margin. 29 
The role ofthe state sector was crucial during the margins for skill debate, as public 
service wage settlements closely mirrored those delivered by the Arbitration Court. Payments 
for qualifications granted by the Court in 1962 were quickly picked up by the Railways 
Industrial Tribunal, which awarded a payment for indentured railways tradesmen. This soon 
became a standard payment for all state sector tradesmen. A similar pr.ocess occurred in 1967 
as, again following the Arbitration Court, the Railways Industrial Tribunal granted an 
application for an extra 6d per hour for indentured tradesmen. This also was quickly extended 
to the remainder of the state sector, and became known as the 'tradesman's sixpence'. This 
surri became crucial in the bargaining process, as the private sector unions moved to regain 
relativity with their state sector counterparts in a circular catch-up endeavour that led to the 
"leap-frogging relativity based bargaining spiral of 1969-70 (and the wage spiral associated 
with this)". 30 
The delicate balance of state wage negotiations was illustrated by the impact of the 
State Services Remuneration Act 1969, which ended the common wage rate paid to 
government tradespeople and removed the basis for long-standing internal wage relativities, 
both between trades, and between the apprenticed trades and 'unskilled' work. In November 
27 Ibid., 31. 
28 Walsh, "In Recognition of Skill: The Growth of Qualification Payments, 1960-1980",86. 
29, Arbitration Court Urges that Margins be Fixed by Negotiation', LEG, 15(4), November 1965, 32. 
30 Walsh, "In Recognition of Skill: The Growth of Qualification Payments, 1960-1980", 87. 
--. --' --_.-----' 
, . ,'-
107 
1970, the Railway Tradesmen's Association (RTA) threatened that its members would 
refuse to train the 167 new Railways apprentices to be taken on in 1971. This was to protest at 
the failure of the government to protect margins and incentives for those who had served an 
apprenticeship in the Railways. The other railway union, the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants (ASRS), did not support the action because they did not believe that apprentices 
should be used as a bargaining weapon. The Otahuhu Branch of the ASRS defied their 
national body, however, and pledged their support for the action "on the principle of good 
trade unionism ... of unity and moral support for fellow trade unionists in times of struggle". 31 
The dispute was resolved in January 1971, after a meeting between the president of the RTA, 
Doug Crosada, and the Minister of Railways, J. B. Gordon. The Minister promised to consider 
urgently a proposal put forward by the RTA "for possible changes to the legislation governing 
the employment of railway tradesmen, their status and the value of apprenticeship training 
within the railway service".32 The offer was on the understanding that any changes to wages or 
relativities would not have "inter-service implications".33 
The National Development Conference, 1968 and 1969 
By the late 1960s, there were calls for a more concerted effort in economic and 
manpower planning, which, until then had been largely ad hoc and uncoordinated.34 An 
attempt had been made to form a centralised planning agency in 1944 when the government 
established the Organisation for National Development. A lack of political and wider support, 
however, meant that the plans were soon "quietly shelved".35 The New Zealand apprenticeship 
committees were required by the Apprentices Act 1948 to estimate the manpower 
requirements of their industry and to take steps to ensure those requirements were satisfied. 36 
Although the committees discussed these functions in their early years, any attempts at 
manpower planning were hampered by the lack of available data with which to make 
estimates. There was also a chronic shortage of labour throughout the late 1940s and early 
1950s, coupled with a shortage of apprentices because of the low birth rates through the 
31 Railway Tradesmen's Association Files, Refusal to Train Apprentices, 197011971. Box 19, Folder 211, AT, 
Wellington. 
32 Gordon to Crosada, 26 January 1971, Railway Tradesmen's Association Files, Refusal to Train Apprentices, 
197011971. Box 19, Folder 211, AT, Wellington. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Gould, The Rake's Progress?, 134. 
35 Martin, Holding the Balance, 233. 
36 New Zealand Statutes, 1948,206. 
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1930s. In the face of this demand for all available workers, estimating the needs of any 
particular industry seemed a "futile exercise".37 
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A manpower planning unit was set up by the Department of Labour's Research Section 
in 1966, in response to ongoing labour shortages and regional disparities in employment. This 
unit was charged with attempting to "forecast the supply of and demand for labour by 
occupation, industry and region".38 The 1967-68 recession, however, raised the spectre of 
unemployment after twenty years of full employment, with 8000 people being registered as 
unemployed in the winter of 1968. Although the recession was short-lived, it altered the focus 
of manpower planning, with unemployment and the vulnerability to it of some sectors of 
society prompting calls for a more active labour market policy.39 The effect of the recession, 
especially on the building trades, is clearly illustrated by Figure 13. 
Figure 13 : New Apprenticeship Contracts for Selected Trades, 1961-1973 40 
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37 Report o/Commission o/Inquiry into Vocational Training, 1965, 42. 
38 Martin, Holding the Balance, 312. 
39 Ibid. 
40 'New Apprenticeship Contracts: Trend Projections' , LEG, 20(4), November 1970, 34; 'Trends in 
Apprenticeship Contracts - Past, Present & Future', LEG, 24(1), February 1974, 34. 
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There had been a growing recognition in some quarters throughout the 1960s that 
the New Zealand economy needed restructuring. It had become clear to some that traditional 
exports were no longer able to provide sufficient income for the levels of growth deemed 
acceptable by the country as a whole. Therefore, it was seen as necessary to expand 
manufactured exports, which in turn, required New Zealand to open its economy to 
international competition. This plan, however, was contentious, threatening as it did both the 
. supremacy of rural interests, and the protected manufacturing sector. The 1967-68 recession 
thus gave the reluctant National government the impetus it required to attempt to persuade the 
country of the need for restructuring. To this end a National Development Conference was 
organised, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, Jack Marshall. 41 
Plenary sessions of this Conference took place in August 1968 and May 1969. The aim 
of the Conference was to examine "the overall potential for economic growth, the consistency 
of the views of the future taken by the various sectors and the capital and other resource needs 
which they would imply".42 The key recommendations of the Conference were a 700 per cent 
increase in manufacturing over the following ten years, coupled with the gradual end of 
protection for manufacturers.43 A skilled labour force was identified as a key resource for the 
future development of the country. The report of the Education, Training and Research 
Committee to the Conference called for a "skilled and contented workforce", equipped with 
the ability to undergo the "continuing education and training necessary to master the 
demanding requirements of our modern complex and technological society".44 The 
Department of Labour's manpower planning unit was used to service the needs of the Labour 
Committee of the Conference by providing estimates of manpower needed to meet growth 
targets.45 
The ability of the apprenticeship system to provide the training required was 
questioned by some of the Conference representatives. A recommendation, based on 
submissions made by the Manufacturing Committee, proposed that: 
because New Zealand's reliance on the apprenticeship system for certain skills used in 
manufacturing has outlived its usefulness, the Government should give further 
consideration to the relevance of the system with a view to its replacement, alteration 
or supplementation as appropriate. 46 
41 S. Harvey Franklin, Trade, Growth and Anxiety (New Zealand: Methuen Publications, 1978),94. 
42 Gould, The Rake's Progress?, 134. 
43 Franklin, Trade, Growth and Anxiety, 94. 
44 National Development Conference. Second Plenary Session. Report of Proceedings, May 1969, 412. 
45 Martin, Holding the Balance, 312. 
46 National Development Conference, Recommendation 494, 440. 
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The discussion about the recommendation acknowledged that there was a need for reform 
of the apprenticeship system, but the comment was made that the recommendation was 
"throw(ing) the baby out with bathwater".47 It was agreed that apprenticeship remained a valid 
method of training in many trades and the recommendation was deleted. The Vocational 
Training Council was charged with examining the criticisms directed at apprenticeship as soon 
as possible. With regard to the existing apprenticeship system, the Conference recommended 
that the proportion of time spent in formal study should be increased, and that part of this time 
should be spent on 'general' studies.48 While the general thrust of the recommendation was 
approved, Mr RS. Lockwood, the chainnan of the Building Industry Council, expressed a 
concern that the provision would throw "an additional burden on one sector (employers) to 
pay for the general studies of people for the benefit of the community as a whole".49 The 
recommendation also incorporated a call for continuous reviews of the requirements of each 
craft, with more clearly defined responsibilities for training. 
The idea of pre-apprenticeship training was also introduced at the Conference. While 
the idea received approval in theory, the question of who would be responsible for paying for 
such a scheme was canvassed thoroughly. After debate, it was recommended that pilot 
schemes be set up in three trades; construction, fitting and turning, and motor-mechanics. The 
courses were to be for apprentices, rather than for those yet to begin their apprenticeship, so 
that existing administrative processes could be used. 50 The costs of tuition and lodging were to 
be met by the Departments of Education and Labour, with the employer providing a wage. 51 
The idea of extended courses in carpentry and engineering for first year apprentices received 
Cabinet approval in 1971 and pilot training schemes were established in February 1972 (due to 
some problems, the motor mechanics trade was not included in the pilot scheme). The scheme 
was later extended for a second and third year, until the end of 1974.52 Carpentry training was 
introduced in Hamilton and Christchurch, and engineering in Auckland and Dunedin. The 
object of the extended trade training schemes was to evaluate the Conference's call for 
"accelerated and more effective technical education and training for apprentices".53 
47 Ibid., Mr R.K. SilIis, Education Committee, 440. 
48 Ibid., 436. 
49 Ibid., 437. 
50 Vocational Training Council, Extended Trade Training Survey (Wellington: VTC, 1979),6. 
51 National Development Conference, 1969. 
52 VTC, Extended Trade Training Survey, 1979, 6. 
53 AJHR, 1972, H-11, 25. 
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The National Development Conference was less effective than had been hoped. 
While it produced some useful economic analysis and reports, it failed to achieve the goals set, 
for three main reasons. First, the Conference was initiated by a National government that had a 
fundamental problem with the notion of central planning. Second, this inherent tension was 
exacerbated by factors outside of the government's control. The international economy 
became increasingly volatile, with worldwide inflation and unpredictable terms of trade. 
Population growth in New Zealand was also less than predicted, making forecasting difficult. 
Finally, there was conflict over the goals of the Conference between the rural and urban 
industrial sectors that formed the twin pillars of support for the National government. Farmers 
saw the protected manufacturing sector as a "threat to their costs and therefore their 
incomes".54 Nevertheless, Franklin argued that the Conference "closed one era of New 
Zealand's economic development as it rather unconvincingly opened another".55 In spite of the 
subsequent reforms being slow and partial, the Conference resolutions "represented the first 
breach in the wall ofprotyctionism".56 The Conference also identified many of the issues that 
would become important in changing the apprenticeship system. 
Pressures for Reform 
The pressure for reform of the apprenticeship system mounted steadily as economic 
conditions tightened. The Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training (ARTT) Committee of 
the Vocational Training Council (VTC) was established in 1970. Its first report was delivered 
in September 1970, and took into consideration the Tyndall Commission findings, the 
National Development Conference recommendations and the results of an informal survey 
carried out by VTC staff There was a general agreement that the apprenticeship system was 
not fulfilling its purpose. It was argued that an overhaul was necessary to "take into account 
modern skills, training methods, and the present and likely future needs of industry, and to 
meet these ideals".57 
54 Gould, The Rake's Progress?, 136. 
55 Franklin, Trade, Growth and AnXiety, 127, 
56 Ibid" 128, 
57 Vocational Training Council (Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training Committee), Apprentice and 
Technician Training: A Review of Attitudes and Criticisms (Wellington: VTC, September 1970), 5, AAOC, 3478, 
Box 8, National Archives (NA), Wellington, 
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The problems with the apprenticeship system identified by the report fell into three 
main areas. The first area commented upon was the rigidity and inertia of the existing system. 
It was argued that the notion of time-serving should no longer be the focus of training; rather 
that the job itself should be the priority. This was one of the first expressions of an idea that 
would gain increasing currency. The notion of competency, rather than the time served, as a 
basis of training called into question some of the essential components of a traditional 
understanding of apprenticeship. It implied a quantifiable list of skills, which, once acquired, 
could be 'ticked-off . Yet, there is a world of difference between acquiring and mastering a 
skill; the time-consuming repetition of a task until perfection is achieved is a common theme 
of apprentices' experience. Another crucial part of apprenticeship that is not amenable to 
speedy acquisition is the socialisation of the apprentice into the values and norms of the trade. 
Progression through the hierarchical layers of the apprenticeship institution requires time, 
ideally combined with the maturation of the apprentice from adolescence to adulthood. This is 
not to say that there was no merit in the idea of competency. The length of apprenticeships 
were historically derived from the time taken to learn the trade; clearly technological changes 
and changes in work organisation made it necessary to examine the time allowed. 
The second area identified was the seemingly low status of the trades, and of 
apprenticeship. The small wage differentials for tradespeople were mentioned as a possible 
cause for this. Industry representatives were concerned that a social stigma operated against 
entry to the trades, resulting in "only boys [sic] of low intelligence offer(ing) themselves for 
trade training".58 Finally, the whole issue of the appropriate amount and quality of the 
'education' component oftrade training was discussed. It was felt that apprenticeship orders 
were dominated by the conditions of employment, with too little attention paid to educational 
needs. The resistance of some apprentices to studying was noted, along with the shortage of 
trained instructors. The importance of the apprentice having a good general education to cope 
with the requirement for increased theoretical knowledge was emphasised. The tension, 
however, between scholastic ability and proficiency was also mentioned, as was the concern 
that a requirement for higher educational qualifications would lead to too many tradespeople 
working towards advanced qualifications, reducing the numbers available to do the work. 59 
The report considered several different ways of organising apprenticeship with the aim 
of overcoming some of the problems identified. It was acknowledged that training must take 
into account the wide variation in the technical and craft content of modem industries, and the 
58 Ibid., 13. 
59 Ibid., 13, 
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regional variation throughout the country. Pre-entry training (distinguished from pre-
apprenticeship training in that no wages would be paid to the trainee) was discussed. The 
conclusion of the report on this matter was that it was: 
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generally considered that pre-entry training ... is not suited to the social and economic 
situation in New Zealand. It has become accepted in New Zealand as a social fact that 
that. .. apprentices are paid during training and as an economic fact that these payments 
are made from the employer's funds rather than the taxpayer's funds. 60 
Apprenticeship to industry, mooted in the 1945 Commission ofInquiry, was again raised. The 
Committee argued that organising apprenticeship at this level would destroy the personal 
interest that employers had in their apprentices, and would remove the incentive to take on an 
apprentice. The question of just who would represent 'industry' also required an answer. 
Broadening the base of apprenticeship training was also suggested, with every apprentice 
having a basic general training, to which specialised skills could be added as required. 
'Integrated' or 'sandwich' training, that is, on-job training alternating with technical institute 
training, was also considered. It was argued that this type of training could produce 
tradespeople in eighteen months to two years, but the apportioning of the costs of such a 
scheme caused concern.61 
A report by the Manpower Planning Unit of the Department of Labour for the ARTT 
Committee was presented in 1972. The report was based on a study of four of the skilled 
trades; engineering, carpentry, plumbing and cabinet-making. The study aimed to examine the 
apprenticeship system by focusing on different facets of apprenticeship, and training in 
general, as illustrated by the four industries. Information for the report was gathered from 
replies to a detailed questionnaire that Unit staff sent to nineteen of the Labour Department's 
District Offices. Other sources included the minutes from New Zealand apprenticeship 
committees and the annual reports of the Trades Certification Board.62 
The report argued that there was enough evidence to suggest tentatively that reductions 
in the terms of apprenticeship in the mid-1960s had initially had a positive effect on the 
number of apprenticeships being completed. It appeared that there were greater numbers of 
young people taking up apprenticeships, and fewer contracts being terminated, than before the 
terms had been shortened. It was also suggested, however, that the influence of the changes 
had weakened and problems were again occurring.63 Fluctuating apprenticeship intakes were 
60 Ibid., 16. 
61 Ibid., 29. 
62 Department of Labour, Report to the Vocational Training Council's Committee on Apprenticeship, 1972. 
63 Ibid., 7. 
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of concern, both from the view offuture requirements for skilled labour, and because of 
the effect on the employment prospects of school-leavers. The study showed that some 
employers felt that there were insufficient incentives for taking on apprentices, and 
highlighted the effects that changes in technology had on some trades.64 
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Despite methodological difficulties encountered in enumerating the number of 
completed contracts in the trades studied, the report showed that quite a small proportion of 
apprentices had passed Trades Certification Board examinations. The percentage of those 
apprentices who had completed their contracts and passed Trade Certification ranged from 
13.7 per cent in the carpentry trade, to 42.9 per cent in engineering. This difference was 
caused in part by the generally higher educational qualifications of engineering apprentices, 
with 32.6 per cent of engineering entrants having School Certificate or better, compared with 
11.8 per cent in carpentry and 10.2 per cent in plumbing. 65 
Concern was expressed at the trend towards an increasing rate of lapsed and cancelled 
contracts. The survey showed that unrealistic expectations and poor communication from both 
employers and apprentices were often at the root of dissatisfaction with the apprenticeship 
contract. The most frequent reason given for contracts lapsing was 'insufficient interest' on the 
part of the apprentice. This was seen as encompassing both disappointment at the type of 
training received, and also an inability to cope with a long-term commitment to one employer 
and the technical study required. Inadequacy in the job was the next most common reason for 
termination of the contract. Again, the survey was not subtle enough to distinguish between 
those apprentices who were incapable of, rather than simply unwilling to, learn the job.66 
Many of the local apprenticeship committees surveyed expressed concerns at the 
number of apprentices who were not complying with the educational requirements. 
Nevertheless, the majority view was that the educational component of the apprenticeship 
should be compulsory. Indeed, much of the work of the local committees focused on dealing 
with apprentices who had unsatisfactory results at, or had failed to attend, technical institute 
classes.67 Defaulting apprentices were called to appear before the committees, and the range of 
excuses offered often showed a great deal of inventiveness. The chairman of the New Zealand 
Carpentry and Joinery Apprenticeship Committee reported in March 1972 that several 
apprentices who had failed to attend block courses at the Christchurch Technical Institute had 
64 'Apprenticeship Today', LEG, 23(1), February 1973. 
65 Department of Labour, Report to the Vocational Training Council's Committee on Apprenticeship, 1972, 9. 
66 Ibid., 18. 
67 Ibid. 
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been penalised in the Magistrate's Court. He felt that this publicity would have a salutary 
effect on other apprentices.68 The Department of Labour report, however, argued that although 
the ability of employers to be selective in their choice of apprentices varied between trades 
and across regions, it was clear that "many employers will have to continue to accept boys 
[sic] who have little aptitude for theoretical study if present intake numbers are to be 
maintained".69 While the 1972 report appears comprehensive, it was not altogether an easy 
exercise for the staff of the manpower planning unit. Despite continual calls for better 
manpower and economic planning, the unit was clearly constrained by a lack of support from 
certain sectors: 
progress in this direction has been rather slow due to such things as problems of 
definitions, an apparent laissez-faire attitude to the need for manpower forecasting on 
the part of some groups and a certain reticence in disclosing information on the part of 
others. 70 
Concerns in the Public Sector 
Concern about conditions for apprentices in the private sector had been mirrored in the 
public sector. In 1973, a committee was appointed by New Zealand Railways to examine the 
practical and theoretical training of the Department's apprentices. The committee called for 
parity between state and private sector apprentices in terms of incentives and time credits for 
examination successes, and for the standard of instructors and teaching aids to be upgraded. 
There was also concern about the physical condition of some of the buildings in which the 
teaching took place. The committee found widespread support, from older tradespeople and 
apprentices alike, for the concept of a broadly trained tradesperson with a wide range of skills, 
even if this meant cutting across trade distinctions. Thus, it was suggested that transfers 
between sections or departments be facilitated to give apprentices a wider range of experience. 
For the same reason, the idea of modular training met with a guarded response: "there is an 
inherent danger in this method of training if it is used to meet narrow needs through the 
adoption of a limited number of modules as an alternative to the established apprenticeship 
contract system".71 The committee did not want apprentice hours further shortened, and called 
for annual apprentice intakes to be maintained at the maximum permitted levels. 
68 New Zealand Carpentry and Joinery Apprenticeship Committee Minutes, March 1972, MB 27, A24, 3C. 
69 Department of Labour, Report to the Vocational Training Council's Committee on Apprenticeship, 1972,28. 
70 AJHR, 1972, H-ll, 26-27. 
71 New Zealand Railways, Report of Apprenticeship Investigation Committee (Wellington: NZR, November 
1973),60. Crosada Collection, 95-072, AT, Wellington. 
The 1965 Commission of Inquiry into Vocational Training had identified retention 
rates for apprentices as a problem, and the 1973 Investigation Committee picked up this 
concern. The committee argued that the 'poverty' of apprentices could no longer be held 
responsible for failures to complete contracts: 
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in place of this (poverty) are a number of social factors, directly related to more 
affluent times, and possibly unheard of in the past. With a more secure employment 
situation, both in range and opportunity, the security and status of a trade diminishes 
d · 1 72 accor mg y. 
Although the average 'drop-out' rate of9.8 per cent was significantly lower in New Zealand 
Railways than the 25 per cent rate in the private sector (see Table 5), the committee called for 
measures to improve the numbers retained. It emphasised the importance of selection and 
recruitment practices, arguing for better induction procedures and more counselling and advice 
during the apprenticeship. In order to retain tradespeople, it was suggested that trade 
qualifications should be recognised with higher pay, that a wider variety of work be made 
available, and that tradespeople be eligible for twelve months leave without pay to travel or to 
gain experience with another employer. 73 
Table 5: Termination of Apprenticeship Contracts, New Zealand Railways, 1964-1969 74 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
Total 
72 Ibid., 83. 
73 Ibid., 87. 
74 Ibid., 87. 
Intake 
288 
260 
211 
239 
128 
162 
1288 
Resigned before Percentage 
Completion 
36 12.5% 
27 10.4% 
15 7.1% 
23 9.6% 
12 9.4% 
14 8.6% 
127 9.8% 
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Suggestions for Reform 
Another report, presented to the ARTT Committee in August 1974, aimed to bring 
together all the material produced or collected by the AR TT Committee during its existence. 
This included the 1970 report, replies to questionnaires and more recent material. The main 
thrust of the report was to offer continued support for the idea of the "all-round tradesman" 
[sic].75 Against a background of skill shortages, particularly in the building industry, the report 
discussed measures that' could be taken to improve the attractiveness of apprenticeship. 
Suggestions included a publicity campaign to combat the perceived poor image and status of 
apprenticeship and the trades in general. It was felt that an improvement in the status of 
tradespeople could be achieved by increasing the margins paid for skilled workers. The report 
also floated some ideas to increase the flexibility of the apprenticeship system, arguing that 
this also would make apprenticeship more attractive to young people. The report called for the 
inclusion of new classifications to enable apprenticeship to be extended to newly developed 
jobs that did not have apprenticeship training. There was also recognition of the need for 
training for semi-skilled workers. 76 
The report offered little that was new or controversial and was dismissed by the AR TT 
Committee as "outdated and inconclusive in many areas".77 A number of the findings had 
been pre-empted by the work of the VTC or industry training boards, and the Committee 
found that many of the changes suggested had already been carried out. For example, in 1973 
discussions on measures to overcome the shortage of skilled labour in "the building industry 
resulted in the New Zealand Carpentry and Joinery Apprenticeship Committee agreeing to the 
introduction of a special emergency contracts scheme for adult carpentry apprentices. This 
scheme provided full-time technical training for sixteen weeks in the first year of the 
apprenticeship for apprentices aged between twenty and twenty-six. It was hoped to provide 
training for 360 apprentices over two years, and was supported by a government subsidy to 
employers for half of the apprentices' wages while they attended a technical institute.78 
Some ofthe more significant changes in attitudes towards apprenticeship related to the 
formal, or off-the-job training, element of apprenticeship. This may have been partly the result 
of the 1974 Educational Development Conference, convened by the Minister of Education, 
Phil Amos. This conference was "one of the most extensive public consultations undertaken in 
75 VTC, Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training in New Zealand: A Preliminary Report to the Vocational 
Training Council, 1974. 
76 Ibid. 
77 VTC, Current Developments in Apprenticeship Training, 1975, 5. 
78 AJHR, 1973-1974, G-l. 
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New Zealand [with] 3000 study groups debat(ing) many aspects of the education system.79 
The conference report "articulated a sense of alienation and frustration with the education 
bureaucracy. It was felt to be vast, faceless, ponderous and unresponsive, particularly to the 
special needs of women and girls, Maori and other ethnic minorities".8o While the results of 
the conference were overshadowed by Labour's 1975 election loss to National, and the 
worsening economic conditions, the Butterworths argued that the conference sowed the seeds 
for many of the changes in education that were to follow, particularly with its emphasis on 
post compulsory education, both training and retraining. 81 
Incentives were introduced in 1974 for group apprenticeship training, off-job training 
and courses for on-job trainers.82 Extended trade training schemes, although not always 
meeting with full approval by all parties, were increasingly becoming the norm. Pre-entry 
training, dismissed by the ARTT Committee in 1970, was suggested more frequently as an b· 
efficient means of shortening the length of apprenticeship and of providing the employer with 
a partially skilled, and therefore productive, employee from the outset. The cost of both 
methods of training was, as always, a concern. It was estimated that if the government through 
the technical institutes funded all apprentices' training, the cost to the taxpayer would be an 
extra $20 million per year. The funding of pre-entry training was also problematic, with the 
added difficulty ofthe inability to guarantee an apprenticeship for the trainee. Nevertheless, as 
Figure 14 illustrates, technical education as a whole grew markedly over the 1960s and 
1970s.83 
79 Graham and Susan Butterworth, Reforming Education: The New Zealand Experience 1984-1996 (Palmerston 
North: The Dunmore Press Ltd, 1998), 17. 
80 Ibid., 18. 
8l Ibid. 
82 VTC, Review of Apprenticeship: Discussion Paper, 1978. 
83 'Technical Education and Training', LEG, 24(2), May 1974. 
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Figure 14: Enrolments in Technical Institutes: Vocational Courses, 1962-1972 84 
Vocational Education 
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Extended Trade Training 
The ARRT Committee attempted therefore in 1975 to pin down the realities of what 
was happening in apprenticeship.85 They reported that the trend was for a much greater 
proportion of the apprentice's training, especially in the first year, to be carried out in a 
technical institute. The committee argued that this resulted in faster, more efficient training, 
which benefited the employer by making the apprentice productive more quickly. It was also 
felt that an initial block course eased the transition from school to work, and allowed the 
teaching of basic practical skills, closely tied to the theory of the trade. An evaluation of the 
carpentry, and fitting and turning pilot courses that had begun in 1972 showed that an 
eighteen-week full-time course, with the balance of the year spent on the job, allowed 
apprentices to gain in one year similar pass rates in the Second Qualification examination to 
those of traditional apprentices who had spent two years on the job. 86 
84 Ibid. , 4. 
83 VTC, Current Developments in Apprenticeship Training. 1975. 
86 Ibid. 6. 
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Based upon the pilot schemes, extended trade training schemes were introduced for 
engineering and carpentry in 1975. Engineering apprentices would spend three six-week 
periods at a technical institute in their first year, and three weeks in their second year. 
Carpentry apprentices would attend technical institutes for nine weeks in the first year, six in 
the second year and three weeks in the third year. hnproved methods of on-the-job training 
and the replacement of the first and second qualification examinations with internal 
assessment at the technical institutes were important innovations of the new schemes. 87 
The major disadvantage of extended trade training, according to the ARTT Committee, 
was the added cost to the employer of paying wages while the apprentice was on a long block 
course. In 1975 the government addressed this with the Minister of Labour, Arthur Faulkner, 
announcing the introduction of a subsidy to the employer for each week in excess of three 
weeks in any year that the apprentice was at a technical institute. The subsidy provided 60 per 
cent of the apprentice's wages in the first year, 50 per cent in the second and 40 per cent in the 
third. 88 There was, however, a condition for payment of the subsidy; the industry as a whole 
had to have conducted a review of both on and off-job training. 89 The government thus clearly 
signaled that modernisation of the apprenticeship system was necessary, and set a precedent 
for tying subsidies to industry action on upgrading the system. As extended trade training was 
adopted by some industries, and investigated by the apprenticeship committees of many 
others, the ARTT Committee expressed concern about variations between schemes. While the 
Committee conceded the need for flexibility, and acknowledged the differences in educational 
and training requirements of some trades, it was opposed to "variation where it exists without 
any real justification".90 
Case Study: The Motor Trade Industry 
The story of the motor trade industry's attempts to reform its trade training is a good 
illustration of the difficulties that industries faced in responding to changing requirements for 
trade training. Organised training in the motor trade industry began after the formation of the 
New Zealand Motor Trade Certification Board (NZMTCB) in 1944. The formal learning was 
conducted with a mixture of night classes and block courses, with some apprentices studying 
through correspondence. By 1965, dissatisfaction was expressed with elements of these 
87 'New System of Apprenticeship Trade Training', LEG, 25(2), May 1975,12. 
88 AffiR, 1975, G-l. 
89 VTC, Current Developments in Apprenticeship Training, 1975, 6. 
90 Ibid., 11. 
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arrangements. It was felt that there was inadequate correlation between the theoretical and 
practical components of the apprenticeship, and that the supervision of the theory work was 
not satisfactory. The length of the training was also questioned. Technological innovations in 
car repairs meant a changing set of skills, and there were difficulties in providing adequate 
practical training in the 'modem' repair shop. Thus, in 1966 a revised training planwas 
drafted, which proposed the abolition of night and correspondence classes, to be replaced with 
"longer, more purposeful block courses".91 This plan did not proceed, due to "restrictive 
Government expenditure.".92 
In 1970, the NZMTCB held an apprenticeship training seminar, at which a new revised 
plan was drafted. This plan retained the features of the initial plan, but proposed that all 
formal, off-job training be completed within the first two years of the apprenticeship. This 
would mean that for the last two, or two and a half, years of the 8000 hour apprenticeship, the 
apprentice would be a full-time productive worker. The revised plan was ratified at the 1974 
Motor Trade Association annual conference. In 1976, the Minister of Education, mindful of 
limited government funds, agreed to the introduction of the revised scheme to limited parts of 
the industry. The October 1977 budget contained approval for the scheme to be introduced in 
1978 in the automotive electrical, motorcycle and automotive machining trades. Thus, a full 
twelve years after the initial plan was drafted there was some movement towards updating the 
training regime. While all the blame for tardiness can not be laid at the government's feet, it is 
easy to understand the frustration of the NZMTCB: 
It is evident that while we remain dependent on Government Departments and State 
funding to assist us in the conduct of our apprenticeship training programmes (we are 
too small to go it alone), there is little prospect of achieving quick, regular, progressive 
changes in our training programme to maintain pace with development in the industry 
and changing economic conditions. 93 
The Demise of Extended Trade Training, 1977-1980 
Despite the relatively favourable reports on the both the pilot schemes and the limited 
number of training programmes introduced in the mid-1970s, doubts about the efficacy of 
extended trade training were expressed. 94 The VTC survey of extended trade training 
published in 1979 found that that the majority of employers, apprentices and technical institute 
staff generally supported the training schemes. There were, however, criticisms of the 
91 New Zealand Motor Trade Certification Board, Apprenticeship Training Plan Questionnaire, June 1980. 
AAOC, W3473, 25/6, NA, Wellington. 
92 Ibid.,!. 
93 Ibid., 3. 
94 AJHR, 1977, G-1, 12. 
122 
administration and record keeping of the schemes, and problems were reported with 
notifying apprentices of the requirement to attend the block course. This often led to 
employers deferring their apprentices' attendance. One of the major complaints that employers 
voiced was about the inclusion of 'liberal studies' in the block course.95 The views of the 
technical manager of a manufacturing company may serve to indicate the strength of feeling 
on this issue: 
We are totally against any time, which we consider to be wasted, on liberal study and 
sports periods ... we do not consider that apprenticeship contracts are adequately long in 
themselves, without wasting this valuable time on these subjects. 96 
A 1980 survey by the NZMTCB of304 employers with apprentices training under 
extended trade training reported a general, but grudging, acceptance of the scheme, but also a 
"considerable lack of understanding of the aims and objectives of the training pattern among 
many employers".97 The report argued, however, that many of the criticisms and difficulties 
experienced were more related to management problems, and a 'resistance-to-change-factor' 
among employers, than actually with the training scheme: 
... no matter what pattern of training was in operation there would still be some 
opposition to some part of it, again not related to the scheme itself, but the inability to 
organise workload and the ~lacement of undue dependence upon an apprentice being 
available in the workshop. 8 
Regardless of the criticisms, throughout the late 1970s there was pressure from other 
industries to be included in the extended trade training programme. The motor industry had 
clearly laid much of the groundwork necessary for the changeover, and was pushing for 
extended trade training to be expanded to the major motor trades. The radio and associated 
electronics trade was experiencing significant growth and rapid technological change, making 
it an ideal candidate for revised training. Indeed, both of these industries featured on a priority 
list for extended trade training drawn up by the VTC in December 1978. Bricklaying was the 
third trade given priority, but was later dropped off the list because funding beyond that 
already provided would be required to update the training programme. 99 
95 VTC, Extended Trade Training Sun1ey, 1979. 
96 Millar, AHI Plastic Moulding Company, to the Chairman, VTC, 14 December 1979. ARTT Files, 1977-81, 
AAOC, W 3473, 25/0, NA, Wellington. 
97 NZMTCB, Summarised Report to the Board on the 1980 Survey a/the RevisedApprenticeship Training Plan, 
1980, New Zealand Motor ITB Minutes 1979-80. AAOC, W3473, 14/9 Pt 4, NA, Wellington. 
98lbid.,6. 
99 Extended Trade Training File, 1978-1982. AAOC, W3473, 25/6, NA Wellington. 
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In July 1979, the Minister of Labour, Jim Bolger, advised the VTC that, due to 
limitations on government expenditure, extended trade training fot the motor and electronics 
trades was unable to be approved. 100 On receipt of this news, the Executive Training Officer 
for the Electronics ITB, J.B. Stewart, wrote to the VTC, expressing dismay that approval was 
not forthcoming. He argued that the lack of approval placed the Electronics ITB in a very 
difficult position because an expanded and updated syllabus, impossible to deliver without 
extended trade training, had already been written. lOI The VTC lobbied the Minister of Labour 
on behalf of the priority industries, especially the electronics industry, 102 but was countered by 
the news that a new set of criteria had been developed, which had to be met before extended 
trade training could be approved. 
The Minister prefaced the new criteria by saying that "current restrictions on 
Government expenditure have limited the scope for major new activities in the short 
term ... expectations seem to be developing that such training (extended trade training) is 
almost an automatic entitlement". 103 Thus, any new training initiatives had to show a clear 
national benefit for the costs involved~ be supplementary to, and integrated with, on-job 
training; be unable to be provided elsewhere than in a technical institute~ be supported by the 
VTC; and have no more practical work than absolutely necessary to reinforce the theory. 104 
The criteria provoked a flurry of repositioning by the industries involved, but to little avail. 
The motor and electronics industries were again turned down for extended trade training in 
August 1980, with the Minister of Labour reporting that "in neither case was the Government 
satisfied that sufficient national benefit would arise to justify the expenditure involved". 105 
Disheartened, the focus of those industries keen to reform their training moved to pre-
apprenticeship training. 
This chapter has described the growing pressures placed upon the apprenticeship 
system by social, economic and technological changes. The early seventies were characterised 
by pragmatic tinkering with the apprenticeship system, rather than by any wholesale change. 
The pressures for change were clearly mounting but the status quo was resistant. This 
100 Bolger to VTC, 2 July 1979. Extended Trade Training File, 1978-1982. AAOC, W3473, 25/6, NA, 
Wellington. 
101 Stewart to VTC, 3 August 1979. Extended Trade Training File, 1978-1982. AAOC, W3473, 25/6, NA, 
Wellington. 
102 Pearce, VTC to Bolger, 5 September 1979. Extended Trade Training File, 1978-1982. AAOC, W3473, 25/6, 
NA, Wellington. 
103 Bolger to Pearce, 28 September 1979. Extended Trade Training File, 1978-1982. AAOC, W3473, 25/6, NA, 
Wellington. 
104 Ibid. 
105 VTC to NZMTCB and Electronics ITB, 27 August 1980. Extended Trade Training File, 1978-1982. AAOC, 
W3473, 25/6, NA, Wellington. 
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partly reflected active support for the traditional system, and was partly the product of 
inertia. Changes were happening fast enough to keep the critics satisfied, but slowly enough 
for the traditionalists to have time to adapt. By the mid 1970s, some important attitudinal 
differences were beginning to creep in, however. The idea of the 'all-round tradesman' [sic], 
although finding favour in the VTC's 1974 report, was under pressure: "the concept of the 
'complete tradesman' [sic] has come to be increasingly questioned during the last few years, 
in the light of the changing requirements of modem industry". 106 Other bulwarks of the 
traditional apprenticeship system, such as the age of the apprentice, the direct employer-
apprentice relationship, the notion of 'time-serving' and the predominance of on-the-job-
training, were also being challenged. 
106 'Apprenticeship Today', LEG, 23(1), February 1973,18. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
'APPRENTICESHIP FOR TOMORROW': PRESSURES FOR CHANGE 
Working life provides daily purpose, access to adult society and behaviours and 
acceptability in the community. The disruption to the traditionally socially recognised 
method for achieving this has resulted in some confusion for young people, and the 
community. 
(Department of Education Discussion Paper, 1982,9) 
The piecemeal reforms of the apprenticeship system during the early and mid 1970s 
had, by 1977, become insufficient to satisfy the clamour from various sectors for change. 
From the mid 1970s there was increasing concern about "perceived problems and deficiencies 
within the education system" as a whole. 1 Codd explained this concern as a symptom of a 
deepening legitimisation crisis facing the state in New Zealand at this time. A crisis of 
legitimisation occurs when the state and its institutions come under attack as people lose 
confidence in the state's ability to deal with problems and begin to question the authority that 
they have vested in it. The lack of economic growth, and the government's ineffectiveness in 
dealing with this precipitated the crisis in New Zealand? Rising levels of unemployment, a 
high rate of inflation, and large budget and balance of payment deficits meant unprecedented 
economic pressures on New Zealand. Trade union action, with its yoke of relativity, "made the 
achievement of higher productivity and maximum output very difficult".3 
This chapter traces the increasing level of disquiet expressed about the apprenticeship 
system. There were calls for increased flexibility within the system and the idea of pre-
apprenticeship training came to the fore. The paradox of shortages of skilled workers in a time 
of growing unemployment was of concern. The VTC carried out a major review of the system 
between 1978 and 1980. The length of time required for this process meant, however, that 
rapid changes in the economy often overtook both the basis for the review, and the 
appropriateness of the proposals it contained. Nevertheless, by 1981 the myriad suggestions 
for improving the apprenticeship system were brought together in Apprenticeship for 
Tomorrow, a consultative document which was the basis for the Apprenticeship Act 1983. 
1 Codd, "Educational Policy and the Crisis of the New Zealand State", 192. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Gould, The Rake's Progress?, 220. 
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Review of Apprenticeship 1977-1980 
Throughout 1977 the apprenticeship system was the subject of a number of 
conferences and seminars. An employers' seminar, titled "What's Wrong with 
Apprenticeship?", was held in Hamilton. While a wide range of views were expressed, there 
was a degree of consensus favouring longer block courses to be held earlier in the 
apprenticeship, some form of module-based training, the sharing of training costs through 
levies or incentives, and a recognition of the need to aid smaller firms to teach their 
apprentices the full range of skills required.4 Apprenticeship was also discussed at the New 
Zealand Employers' Federation conference, and the Technical Institutes Association (TIA) 
conference held in Christchurch in November 1977 had as its theme: "Apprenticeship-
Present and Future".5 An address at this conference by Major-General Pearce, the chairman of 
the Vocational Training Council, highlighted the fundamental problem with apprenticeship in 
the contemporary economic climate: 
a paradoxical situation exists in the apprenticeship area: employers complain of an 
inadequate flow of trained tradesmen [sic], but many young people cannot find 
employers to indenture them. Economic uncertainty and the individual recruitment 
responsibilities of employers create this problem. 6 
The resolutions of the TIA conference regarding apprenticeship ranged far wider than 
just the educational component of the system. The conference called for the administration of 
the system to be streamlined, and to emphasise the' carrot' , rather than the' stick', in the 
pursuit of compliance with legislative requirements. It was argued that pre-apprenticeship 
courses could be used to cushion the effects of cyclic fluctuations in apprenticeship intakes. It 
was suggested that the VTC study wastage in the skilled trades, and report upon the best 
means to upgrade the image of those trades and of apprenticeship in general. The conference 
agreed that the primary objective of apprenticeship was for the trainee to reach tradesperson 
status, but argued that there was a need for recognition of intermediate levels of achievement. 7 
These resolutions, plus other ideas and criticisms generated during the many 
discussions throughout 1977, were collated in a paper prepared by the VTC, Review of 
Apprenticeship: Discussion Paper, and circulated widely for comment.8 In the area of 
4 Report to VTC on "What's Wrong with Apprenticeship" Seminar. AAOC, W3473, 2510, NA, Wellington, 2. 
5 VTC, Review of Apprenticeship: Discussion Paper, 1978. 
6 Vocational Training Council, Apprenticeship - Present and Future: Keynote address by Major-General L.A. 
Pearce, Chairman VTC, for the Technical Institutes Association Conference (Christchurch: VTC, 1977). AAOC, 
3478, Box 8, NA, Wellington. 
7 Technical Institutes Association (TIA), Resolutions of TJA 1977 Conference: Apprenticeship - Present and 
Future (Christchurch: TIA, 1977). AAOC, 3478, Box 8, NA, Wellington. 
8 VTC, Review of Apprenticeship: Discllssion Paper, 1978. 
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manpower planning, the paper pointed to the chronic imbalance between supply and 
demand in the trades. Echoing the TIA conference resolutions, the paper suggested that the 
responsibility for manpower planning, which by law rested with the New Zealand 
apprenticeship committee for each industry, should be a joint government and industry 
concern. It was argued that manpower planning could only really be accurate in the short-tenn, 
and that therefore: 
training should be transferable between industries and ... specialist training that would 
tend to lock a person into a particular occupation (should) be built on more general 
basic training and be of as short a duration as possible.9 
The discussion paper suggested that the recruitment and selection of apprentices had 
been largely "haphazard and infonnal", resulting in unnecessary and costly high drop-out rates 
for apprentices. 10 Approximately thirty per cent of all beginning apprentices did not go on to 
complete their contracts, with the heaviest drop-out rate being in the first year. 11 Ideas to 
improve this situation focused on a better exchange of infonnation between employer and 
apprentice. Secondary schools were seen as having a role in this process by providing a wider 
range of technical and vocational training, with closer links to industry. Many employers felt 
that school-Ieavers were short on communication, numeracy and life skills, and often lacked a 
"basic understanding of the world of work". 12 Part of the reason for this may have been the 
wide variation in the educational standards of apprentices entering new contracts, as shown by 
a study carried out by the Department of Labour in 1979 (see Table 6)~13 
9 Ibid., 14. 
10 Ibid., 15. 
11 Ibid., 22. 
12 Ibid., 17. 
13 'Educational Standards of Apprentices Entering New Contracts', LEG, 29 (3), September 1979, 13. 
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Table 6: Apprentice Educational Qualification, November 1978-Apri11979 14 
Trade Total % with Less % with 3 % with 6th 
Number of than 3 years Years Form 
New Secondary Secondary or Certificate 
Apprentices Education some School or Better 
Cert Subjects 
Aircraft 85 0 53% 47% 
Carpentry 341 46% 41% 13% 
Coachbuilding 168 50% 43% 7% 
Electrical 231 21% 54% 25% 
Engineering 369 26% 55% 19% 
Furniture 107 61% 32% 7% 
Hairdressing (Ladies & 191 62% 33% 5% 
Men) 
Horticulture 37 27% 38% 35% 
Motor Trades 473 29% 62% 9% 
Painting 57 65% 32% 3% 
Plumbing! Gasfitting 81 37% 62% 11% 
Printing 91 39% 46% 15% 
Radio 43 19% 30% 51% 
Retail Meat Industry 106 65% 31% 4% 
Sheetmetal Working 34 29% 50% 21% 
Average (2414) 38% 44% 18% 
Challenging the status quo on the industrial relations front, the Review of 
-
Apprenticeship discussion paper presented arguments in favour of deleting the proportion 
clauses from apprenticeship orders. It considered that proportions were overly restrictive, and 
that the effect of this restriction compounded in times of economic downturn. Thus, the lower 
number of apprentices taken on in a tight economic situation limited the number of 
tradespeople available to fulfill the proportion requirements as the economy improved. It was 
felt that, given a chronic shortage of skilled labour, numbers were better controlled through 
manpower planning. Indeed, declining numbers of new and completed apprenticeship 
contracts, as shown in Figure 15, were causing concern, prompting the Industrial Relations 
Council to set up a working party to examine fluctuating apprenticeship intakes. The 
inflexibility of the fixed term of apprenticeship was also questioned, and it was argued that 
this rigidity was one of the major hindrances to women taking up apprenticeships. Wage 
relativities, both between trades and with other levels of work, were seen as a major factor in 
14 Ibid. 
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the high levels of wastage of apprentices. Low apprentice wages, and the lack of any 
financial assistance also "effectively preclude( d) most adults from learning a trade". 15 
Figure 15: Apprenticeship Contracts, 1970-1980 16 
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The issue of skill was to the fore in the discussion paper. The paradox of increased 
technical sophistication in some areas, versus the deskilling of parts of other occupations, 
raised questions that the traditional apprenticeship system struggled to answer. Some 
industries reported difficulties in teaching the full range of skills laid down in apprenticeship 
orders, whereas in other industries, technological developments enabled the work to be carried 
out by skilled operatives, rather than fully trained tradespeople. Suggestions to counter the 
effects of technology included redesigning jobs and broadening apprenticeships by 
amalgamating allied trades. It was argued that training had to be flexible and speedy, and that 
it should provide intennediate qualifications that would allow a career path for 'semi-skilled' 
workers. 17 Pre-apprenticeship training found favour with many industries, but it was 
acknowledged that it was an expensive method of training, and that schemes needed to be 
IS Ibid., 22. 
16 Department of Labour, Summary of Apprenticeship Trends to 31 March 1983 (Wellington: Department of 
Labour, 1983), 7. 
17 Ibid., 21 . 
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linked closely with manpower planning to ensure that trainees could find employment after 
their training. It was argued that the administration of the apprenticeship system needed to be 
simplified, with less bureaucracy and duplication of work 18 
The discussion paper identified concerns about the funding of apprenticeship. 
Compulsory industry levies had been rejected in the early 1970s, and the funding of training 
was organised on a voluntary basis, in conjunction with various government incentives. The 
problem of 'poaching', where a tradesperson recently out of their time moved to a different 
firm, was a major disincentive for many employers to take on apprentices. The discussion 
paper, however, called for the cost of training to be shared more equitably across industries: 
"those who do not carry out any training should contribute to the cost of training; those who 
fulfill their training responsibility should be compensated for it". 19 
The discussion paper was circulated widely between February and July 1978, 
provoking many comments, and over 70 submissions. The tenor of the submissions was, 
according to the VTC, "largely conservative and very much concerned with maintaining the 
status quO".20 A series of letters from the Apprenticeship Division of the Department of 
Labour, representing the views of a number of New Zealand apprenticeship committees, plus 
correspondence from the Canterbury Trades Council and the New Zealand Furniture and 
Related Trades Union, revealed the seat of some of the opposition to the changes proposed in 
the discussion paper. The basic thrust of these submissions was that, although it was agreed 
that some modifications to the apprenticeship system were required, the Apprenticeship 
Division was handling these adequately. The review was seen as impractical and potentially 
damaging, and those submitting argued that the VTC should have sought more fully the views 
of organisations involved in apprenticeship.21 
The education sector was also unhappy with aspects of the review. The president of the 
New Zealand Technical Institutes' Student Association, Mr. M. Pilcher, expressed in a 
newspaper article the Association's dissatisfaction with the report. He argued that the review 
was not comprehensive enough, and had serious deficiencies; in particular, that it had been 
produced before an experiment in modular training being undertaken by the Master Builders' 
Association had been completed and assessed. Mr Pilcher expressed a lack of confidence in 
the VTC, and claimed that the review was merely a muddled summary of the British 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 22. 
20 Vocational Training Council (Advisory Committee on Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training), Review 0/ 
Afprenticeship: Recommendations/or Future Policy (Wellington: VTC, 1980),2. 
2 Vocational Training Council, Review of Apprenticeship. AAOC, W3473 25/5 Ptl, Box 49, NA, Wellington. 
vocational training system. 22 The Post Primary Teachers Association was scathing about 
the role envisaged for secondary schools in the review: 
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The Association deplores the reactionary tone of the paper which implies that 
secondary schools should turn out products moulded to suit the workforce. The rapid 
pace of technological change alone demands that schools prepare pupils to adapt to 
new situations rather than preparing them for occupations which may not exist ten 
years hence". 23 
This intention was denied by the VTC, although it was acknowledged that "this over-
simplified view has be~Ii expressed many times by some of the bodies involved in 
apprenticeship".24 The VTC, as the arbiter of these fundamentally different approaches to the 
role of education, clearly walked a fine line between the business and education sectors. 
The submissions to the review were collated by Hilary Rendell, the VTC's 
Apprenticeship Advisory Officer, and presented to the ARTT committee in October 1978. The 
.-
.~. 
committee commented on the first half of the report, but then decided to wait until the survey 
on extended trade training was finished. As this was not completed until August 1979, the 
p~blication of a final report, Review of Apprenticeship: Recommendations for Future Policy, 
was delayed until mid 1980. The VTC considered that changes in technology and the economy 
had overtaken many of the submissions to the discussion paper, and that it was inappropriate 
to merely present a summary of the comments. Rather, the VTC in its report attempted to 
"assess the apprenticeship system critically in the light of the current situation" and urged that 
its recommendations be given early consideration as "evidence available to the Council points 
to the fact that the present system of apprenticeship will not meet the rapidly changing needs 
of industry in the 1980s".25 
While some of the changes suggested by the report were minor, it also proposed some 
fundamental modifications to the apprenticeship system. The importance of manpower 
planning was again emphasised. The report argued that this should be done on an industry 
basis, leading to planned apprentice intakes, and that it should be tied to government 
incentives to smooth fluctuations in intakes caused by economic conditions. It was suggested 
that the structure of apprentice training be modified to maximise flexibility, increase skill 
levels and share more fairly the cost of training. To this end, stratified training was suggested. 
22 "Apprenticeship Review Seems Deficient," New Zealand Herald, 27 July 1978. VTC Review of 
Apprenticeship, AAOC, W3473 25/5 Ptl, Box 49, NA, Wellington. 
23 Webster, General Secretary, PPTA to Stuart, Director, VTC, 11 April 1978, AAOC, W3473 25/5 Ptl, Box 49, 
NA, Wellington. 
24 Stuart to Webster, 20 April 1978, AAOC, W3473 25/5 Ptl, Box 49, NA, Wellington. 
25 VTC, Review of Apprenticeship: Recommendationsfor Future Policy, 1980, 2. 
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This would involve broad-based training in transferable, general skills, followed by 
specialised training as required. A model suggested by the engineering trades was used as an 
example; the first 6000 hours of the apprenticeship to be spent on broad-based core training, 
followed by 2000 hour specialised units in whichever branch of the industry was suitable. 
Certification would occur at the end ofthe general training, with further recognition for the 
specialised units. The VTC considered that the flexibility envisaged would benefit school-
·leavers, who would gain experience in a broad area of work, before having to commit to a 
specialised occupation. Women would find it easier to take on an apprenticeship, as the 
training could be completed in two or more segments. The model would also allow 
tradespeople to update their skills more easily. 26 
The traditional mix of on and off-job training was also questioned by the VTC's report. 
It considered that greater periods of off-job training were inevitable for some trades, in light of 
rapid changes in technology and work practices. An advantage of this would be to intensify 
training, with shorter apprenticeships allowing more accurate manpower planning. Increased 
periods of off-job training would also help spread the cost of training more evenly. If trainees 
were already apprenticed, employers would require greater government incentives to 
compensate for the length of time without the apprentice. If pre-apprenticeship courses were 
favoured, this funding would go straight to the trainee in the form of a bursary. In either case, 
the taxpayer would be responsible for more of the costs of training. 27 
The report was in favour of promoting alternative forms of apprenticeship. It argued 
that group apprenticeships and apprenticeship to industry could be used to smooth apprentice 
intakes, and to ensure that a full range of skills was taught to each apprentice. Such schemes 
would also help solve the problem of the apprentice's fate if individual businesses closed 
down. The report strongly recommended that on-job training become more effective and 
formalised. Increased government incentives were seen as a means to motivate employers to 
'train their trainers'. A footnote to the report expressed pleasure that a subsidy for the wages 
of an apprentice instructor had been announced in the 1980 budget. The report also offered 
suggestions for rationalising the administrative structure of apprenticeship.28 The Review of 
Apprenticeship became the basis for a consultative document, Apprenticeship for Tomorrow: 
A Government Statement on Directions for Trade Training in New Zealand, presented to the 
House of Representatives by Jim Bolger, the National Minister of Labour, in October 1981. 
26 Ibid., 14, 
27 Ibid., 14. 
28 Ibid., 15. 
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Economic and Policy Background to Apprenticeship tor Tomorrow 
As the 1980s began, the New Zealand economy came under increasing pressure. New 
Zealand's trade with Britain declined from 53 per cent of its exports in 1960 to just nine per 
cent by 1985.29 This meant that exporters had to compete in the world market, rather than 
having a guaranteed destination for their products. The oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, 
along with the international phenomenon of' stagflation' (declining employment and 
increasing inflation), meant that the highly protected economy could no longer be insulated 
from global events. The economic difficulties are illustrated clearly by the continual decline in 
New Zealand's terms of trade; that is, the prices received for exports compared with the prices 
paid for imports. From a base of 100 in 1957 it had fallen to 83 by 1971, and to 73 in 1985.30 
The reaction of the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Rob Muldoon, to the 
economic crisis was to intervene in the economy on an almost daily basis. While his actions 
were those of orthodox recession economics, and at the time met with wide approval, he 
neglected long-term strategies, relying instead on "Keynesian fine-tuning of the economy". 31 
Muldoon looked to the farming industry to salvage the economy. Billions of dollars, acquired 
through overseas borrowing, were poured into the pastoral industry; directly, through 
subsidies and indirectly, through an overvalued exchange rate.32 The flagship of Muldoon's 
1981 election strategy, the ill-conceived 'Think Big' scheme, was designed to give the 
impression that the government had a vision, and to reduce unemployment and inflation. Not 
only did this fail to occur, but cost over-runs and changes in the circumstances upon which the 
viability of the large-scale energy projects was assessed, made the scheme an expensive 
liability. Unable to control inflation or halt the wage-price spiral, Muldoon resorted to a 
serious intervention, a wage, rent and price freeze that began in June 1982?3 
Concern about increasing unemployment in 1979 (see Figure 16) prompted the New 
Zealand Planning Council to commission a study "to search for policies which were likely to 
sustain full employment in ways that would contribute to the improvement of living 
standards".34 The rapid increase in the labour force, combined with "negligible economic 
growth" in the late 1970s, meant there was a significant gap between the supply and demand 
29 Bruce Jesson, Behind the Mirror Glass (Auckland: Penguin Books Ltd, 1987). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hugh Templeton, All Honourable Men (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995),231. 
32 Jesson, Behind the Mirror Glass, 58. 
33 Paul Dalziel & Ralph Lattimore, The New Zealand Macroeconomy: A Briefing on the Reforms (Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 1996). 
34 New Zealand Planning Council (NZPC), Employment: Towards an Active Employment Policy (Wellington: 
NZPC, 1980), 5. 
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for employment. The 1980 Planning Council report, Employment: Towards an Active 
Employment Policy, set out the nature of this structural unemployment. The report pointed to 
wide regional variation in employment, and highlighted the age differences in the 
unemployed. Of the 28,800 registered unemployed in May 1980, 77 per cent were aged under 
30, and 48 per cent under 21. Unemployment was also proportionally greater amongst women, 
Maori and Pacific Islanders, and the inexperienced and unskilled. 35 
Figure 16: Monthly Average Registered Unemployed, 1975-1984 36 
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The Planning Council report explored more fully one of the paradoxes of the late 
1970s, that is, shortages of skilled workers in a time of high unemployment. Two factors were 
identified as contributing to the reduction of the proportion of the workforce with skills and 
experience. First, those groups of people experiencing growing employment opportunities 
were young people, women returning to the workforce and part-time workers. Each of these 
groups was less likely to have had the opportunity to train or retrain, and was more likely to be 
33 Ibid., 14. 
36 Martin, Holding the Balance, 383 . 
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inexperienced. The second factor was the outflow of skilled workers through emigration. 
A survey of emigrants conducted by the Planning Council in October 1979 showed that those 
leaving were more likely to have been in the labour force, and that they had on average eight 
years work experience in their trade or occupation. Forty per cent of those aged over fifteen 
had a trade or professional qualification. Thus, a significant proportion of the approximately 
85,200 people who left New Zealand on a permanent or long-term basis between 1977 and 
1980 were skilled, experienced workers (see Figure 17 for migration patterns). Department of 
Labour figures showed "consistent shortages in a number of key areas ... such a reduction of 
the skilled segment of the workforce can limit the ability of New Zealand to seize 
opportunities for expansion and development". 37 
Figure 17: Net Migration, 1977-1987 38 
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37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Martin, Holding the Balance, 388. 
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The Change Begins 
In Muldoon's 1980 Budget, the National government signalled changes that were 
viewed as necessary to update apprenticeship and to decrease the perceived rigidity of the 
system. These changes included introducing more flexibility in training patterns, postponing 
the choice of specialisation until nearer the end of training, shortening the training period and 
improving the quality of training. Although it was acknowledged in the Budget that the detail 
of these broad objectives had to be worked out at the industry level, two initiatives were put 
into place immediately. First, to encourage a more systematic approach to work-place training, 
the government announced an 80 per cent subsidy of instructor's wages for approved in-house 
training programs for five or more apprentices.39 This subsidy augmented two incentive 
schemes already in existence~ an apprentice wage subsidy for the duration of extended block 
courses, and the Additional Apprentice Incentive Scheme. 
The Additional Apprentice Incentive Scheme (AAIS) was expressly introduced to 
boost apprentice intakes. Intakes in some trades had fallen drastically; the carpentry intake in 
1978, for example, was 36 per cent less than in the previous year. The scheme thus aimed to 
provide help to employers during the generally unproductive first year of apprenticeship.40 A 
$40 weekly wage subsidy was to be paid for the first year of apprenticeship for "genuinely 
additional apprentices".41 From the inception of the scheme in January 1979 up to the end of 
September 1980, 4568 additional apprentices were taken on, with 2256 contracts remaining in 
force at 30 September 1980.42 (See Illustration 3 for an example of promotional material 
related to AAIS). 
39 1980 Budget, AJHR, 1980, B6. 
40 'Additional Apprentice Incentive Scheme', LEG, 29(1), March 1979, 9. 
41 AJHR, 1981, G-l. 
42 'Additional Apprentice Scheme', LEG, 30(4), December 1980, 6. 
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Illustration 3: Advertisement for Additional Apprentice Incentive Scheme, 1981 43 
The Additional Apprentice Incentive Scheme 
If you employ apprentices or could employ apprentices,you ma,y be entitled to 
receive $2080 in cash under the Additional Apprentice Inoentive Soheme. 
More apprentioeships are needed: to offer young New Zealanders the 
opportunity to acquire worthwhile skills In the workpIece, and to train the 
skllled tradespeople needed for future economIc development. 
But employers who take on additional apprentices ma,y need help during the 
early, less productiVe period of their aPprentices' tra.1nJ.ng. This scheme helps 
employers to proVide these extra apprenticeship opportwlitiea. 
'The Bcheme offers a wage subsidy of S40 a week throughout the ftrst year of 
apprenticeship for each addWona.1 apprentice. This adds up to a total pa,yment of 
$2080. 
S d thi for further inform"tlon, conditions and.on e,1"" s coupon appllcatlon form. Or see the Apprentioeship' iL.L Section of your nearest Department of Labour. 
-------------------
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Second, in anticipation of the extra engineering tradespeople that would be required for 
the planned construction of the 'Think Big' energy projects during the 1980s, the Special 
Engineering Apprentice Training Scheme (SEATS) was announced. This scheme aimed to 
train an additional 600 people to those in traditional engineering apprenticeships (see 
Illustration 4 for promotional material related to SEATS). In order to ensure that the intake of 
traditional apprentices was maintained, employers were not generally eligible to take on 
SEATS trainees unless they could show that the trainee was additional to their usual intake. 
The scheme involved a 20-week pre-apprenticeship course, followed by placement in a special 
apprenticeship with a shortened term of 5000 hours. The first intake of 224 trainees 
commenced the pre-apprenticeship course in September 1980. 
43 Back Cover, LEG, 31 (3), September 1981. 
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The SEATS initiative had employer and union support, with the New Zealand 
Engineering Apprenticeship Committee indicating that it would consider favourably 
applications for proportion waivers to allow the employment of additional apprentices through 
the scheme.44 The scheme had some problems, however, with a number of the first intake 
being unable to findjobs at the end of the course. There were claims that the trainees had been 
misled by the Department of Labour hand-out advertising the course, which had stated that 
graduates would be placed in an apprenticeship. The Department acknowledged that they had 
"miscalculated the number of firms willing to take on apprentices under this scheme", and 
corrected the misleading impression given for the secon~ intake.45 
Illustration 4: Advertisement for SEATS, 1980 46 
Engineering Employers! 
BY19B3 NEW ZEALAND COULD BE SHORT OF 
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Don', let "'" 0(lfl0rhrit)' ,Ip by. A>k """ for 
fiJI details of the Spacial EngIneering 
App-entice TralnK)g Sc:hImlI! at your nearest 
~ntofLabOOro_or M '" and 
post the coupon below. 
. Spacial Engineering r - - - - --- ---, Appnudica Training Scheme. • ='~af_,"",p. 
44 'Energy Project Training Scheme Announced', LEG, 30(2), June 1980, 36. 
45 Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training Committee Files, 1977-81, Font. AAOC, W3473, 25/0, NA, 
Wellington. 
46 Back Cover, LEG, 30(4), December 1980. 
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'Apprenticeship (or Tomorrow' 
The reforms and changes in apprenticeship that had occurred throughout the 1970s 
were summarised and assessed in a consultative document, Apprenticeship for Tomorrow: A 
Government Statement on Directions for Trade Training in New Zealand, presented to the 
House of Representatives by Jim Bolger, the Minister of Labour, in October 1981. This report 
maintained that the basic principles of the apprenticeship system were sound. Given, however, 
that there had been fundamental changes in the economy and the labour market, reforms to the 
system were needed to make apprenticeship more flexible and responsive to changing skill 
demands. 47 
The report highlighted New Zealand's vulnerability to the international economy. It 
was argued that, to temper the effects of worldwide low growth rates, high unemployment and 
inflation, New Zealand had to improve the efficiency of the use of its resources. A skilled and 
adaptable workforce was seen as being crucial to maintaining and extending any competitive 
advantage the country possessed. The labour market had clearly changed from the hey-days of 
virtually full employment, yet despite the high levels of unemployment, skill shortages 
remained a problem, particularly in key trades such as engineering, motor mechanics and the 
electrical trade. Skill shortages not only inhibited increases in productivity, but also forced up 
the wages of the available skilled workers, exacerbating "inflation, reduc(ing) export 
opportunities and hinder(ing) economic growth".48 The report argued that the traditional 
method of topping-up the skill levels of the workforce, immigration, was no longer a viable 
option. Skilled workers had a greater choice of countries to migrate to, and the social cost of 
not training unskilled and unemployed New Zealanders was considered too high. 49 
Apprenticeship for Tomorrow identified several principles that together underpinned 
the strength and validity of apprenticeship as a means of training workers. These were the 
guarantee of employment during training, the integration of theoretical and practical training, a 
supply of skilled workers and the ethos of tripartite involvement in training. The report argued, 
however, that the traditional apprenticeship system was predicated on low rates of change, of 
gradual industrial, technological and social development. The exponential rate of change that 
was in fact being experienced in these areas meant that a long period of training, in a 
specialised field, was no longer always an appropriate means to ensure a skilled work force. 
Thus, the report considered that an apprenticeship system should function to address three 
47 Apprenticeship/or Tomorrow, AJHR, 1981, G-39. 
48 Ibid., 6. 
49 Ibid. 
fundamental questions: "What are the skills required? How can they be taught most 
effectively? How many people are needed equipped with those skills?,,50 
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It was envisaged in the report that each industry would take responsibility for detailed 
and formalised analysis of the skills required for that industry. This would allow training to be 
structured so that basic, broad-based skills could be taught first, possibly in a more intensive 
manner than before. This would increase the initial productivity of the apprentice and allow 
for shorter training terms. The training would then move to a more specialised area. Formal 
recognition as each stage was completed would allow for cross crediting of achievements. In 
this way, changes of direction would be possible, and there would be less emphasis on an 
uninterrupted period of training. This would advantage adult apprentices, those retraining, and 
women, who were often not in a position to commit to an unbroken period of around four 
years that a traditional apprenticeship required. 51 
Apprenticeship for Tomorrow explored the best means to more accurately judge the 
optimum number of apprentices that should be trained, and in which areas. Ongoing skill 
shortages were explained by the fact that the apprenticeship period tended to be longer than 
business planning horizons. This, coupled with the conservative attitudes held by many of the 
parties to apprenticeship, locked in the rigidities of the system. Because the ultimate 
determinant of the number of apprentices was the needs of the individual employer, there was 
no mechanism to translate anticipated industry needs into the number in training: 
decisions by individual employers on how many apprentices they will engage are 
normally based on the amount of work the employer has on hand ... consequently, 
during recessions apprentice intakes usually remain static or fall ... however, the time 
taken to train an apprentice means that trade training is pro- rather than counter-
cyclical, reinforcing skill shortages when the demand for skills is high and threatening 
surpluses when the demand falls away. 52 
Thus, throughout the early 1980s there was a general decline in the number of 
apprentices, (see Figure 18) although the tight economic conditions saw the number of lapsed 
contracts halving between 1974 and 1984.53 Much of the decline in apprentice numbers was 
directly the result of the decline in employment in some traditional apprenticeship industries, 
like the building and motor trades. 54 One of the main problems encountered by the Department 
of Labour at this time was the need to find new employers for those apprentices who had been 
50 Ibid., 10. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 15. 
53 Catherwood, Young People, Education and Employment, 27. 
54 Ibid., 28. 
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made redundant. This was especially prevalent in country areas, and in the building trades. 
Some apprentices had to move to different areas to maintain their service, while others were 
placed with government departments to complete their contracts. 
Figure 18: Trends in Private Sector Apprenticeship Contracts, 1970-1984 55 
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The balance of Apprenticeship for Tomorrow thus addressed the best means of 
increasing the supply of training positions, and the administrative changes that would be 
necessary to implement the reforms signalled. Secondment of apprentices to other employers 
to broaden the range of skills taught, group apprenticeship schemes for three or four 
employers, and apprenticeship to industry were all mooted as ways of getting more people into 
apprenticeships. Existing proportion regulations were also questioned. It was felt that these 
could sometimes be restrictive, and limit apprentice intakes, but it was also found that often 
individual employers did not take on as many apprentices as they were permitted. The report 
SS Department of Labour, Summary of Apprenticeship Trends to 31 March 1983, 10. 
therefore recommended that the emphasis on eligibility to train should move from numbers 
pennitted to the ability of the employer to provide quality training. 56 
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A discussion paper prepared by the Department of Education for the National Advisory 
Committee on Transition from School to Working Life reinforced the difficulties of organising 
work-based training in a tight economic situation. The paper identified the key problem: "on 
present economic indicators there will continue to be difficulties - at least to the mid 1980s, in 
the workforce absorbing the annual projected output from secondary schools".57 The paper 
highlighted the decline in traditional training opportunities, and argued that support for 
training programmes needed to be accompanied by "an equally strong effort for job 
creation".58 Table 7 sets out the changes in the destinations of schoolleavers between 1970 
and 1980, showing that the percentage of young people intending to take up apprenticeships 
had dropped by more than one third. The issue of credentialism, that is (in this case), the use 
of educational qualifications as a selection device regardless of the appropriateness of the 
qualification for the occupation, was also discussed. The paper reported a loss of 
approximately one third of the apprentice intake in the metal trades, arguing that the reason for 
this was the high level of qualifications required for selection, which meant that it was often 
difficult to retain the apprentices' interest in the work involved. 
Table 7: Destination of School Leavers, 1970-1980 59 
Destination 1970 1975 1980 
(Total Leavers) 51729 54233 58851 
To University 11.5% 10.6% 10.8% 
Teacher Training 4.4% 3.7% 2.6% 
Technicians & Health Services 9.1% 9.0% 5.4% 
Other Full-time Training 4.1% 6.1% 7.6% 
Apprenticeships 15.0% 15.4% 9.1% 
All Other 55.9% 55.3% 64.5% 
56 Apprenticeship for Tomorrow, 1981. 
57 Department of Education, Discllssion Paper- Trmlsitionfrom School to Working Life (Wellington: National 
Advisory Committee on Transition from School to Working Life, 1982), 1. AAOC, W3473, 3-7-8, NA, 
Wellington. 
58 Ibid., 5. 
59 Ibid., 14. 
. :~: .'- '~" -, .. -- .. 
-'"-_.-,--'-. ' 
--". - ,-.... 
- - - - ... - . - . ~ 
'r- :-:-~-7~~ -:-::- ~::-::-" 
143 
The Move to Pre-Apprenticeship Training 
Pre-apprenticeship training came to be seen as an increasingly viable option during the 
early 1980s for three main reasons. First, from the point of view of young people, the 
economic downturn meant that there were fewer apprenticeships being offered by employers. 
Thus, a young person who had studied the trade for six or twelve months at their own expense 
would perhaps have the edge over ajob applicant fresh from school. Many smaller employers 
were no longer taking on first-year apprentices, preferring instead to 'poach' second or third-
year apprentices who had completed the first year's intensive training at the expense of 
another employer. Second, there was a concerted push from technical institutes for a bigger 
proportion of the apprenticeship training to be carried out within their organisations.60 Some of 
the difficulties raised for technical· institutes by the traditional structure of apprenticeships 
were illustrated by the problems that the Carrington Technical Institute had with its three-year 
carpentry course. The institute was forced to tum down applicants for this course because only 
trainees taken on as apprentices by tradespeople were eligible. The course thus had a roll of 
80, instead of the 500 it was designed for, and ofthose, only 18 were first-year apprentices. 61 
Finally, employers, too, could see the advantages of pre-apprenticeship training. A 
paper prepared for the 1982 New Zealand Master Builders' Federation Annual Conference 
outlined the reasons behind this support.62 The paper argued that, although the building 
industry was generally in favour of apprenticeship, there were four factors that pointed to the 
benefits of modifying the system to include pre-apprenticeship training. First, an initial period 
of off-job training would postpone the need for the young person to specialise in a particular 
trade at the outset of the apprenticeship. This would allow a more informed choice to be made 
and perhaps lessen the attrition rates of apprentices. Second, pre-apprenticeship training would 
alleviate the high cost to the employer of the early years of apprenticeship; the result of the 
combination of an unproductive apprentice, and supervision and instruction costs. Third, pre-
apprenticeship training would remove the need for the apprentice to be away from the job for 
protracted periods at block courses. Fourth, the paper spoke of the need to prepare apprentices 
for re-training that could be required in the future. In light of these concerns, the paper called 
for a "positive approach to pre-apprenticeship training".63 Clearly the 'social fact' identified 
60 Kim Ulberg, Skill New Zealand, interview by author, 16 August 2000. 
61 "Red Tape Across the Path to Workshop," New Zealand Herald, 18 April 1980. Apprenticeship and Related 
Trade Training Committee Files, 1977-8l. AAOC, W3473, 25/0, NA, Wellington. 
62 Apprenticeship - Time for Change, paper for the New Zealand Master Builders Federation Annual Conference, 
March 1982. Building Industry Training Board Minutes, AAOC W3473, 14111, NA Wellington. 
63 Ibid. 
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by the VTC ten years earlier; that apprentices should be paid, and by the employer, 
throughout the course of their training, was being questioned in the early 1980s. 
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The industries that had moved the furthest towards extended trade training (see 
Chapter 6, pp.119-123), but had been frustrated in their efforts for reform by the lack of 
government funding, were quickly persuaded that pre-apprenticeship training could provide an 
acceptable substitute. Between May and July 1981, the VTC received applications for pre-
apprenticeship courses from the New Zealand Motor Trade Certification Board, the 
Electronics ITB and the Engineering ITB. The VTC met on 15 July 1981 to discuss the 
proposals, and immediately informed the applicants that the Depart:ri1ent of Labour deadline 
for courses to obtain funding for the following year was 31 July 1981. Given the short time 
frame, the industry applications for pre-apprenticeship courses were sent to the Department 
without being finalised, but were nevertheless supported by the VTC. 
The response of the Department of Labour to the applications was cautious. The 
Department argued that the concept of pre-apprenticeship training raised a number of issues. 
The question of trainee selection was mentioned; without the direct employer/apprentice 
relationship, who would select suitable candidates? The extent and responsibility for income 
support for trainees was also queried, as were the contractual obligations of the industries 
involved to employ trainees at the end of the pre-apprenticeship course. The major concern of 
the Department was that "any increase in public investment should be clearly balanced by 
substantial reductions in training times"; therefore, the combined time required for pre-
apprenticeship training and the reformed apprenticeship "should be significantly less than the 
time required for the existing apprenticeship".64 The September 1981 minutes of the 
NZMTCB recorded the Board's response to these concerns. The Board argued that, because of 
the substantial workshop training required in the motor trades, it was not practicable to reduce 
the total training time by any longer than the time taken for any pre-apprenticeship course. The 
Board considered that it would be impractical to offer unconditional agreement to employ 
those completing pre-apprenticeship courses, but guaranteed to do its best to place apprentices. 
Movement towards some form of pre-apprenticeship training was as ponderous as the 
extended trade training scheme had been. In May 1983, the Apprenticeship Training Co-
ordinating Committee (ATCC), set up by Bolger in 1982 "to facilitate dialogue between 
training authorities in the public and private sectors and to encourage harmonisation of the two 
64 Jackson, Department of Labour, to Wood, VTC, August 1981. Pre-apprenticeship Training File, AAOC, 
W3473, 25110, NA, Wellington. 
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systems", was presented with a paper, Training in Anticipation of Apprenticeships".65 This 
paper set out the extent of existing pre-apprenticeship schemes.66 The Department of Maori 
Affairs was offering courses aimed at rural Maori and Pacific Islanders. These were one-year 
courses and, if an apprenticeship was gained at the completion of the course, the time was 
credited. The SEAT scheme had taken on no further trainees since the third intake in 1982, 
and in fact, although the course was designed to lead to a shortened apprenticeship of 5000 
hours, this was not acceptable to some employers. Thus, some SEATS graduates accepted 
longer apprenticeships, negating to some degree the advantage of the pre-apprenticeship 
course. The Department of Labour had no specific pre-apprenticeship schemes under way. The 
paper acknowledged the interest in pre-apprenticeship training on the part of a number of 
industries, and called for more research on the subject.67 
The Apprenticeship Act 1983 did not specify directly how training should be 
organised, throwing the question of pre-apprenticeship training firmly back to industries. In a 
letter that explained the reasons behind the Act, written to Rick Julian, the Commissioner of 
Apprenticeship, Bolger reiterated that individual industries, through their apprenticeship 
committees, must decide "how best to adapt their training arrangements to present and future 
needs".68 Bolger made a wary commitment to assist with funding for pre-apprenticeship 
training. There were, however, many hoops to be jumped through before this funding would 
be available. Industries had to show that a training needs analysis had been carried out for that 
industry; that there was "clear justification for the amount of technical Institute instruction" 
sought; that on-job training had been improved; that there was, where possible, an overall 
reduction in training time; and that there was a "clear demonstration that the costs to the tax 
payer are clearly matched by the benefits".69 
Pre-apprenticeship training did gradually became the norm in some industries, but 
more by default on the part of the government than any active policies. For example, pre-
apprenticeship courses in the electrical trades began at Christchurch Polytechnic in 1989. They 
were instigated by the Polytechnic at the request of the industry, which wanted apprentices to 
have some training before they began their time.70 There is little question that pre-
65 Apprenticeship Training Co-ordinating Committee (ATCC) Files. AAOC, W3473, 25/1211, NA, Wellington. 
66 ATCC Files. AAOC, W3473, 25/12, NA, Wellington. 
67 ATCC Files, Training in Anticipation of Apprenticeships. AAOC, W3473, 25112, NA, Wellington. 
68 B.QJger to Julian, 6 July 1983. AAOC, W3473, 25/01Ptl, NA, Wellington. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Murray Richards, Course Supervisor, Electrical Trades, School of Electro technology, Christchurch Polytechnic 
Institute of Technology, email to author, 8 February 2001. 
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apprenticeship courses are useful. They provide the student with a 'taste' of the trade, 
allowing the student to decide whether they have both the aptitude and the inclination to go on 
to an apprenticeship. The employer is able to obtain a more focused report on the abilities of 
the student than a generalised school report could provide and, once an apprentice is selected, 
they have some theoretical and practical training which allows them to become productive 
earlier and reduces the need for supervision. In the electrical trade, for example, apprentices 
who have completed a course are competent in safe working practices, including important 
testing procedures, and have some knowledge of the use of hand tools. This provides a 
monetary saving to the employer as less instruction in these areas is required.7l There is also 
less time required on block courses throughout the apprenticeship. 
There are, however, some concerns with the concept of pre-apprenticeship training. 
The cost of the course may be a barrier to participation for some. Students with a more 
practical bent, who may be regarded as the natural recruitment catchment for some trades, may 
find the prospect of another six months or a year in a 'school' setting daunting. The theoretical 
emphasis of the courses may also be off-putting for these students, as may be the educational 
entry requirements. The recent proliferation of course providers raises concerns about quality. 
Ultimately, pre-apprenticeship courses do not solve the problem oflack of job opportunities. 
While this is less of a problem in some trades,n and in times when the economy is booming, it 
raises concerns about the use of pre-apprenticeship courses as a 'holding pen' for school 
leavers, with achievement on those courses merely providing another sifting device for 
potential employers. Course providers have mixed incentives when it comes to setting intake 
numbers for their courses. They may not always be in a position to guarantee that acceptable 
levels of their graduates go on to take up apprenticeships, raising false expectations in some of 
their students. 
Public Service Apprenticeships 
The role of government departments in fostering apprenticeship was also examined by 
Apprenticeship for Tomorrow. Public service apprenticeships had historically been regulated 
by separate legislation, beginning with the Government Apprentices Act 1875. This act 
expanded the provisions made for government apprentices in the Master and Apprentice Act 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid.: Of the participants in the electrical pre-apprenticeship courses, approximately 90 per cent of each course 
would get apprenticeships, 5 per cent would go on to further training, and about 5 per cent would drop out 
through lack of ability or disinterest (a filter for industry). 
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1865, setting terms to between three and seven years, and ensuring that apprentices 
received wages as opposed to board. The act was consolidated in 1908.73 After 1945, public 
sector apprentices had been indentured under a variety of acts, such as the Government 
Railways Act 1949, the Post Office Act 1959 and the State Services Act 1962?4 By 1983, ten 
government departments (including the armed services) employed apprentices, with the 
majority (61.8 per cent) working for either New Zealand Railways, the Ministry of Energy 
Resources, the New Zealand Post Office or the Ministry of Works and Development.75 
Apprenticeship for Tomorrow highlighted the importance of public sector 
apprenticeship, and called for greater co-ordination and comparability between public and 
private sector training authorities.76 While the number of government apprentices was not high 
(see Figure 19), averaging 7.7 per cent of the total number of new apprenticeship contracts in 
the years 1969 to 1983,77 public sector apprenticeship was important for three reasons. 
First, in general terms, the public sector played a crucial role in industrial relations, with 
apprenticeship conditions in the public service forming one component of the bargaining 
framework. Second, some trades existed only in the government sector. In New Zealand, 
enterprises that required specialised tradespeople, such as the large railway workshops and 
hydroelectric developments, were only possible with state sponsorship. Finally, the intake of 
government apprentices was less dependent on economic conditions, and was thus able to help 
smooth fluctuations in the supply of tradespeople. 
Given that the individual government departments fIxed the proportion of apprentices 
to tradespeople/8 the public sector was able to train "well in excess of the number required to 
replace their loss oftradespersons".79 The Railways Department, for example, needed to 
replace about 100 tradespeople each year, but in the fIve years up to 1981, had taken on an 
average of 300 apprentices per year. The cost of this service was analysed by New Zealand 
Railways in 1980. The unrecompensed cost of the apprenticeship training provided by New 
Zealand Railways was in the vicinity of $3 million for the year ended 31 March 1980.80 Thus, 
73 VTC, Current Developments in Apprenticeship, 1975,13. 
74 VTC, Review of Apprenticeship, 1978, 11. 
75 Department of Labour, Summary of Apprenticeship Trends to 31 March 1983, 11. 
76 Apprenticeshipfor Tomorrow, 1981,19. 
77 Department of Labour, Summary of Apprenticeship Trends to 31 March 1983,6. 
78 VTC, Review of Apprenticeship, 1978, 11. 
79 Apprenticeshipfor Tomorrow, 1981,19. 
80 New Zealand Railways, The Social Role (Wellington: NZR, 1980), 7. 
the excess numbers of tradespeople produced by the state clearly provided an indirect 
subsidy to private sector training costs. 
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Apprenticeship for Tomorrow was tabled in the House in 1982, and a tripartite 
Advisory Committee on Apprenticeship Reform established to advise the Minister of Labour 
on the "broad issues of principle" that would arise as the system was being reformed.82 The 
committee was chaired by Major-General L.A. Pearce, a past chairman of the VTC, and 
superceded the VTC's Apprenticeship and Related Trade Training Committee.83 It comprised 
two Employers' Federation representatives; two representatives from the Federation of 
Labour; Derek Wood from the VTC~ and was supported by officials from the Departments of 
Labour and Education.84 The committee was made up entirely of men, a fact that was noted 
with concern by National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women (NACEW), which 
81 Department of Labour, Summary oj Apprenticeship Trends to 31 March 1983, 6. 
82 ~ 1982, G-l, 22. 
83 ARTT Committee Files, VTC. AAOC, W3473, 25/1 111, NA, Wellington. 
84 ' Apprenticeship Committee Members Named' , LEG, 32(1), March 1982, 7. 
called for representation of women and their concerns on the committee.85 The committee 
reviewed over 100 submissions on Apprenticeship for Tomorrow. 86 
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While the Advisory Committee endorsed the bulk of Apprenticeship for Tomorrow, 
there were three proposals they were unable to support. The proposal that formal recognition 
should be granted for each stage of skill acquisition raised the concern of the "possible 
dilution of the objective of achieving an adequate supply of fully qualified people".87 The 
committee was opposed to a proposal that adult apprenticeships should be positively 
encouraged, feeling strongly that "apprenticeship should continue to be seen primarily as the 
preserve of schoolleavers". 88 The committee also disagreed with the proposal that lodging 
allowances should be increased at the expense of travel subsidies.89 The work of the Advisory 
Committee was considered complete in May 1983, as the Apprenticeship Act was passed into 
law. 90 
Many of the suggestions made in Apprenticeship for Tomorrow were enacted in the 
Apprenticeship Act 1983. The Act was passed with little debate; the consultation preceding it 
had been so lengthy and thorough that there clearly was little more to be said. Eddie Isbey, the 
Labour member for Papatoetoe, explained the Opposition support for the Act by saying: 
"anything that will streamline the apprenticeship procedures should be supported by the 
House".91 There were three major themes in the Apprenticeship Act. These were the 
promotion of additional apprenticeship opportunities, a simplification and streamlining of the 
apprenticeship system and the enhancement of the quality of training. 91 While retaining many 
of the traditional concepts of apprenticeship, the Act made some important changes. Section 3 
reiterated that all or most of the knowledge and skills to be learnt during the apprenticeship 
would be acquired "by means of practical training received in the course of the employee's 
employment", but made provision for formal instruction elsewhere.93 The section also left the 
term of the apprenticeship open, specifying only a "period of employment whose length is 
related to the extent of the knowledge and skills intended to be acquired".94 The legislative 
85 National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women (NACEW) Minutes, 3 June 1982. AAOC, W3473, 
21112, NA, Wellington. 
86 AJHR, 1983, G-1, 23. 
87 Advisory Committee on Apprenticeship Reform, Response to Apprenticeship for Tomorrow Proposals, June 
1983. AAOC, W3473, 25/0 Pt 1, NA, Wellington. 
88 Ibid. 
89 'Apprenticeship Reform: the Next Steps', LEG, 33(3), September 1983. 
90 Apprenticeship Training Co-ordinating Committee Files. AAOC, W3473, 25112, NA, Wellington 
91 NZPD, 451,1983, p.1051. 
92 'New Apprenticeship Act has Three-fold Purpose', LEG, 33(4), December 1983, 7. 
93 New Zealand Statutes, 1983, 182. 
94 Ibid., 183. 
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machinery for secondments, group apprenticeships, joint contracts and apprenticeship to 
industry was put in place, and the reality of uncertain economic conditions was recognised 
with provisions for transfers, secondments to state service employers and a section detailing 
the procedure when a employer's business was wound up. The administration of the 
apprenticeship system was rationalised, and the Arbitration Court was charged, through 
apprenticeship orders, with creating the "maximum number of opportunities for the 
employment of apprentices". 95 
The Apprenticeship Act 1983 included the expectation that individual industries would 
attempt to increase their number of women apprentices, and encourage minority groups into 
apprenticeships. Section 40 of the Apprenticeship Act 1983 charged local apprenticeship 
committees with promoting: 
the taking up of apprenticeships by members of groups that are under-represented (in 
relation to the sexual and ethnic composition of the New Zealand workforce) in the 
workforce of that industry, and by persons with special needs.96 
It was also expected that industries would restructure their local committees, to facilitate their 
new promotional role of encouraging additional apprenticeship openings for all young people. 
The major focus required of industries was to initiate a formal analysis of their training 
requirements, backed up by an 80 per cent government subsidy through training development 
. 97 
aSSIstance grants. 
-
Thus, the pressure for the reform of apprenticeship that had been steadily mounting 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s resulted in an Apprenticeship Act that acknowledged 
those issues, but retained an essentially traditional understanding of apprenticeship. The 
provisions of the Act, while encompassing many of the concerns that had been expressed, 
contained more potential than actual solutions. While the mechanics for new initiatives were 
put in place by the Act, the responsibility for developing those initiatives was placed largely 
with industries. This raised three possible barriers to reform. First, many industries were 
conservative by nature, finding little incentive to change a system that in the main suited their 
needs. Second, some of those industries which were keen for reform had tried their best with 
both the extended trade training and pre-apprenticeship schemes, but had often been thwarted 
by the cumbersome nature of the process and the lack of funding. It was not surprising that 
these industries were sceptical about apprenticeship reform. Third, industries were bearing the 
95 Ibid., 212. 
96 Ibid., 219. 
97 A.JHR, 1984, G-1, 21. 
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brunt of the economic hardship. Given that training is one ofthe first areas to be pruned in 
hard times, it was perhaps a little ambitious for the government to expect wholesale refonn of 
training in a period of virtually nil economic growth. The impact of the Apprenticeship Act 
1983 is difficult to assess fairly, however, because mere months after its passing, the fourth 
Labour government was elected, precipitating a maelstrom of change in every aspect of life in 
New Zealand. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE FOURTH LABOUR GOVERNMENT: 
'REVOLUTIONISING' APPRENTICESHIP? 
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The election of the fourth Labour government in July 1984 marked the beginning of 
fundamental and far-reaching changes in the role of the state in New Zealand. The 
combination of harsh economic conditions, a country tired of the authoritarian interference 
during the Muldoon years, and an incoming government brimful with new ideas, ensured the 
climate for reform was in place. The economic crisis that occurred immediately after the 
election provided the kick-start required to initiate the reforms, and "coloured the policies and 
style" of the new government.} It was clear that long-term economic issues had to be resolved 
and that this was most effectively done with swift and fundamental reform. This in tum 
required a level of research and analysis not before seen in New Zealand: "officials were 
required to shift their focus from recommending marginal improvements to fundamentally 
reassessing the purpose and effectiveness of existing policies and institutions"? 
This chapter first examines the changes to the education system as a whole desired by 
the incoming Labour government. It is significant that discussion about apprenticeship during 
this period became to be seen more as an 'education' issue than a 'labour' one, partly 
reflecting the emphasis on post-compulsory education and training, and partly in tacit 
recognition that entrance to the labour market became increasingly circumscribed. Second, it 
traces the mechanics of the government's attempts to force apprenticeship reform. The means 
used for this was the Apprenticeship Act 1983, but the deal was 'sweetened' with a subsidy 
tied to reform. Third, the chapter examines the findings of many of the taskforces and working 
parties that were formed to advise on restructuring the education system. It will show that, 
while many of the reforms that took place were informed by the neo-liberal ideology of 
lessening state involvement, education and training policies were often the site oftension 
between such ideals, and demands for equity and a steady supply of skilled workers. 
Codd identifies "deep-seated contradictions" embedded in the educational policies of 
the fourth Labour government: "the fundamental contradiction [was] between a democratic 
imperative for more community participation in decision-making, and an economic imperative 
1 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 33. 
2 Ibid., 34. 
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- for tighter controls over public expenditure".3 This contradiction, however, was not new to 
education, and was in fact merely a part of the ongoing tension (identified often during this 
research) between the social and economic goals of education. The Butterworths confirmed 
that "education reforms in New Zealand have wrestled time and time again with a relatively 
small number of intractable and interlocked issues": the tension between local and central 
control; issues of equality and equity; the question of who should pay for education and how 
accountability can best be organised; and crucially, the debate about the purpose of education 
and whether it is primariiy an individual or societal benefit.4 
The Labour party's 1984 election manifesto emphasised the role of the education 
system in delivering an equitable society. It expressed concern about the lack of opportunities 
for women, Maori and Pacific Island groups, and the working class, and resolved to improve 
these through the education system. The manifesto also promised to "ensure that all school 
leavers who fail to find employment in their first year after leaving school will have access to 
further education and vocational training". 5 The means to fulfil this promise was investigated 
by a caucus Transition Education Committee,6 which noted in its interim report, presented in 
January 1985, that there were a decreasing number of work opportunities available for young 
people. The report claimed that the primary causes of youth unemployment were a marked 
decline in the number of apprenticeships offered, and the restructuring effects of new 
technologies, both of which worked to reinforce the disadvantages tha( some groups in society 
already faced.7 The commitment to social equity was cemented with the appointment of 
Russell Marshall, "well known for his liberal views on education",8 as Minister of Education, 
and underscored by the importance to the policy process of the Cabinet Social Equity 
Committee (chaired by Marshall).9 The Prime Minister, David Lange, established this 
committee in 1984 and its role was to address issues relating to social equity; to review 
existing policies and resource allocations; and to initiate new policies to deal with social 
imbalances. 10 
3 Codd, Educational Policies and the Crisis of the New Zealand State, 191. 
4 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 21-
5 Liz Gordon, "The Right Way to Work: The Development of the Access Training Programme," in New Zealand 
Educational Policy Today, ed. Sue Middleton, John Codd & Alison Jones (Wellington: Allen & Unwin NZ, 
1990), 179. 
6 Ibid.: Members of Committee: Noel Scott, Margaret Austin & Trevor Mallard. 
7 Ibid., 180. 
8 Ibid., 179 
9 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 40. 
10 Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power 2nd ed. (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987) 41-42. 
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Alongside these equity goals, however, was a growing feeling in some sectors that 
the economic goals of education were equally important, and that they had been neglected in 
the New Zealand education system. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s "the worsening 
economic climate, and the need for New Zealand to develop sharper, more modem skills, 
focused attention on the economic purposes of education". 11 A 1982 GEeD report had (as 
part of an international series) reviewed the New Zealand education system. The report was 
generally complimentary, but did make the comment that the New Zealand system stressed 
individual development, prioritising educational, rather than economic and instrumental 
values. 12 
This vein of thought was evident in the 1984 Treasury briefing to the incoming 
government, Economic Management. Treasury, after imbibing New Right ideology during the 
'thumb-twiddling' years of the Muldoon administration, was "ready to hit the ground 
running".13 While the main thrust of the briefing dealt with economic policy, it also raised 
serious questions about the effectiveness of current social spending. With regard to education, 
the main concern of Treasury at that point was the tertiary sector. It argued that education at 
the tertiary level was as much a private good as a public one, and that tertiary education was a 
classic example of 'middle-class capture', that is, that tertiary education largely benefited 
those who could well afford to contribute more fully to its cost. The briefing also identified 
what was to become a driving force for reform in the education sector;_"the mismatch between 
school-Ieavers' skills and the labour market". 14 
It was against this background that Marshall began what was regarded by many as a 
long overdue rationalisation and reform of the education system. The administration of 
education, in particular, was a "mishmash", and Marshall was especially aware that the 
"polytechnic and technical institute sector was fragmented, unco-ordinated, and grossly over-
centralised" .15 Reform in this area was complicated by the fact that post compulsory education 
and training was fought over by the Departments of Education and Labour, and by the need 
for the government to keep its election promise of providing training for the growing numbers 
of unemployed youth. Marshall's style was consultative and he wanted to improve the system 
through the "traditional means of incremental reforms and increased resources". 16 
11 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 26. 
12 Ibid., 21, 
13 Ibid., 35. 
14 Ibid., 37. 
15 Ibid., 40, 41. 
16 Ibid., 40. 
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A series of reports throughout the first term of the Labour government reaffirmed 
the idea that the state had a role to play in organising and delivering vocational training. While 
the pressure for economic deregulation was firm and sustained, the idea that education and 
training should be subject to market forces had not yet fully taken hold. The changing nature 
of the debate surrounding vocational education illustrates well the tension between neo-
liberalism and corporatism that became evident throughout the 1980s. Corporatism is defined 
as "the formulation and implementation of government policies through the mechanism of a 
negotiated and consensual alliance oflabour, capital and the state".17 Oliver argues that within 
the fourth Labour government, the demand for free-market restructuring drove out corporatist 
policies. This may well have been true in the government's economic approach, but there 
remained a role for tripartite negotiation about vocational educational policies until the late 
1980s. 
Young People. Education and Employment. New Zealand Planning Council, 1985 
This report set out the changes that the 1983 Apprenticeship Act and the 1984 Labour 
government had made to apprenticeship. It argued that the fundamental issue at stake was the 
"role of the state in relation to the vocational training of young people" .18 The report presented 
two opposing views of what that role should be; the fledging notion of 'user pays' as reducing 
the role of the state on one hand, and, on the other, the idea that the state should have a greater 
role in vocational training, in line with public expenditure on universitY education, for 
example. The report identified the perceived cost of apprenticeship to employers as being one 
of the maj or factors in the decline of the number of apprenticeships offered, and commended 
government initiatives to ease this burden. It argued that "a key barrier to growth in numbers 
of apprentices is the requirement for concurrent work experience alongside the training the 
apprentice receives". 19 Clearly, then, in an economic downturn, less work available translates 
into fewer apprentices required. Thus, the report argued, the state must be prepared to 
intervene to even out this drop in demand and to ensure the required flow of skilled workers: 
"the problem which arises is that there is a gap between industry demand for skilled labour 
and industry'S willingness to train that labour". 20 
17 W. Hugh Oliver, "The Labour Caucus and Economic Policy Formulation, 1981 to 1984", in The Making of 
Rogernomics, ed. B. Easton (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989), 11. 
18 Vince Catherwood, Young People, Education and Employment: Planning Paper No. 23, 28. 
19 Ibid., 28. 
20 Ibid., 28. 
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The report at no stage questioned the validity of 'apprenticeship' as a means of 
training young people. It did, however, offer several suggestions to ease the perceived 
rigidities of the existing system, arguing that "radical structural changes ... may be the only 
satisfactory, long-term answer to the problem of providing New Zealand in the future with a 
skilled and adaptable workforce".21 The suggestions largely followed the ideas in the 1981 
document, Apprenticeship for Tomorrow, such as broad-based initial training, competency-
based assessment and pre-apprenticeship training. The report also suggested widening the 
range of industries using systematic training and introducing variations on the organisation of 
the formal component oftraining, such as polytechnic trade training schemes run in parallel 
with apprenticeships.22 
The Employment Promotion Conference, March 1985. 
In March 1985 the fourth Labour government initiated the Employment Promotion 
Conference. The aim of the Conference was to address employment policy; particularly 
growing levels of unemployment, using a "collective consultative process".z3 Despite short 
time horizons allowed for the preparation of submissions, a wide range of viewpoints were 
represented. Higgins, in a retrospective article that compares the 1985 conference with the 
Employment Taskforce of 1994, argued that there were clear and concrete ideas offered on 
how to manage unemployment at the community level. Unfortunately,_Higgins argued, the 
"boundaries within which the government was prepared to move on unemployment iSsues 
were already settled by an agenda dominated by economic policy".24 Thus, a strategy of 
subsidised work and training for unemployed people, which had been the theme of many of 
the submissions to the Conference, was phased out and replaced with the Access programme. 
The focus of Access was on training rather than on creating jobs. Higgins argued that that 
rhetoric behind the scheme "lifted responsibility for the punishing policy-induced 
unemployment that was to follow neatly onto the shoulders ofthe unemployed themselves". 25 
This is borne out by a description given in 1988 by Phil Goff, Minister of Employment, of the 
21 Ibid., 30. 
22 Ibid. . 
23 Jane Higgins, 'The Task Force on Employment: An Experience of Deja vu?," New Zealand Political Review, 
February/March 1995, 7. 
24 Ibid., 7. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
Access scheme as "a programme designed to address the personal and vocational skill 
deficiencies of long-tenn unemployed people" (author's italics). 26 
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The VTC submission to the Employment Promotion Conference set its discussion of 
apprenticeship finnly within the larger issue of youth employment, laying out cogently three 
inter-related issues. The first issue was the direct correlation between low levels of 
qualifications and high levels of unemployment. A profile of those unemployed between 
November 1983 and January 1984 showed that 77 per cent were lowly skilled, 69 per cent had 
no educational qualifications and 58 per cent were aged under 24,z7 Second, training 
opportunities for young people had declined markedly. The tight economic situation meant 
that fewer apprenticeships were being offered, with employers tending to recruit already 
qualified workers to fill the smaller number of vacancies available. This exacerbated the 
problem of 'poaching' of workers trained by a particular finn, making employers even more 
reluctant to take on apprentices. The scarcity of training opportunities also allowed the entry 
standards to become artificially high, penalising the less qualified, with shrinking 
opportunities for unskilled or semi-skilled work effectively creating a barrier to any fonn of 
employment for much of this group. The third issue identified was that by international 
standards there was a "serious lack of vocational skills and training amongst young workers in 
New Zealand".28 (See Table 8 for international comparisons). The paradox identified in the 
1985 Planning Council report was reiterated by the VTC; the need for highly-skilled, flexible 
-
workers, but the claim by industries that "in the modem competitive business world, they are 
not in a position to develop these characteristics in their skilled workers".29 
26 New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Proceedings of the Towards Competency Seminar, August 
1988, ed. Graham A. Wagner (Wellington: NZCER, 1989), 10. 
27 Vocational Training Council, Training and Employment: Papers Prepared for the Employment Promotion 
Conference, March 1985 (Wellington: VTC, 1985), 7. 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 Ibid., 7. 
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Table 8: Post-secondary Education Trends: International Comparisons, 1981 30 
% of School Leavers Entering % of Population aged 16-24 
Labour Market without a Participating in Education 
Recognised Educational (1981) 
Qualification (1981) 
Germany 10 45 
Japan 13 54 (1982) 
United Kingdom 16 32 
USA 29 73 
New Zealand (1984) 33 27 
The VTC recommended the development of a comprehensive youth training policy, 
catering for the unemployed and inadequately trained. The concept of broad-based, flexible 
training was again to the fore, but the VTC saw this as a complement to traditional methods of 
training, such as the apprenticeship system, rather than as becoming an integral part of that 
training. Thus, broad-based, pre-vocational training was viewed as a means to increase the 
adaptability and employability of young people, not as a "substitute for traditional avenues of 
skill training such as apprenticeship, which the Council believes should be promoted and 
utilised to the full".31 The VTC's paper also introduced the concept of -'skill ownership'; the 
ability to reuse learned skills and knowledge in different environments, thus placing the notion 
of 'skill' firmly in the hands of the individual, as opposed to connecting it to the job.32 
On Education and the Economy, 1986 Vocational Training Council Report 
This report was produced as a contribution to an international Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study on the role of education and training 
in economic performance and growth. The OECD had carried out a survey on the New 
Zealand post-secondary system in 1982.33 While the findings were generally positive, 
describing the system as "low-cost, efficient and economic", the report noted growing 
structural youth unemployment and asserted the "inhibiting influence ofthe existing 
30 J. Tetley, B. Whisker & D Wood, Education and the Economy: A Vocational Perspective (Wellington: VTC, 
1986), 10. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
32 Ibid., 8. 
33 Also discussed on page 146. 
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apprenticeship system on skill change".34 With this survey as a background, and in the 
light of the economic and political changes of the mid-eighties, the VTC asked 126 prominent 
and influential decision-makers from all sectors of the country their views on the efficacy of 
New Zealand's education system and its place in economic development. The respondents 
showed "surprising agreement about major issues", with top priority being given to "a more 
flexible workforce with adaptable skills".35 Echoing concerns that had been raised on many 
occasions in the past (for example, see Chapter 7, p.127), many respondents questioned the 
validity of the secondary .curriculum in preparing young people for 'the world of work'. The 
apprenticeship system was criticised by many as being "archaic and sex discriminatory", and it 
was felt that more emphasis should be placed on pre-apprenticeship training. 36 
Clearly, then, the problems that had been identified with the apprenticeship system 
during the preceding twenty years were not significantly closer to being solved. Despite 
economic and social pressures, the apprenticeship system proved remarkably resistant to 
change. It is interesting to note that in the on-going discussion regarding apprenticeship 
reform, all parties appeared to be receptive to change to a greater or lesser degree. From the 
myriad of reports and papers it would be difficult isolate one group involved in the 
apprenticeship system, and pinpoint that group as the seat of resistance. Thus, it could be 
suggested that the sticking point was at the 'work-face'; that the rhetoric of official bodies, be 
they union, employer or educationalist, perhaps was not always reflective of deeply 
entrenched ideas held by those' doing the doing'. The power of the socialisation processes 
involved in apprenticeship must not be underestimated. To those involved in the process, 
apprenticeship is much more than an education, or an economic transaction. This may explain 
why changes made to the system from' above' , or by those with only an intellectual 
understanding of apprenticeship, may be doomed to failure. 
The 'Economic Miracle' Fails to Materialise 
By 1985 the fourth Labour government was well down the track of radical 
restructuring and liberalisation of the economy. Unemployment had fallen steadily, reaching a 
low point of 45,000 in March 1985. Much to the government's consternation, however, after 
September 1985 the numbers began to rise again and economic growth began to slow: "this 
was alarming to a government that had staked everything on its belief that economic 
34 Vocational Training Council, On Education and the Economy (Wellington: VTC, 1986). 
35 VTC, On Education and the Economy. 
36 Ibid. 
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restructuring would restore economic growth and create employment".37 The reaction of 
the government was to develop an "extraordinary focus" on the need for the education system 
to provide the necessary skills and training for young people to enter the labour market. This 
resulted in the establishment of the Cabinet ad hoc Committee on Employment and Training 
in March 1986, which was charged with developing policy on reducing unemployment 
through improving education and training. 38 Reflecting the depth of concern, this committee 
sat for fifteen months. It authorised the Access scheme, then turned its attention to "a rational 
reappraisal of the whole tertiary sector". A Green Paper on vocational education and training 
prepared by the Department of Labour was to have a "seminal influence" on the committee, 
setting out for the first time many of the themes that would guide reform of the sector.39 
Green Paper on the New Zealand Vocational Education and Training System and Institutional 
Arrangements in the Labour Market, 1986 . 
The paper was a sincere and detailed discussion of the state of vocational training in 
New Zealand, encompassing both practical and theoretical concerns. The paper began by 
stating that the thr~e inter-related objectives of vocational education and training were to 
contribute to economic growth, to promote equity in the labour market and to enhance 
personal development.4o It argued that vocational education and training should be 
"accessible, flexible, measurable, transferable and culturally appropriate", and then suggested 
reasons why the historical development of vocational education and training impeded the 
realisation of some of these goals.41 
The main argument of the Green Paper was that post-war vocational training, in 
particular the apprenticeship system, had grown out of the particular social and economic 
environment of the time. Thus, strong economic growth and little unemployment had 
"profoundly influenced" attitudes to training.42 For example, the notion of a 'job for life' 
meant that there was a widespread belief that training was something that happened at the 
beginning of a person's working life. Training arrangements were historically closely linked 
with industrial relations issues, with the length of training strongly influencing the ultimate 
37 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 55. 
38 Ibid., 56: The members of this committee were Marshall, Kerry Burke (Employment), Ann Hercus (Social 
Welfare), Koro Wetere (Maori Affairs) and Richard Prebble (Finance). 
39 Ibid., 58. 
40 Department of Labour, Green Paper on the New Zealand Vocational Education and Training System and 
Institutional Arrangements in the Labour Market, 1986. New Zealand Qualifications Authority Library. 
41 Ibid.,!. 
42 Ibid., 7. 
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rate of pay. Pay-rates often became distorted by the need to attract skilled workers, and the 
protected nature of the economy meant there was little requirement to attend to the demands of 
international competitiveness, or to recognise changing skill levels. The plentiful number of 
relatively well paid, unskilled jobs for schoolleavers meant' there was little pressure to change 
the route to skilled work. Immigration had been an important source of skilled labour; this 
reduced the motivation for the country to be self-sufficient in skilled labour and gave a buffer 
that allowed some training practices to become "unsystematic, inefficient and unresponsive to 
change". 43 
The Green Paper then provided a stock-take of both historical and contemporary 
problems with vocational training. These problems can be grouped into areas relating to 
training and technical education, and the cost of training. The paper argued that there was 
difficulty with translating the identified needs of industries into actual training programmes: 
"only in some cases has attention been given to the intensive task of translating a raw list of 
skills and attributes into a comprehensive on-job and off-job teaching/learning programme".44 
The paper called for more flexibility in training arrangements, arguing that improved linkages 
between different types of training were impeded by the "haphazard and unco-ordinated" way 
in which training had evolved.45 The arbitrary demarcations between different occupational 
groups, and the tendency of each group to protect its position, also contributed to the difficulty 
in any attempt to integrate qualifications. The paper argued that a national certification system 
was necessary to facilitate a flexible and multi-skilled workforce. It also questioned the 
reliance on written examinations, and favoured competency, rather than timeserving, as the 
best means of assessment. The Scottish system of standards-based assessment for technical 
and vocational education was suggested as a model that could provide a national basis for 
judging competency in a wide range of subject areas. 
The Green Paper criticised the lack of transparency and logic in the sharing of costs of 
vocational training and set out the ways in which the costs had been traditionally spread. The 
individual trainee paid through fees for formal education, and through receiving a discounted 
income for the years spent in training. There was therefore a clear expectation on the part of 
the trainee that the income received after qualification would be sufficient to make up for the 
years of low income. The rest of the country paid through the taxation required for formal 
education, and by paying extra for goods and services to which the employer had added an 
43 Ibid., 8. 
44 Ibid., 15. 
45 Ibid., 20. 
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implicit cost for training expenses. These training expenses were largely unquantified by 
the employer, as were the benefits received from training: therefore, there was "no clear and 
direct pay-off to individual employers to invest in general vocational training".46 Thus, cost 
benefit analysis was piecemeal, often unstated and unquantified, and dependent upon values 
and attitudes that had their basis in a very different economic and social climate: 
the present distribution of the costs [of vocational training] owes more to historical 
accident than to the application of a set of well thought-out principles. This suggests 
that training efforts may be unduly influenced by funding arrangements which have 
little basis in logic. 47 
The Green Paper then set out two perspectives that the government considered as 
frameworks within which to tackle the problems faced in vocational training: 
Employment Perspective 
-highly trained and multi-skilled workforce; 
-identification of new skill requirements and 
numbers required; 
-provision of universal, systematic and recognised 
training. 
Education Perspective 
-equality of opportunity; 
-equity; 
-broad and flexible continuing 
education; 
- preparation for non-traditional 
employment. 
The 'employment' option was seen as implying co-ordination of vocational training from a 
labour market perspective; an optimistic notion given the singular lack of success of previous 
attempts in labour market planning. The 'education' option, on the other hand, would 
emphasise co-ordination across the whole tertiary sector, with subsequent links to a labour 
market perspective. The government called for greater cohesion between the two approaches, 
but declared itself unsure of the best way to achieve this. 48 Nowhere, however, was there a 
mention of the 'market' as the most appropriate means of determining vocational training 
requirements. 
Many of the issues highlighted in the Green Paper were discussed in a short report 
made by the Cabinet ad hoc Committee on Employment and Training in late October 1986. 
This report set out guidelines for reform, pointing to the need for the decentralisation of the 
administration of the continuing education sector, and to the importance of an independent 
46 Ibid., 8. 
47 Ibid., 35. 
48 Ibid., 35. 
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validation authority. The committee argued that flexibility in training practices was best 
ensured by focusing on the end product~ that validation, rather than curriculum prescription 
would result in young people acquiring the skills that the economy required. Integral to this 
flexiblity was the need for the ability to cross-credit courses, and for assessment to be based 
on competency, rather than time served. The committee also proposed that institute based-
training run parallel to on-job training, suggesting that the "committee had doubts about the 
apprenticeship system".49 These changes were so far-reaching that the committee saw the need 
for an extensive review of the post-compulsory sector, and thus deferred its findings to the 
more comprehensive review of the entire post-compulsory sector announced by the Minister 
of Education in late 1986.50 
The Ministerial Working Party on the Management, Funding and Organisation o[Continuing 
Education and Training (The ProbinelFargher Report), March 1987. 
The first component of the review was a working party established by Marshall to 
examine the funding and administration of the polytechnic sector. Dr Mervyn Probine, a 
former chairperson of the State Services Commission, and Ray Fargher, a former secretary of 
the Technical Institute Teacher's Association, jointly chaired the working party (which 
became known as the ProbinelFargher Committee). The report of the committee was "notable 
for its philosophical and analytical stance".51 It acknowledged the importance of the 
polytechnic system in the delivery of both vocational training and courses that provided 
'personal emichment'. The low participation rates in post-compulsory education, and the wide 
variations in the funding and delivery of that education, however, were of great concern to the 
committee. The wider concerns of youth unemployment and the lack of progress on equity 
issues were also canvassed by the report. 
While in many respects the report reiterated the main points of the 1986 Green Paper, 
it also reflected the growing influence of neo-liberal ideology. It recommended that technical 
institutes be permitted to charge fees, and to provide services directly to individual companies. 
The report suggested that the management of technical colleges be devolved to principals and 
boards, through a charter system. At the same time as promoting devolution, the report 
recommended that the responsibility for continuing education, together with the Labour 
49 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 60. 
50 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 61: This review was announced despite the appointment on 30 October 
1986 of the Royal Commission on Social Policy, which was also to consider education. 
S! Ibid., 62. 
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Department's responsibility for training, be both centralised in a statutory board, to be 
known as the Continuing Education and Training.Board.52 Probine and Pargher considered 
that many of their of their ideas were "unpalatable to many people and [the report] was 
therefore buried".53 Nevertheless, the report helped "crystallise government opinion about the 
need for structural reform of the tertiary sector, and by 1990 many of its recommendations had 
been implemented".54 Many of the ideas developed in the report were also to have a 
'profound' influence on the Picot Taskforce, convened by Marshall in mid 1987 to examine 
the compulsory educatiou sector.55 
A memorandum summarising submissions to the ProbinelFargher Report, prepared by 
the authors themselves, was sent to the ministers concerned in September 1987. The 
submissions received were considered to be generally in favour of the report. The 
memorandum suggested that apprenticeship contracts remain with the Department of Labour. 
It recommended that the VTC be dispersed, with Industry Training Boards to come under 
control of the proposed umbrella statutory board. The memorandum reported that there had 
been reservations from some sectors about the tenor of the report. Employers perceived it as 
being 'education biased', while unions felt that the report was too market orientated, and that 
it downgraded social equity issues. 56 
An article in the October 1987 Printers' News suggests that there were wider concerns 
at industry level about the report. The article critiqued the report as making little mention of 
the responsibility for apprenticeship training and in particular criticised the lack of any 
regional structure in the sketchy proposals. Support was given for the role of the 
Apprenticeship Division of the Department of Labour, and concern was expressed at the 
emphasis on 'education' in the establishment and control of the new framework. The article 
wondered if this reflected the attitude of the authors of the report, and of the education sector 
in general, "that the apprenticeship system of training [was] no longer relevant and should be 
scrapped".57 The article argued that most industries were firmly committed to apprenticeship, 
52 M. Probine & R. Fargher, The Management, Funding and Organisation oj Continuing Education and Training 
(Wellington: Ministry of Education, 1987). 
53 Butterworths, Rejorming Education, 62. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 61. 
56 M. Probine & R. Fargher, Summary oj Submissions re 'The Management, Funding and Organisation oj 
Continuing Education and Training', September 1987, (Memorandumjor the Prime Minister, Minister and 
Associate Minister oj Education & the Minister oj Employment). ABVO, Series 947, 5091/3, 51/10717, NA, 
Wellington. 
57 'The Printing Industry's Response to the ProbinelFargher Report' Printer's News, October 1987, 7-9, ABVO 
947,5091/3,51110717, NA, Wellington, 7. 
giving as proof a description of the difficulties that the printing industry had faced in 
refonning its apprenticeship system. 58 
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While these on-going concerns about post-compulsory education were being thrashed 
out at ministerial level, reform of the apprenticeship system at the 'coal-face' had been given a 
new impetus by the Apprentice Block Course Subsidy (ABCS), announced by the Minister of 
Employment, Kerry Burke, in September 1984.59 It is interesting to note that, despite the 
fourth Labour government being defined by its dismantling of state regulation, and "driven by 
a market-liberal philosophy involving a mix of monetarist and supply-side economics", 
apprenticeship remained firmly under direct government control.60 The ABCS was designed to 
subsidise employers for the wages paid to apprentices while they attended block courses. It 
was to be paid at two rates; an interim rate of 60 per cent of average apprentice wages (set at 
$80 per week for 1985), and a full rate ($120 per week). The interim rate was to be available 
for three years only, but the full rate, earned when industries had reformed their apprenticeship 
systems to a standard set by the government, had no tennination date.61 
The Labour government also introduced the Female Apprentice Incentive for 
Recruitment (FAIR) subsidy in October 1984, which provided $20 per week for the first year 
of training to employers of female apprentices (other than in women's hairdressing).62 An 
Apprenticeship Administration Incentive was introduced at the beginning of 1985 to 
encourage the development of group apprenticeship schemes. The Additional Apprenticeship 
Incentive and the Apprentice Instructor wage subsidy were discontinued in September 1984, 
and the obsolete extended trade training scheme was phased out from the end of 1984.63 
The reforms sought by the government were largely based upon the concerns identified 
in Apprenticeship for Tomorrow and enacted in the 1983 apprenticeship legislation. The 
significant difference was that the Labour government clearly felt that the promise of the 
ABCS gave the reforms some 'teeth'. The changes that were required of industries fell into 
two categories. In the 'essential' category, there was a strong emphasis on industry planning. 
Each industry had to undertake a systematic review of its training needs and be committed to 
58 Ibid., 9. 
59 AJHR, 1985, G-l, 20. 
60 Alan McRobie, "The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991", in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd, ed. G.w. 
Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996),403. 
61 AJHR, 1985, G-l, 20. 
62 Pleasance Hansen, Women's Employment Issues (Wellington: Department of Labour, 1987), 18. 
63 Circular No. 209, 5 October 1984. ARTT Committee, VTC, AAOC, W3473, 25/01Pt 1, NA, Wellington. 
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regular reviews, it had to improve the quality of on-the-job training, and it had to review 
the length of its training period. The total time taken to train had to be reduced, or apprentices 
had to be allowed to complete their apprenticeship on the basis of their competency, rather 
than the time served. In the' desirable' category, industries should have considered, and 
implemented where possible, a broader-based initial training, improved opportunities for 
female and adult apprentices, and considered the active use of group and industry-wide 
. hi h 64 apprentIces p sc emes. 
There were two strands to the new emphasis on industry planning. First, attempts were 
made to identify trends in key skills. The Department of Labour carried out a series of studies 
in the mid-1980s using the 'key informants system', a "bottom-up approach whereby 
knowledgeable and infonned people within the industry being studied are identified, ~d their 
opinions sought, collated and published".65 The key skills trends studies differed from 
previous attempts at forecasting because they were concerned with qualitative, as well as 
quantitative, trends in the demand for skills. The studies were seen as complementary to 
training needs analysis, which formed the second strand of industry planning. 66 
The VTC was the main body organising training needs analysis, with the help of the 
independent Vocational Prescription Review Unit, which had been established in 1982. The 
analytical tool used was the DACUM (Developing or Designing a Curriculum) system. This 
process had been developed and used in Canada, and involved calling a conference of industry 
experts, which aimed to produce a comprehensive chart delineating all the skills used and 
required in the industry. The skills profile was then sent to employers for comment and 
ratification, resulting in a programme that was seen as "industry based and not something that 
is being foisted on industry by 'ivory tower' educators or others".67 
The first step in training needs analysis was the establishment by each of the New 
Zealand apprenticeship committees of a steering committee to conduct an analysis for its 
industry. The steering committees were mainly employer and worker representatives, and it 
was noted by the VTC that there was a reluctance to include the education sector in the 
consulting process. This reluctance was in fact supported by the theoretical basis of the 
DACUM method. It was felt that training providers should ideally be kept separate from the 
process: 
64 Ibid. 
65 Department of Labour, Key Skills Trends Studies: Printing and PublisMng Industry, November 1984. 
Manpower Planning and Key Skills Trends Studies, AAOC, W3473, 3-8-1, NA, Wellington. 
66 Ibid. 
67 'Unit Reviews Apprenticeship Prescriptions', LEG, 34(2), June 1984, 14. 
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This ensures that industry determines what its job is about and is able to infonn the 
training provider of its needs and eliminates what is in the view of fonner trainees, the 
halo effect of tutors. It is then up to the provider to meet those needs without 
interference in that process from the industry. 68 
Nevertheless, the VTC requested that the apprenticeship committees consider "the benefit of 
affording observer status on steering committees to their Education Department 
representatives" in order to keep them informed of emerging trends, and to allow them to plan 
for resource provision.69 By 1986 the Labour Department reported that nearly all of the New 
Zealand apprenticeship committees had commissioned training needs analyses.7o The VTC 
expanded its analysis and development role throughout 1986, formalizing this process with the 
establishment of the Training Needs Analysis Unit. The number of dedicated staff increased 
from four to seven, with skill profile charts being developed for twenty-six of the apprenticed 
trades.71 
Despite the progress made in this area, it was felt that "most industries still have a long 
way to go ... if they are to meet the Government's timetable of finalising their reforms [of the 
apprenticeship system] by the end of 1987".72 The VTC also cautioned that progress in 
apprenticeship reform was "still disappointingly slow". The lack of progress was not seen by 
the VTC as a sign of reluctance by industries, indeed, the Council felt that much enthusiasm 
for training was being shown. 73 Rather, obstructions in the system were blamed: "present 
blockages are due, in the main, to the lack of any monitoring procedures to connect the 
separate and independent parts of the system".74 The VTC suggested the establishment ofa 
co-ordinating committee, as many of the problems were out of their jurisdiction. Some of 
these problems included delays in setting up the machinery needed to conduct training needs 
analyses, a general lack of resources, the infrequency of New Zealand apprentice committee 
meetings, and lack of co-ordination between those committees and their industries. 75 
68 Adrienne Burleigh, "DACUM: Its Influence and Impact," in The Impact of American Ideas on New Zealand's 
Educational Policy, Practice and Thinking, ed. David Philips, GeoffLealand & Geraldine McDonald (New 
Zealand Council for Educational Research: Platform Publishing, 1989),230. 
69 VTC Circular 84/16, 23 May 1984. ARTT Committee, VTC, AAOC, W3473, 25/0/Pt 1, NA, Wellington. 
70 AJIIR 1986, G-l, 52. 
71 AJIIR 1986 G-36, 13. 
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73 AJIIR 1986, G-36, 13. 
74 Peters, Chairman, VTC to Burke, Minister of Employment, 10-12-85. ARTT Committee, VTC, AAOC, 
W3473, 25/01Pt 1, NA, Wellington. 
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The VTC's view was in marked contrast to that held by the Labour Department in 
its 1987 annual report. The Apprenticeship Division of the Department had continued to 
promote reform, reminding industries that those who met the standard would qualify for the 
higher level of ABCS, while those who did not would lose all subsidy payments after 31 
December 1987. The Department claimed that resource and co-ordination issues had been 
"largely resolved" and stated that many industries would fall short of the requirements "unless 
there (was) a fundamental change in the attitude towards significant reform on the part of 
some individuals and organisations involved".76 
The apprenticeship reform process continued after the Labour government's second 
election win in 1987. Phil Goff became Minister of Labour, replacing the "largely ineffectual" 
Kerry Burke.77 A memorandum to Goff, from Susan Shipley on behalf of the Secretary of 
Labour, reveals much about the attitudes towards apprenticeship reform. The memorandum 
accompanied a letter to be sent to the Chairman of the New Zealand Photo Engraving Industry 
Apprenticeship Committee, declining their application for the ABCs. The grounds for this 
were the failure of the industry to either reduce the overall apprenticeship term, or to introduce 
a competency-based system of assessment. Ms Shipley suggested that the Minister support 
this stand because: 
We understand that there are several other industry proposals in the pipeline which are 
similar ... and would therefore recommend that a 'hard line' approach be adopted to 
signal the Government's determination that substantial change is required in this 
area. 78 -
The memorandum detailed some of the reason that employers had given for not 
agreeing to shorten the term of apprenticeship. In many cases, they felt that apprenticeship 
training was becoming more complex. They argued that formal skills profiles increased the 
coverage and depth of what was required to be taught, and asked how, in light of this, the 
hours required could be reduced. Employers also raised concerns about the maturity of 
apprentices if the term was shortened. They argued that administrative delays made it difficult 
to contemplate reducing the time available to train, with hold-ups in the development of 
training materials because of backlogs at the VTC, and delays with the DACUM steering 
committee being mentioned. At a more pragmatic level, employers pointed to the financial 
benefit of a longer term; the final year of the apprenticeship, with the apprentice virtually 
76 AJHR, 1987, G-1, 52. 
77 Jeff Hayward, "The Rise and Pall of Phil Goff," North & South, September 1988, 86. 
78 Shipley to Goff, 29 September 1987, ABVO 947, W509119, 511141/8 Pt1, NA, Wellington. 
working at the level of a tradesperson and able to be charged out as such, but still only 
receiving apprentice wages, was considered the 'pay-back' time for training costs incurred 
earlier in the apprenticeship.79 
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By its 1987 annual report, the Vocational Training Council had become a little more 
circumspect about the success of apprenticeship reforms. It acknowledged that the reform 
process had been slower than expected, arguing that "disagreements and misunderstandings 
about roles and responsibilities (of Government departments and statutory bodies) and a 
somewhat slow response Jrom industry caused initial delays". 80 A letter from Rick Julian for 
the Secretary of Labour, to the Minister of Employment, dated 18 December 1987, set out the 
progress towards apprenticeship reform that had been made by various industries (given the 
deadline of 31 December 1987 to receive the full ABCS). Three 'Category A' industries; 
printing, engineering, and cooking and catering, had either received approval or would meet 
the deadline. 'Category B' comprised twelve industries that had made considerable progress, 
while five 'Category C' industries had made substantial progress, but had failed to complete 
the requirements by rejecting one or more of the reform components, notably the requirement 
for term reduction. 'Category D' comprised seven industries that had made some progress, but 
had rejected all calls for reform in some aspects of the standard and were "unlikely ever to 
qualify on the current criteria".81 The ten industries in 'Category E' were considered unlikely 
to achieve the standards set in the foreseeable future, because of either a lack of commitment 
or poor industry infrastructure. The letter concluded by saying: 
While on the face of it, it would appear that the reform process has not achieved as 
much in the time allowed as had been expected there has been substantial progress 
made in most industries. 82 
Perhaps the last word on the apprenticeship reform process should go to the printing 
industry. This industry grouping, covering eight separate trades, was held up as a shining 
example of how apprenticeship reform could and should be achieved. It was the first industry 
to complete training needs analyses for all its component trades, and was also the first industry 
to receive the full ABCS. 83 Yet a report in the October 1987 Printer's News, clearly illustrates 
the difficulties encountered: 
79 Ibid. 
80 AlliR, 1987, G-36, 15. 
8! Julian to Goff, 18 December 1987, ABVO 947, W5091/9, 51/141/8 Pt 1, NA, Wellington. 
82 Ibid., 3. 
83 AJHR, 1986, G-36, 13. 
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As the first industry to have completed the reform process and to have received the 
Apprentice Block Course Subsidy, we make the point that we have only achieved this 
through sheer determination, commitment and straight out doggedness in the face of 
just about every imaginable impediment presented throughout the entire review 
process by the host of a~encies, educationalists and departmental officers with which 
we have been involved. 4 
Labour's Second Term: Hands Off? 
By the late 1980s the incremental and often piecemeal reforms of the apprenticeship 
system were overtaken by harsh economic realities and the consolidation of emerging neo-
liberal ideology. Similar themes had been mentioned in report after report; the need for a 
highly skilled workforce and flexible, life-long learning practices~ demands for increased 
productivity and responsiveness to the global market place~ and the superiority of the market 
in determining the best mix of skills. These ideals, however, were promulgated in the midst of 
high levels of unemployment (see Figure 20), especially youth unemployment, and in a 
country reeling from untrammelled deregulation and the effects of the stock market crash of 
October 1987. 
Figure 20: Monthly Average Registered Unemployed, 1980-1990 85 
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The increasing growth of unemployment became a defming issue for the Labour 
government (re-elected comfortably in August 1987), with the number of unemployed 
breaking the 100,000 mark in 1988. In the government's first term, the various components of 
labour market policy had been divided between several ministers, but after the 1987 election, 
Phil Goff became the Minister of Employment, Associate Minister of Education (with David 
Lange) with responsibility for tertiary education and Minister of Youth Mfairs. This was in 
recognition of the interconnectedness of employment issues; the need to integrate training, 
job-placement andjob-creation.86 Goffwas a firm believer in the free-market policies the 
government had pursued over the preceding three years, arguing that patience and faith in 
those policies were the only long-term solution available for unemployment: 
(the government) has decided not to attempt futile band-aid solutions and is attacking 
the fundamental economic problems ... the government's macro-economic policies are 
the key to reduced levels of unemployment. .. they must, however, be complemented by 
education and active labour market policies to help individuals adjust to change. 87 
The promised payback from the Labour government for three years of economic 
trauma was to be significant reform in social policy in its second term. Education was marked 
as one of the crucial areas for reform. The fact that the education portfolio was taken by the 
Prime Minister, David Lange, signalled the importance placed upon it by the government. The 
political and ideological significance of education was also affirmed by 1987 Treasury's 
Briefing to the Incoming Government. The second half of this document was dedicated 
entirely to education, and left the government in little doubt as what role Treasury believed c' c·c··,·'>C·".< 
government should play: 
In sum, government intervention (in education) is liable to reduce freedom of choice 
and thereby curtail the sphere of responsibility of its citizens and weaken the self-
steering ability inherent in society to reach optimal solutions through the mass of 
individual actions pursuing free choice without any formal consensus. 88 
Thus, education policies, including those affecting vocational training, became the site 
of a contest between the hard-line neo-liberal viewpoint epitomised by Treasury, and attempts 
by some in the government to define workable policies that would assure social equity and 
justice. There is a debate in the literature regarding the extent of Treasury's influence in 
education policies at this time. The Butterworths argued that during the mid 1980s, while 
86 Jim Eagles, "Goff: Co-ordinating Policy to Cushion Restructuring Effects", National Business Review, 20 May 
1988, 11-12. 
87 Goff, cited in Hayward, "The Rise and Pall of Phil Goff,", 90. 
88 Treasury, Briefing to the Incoming Government (Wellington: Treasury, 1987),41. 
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Treasmy's views were influential, "it did not necessarily get its way in detailed policy 
making".89 Disputing this, Codd pointed to a "major shift in ... in the determinants of 
educational policy" in 1987, arguing that "Rogemomics finally caught up with the education 
system and produced a new set of conditions in which policy would be moulded".90 The 
Butterworths claimed, however, that it was not until Goff became Minister of Education in 
August 1989 that Treasury began to vigorously oppose education spending, and that even then 
it generally only succeeded in delaying proposals. 91 Nevertheless, the framework and language 
of the reports of the late 1980s was quite different from those of the fourth Labour 
government's first term. 
Three taskforces were thus established in late 1987 and early 1988 to review each of 
education sectors. The Picot Taskforce, focusing on the administration of primary and 
secondary education, was set up by Marshall as Minister of Education. The Meade Committee, 
investigating early childhood education, and the Working Group on Post Compulsory 
Education and Training (known as the Hawke Report), "were part of a comprehensive review 
of government social policy inaugurated by the Cabinet Committee on Social Equity and 
announced in March 1988".92 There was a clear expectation that each taskforce would produce 
a programme for action utilising the work done during previous reviews: "the education 
system had been reviewed to within an inch of its life, and it was time to do something about 
't" 93 1 . 
Report ofthe Working Group on Post Compulsory Education and Training (The Hawke 
Report), 1988. 
This working group was headed by Professor Gary Hawke, Director of the Institute of 
Policy Studies at Victoria University, and aimed to bring together several previous reviews of 
the post-secondary sector. 94 It comprised representatives of the Departments of Labour, 
Education, Maori Affairs, Pacific Island Affairs and Women's Affairs, and officials from 
Treasury and the State Services Commission. Hawke was quite aware of the tension between 
the Labour and Education Departments over the control of post compulsory education, and 
restrained possible infighting by insisting that the final outcome would be "his personal report 
89 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 52. 
90 Codd, Educational Policies and the Crisis of the New Zealand State, 191. 
91 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 52. 
92 Ibid., 72. 
93 Ibid., 71. 
94 Department of Education, Learningfor Life Two (Wellington: Department of Education, August 1989), 11. 
as convenor", and as such would reflect differences without having to obtain consensus 
between all parties.95 
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The tenns of reference of the working group were to "concentrate on the present and 
desirable roles of government in post compulsory education and training", emphasising 
"effective funding and management systems while ensuring equity in both access and 
process".96 The report called for those antithetical catch phrases of the 1980s, decentralisation 
and greater accountability. A predominantly public system of post compulsory education and 
training was favoured, tO,be administered by a new Ministry of Education and Training, which 
would eventually take responsibility for apprenticeship. One of the main thrusts of the report 
was the need to avoid distinctions between education and training. While this recommendation 
was largely made in an attempt to move the role of universities towards becoming "primarily 
training institutions", it would clearly have a great deal of impact on traditional ideas of 
vocational training. 97 
The Hawke Report spent relatively little space directly discussing apprenticeship.98 It 
acknowledged that "apprenticeship is an educationally valid fonn of learning, provides a pool 
of skilled labour, and has union and employer support".99 The emphasis of the 
recommendations was on streamlining apprenticeship administration, and lessening direct 
government control ofthe system. For example, it was suggested that negotiations about 
wages and conditions be returned to unions and employers from the bureaucratically chaired 
national apprenticeship committees. The report also argued that polytechnic institutes should 
not be required by regulation to run specific vocational courses; these instead should be 
organised at the behest of local apprenticeship committees. 100 Ideas for a national qualification 
system were finned up, and the disestablishment of the Vocational Training Council was again 
mooted. While the report included social goals such as accessibility, equity and "social 
cohesion", it also recommended that the government should "adopt policies and procedure 
which require a greater level of private funding" of post compulsory education and training. 101 
In line with the emphasis of the report on shifting the basis of funding from the state, it 
recommended that the Departments of Labour and Education hold discussions to advise 
95 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 98. 
96 G.R Hawke, Report of the Working Group on Post CompUlsory Education and Training (The Hawke Report) 
(Wellington: Government Printer, 1988),3, 
97 Brian Easton, The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997),213, 
98 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 104: The Butterworths claimed that Hawke's personal view was that 
"apprenticeship as a mode of training was ripe for abolition, but it still had its supporters within industry", 
99 The Hawke Report, 1988,93. 
100 The Hawke Report, 1988,93-95. 
LOI Butterworths, Reforming Education, 100, 
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whether a "a workable and effective system of levies for industrial training" could be 
devised. 102 The Hawke Report was not intended to be a public document,1 03 but when it was 
released (together with the Picot Report), many of the ideas met with a "storm of protest", 
particularly from teacher and university organisations. 104 
Our Education and Training Choices - Post-compulsory Education and Training in New 
Zealand. New Zealand Planning Council, June 1988. 
This report 100ke4 more specifically at apprenticeship training, setting its analysis 
within a discussion of New Zealand's low rate of participation in post compulsory education 
and training, and what was regarded as its under-investment in trade and middle level 
education and training. 105 The report argued that apprenticeship was declining in importance 
as a means of training, citing as proof a fifteen percent decline in new apprenticeship 
contracts, and a twenty-one per cent decline in completed contracts, from 1986 to 1987.106 The 
report, however, also acknowledged that apprenticeship numbers tended to move in response 
to the business cycle. Indeed, considering that about 21,000 manufacturingjobs had been lost 
in 1987, it was hardly surprising that apprentice intakes were down. 107 A judgement on the 
strength of support for apprenticeship based on examining numbers must therefore be seen as 
spurious unless economic conditions are also taken into account. 
The report was also concerned with the equity of post compulsory education and 
training. Students from higher socio-economic backgrounds were over':represented throughout 
post compulsory education and training, with 89 per cent of new entrants to apprenticeships in 
1988 being from the four top socio-economic groups, compared with the 76 per cent of third 
form students in these categories. Nearly 90 per cent of the 1988 intake of apprentices were 
male, while in 1987, 75 per cent of all female apprentices were in the hairdressing industry.108 
102 The Hawke Report, 1988, 10. 
103 Easton, The Commercialisation of New Zealand, 214. 
104 G.W. Rice, "A Revolution in Social Policy," in The OxfordHistmy of New Zealand, 2nd, ed. G.W. Rice 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996),491. 
105 Lesley Haines, Our Education and Training Choices - Post-compulsory Education and Training in New 
Zealand (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, June 1988). 
106 Public Sector Apprentice Training, ABVO, Series 947, 511160/1/2. NA, Wellington: Contributing to this 
figure was the fate of government apprentices in the newly formed State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Provision 
was made in May 1987 for their contracts to continue as if the original legislative base remained. At the end of 
June 1987, however, it became necessary for the government to approve a financial assistance package to help 
place apprentices made redundant from the SOEs into the private sector. 
107 Hayward, "The Rise and Pall of Phil Goff,", 86. 
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Towards Competency Seminar, New Zealand Council for Educational Research (NZCER) 
& Vocational Training Council, August 1988 
This seminar was held during the "ongoing ferment" in vocational training and 
education during the late 1980s. The seminar was organised by a working party comprising 
representatives from the Department of Education, the New Zealand Employers Federation, 
the Central Tutor Education Centre, the New Zealand Association of Polytechnic Teachers 
and the NZCER. It was ostensibly designed to bring together the practitioners and users of 
vocational curricula to examine the design and evaluation of that curriculum, with a view to 
moving towards competency-based education. The exercise seems, however, to have been a 
classic case of' shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted'. Given the clear signals 
indicating a wholesale revamp of the ethos and administration of vocational training, the 
seminar can be viewed as a rather desperate effort by those involved in the delivery of the 
formal component of industry training to stake a claim in the new order. 109 
The discussion of the main points arising from the seminar illustrates clearly how 
distinct 'education' and 'training' were in reality. The editor identifies the differences as 
"contradictory dichotomous themes that ran through nearly every workshop group".110 For 
example, the 'ownership' of assessment was debated. Some educationalists argued that results 
of assessment belonged to the trainee and should be shared with the employer at their 
discretion. The response to this of those "with some idea of what it was like to work in the 
world outside schools" was clearly incredulous. 111 The means and reliability of assessment 
was crucial to the credibility of any system of competency-based education, and debate on 
these topics was equally polemical. The editorial comment summarises the schism as the 
holistic 'humanistic' views of the formal educationalists versus the mechanistic 'behaviourist' 
views of those involved in traditional technical education or the workplace. ll2 
Of great interest to all involved in vocational training was the speech delivered at the 
seminar by the Minister of Employment, Phil Goff. It was clearly expected that he would 
signal the shape of vocational education for the future. The Minister was constrained by the 
fact that the Hawke Report had not been released, but he nevertheless dropped several large 
hints as to the framework that could be expected. The move to a national qualifications 
authority, combined with the decentralisation of the provision of training was confirmed. This 
109 New Zealand Council for Educational Research, Proceedings of the Towards Competency Seminar, August 
1988. 
liD Ibid., 76. 
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move would also imply the end of other organisations, such as the VTC and the Trades 
Certification Board. Apprenticeship administration was also marked for change, with a 
reduction in the number of national apprenticeship committees and a rationalisation of local 
committees. The Minister painted a rather rosy picture of the reforms that had already been 
undertaken, glossing over the many difficulties encountered and the resistance by some trades 
to competency-based assessment. The participants at the seminar were left in little doubt as to 
the importance placed by the Minister on competency rather than timeserving: 
The movement in training and education will be towards a focus on outcomes, rather 
than as it has traditionally been, on inputs into the system. Assessment will be on the 
skill achieved rather than where or how it was acquired or how long it took to get it. 113 
"Reboring the car with the engine running" : Implementing the Reforms 114 
The policy process required to implement the Hawke Report was complex, with its 
findings being released in two stages: Learning/or Life (February 1989) and Learning/or Life 
Two (August 1989). The recommended measures had met with wholesale distrust from the 
universities, which "were not only jealous of their status and independence, but suspected a 
hidden right-wing agenda to privatise them".1l5 The polytechnic sector stood to benefit from 
increased autonomy, and potentially a greater number and variety of courses to deliver. There 
were, however, industrial relations and costing implications that had to be addressed. 116 
Continuing political turmoil, which ended with the resignation of Lange as Prime Minister and 
Minister of Education on 8 August 1989, further complicated the process. The hard-line 
economic policies of Roger Douglas, which were influenced and supported by Treasury, had 
become increasingly unpalatable to Lange, and when Douglas was re-elected to Cabinet by the 
Labour caucus, Lange resigned. 117 His successor as Minister of Education was his associate, 
Phil Goff. 
Learning/or Life Two was a statement of the government's intentions for post-
compulsory education and training, setting in place the framework that would take effect in 
the early 1990s. The policy decisions were largely in line with the recommendations of the 
Hawke Report although, recognising the controversy surrounding parts of the earlier report, 
they diverged from it in some areas. 118 The principal features underpinning the document were 
113 Ibid., 9. 
1!4 David Lange's description of the education reforms, cited in Butterworths, Reforming Education. 
115 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 162; 155. 
1!6 Ibid., 113. 
1!7 Brian Easton, "The Unmaking of Roger Douglas?", in The Making ofRogemomics, ed. Brian Easton 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989), 171-187. 
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the devolution of power to individual tertiary institutions, a broadening of the funding 
base, the encouragement of increased participation in post-school education and the 
development of a national qualifications framework. The document delineated the problems 
that the government saw with the existing structure for post-school education. Many of the 
issues already identified were again mentioned; the slow response of the system to 
technological change and the complexity of the administrative structure, for example. Issues 
that had become fashionable with the growing hegemony ofneo-liberal economics were also 
mentioned. Accountability and efficiency were key-phrases, and the notion ofthe importance 
of choice for the cons~er of the services was raised. 119 
Nevertheless, the government remained committed to its role as the principal funder of 
post-school education. It was acknowledged that "there are benefits from education and 
training that accrue to society as a whole. Better education ... is a positive influence in 
encouraging social responsibility and tolerance". 120 The increasing numbers of participants, 
and growing financial constraints required the government to attempt to shift some of the costs 
involved in this sector. Hand in hand with giving individual institutions more power were 
moves to "enhanc[e] the ability of institutions to generate income from saleable services".l21 
The possibility for increased contributions to the cost of education and training by employers 
was to be investigated by a tripartite working group (see page 178). The third means of 
spreading the cost was to increase the 'contribution' from students. This was justified mainly 
in terms of equity; a part-charge for all students would allow more students to participate by 
increasing the number of places available. There was a reassurance that "part-payment of costs 
by students will not be allowed to create a financial obstacle to participation". 122 Appearing 
almost as a footnote was an acknowledgement that education was no longer regarded as a 
totally public good: "the increased student contribution also recognises the personal benefits 
which post-school education and training can give the individual". 123 Despite this concession, 
the government's position was a long way from that recommended by Treasury in its 1987 
Briefing to the Incoming Government: 
Education is not a 'public good' in the technical sense used by economists ... hence, 
formal education is unavoidably part of the market economy ... it appears that the costs 
(of government intervention in education) have come to dominate the benefits. 
Government intervention is significantly ineffective, possibly counter-effective. 124 
119 Learningjor Life Two, 1989, 10. 
120 Ibid., 13. 
121 Ibid., 13. 
122 Ibid., 14. 
123 Ibid., 14. 
124 Treasury, Briefing to the Incoming Government, 271-274. 
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The new framework would clearly have implications for the apprenticeship system. 
This would now come under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, although the Ministry 
would primarily provide policy advice, rather than having a 'hands-on' involvement. 
Apprenticeship would be administered by the Education and Training Support Agency 
(ETSA), which would combine a labour-market focus whilst overseeing education and 
training programmes. The role of apprenticeship committees was not finalised. The National 
Education Qualifications Authority (NEQA) would be established, to supercede the University 
Entrance Board, the Trad.es Certification Board, the Authority for Advanced Vocational 
Awards, the Board of Studies and the VTC. Training needs analysis would become the 
responsibility of industries, but NEQA would facilitate this activity. It was envisaged that 
Industry Training Boards would become self-funding. 
While the legislation required for the reforms to the compulsory education sector was 
passed quickly, the legislation needed for the changes at the post compulsory level was 
delayed as the universities fought to maintain autonomy, and to remain outside of the 
proposed national qualification framework. Their campaign was largely successful and the· 
"universities were among the least reformed of all the educational institutions". Finally, then, 
in July 1990 the Education Amendment Act established NEQA and ETSA, and the scene was 
set for the possibility of fundamental changes to apprenticeship that had been sought for so 
many years. 125 
Who Should Pay For Training? 
This tripartite Working Party on Employer Contribution to Training was established 
under the auspices of the Minister of Education. It did not report its findings until mid-August 
1989; thus, they were not included in Learn ingfor Life Two. 126 The working party was chaired 
by the Director of the VTC, Derek Wood and reported to Phil Goff in his capacity as associate 
(and subsequently) Minister of Education. The brief of the working party was to recommend 
schemes that would facilitate a greater employer contribution to the costs of training. The 
consultative document prepared by the working party identified a wide variation in the amount 
of training undertaken by New Zealand businesses. The factors affecting employers' attitudes 
to training expenditure were summarised; past attitudes, the structure of employment relations 
and the perceived lack of responsiveness of training institutions. The predominance of small to 
medium sized firms in the New Zealand business environment was also mentioned. Small 
125 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 276. 
126 Learningfor Life Two, 1989, 14. 
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firms had proportionately higher training costs and greater difficulty in releasing workers 
for formal training. These factors, combined with unfavourable economic conditions, clearly 
threatened the ethos of the small-scale tradesperson taking on an apprentice at regular 
intervals. Strategies to encourage employers to invest in training were then discussed by the 
working party. The choices were essentially between prescriptive measures, such as an 
industry-based or national training fund, and voluntary measures, such as tax incentives. 127 
The funding ofITBs had long been problematic. In 1982, the government set a 
benchmark for the industry contribution by stating that industries must contribute at least 10 
per cent of their lIB's total budget. The average percentage contributed at that time was 35 
per cent. The government planned to progressively scale down the grants it provided to IIBs 
until industries were funding 50 per cent of the cost. 128 The means of guaranteeing this level of 
industry funding was not made explicit. One option amongst others suggested by the VTC was 
a compulsory levy on all employers in an industry to finance that industry's ITB. A 1984 
report by the New Zealand Employers Federation was critical of this suggestion, and argued 
that employers must be free to determine their training requirements. The report pointed to the 
variation in training needs between industries, and between companies within industries, and 
claimed that cross-subsidisation of training costs was inefficient and unfair. It argued that if an 
industry wished to train, it should be responsible for funding that training, and that "if training 
boards have difficulty in collecting voluntary contributions from employers, this calls into 
question their usefulness. Training schemes should stand or fall on the support they 
receive". 129 
Submissions to the 1989 working party illustrated the wide variety of views on the 
funding of training. Some businesses had clearly moved beyond the boundaries of the 
traditional apprenticeship system. The Government Printing Office (GPO) and New Zealand 
Forest Products (NZFP), for example, had both adopted modular training schemes, set up by 
the firms themselves outside of the traditional state-supported system. The rationale for 
choosing this method was different for each firm; the GPO had found that new technology and 
changing economic circumstances favoured this method of in-house training. Concern was 
expressed, however, at the amount of 'poaching' within the printing industry, and the GPO 
called for levies to be placed on those firms who did not train, or who recruited overseas. 
127 Working Party on Employer Contribution to Training, Employer Funding Contribution to Training: a 
Consultative Document (Wellington: June 1989). 
128 VTC Circular, 21 May 1985. AAOC, W3473, 14/9 Pt 5. NA, Wellington. 
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NZFP found that the modular approach allowed multi and cross-skilling, with staff able to 
upgrade skills with a small amount of additional training. Crucially, for a multi-union 
workplace, in-house modular training gave the flexibility for new skills to be added across 
union boundaries. 130 
Poaching was again mentioned as a concern in a submission written by an electrician. 
The high cost of informal on-job training in the electrical industry was also seen as a problem. 
This was because of the complexity of many tasks, and the constant need for supervision 
because of safety requirements. This submission called for more training at polytechnic 
institutes, with the cost of this not to be met by the employer. The difference in training needs 
between industries was a common theme ofthe submissions, as was the lack of support for a 
national training fund, seen as potentially "an enormous, inefficient bureaucratic monster,,131. 
The tension between a dislike of compulsory industry levies, and an even greater dislike of 
those firms who 'freeloaded'; making use of trained staff without themselves committing to 
training, was evident in many of the submissions. There appeared to be a consensus that all 
employers should contribute to industry training costs, but many felt that tax incentives were 
preferable to levies. 132 
A marked distrust of the education system was clear in some of the submissions. Many 
felt that training should be organised at the industry level and be market-led, rather than driven 
by educational institutes. The managing director of a small engineering firm had this to say: 
Politicians, School-teachers and people with no practical knowledge of Trade 
experience are attempting to decide what is right and wrong and unfortunately have 
over the past few years succeeded in wrecking a number of Trades entirely due to the 
fact they are theorists and not practical people. 133 
In a slightly more measured manner, the submission of the New Zealand Federated Painting 
Contractors critiqued government training policies. The organisation recognised the 
difficulties in quantifying the extent of employer contributions to training, but argued that the 
recent additions of course and training fees to the Fringe Benefit Tax schedule had added yet 
another disincentive to training: "it would seem that Government fiscal policy and the tenor of 
continued training are diametrically opposed". 134 The submission also questioned what it 
viewed as a contradiction in government policy on training: 
130 Submissions to the Working Party on Employer Contributions to the Funding o/Training. ABVO, Series 947, 
5091111,51/160/112. NA, Wellington. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
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an expenditure of $254 million on 13,500 ACCESS trainees as opposed to $7 
million in employer incentives for 26,256 apprentices does not give the impression of 
support for education and training. 135 
This chapter has examined at three levels the changes to apprenticeship throughout the 
six years of the fourth Labour government. At one level, the sweeping changes to the economy 
had a profound effect on the number of employers able to offer apprenticeships, or indeed, to 
be willing to commit to any form of training. Technological and labour market changes, 
largely outside of the government's control, also worked to alter the nature of many industries, 
calling into question the appropriateness of apprenticeship as a means of training. At another 
level, the radical reform of the education system undertaken by the government would lead to 
more flexibility in the way in which the formal component of technical training was delivered, 
with pre-apprenticeship courses becoming the norm in some industries. At the level of the 
day-to-day running of apprenticeship, the expectations of the government that flexible and 
competency-based training should prevail met with reluctance from some industries. Some 
who were willing to change found barriers, and others who preferred the status quo were 
unconvinced by the government's arguments. 
135 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
"GIRLS CAN DO ANYTHING?": WOMEN AND APPRENTICESHIP 
It is not just a matter of some women getting into the mainstream, but of shifting its 
very course; with the realisation that if it leaves out the half the human race it cannot 
be as main as all that. 
(Katherine Whitehorn, British Journalist, Observer, 18 August 1991) 
The decision about where to position a discussion of women in the apprenticeship 
system exposes the difficulties involved in 'infusing gender,l into what is essentially a 
'blokes' world. It could be argued that a separate discussion about women marginalises the 
topic; one chapter out of eleven for half of the population reinforces the invisibility of women. 
Yet, within the reality of the apprenticeship system, and of 'skilled work', women ~ largely 
marginalised and invisible. Thus, an 'on-the-edge' chapter reflects and acknowledges this. But 
this chapter is also a celebration of the activities of many second-wave feminists who, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, worked untiringly for a fairer deal for women. Given the 
economic and political environment in which they worked, particularly from the mid-1980s, 
the success of their efforts must be judged on less tangible factors than raw data regarding 
increased numbers of women apprentices. 
The Early Days 
Apprenticeship training was historically the "traditional preserve of young Pakeha 
men"? Even during the upheaval of the First World War, the suggestion of the National 
Efficiency Board that New Zealand employers should follow the British example and 
substitute women for men in the skilled trades was ignored by the Arbitration Court. 3 In 1923, 
the 'modernised' apprenticeship legislation excluded women, unless a case was made to the 
Arbitration Court for an order for a specific industry. The rationale for this exclusion was 
based on 'evidence', largely from employers, that showed: 
1 Clark, The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class. 
2 Anne Horsfield, Women in the Economy (Wellington: Ministry of Women's Affairs, 1988), 165. 
3 Melanie Nolan, Breadwinning: New Zealand Women and the State (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 
2000), 16. 
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that it would not be practicable to apply the scheme in its entirety to female 
apprentices. The average working-period of girls in factories is said to be only about 
eight years, and the period of their apprenticeship is also comparatively short. 4 
The first female apprenticeships, in ladies' hairdressing, were recognised in 1926.5 In 1927, 
females working in the chemistry trade were included in the apprenticeship order covering that 
trade.6 
Also in 1927, the Bakers and Pastry-cooks award permitted females to be apprenticed 
to the trade, ostensibly under the same conditions as male apprentices. The modifications and 
conditions for women apprentices, however, were clearly designed to restrict them to small 
'one-woman' cake-shops, or to less 'skilled' work than their male counterparts performed. The 
term for female apprentices was set at four years (one to two years less than that for males), 
the proportion fixed at one apprentice to one journeywoman, and an employer was to be 
counted as a joumeywoman if she was substantially employed at the trade. The award, 
however, made clear that male apprentices were to be given priority: "female apprentices shall 
not be employed ifmale apprentices or journeymen are employed".7 Journeywomen were to 
be paid at three-quarters ofthe journeyman's rate. The finely-tuned nuances of 'skill' are 
revealed with further detail in the award: journeywomen or female apprentices were permitted 
to work in the bakehouse and to do hot plate work, gaining an almost honorary male status. 
Unapprenticed women, however, were restricted to the most menial of unskilled work, being 
allowed, for example, to break eggs, clean fruit and package small goods. 8 
The ambivalence surrounding working women was reinforced throughout the 
Depression years. Concerns over growing unemployment led the government to establish an 
Unemployment Inquiry Committee, which had been first suggested at the 1928 National 
Industrial Conference. The committee reported that female labour was part of the cause of the 
high rates of male unemployment, and declared that "the infiltration of female labour had been 
detrimental to men".9 Thus, from 1929, although conditions tightened for most sectors of the 
community, women were especially hard hit. 10 Those who had work were seen as taking jobs 
4 Apprenticeship Question (New Zealand), 1923,40. 
5 Martin, Holding the Balance, 138. 
6 AJHR, H-ll, 1928. 
7 Book of Awards, XXVII, 1927, p.327. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Melanie Nolan, "Politics Swept Under a Domestic Carpet?," New Zealand Journal of History 27(2) (1993), 203. 
10 Brooking, "Economic Transformation", 252. 
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from men, while unemployed women received little, if any, relief. 11 Nevertheless, "paid 
employment became the majority experience for young women", with over half of women 
aged between 15 and 24 in paid employment in 1921, and the proportion steadily increasing 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s. 12 The nature of that work was also changing as the number of 
women in domestic service decreased rapidly, while those employed in the industrial and 
commercial sectors increased. 13 
During the Second World War, the war effort required the entrance of many women 
into the paid work force .. Montgomerie argues, however, that this work did little to break down 
barriers to women's involvement in skilled occupations, or to increase the status of what was 
classed as 'women's work': 
There is a wide difference between increased economic participation by women, 
perceived as a temporary expedient to solve a labour shortage, and the same increased 
economic participation being seen as a move towards a more equitable position for 
women within the workforce. 14 
The r~cognition of the temporary nature of the work, and the clearly held expectations that the 
jobs would be 'returned' to men at the end ofthe war, limited the inroads that women were 
able (or chose) to make. Montgomerie shows that the occupational distribution of women 
workers remained broadly similar to the pre-war years, "the war redistributed women within 
female-dominated areas of employment; it did not break down the sex segregation of the 
workforce.,,15 Where women did take on 'male' jobs, they were usually restricted to the less 
'skilled' areas of those jobs. For example, women working in butcher's shops were permitted 
to handle only "money, customers and precut meat" and women employed by New Zealand 
Railways were not allowed to perform outside duties, or to dispatch or signal trains. 16 Women 
who worked in the new military industries, such as munition factories, were generally trained 
in repetitive, mechanical tasks, so the war years did not provide any sort of thorough trade 
training. 
11 Nolan, "Politics Swept Under a Domestic Carpet?". 
12 Ibid., 215. 
13 Ibid., 216. 
14 Deborah Montgomerie, "The Limitations of Wartime Change," NZlH23(1) (1989), 69. 
15 Ibid., 74. 
16 Ibid., 75. 
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Post War Issues 
While only a relatively small number of women were conscripted in to the paid 
workforce during the Second World War, and the scope of work they performed was not 
greatly broadened, the war years did accelerate the growing trend of women's involvement in 
paid work. The war years were also significant in that they made working women more 
conspicuous, and brought the issues of women's employment, especially equal pay, to the 
fore. 17 Agitation for equal pay for women began as early as 1943, with the main impetus for 
change in the early post-~ar years coming from women employed in the public service. 
Intense lobbying throughout the 1950s, supported by a growing coalition of women's groups 
and unions, resulted in the appointment of a working party in March 1957, charged with 
investigating the implementation of equal pay in the public service. The 1957 Labour 
government included equal pay in its manifesto, and the Government Service Equal Pay Act 
1960 was passed with little opposition, taking effect in stages up until 1964. 
At the close ofthe war, the 1945 Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship and 
Related Matters reported that "because of the infiltration of females into industry", women 
should no longer be excluded from apprenticeship legislation, but that it should be left to the 
Arbitration Court to decide whether women workers in certain industries were apprentices 
within the meaning of the legislation. 18 The post-war apprenticeship legislation thus allowed 
an increase in the number of industries with women apprentices, but the total numbers of 
women in formal apprenticeships remained miniscule, and they were restricted to very few 
trades. In the decade after 1945, the overriding activity for many women was child-bearing 
and child-raising. The level of participation in the workforce of married women aged sixteen 
to twenty-nine years barely increased during this time, although the number of older married 
women returning to the workforce steadily increased. 19 It is not surprising, then, to note the 
large gap in the percentages of male and female schoolleavers intending to work at a skilled 
trade shown in Figure 21. 
17 Charlotte Macdonald, The Vote, The Pill and the Demon Drink (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books Ltd, 
1993), 122. 
18 AJHR, 1945, H-llB, 14. 
19 Dunstall, "The Social Pattern", 480. 
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Figure 21: Percentage of Secondary School Leavers Destined for Skilled Trades, 1946-
1974 (Selected Years) 20 
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The report of the 1965 Commission o/Inquiry into Vocational Training included a 
small section on women and girls. Members of the Commission were surprised that "at our 
stage of social development. .. it is still necessary to present in a report of this nature a section 
dealing with the training of women and girls". 21 Yet, the prevailing attitudes were clearly 
illustrated by the remainder of the section. The focus of the submissions received by the 
Commission on the subject was the need to train or retrain women re-entering the workforce, 
"with their families grown up and with time on their hands,,?2 The Commission thought that it 
was "probably necessary" to counter the "old-fashioned" idea that it was a waste of time to 
educate or train women, as they recognised that women were increasingly returning to work 
after having children, and that women trainees "in general become productive, that is, they 
earn their keep, quite early in their careers".23 It was even acknowledged that there might be a 
place for girls in the traditional male trades, with a very tentative suggestion that "more girls 
could be apprenticed in a wider range of trades". 24 
20 AJHR, E-1, 1946-1974. 
21 Report o/Commission 0/ Inquiry into Vocational Training in New Zealand, 1965, 52. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. , 53. 
24 Ibid. 
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A submission was made to the Commission by the Joint Committee on Women and 
Employment, a group comprising representatives of the New Zealand Federation of Business 
and Professional Women's Clubs, the New Zealand Federation of University Women and the 
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA). The committee argued that factors such as 
the need for a larger labour force, technological changes, and the re-entry of married women 
to the workforce made an examination of women's employment urgent. It recommended a 
longer and better general non-vocational education for girls, and suggested that vocational 
training was more effective if offered after secondary school. The committee expressed an 
interest in trade training, but did not consider itself well informed enough to make specific 
recommendations, emphasising instead technician-type training. The committee considered 
vocational guidance and retraining for older women to be crucial, and argued for better 
occupational choice for women, but not at the expense of displacing "the accepted 
responsibilities of women to their home and family".25 
National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women (NACEW) 
The organisations represented on the Joint Committee formed the nucleus of a new 
advisory committee on women's employment. In 1967, T.P. Shand, the Minister of Labour, 
announced the formation of the National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women 
(NACEW) (see Illustration 5). The aim of the organisation was: 
the creation of the conditions for women to make their full confribution to the national 
economy consistent with their individual freedom and their responsibilities as wives 
and mothers. 26 
NACEW initially comprised representatives from the Labour and Education departments, the 
YWCA, professional women's organisations and the National Council of Women, with 
representation being broadened in 1969 to include union and employer interests, and an 
economist?7 The Council's role was at first seen as advisory only, and news of its formation 
was kept low-key, because of the sensitivity about male unemployment at that time. As the 
aims of the organisation suggest, the traditional view of the role of women was not challenged 
by NACEW; paid employment was seen rather as an important adjunct to that role.28 
25 Joint Committee on Women and Employment, Submissions to the Commission oj Enquiry into Vocational 
Training Including Apprenticeship, 1965. MS Papers 5889-07, AT, Wellington. 
26 'The Employment of Women in the 70's', LEG, 23(1), February 1973, 34. 
27 Martin, 1996, 333. 
28 Hansen, Women's Employment Issues: New Zealand 1967-1987, 5. 
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Illustration 5: Inaugural Meeting ofNACEW, 21 February 1967 29 
Inaugural Meeting of NACEW 21st February 1967 
Left to right 
Miss rE. Ballard, Mrs E. W. Orr. Mr H.C). Thompson; Mr C. W. SydaJI 
(Sec). Mr J.K. Hunn (Chairman), Hon. T. Shand (Min. orLab.). 
Mr N. S. Woods (Sec. Lab.), Miss R. McBride. Mrs M. Gilson. 
Miss LM. Kennedy (Educ.) 
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The improving economic conditions at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s 
alleviated some of the fears of women taking 'men's' jobs, and allowed the Council to begin 
promoting the employment of women more vigorously. A study was published by the Council 
on the education of girls, revealing that they stayed at school for a shorter time than boys, and 
took a narrower range of subjects. An Information Centre was set up in April 1969, and work 
was begun on encouraging pre-employment training, with a pre-employment course 
established at Wellington Polytechnic. 
Although education and training issues were considered vital by NACEW, during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s the main focus of the group was on extending the public sector 
equal pay legislation to the private sector. They were joined by a fresh coalition of lobby 
groups, bolstered by the growing strength of 'women's unions ', such as the Clerical Workers ' 
Union, and began pressuring the government. The "frenetic" lobbying, supported by entities 
such as the Labour Committee of the National Development Conference and the Federation of 
Labour, led to the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry into Equal Pay in 1971, and 
ultimately in 1972 to the equal pay legislation (supported by both the Labour government and 
29 Ibid., 4. 
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_ the National opposition).3o By 1973, social attitudes had changed sufficiently for NACEW 
to state in its annual report that "its activities in promoting better opportunities for women's 
employment, particularly married women, should not be dictated by the level of demand for 
labour".31 
The 'Second Wave' Begins 
This change in social attitudes had begun to gather pace throughout the 1960s. Women 
began to question the stereotypes that held them in the home, and to focus on wider issues than 
just equal pay. The availability of the contraceptive pill from 1962 onward placed fertility 
control firmly in the hands of many women; the reality of smaller families meshing with the 
increasing emphasis on individual freedom and self-determination. By the early 1970s, New 
Zealand women were ripe for the re-emergence of active feminism, with Women's Liberation 
groups forming in the main centres. The radical agendas of these groups swiftly incorporated 
and reconceptualised existing concerns.32 
Within this more ambitious framework for women's empowerment, it became clear 
that equal pay legislation alone was insufficient to address the disadvantages and 
discrimination that women faced in the work place. Thus, the emphasis of groups such as 
NACEW shifted to broadening the participation of women in the labour force. 33 The 
legislative impediment to greater numbers of women apprentices had been removed with the 
Apprentices Amendment Act 1972. Section IB stated: 
Every apprenticeship order, whether made before or after the commencement of this 
subsection, shall apply to both male apprentices and female apprentices, subject to any 
separate provision applying expressly to male apprentices only or applying expressly 
to female apprentices only. 34 
Despite this new legislation, there were few immediate changes in the numbers or types of 
female apprenticeships. There was, however, limited evidence of changing attitudes in some 
areas. The 1973 report of the New Zealand Railways Apprenticeship Investigation Committee, 
for example, spoke of the need to encourage more women to take up apprenticeships: 
30 Nolan, Breadwinning, 242-253. 
31 Hansen, Women's Employment Issues: New Zealand 1967-1987, 7. 
32 Macdonald, The Vote, The Pill and the Demon Drink, 161-164. 
33 Martin, Holding the Balance, 338. 
34 New Zealand Statutes, 1972,518. 
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We have been prepared, as a country, to use the untapped potential of female 
labour over a wide range of activities, including skilled occupations, during periods of 
national emergency and then promptly relegate women to the mundane and lower-paid 
employment once the emergency has passed. This is an attitude inherent in our national 
thinking and trade unions must accept their share of the responsibility for this state of 
affairs, along with employers and the government. 35 
The reality, however, was that most employers remained resistant to the idea of taking 
on a woman apprentice. This was mad~ clear by the results of a survey carried out in March 
1971 by the Society for Research on Women (SROW)36, NACEW and the Department of 
Labour, and reported in Employers' Attitudes: Work Opportunities for Women. The 
questionnaire was answered by 1055 employers, 90 per cent of whom were male, located in 
the larger cities, and in a range of industries. Interestingly, industries such as building and 
mining were not surveyed because of the comparatively few number of women employed; the 
possibility of more women working in those areas in the foreseeable future was clearly 
considered too unlikely for the views of those employers to be taken into account. The "fact-
finding, descriptive" survey showed "considerable differentiation in employment, according to 
sex roles".37 
This differentiation was especially clear in the responses of the 352 employers in the 
survey who had experience of apprenticeship. Only 20 per cent of the respondents thought that 
there could be more apprenticeship opportunities for girls, and even then occupations deemed 
-
suitable were limited. The main reasons given for not accepting girls into apprenticeship were 
the physical nature of the work, and the length of the training period; "employers were not 
prepared to put four or five years into training girls who, they felt, would marry and leave".38 
It must be noted that apprenticeship in general did not find favour with this group of 
employers, with only 8 per cent regarding the system as satisfactory, and concerns being 
expressed about the low rate of pay and the length of the training period. The report 
recommended that, in light of these findings, girls look to other areas for employment: 
35 New Zealand Railways, Report of Apprenticeship Investigation Committee (Wellington: NZR, November 
1973), 93. Crosada Collection, 95-072, AT, Wellington. 
36 Nolan, Breadwinning, 248: SROW was formed in 1966 as a result ofa 1964 study conference, entitled 
'Women's Contribution in a Changing Society", which had been organised by the Wellington branches of the 
Business and Professional Women's Club and the New Zealand Federation of University Women. Its aim was to 
frovide research on the education, training and employment of women. 
7 Marie Bullock, Why Employ Women? (Wellington: Society for Research on Women, 1973),5. 
38 Ibid., 18. 
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Apprenticeships exist largely in the old well-established trades where there are 
traditional attitudes to sex roles and sex allocation of jobs. Rather than try to break into 
a system admittedly unsuited to modem conditions girls should perhaps look to the 
newer jobs being created in a technological age, which are not hide-bound by tradition 
and which have a shorter period of training. 39 
The small number of female apprentices, and their concentration in women's hairdressing, is 
shown clearly in Table 9. 
Table 9: Female Apprenticeship Contracts, Contracts in Force as at March 31, 
1972-1975 40 
TRADE 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Baking 9 8 6 5 
Carpentry - - 1 1 
Clothing 6 6 10 13 
Coachbuilding - - 1 -
Dentistry: Mechanical 2 7 7 6 
Electrical - - - 1 
Engineering - - 2 3 
Hairdressing: Men's 3 3 9 9 
Hairdressing: Women's 1266 1263 1229 1187 
Horticulture 7 10 13 24 
Jewelry 1 3 4 3 
Motor Trades - - 5 -8 
Painting 
- - - 2 
Photo-engraving - - - 1 
Plumbing 
- - - 1 
Printing 
- - 5 10 
Radio - - 1 1 
Retail Meat Industry 
- - -
1 
TOTAL 1294 1300 1293 1276 
The report of the 1975 Select Committee on Women's Rights highlighted the limiting 
effects of subjects chosen by young women students. The evidence produced showed that girls 
were more likely than boys to curtail their schooling, and to choose less demanding and less 
39 Ibid., 18. 
40 Research and Planning Division, Department of Labour, Women in the Workforce Series, Facts and Figures, 
Slpplement No.2 (Wellington: Department of Labour, November 1975),40. 
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vocationally orientated subjects. Two critical decision points were identified; the transition 
to secondary school, and the school-leaving period. The select committee recommended more 
extensive and varied use of vocational guidance counsellors at these times "to counteract the 
existing limitations on girls' freedom to choose their future lifestyles".41 Figures 22 and 23 
illustrate clearly the gender-based differences in occupational choice on leaving secondary 
school. 42 
Figure 22: Top Four Probable Destinations of Girls Leaving Secondary SchooL 
1963-1978 43 
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41 Select Committee on Women's Rights, The Role o/Women in New Zealand Society (Wellington: Government 
Printer, 1975), 55. 
42 It is acknowledged that nursing training (part of the 'health services' category) was organised along similar 
principles to the apprenticeship system. While there would be some justification in including the nursing intake 
with other apprenticeship statistics, there are two reasons against this. First, nurses were employed by the 
government and they trained in large cohorts, without a direct employer/apprentice relationship (while these 
conditions applied to some apprentices, it was not the majority experience). More importantly, I would argue that 
nurses would describe themselves as having a 'profession', rather than a skilled trade. 
43 AJHR, E-l, 1963-1978. 
Figure 23: Top Four Probable Destinations of Boys Leaving Secondary School, 
1963-1978 44 
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The Women's Advisory Committee of the VTC, established in 1975, was instrumental 
in setting up 'positive action' programmes in the late 1970s and early 1980s.45 Examples of 
the work of this committee were two booklets; the 1975 Women & Training - an Action Plan 
for Employers and Women Back to Work: GUidelinesfor Employers on Women Returning to 
Work, published in 1976. These publications emphasised the growing importance of women in 
the labour market, and encouraged employers to "actively promote the training and 
development of women workers".46 The minutes of the committee provide an interesting 
insight into the range of activities and concerns of the many groups represented on the 
committee. The State Services Commission, Pacific Island Mfairs, the Departments of Labour 
and Education, the Federation of Labour, the Combined State Unions, NACEW, the 
Employer' s Federation and Technical Institutes were all represented on the committee, with 
other organisations invited to send representatives as needed. The minutes traverse a diversity 
44 Ibid. 
45 'The VTC in Retrospect' , Vocational Training Council Training Bulletin, 5(1), March 1989, 5. 
46 Woman's Advisory Committee, VTC, Women in Training (Wellington: VTC, 1975),3 . 
- of subjects, including child-care, positive action initiatives, women with disabilities and 
training for rural women, as well as discussion of women in apprenticeships.47 
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A pilot course for women in radio and television servicing was organised by the VTC 
and run at the Auckland Technical Institute in 1977 and 1978. This course had first been 
suggested at the 1975 Conference on Education and Equality of the Sexes, which was 
organised by the Committee on Women and the Department of Education. In June 1976, Jo 
Lynch, the Women's Advisory Officer of the VTC, began to liaise with lB. Stewart, the 
Executive Training Offic'er of the Electronics ITB. The ITB pledged its support for the 
scheme, and reported that guarantees of apprenticeship for the trainees had been received from 
some employers. The course required approval from the National Apprenticeship Committee, 
the Electrical Registration Board, the Trades Certificate Board and the Director of Technical 
Education. The need for approval from so many organisations made a quick decision difficult, 
and on 20 October 1976 the deadline for confirmation to allow the course to proceed in 1977 
had to be moved to the end ofNovember.48 
Jo Lynch compiled a progress report on the course on 1 December 1976. On 30 
November, the New Zealand Apprenticeship Committee had unanimously agreed to the 
establishment of the course, and had recommended to the Electrical Registration Board that 
the 1500 hours of the course be counted as apprenticeship hours. The committee also 
recommended to the Trades Certificate Board that students be allowed to sit the First and 
Second Qualifying examinations in the same year. Those employers who had guaranteed 
apprenticeships were to make formal application to the Auckland apprenticeship committee at 
the beginning of 1977 for a contract that would not be uplifted until 1978, when the course had 
been completed. Ministerial approval for the course was received on 24 December 1976, and 
the course began at Auckland Technical Institute on 28 February 1977.49 
The short lead-in time for the course caused some problems with recruitment of 
suitable women. Uncertainty over whether the course would run meant that some applicants 
had to make other plans, and there was insufficient time for familiarisation for the thirteen 
women who eventually did start the course. Other problems emerged as the course proceeded. 
There was too great a variation in the academic qualifications of the recruits; thus, some 
struggled whereas others found the work too easy. It was considered that the course was too 
47 Vocational Training Council,Minutes of the Women's Training Advisory Committee, August 1986-November 
1988 (Wellington: VTC, 1988). 
48 Women's Advisory Committee (VTC): Apprenticeship File, AAOC, W3473, 21/1111, NA, Wellington. 
49 Ibid. 
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long for what had to be taught, and that there was insufficient practical work involved. The 
women found the 38-hour week too long, particularly because there were no holidays, and 
they found themselves isolated from other students at the Institute. There were also planning 
and staffing difficulties; again, intensified because of the short time frame. Nevertheless, of 
the thirteen women who began the course, only two dropped out, and seven went on to gain 
apprenticeships. Apprenticeships were considered a possibility for two others. 
A second course was run for nine women in 1978. The smaller number of women was 
indicative of the tightening economic situation, with fewer firms prepared to take on 
apprentices. Learning from the problems of the previous year, communication was improved, 
and the women each spent a three-month orientation period with a firm. Their classes were 
more integrated with those of other students, and the course incorporated two one-week 
breaks. 50 An evaluation of the course was made by the Auckland Branch ofSROW and 
published in 1981, with a follow-up study carried out in 1985. The evaluations of the course 
were generally positive, with fifteen of the twenty-two trainees from the two courses 
beginning an apprenticeship. The later study showed that at least ten of those fifteen had 
qualified as electronic technicians, and that they reported an increasing acceptance of women 
in the trade.51 In 1981 another pre-apprenticeship course in engineering skills was run for 
women at Manukau Technical Institute. This course aimed to correct the constraining subject 
choices that girls were often encouraged to make at school and to allow them to gain the 
prerequisites necessary to apply for apprenticeships. 52 
The Apprenticeship Act 1983 
The shape of the apprenticeship system had been under debate throughout the 1970s 
and the early 1980s. The pressure for reform resulted in the Apprenticeship Act 1983, which 
also incorporated the growing social awareness of the systemic disadvantage that women 
faced in the labour market. The consultative document that preceded that Act, Apprenticeship 
for Tomorrow, made suggestions for modifications to apprenticeship that would make it easier 
for women to take part in the system. These included broad-based training followed by 
specialisation, which would allow training to be completed in sections, rather than in a 
unbroken stint, and formal recognition for units of training to allow cross-crediting. 
50 Ibid. 
5! SROW, Follow Up Study of Female Radio and TV Servicing Apprentices, Part II (Wellington: VTC, 1986). 
52 'Positive Action Programme to Start in New Plymouth', LEG, 33(1), March 1983, 7. 
.-~.-.~ - , .... ' - -. , ,-
Complementing these practical steps, Section 40 of the Apprenticeship Act 1983 charged 
local apprenticeship committees with promoting: 
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the taking up of apprenticeships by members of groups that are under-represented (in 
relation to the sexual and ethnic composition of the New Zealand workforce) in the 
workforce ofthat industry, and by persons with special needs.53 
This was reinforced in 1984 by the introduction ofthe Female Apprentice Incentive for 
Recruitment (FAIR) scheme, where employers of female apprentices, other than those in the 
hairdressing trade, would receive a $20 per week subsidy during the first year of training. 54 
The FAIR scheme was strongly fought for by women activists, including Lois Welch in the 
VTC, in the face of sceptical opposition, and was linked with other positive action 
initiatives. 55 The reason behind these initiatives was the 'tiny' percentage of women 
apprentices, reflecting the concentration of women into narrow occupational groupings. At the 
1981 census, over half of all full-time employed women worked in seven occupational groups; 
clerical workers (15.4 per cent), sales assistants (7.75 per cent), typists (7.5 per cent), 
bookkeepers/cashiers (7 per cent), health workers (7 per cent), teachers (6.6 per cent) and 
clothing workers (4 per cent).56 In 1983, of the 172 occupations with apprenticeships, there 
were women in only 55 of them, with the number of women apprentices reaching double 
figures in only 13 of those occupations. 57 Figure 24 also illustrates the predominance of males 
in the production sector, home of the traditional apprenticeship trades. 
53 New Zealand Statutes, 1983,219. 
54 Catherwood, Young People, Education andEmployment: Planning Paper No. 23,27. 
55 Alison Kuiper, interview by author, 23 August 2000. 
56 Horsfield, Women in the Economy, 279. 
57 'Positive Action Programme to Start in New Plymouth', LEG, 33(1), March 1983, 7. 
Figure 24: Distribution of Labour Force by Occupation, 1981 58 
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Mary O'Regan (who later became the first head of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, 
established in 1984), an officer of the Vocational Training Council, highlighted in a 1980 
article some of the reasons for the low number of women apprentices. She argued that the way 
women were socialised discouraged them from having an interest in technical areas. This 
impacted on the choice of subjects at school, which narrowed the career options available. 
Careers advice was often slanted, with being a woman "regarded as a vocational defect", and 
dire warnings being issued about the consequences of women entering a male bastion. 59 If, 
despite all the disadvantages faced, a woman did decide to take up an apprenticeship in a non-
traditional area, it was then necessary to find an employer willing to engage a woman 
apprentice. The predominance of male employers and the often informal nature of 
apprenticeship recruitment were barriers at this stage. If a position could be secured, there 
were still the difficulties and prejudices encountered in the workplace to be overcome.60 It is 
hardly surprising, then, to see the small of numbers of women apprentices, illustrated in Table 
10. 
58 Horsfield, Women in the Economy, 277. 
59 Mary O'Regan, 'Apprenticeship - Jobs for the Boys?,' Broadsheet, October 1980, 15. 
60 Ibid. 
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Table 10: Females as a Percentage of Apprentices in the Private Sector, 1972-1982 61 
1972 1977 1982 
Percentage of Female 4.8% 5.2% 7.8% 
Apprentices (26693 Contracts (29838 Contracts (26124 Contracts 
in Force) in Force) in Force) 
Percentage of Female. 0.1% 0.4% 1.7% 
Apprentices (25427 Contracts (28460 Contracts (24531 Contracts 
(excluding Women's in Force) in Force) in Force) 
Hairdressing) 
'Positive Action': Taranaki, 1983 
The Department of Labour continued with a number of local initiatives, particularly 
the 'positive action' campaign that was launched in htte 1982. This programme was designed 
to move women out of the small number of occupational groups to which they were largely 
confined.62 A pilot scheme was conducted during 1983 in Taranaki, where many of the major 
energy projects were based, and aimed to "increase the employment potential of young 
unemployed women", encouraging them into non-traditional fields through training, education 
and publicity, and financial incentives.63 The programme aimed to educate both young women 
and employers, and saw around 100 women placed in training and employment in non-
traditional areas.64 Seven months after the beginning of the programme, 53 of the women had 
moved into permanent employment, with a "lucky few" entering apprenticeships. An 
evaluation of the programme showed that the women aged between eighteen and twenty were 
more responsive to the idea of entering non-traditional work. These women had often already 
been employed in routine and low-paid jobs, but because they were a little older than school-
leavers, had the maturity and confidence to try something different.65 
61 Lois Welch, "A Survey of Trends in Women's Training 1972-1982," in Women's Studies Association (New 
Zealand) Conference Papers, Blenheim 1984, ed. Claire Philipson (Auckland: Women's' Studies Association, 
1984),248-259. 
62 Martin, Holding the Balance, 338. 
63 AJHR, 1984, G-l, 22. 
64 Ibid. 
65 'Positive Action Programme Evaluated', LEG, 34(1), March 1984, 15. 
'Women Across the Workforce', 1983 
During 1983, Lois Welch of the VTC organised a public education programme 
designed to encourage women to expand their vocational horizons. The programme was 
named 'Women across the Workforce', after the suggested title of 'Girls into Trades' was 
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rej ected as having too narrow a focus (and an unfortunate acronym!). The main thrust of the 
programme was a media campaign that utilised television community service advertisements, 
commercial radio and a series of radio interviews carned out by a well-known media 
personality, Sharon Crosbie. The Young Women's Christian Association and the Business and 
Professional Women's Club (BPWC) supported the campaign. The Auckland branch of the 
BPWC had compiled a directory of women in non-traditional jobs. A booklet was produced to 
help school careers advisors, and a number of women were employed in various areas through 
the Project Employment Programme to promote women into non-traditionaljobs.66 
Personal Viewpoint Pamphlets 
This series of pamphlets provides a good example of how various organisations linked 
together to produce a resource that could be used to challenge existing attitudes. In the early 
1980s, the Christchurch branch of SROW carried out a study on women in non-traditional 
jobs. This led to the production of the first Personal Viewpoint pamphlets (see Illustration 6). 
The initiative was also supported by NACEW, and a further series of the pamphlets were 
published by the VTC. 67 Members of the 1982 Kellog Rural Leadershtp Course, held at 
Lincoln College added pamphlets featuring women in agricultural occupations to the series. 
The participants interviewed women in non-traditional rural occupations, with the aim of 
encouraging "girls to consider all types of work - to lift their sights beyond the stereotypes".68 
66 VTC Public Education Programme. AAOC, W3473, 21122, NA, Wellington. 
67 Kuiper, 23 August 2000. 
68 Isla McFadden & Robyn Grigg, Women are in Agriculture (Lincoln College: Kellog Rural Leadership Course, 
1982). 
Illustration 6: 'Personal Viewpoints' Series of Pamphlets 69 
Personal Viewpoints 1 
Tui Dixon 
Painter/ 
Paperhanger 
Personal Viewpoints 7 
Linda Dunlop 
Fitter-and 
Tumer 
Department of Labour 'Positive Action Programme', 1984-1990 
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Personal Viewpoints 18 
Hilary Davidson 
App.rentice 
Joiner 
At the end of 1984, the Labour Department established a Positive Action Programme 
for Women.70 The 'Girls Can Do Anything' publicity campaign', co-ordinated by the 
Department of Labour and run by the VTC's Women's Advisory Committee, provided the 
'catch-phrase' for the programme (see Illustration 7). One of the main instigators of the 
Positive Action programme was Susan Shipley, who worked in the Policy Division of the 
Department. Her academic work on women's employment, unemployment and under-
employment in Palmerston North provided a basis for many of the initiatives that were to 
develop.71 In early 1985, four Senior Employment Officers (Positive Action for Women)72 
69 Alison Kuiper, personal papers, early 1980s. 
70 'Positive Action Programme Appointments', LEG, 35(2), June 1985,30. 
71 Alison Kagen, interview by author, 23 August 2000. 
72 Kagen, personal communication, 13 November 2000: the job title changed to 'Women's Employment Co-
ordinator' in June 1987 and to 'Women's Employment Advisor' in March 1988. The women's positions were 
disestablished in 1990. 
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were appointed in each of the main centres; Anne Brown in Manukau, Annabeth Kew in 
Wellington, ilana Edson in Hamilton and Alison Kagen in Christchurch. 73 
Illustration 7: "Girls Can Do Anything" Pamphlet, 1984 74 
Girls can do anything! 
If, not l2I)' lemng sdlool 
;tnd ftnding <'It job - espedlUy wOOl 
you don" ttaIIy Jmw, wtw )IOU 
I ' ",..nt to do. SiJmnimes il',lamer 
wilen }'Olite a ltili - ~11y 
wtlen all tIl.tjobs.~ tC!ft yOU 
I~)'OU cooId do don't.at vtty 
ncitinal or-intttr:stint. to you. 
And it'5e\-eft I\.1rdeTwbm}'OU 
don't mlly knowwba.t')wcouJddo. Or 
"tim )W~almd)t.pent ~ lon, time 
trying to tind a job. 
ButwaiU 
Don't ,i~ UP)'tt. Think about ~ 
thin,. you like doing. ThiItlf$ that dOII't 
I?''m sumlJke WInk. 
And aak )'OUmll • .• 
Do l tile bein(outdoors? 
Do I lib fixing ~ pulling thtngs 
. ~It Ind nuttlnll than bKk t~1 
00 Ili~ big lNthina, lruc.,. 
buJlcbun~aPd watdUnlthe 
way !My work? 
Would I like ttettina Qlrt)', ~ 
lJ\'t1'alk and knowin-. how-things work? 
Would I mce {)1llntin«. paperIr\C 
3M ag,\dng houses look betm? 
Would J like desifnint. 
buiIdina 4Dd litrilhlq SOIIIdhiall by 
. mywit? 
Aad OM rut quatiOll" Do )'00 
want a job ~ ilil>'U )t'OU s\l'l!'dal 
tniJrinA iIIId taches you spedal skUIs? 
, «tha.t i& w~ you wW then YOIf 
CiII1 do anything. 
" \' OOQn lit;) ~. "dccorator. <l 
furnituft INktr. ~ plumber. a 
mcchanil:. 
You <an dm'C ~ truck Of ~ bus. 
opam <'It fodlift or a cnnr..work on 
a CONtluction si~. make jewetlcry 
or do datgn work. 
\'OU an becoIIIe-.m. 
lJlt)f't!fltke~ ltam a~ 
because if tlwy naJIy milt III -
IIhW can'" anythtnc. And the iOOs 
Ift'~ biking about :mu't just jobs ior 
~. 
SU~. it's stili not atY to decide. 
Hut there are p.!OpIe who an 
hdp)'OU. 
T:tlk In them. 
'filk to your pamws. SIIow tbm this 
~ and talk to than ibouttbe thm,. 
100 mjo)-ed. as a kid. about the taImts ~'CN 
0lI11'C3dy !\l\'C - and drsc:U3$ with tIlan the 
\Wiety aI jobs tbar lrimIa imoe and people 
~ could QJk to. 
Ifyou're aa school, orroo\'e ju.t-Ieft 
$Chool talk to-)'OOt sdloot GuidaDae 
Cl>un5dlOr. ;md discuss the ilbs )'00 h.lve 
;Jbout the kind 01 pmon you olre and the 
thing. ~ou likedoina, 
Or; if you don't 1u\'eoljob.ol'tbt 
;oo}'OU do ha\'t is not what )'OU mJly 
w.mt to do. rome mel tlIk In tIL Tbere'~ 
JOiDeone here attbc ~t of 
(~, who'! ready to ~lk to Y9U about 
aU ~jobsJtirlsW'l do.. Tbec~ 
~ aI your norut Departmc:ntof 
L.tbour EiupJoymmt md Vocollional 
CuidMta Scl'\i~!S 01\ the buk CJt this 
bl'OdlUTl!. 
Ring us. Tdl U. }'Qu'\,\? ken this 
¥IIi )'Ou're rmdy to do MlJIXthingnow! 
The programme, sanctioned by the Human Rights Commission 75, was to use the 
existing resources of the Labour Department to "promote wider job horizons for girls and 
women and to identify and promote training and employment opportunities in non-traditional 
areas ofwork".76 Early initiatives included 'Girls Can Do Anything' and 'Women Can Do 
Anything' bumper stickers. The latter were printed on bright pink paper "because there was 
suspicion that what did happen would happen, that men who were very witty would cut off the 
'wo ... ' bit, so that it said' ... men can do anything', and that's very amusing!".77 Despite the 
rhetoric, the Women's Employment Officers were to a large extent isolated and unsupported 
73 'Positive Action Programme Appointments', LEG, 35(2), June 1985, 30. 
74 Alison Kuiper, personal papers, 1984. 
75 Established by the Human Rights Commission Act 1975. 
76 AJHR, 1985, G-1, 23. 
77 Kagen, 23 August 2000. 
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within the Department: "I would say that we met with a combination of almost complete 
indifference and opposition ... it was a constant battle to try and work out what we could do 
and how we could do it,,?8 The size of the area that each officer was responsible for also 
contributed to the difficulties of the job. Alison Kagen, for example, based in Christchurch, 
was responsible for Timaru and Dunedin, with much of the remainder of the South Island 
technically without representation. 79 
One of the roles of the Women's Employment Officers was to promote women into 
apprenticeship. There were some successes; for example, of the 82 supplementary apprentices 
taken on by New Zealand Railways in 1985, fifteen were women, and seven of these women 
were hired as a direct result of initiatives from the Women's Employment Officers. Three 
hundred and sixteen women began apprenticeships in non-traditional jobs in the year ended 
September 1985.80 For some of those women, however, the reality of the apprenticeship 
experience was at times harrowing. A carpentry apprentice at Addington railway workshops, 
for example, had to work in an area where the 30-foot high walls and doors were plastered 
with Playboy centrefolds. Alison Kagen recollected visiting a diesel mechanic apprentice who 
had resigned from her apprenticeship: 
I got hauled down there to try and stop her leaving, she had already resigned, and 
handed in her notice, but she agreed to stay that day and talk to me, but there was no 
way she was going to stay, and she came from a family with a background in the 
motor-trade, and she was really keen. The guys in the workshop took me around and 
showed me, explained how it wasn't really practical having a gjrl doing this kind of job 
because it was really heavy, and 'you know, they're just not strong enough', sort of 
thing, and showed me things like taking the motor out of a bus, which takes four men, 
and they showed me how good they were working together, because four men could 
co-operate to get the motor out, but they didn't see any inconsistency between that and 
saying a girl wasn't strong enough ... basically she left because they called her "Cunt", 
they didn't use her name, it was like "hand me the spanner, cunt". And they had 
absolutely no idea, I think genuinely, that that was really why she'd left, that it was 
inappropriate behavior. The union guy said they would take action on her behalf 
against their members if she wanted to, but she just wanted to get out ... 81 
The raft of 'positive action' initiatives throughout the mid 1980s appeared to be 
meeting with some success. The results, however, were often nominal, and only achieved with 
a great deal of persistence by the small number of dedicated women in key roles. In a 
78 Kagen, 23 August 2000. 
79 Ibid. 
80 NACEW Minutes, 1985-6. AAOC, W3473, 21112, NA, Wellington. 
81 Kagen, 23 August 2000. 
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reflective letter written in early 1984, Lois Welch, the VTC Women's Advisory Officer, 
replied to a request for suggestions of strategies to increase the number of women apprentices: 
"1 have been trying to think what your best strategy would be to help give employers a 
shove ... whoever you write to be prepared for the answer 'girls don't apply' ... ".82 The letter 
went on to lament the low numbers of women apprentices in government departments (see 
Table 11), which was at that point less than one per cent of the total and falling: "1 am always 
horrified by the public sector apprenticeships, which are getting worse, not better, and when 
government could demand that the numbers of women could be increased ... ".83 As an 
example, the first intake of224 government-sponsored SEATS trainees did not include any 
women; there were three women in the 1981 intake and one woman in the final 1982 intake.84 
Indeed, concern about those low numbers prompted the VTC Chairman, George Peters, to 
write to the Minister of State Services, D.S. Thomson, urging that the recruitment of female 
apprentices become a priority, with the aim of at least equaling the proportion in the private 
sector.85 
Table 11: Proportion of Female New Apprenticeship Contracts, 1975-1983 86 
Private Sector Government Departments 
Year Ended Males Females Proportion Males Females 
31 March (including 
-
women's 
hairdressingl 
1975 8728 535 6.1% 702 7 
1976 7326 605 8.3% 678 4 
1977 8006 663 8.3% 758 13 
1978 7053 751 10.6% 1150 15 
1979 6808 763 11.2% 748 9 
1980 6356 663 10.4% 796 10 
1981 5950 642 10.8% 747 5 
1982 7244 666 9.2% 563 1 
1983 6286 708 11.3% 555 3 
82 Welch, VTC to Powell, YWCA, February 1984. AAOC, W3473, 21111, NA, Wellington. 
83 Ibid. 
84 NACEW Minutes, June 1982. AAOC, W3473, 21112. NA, Wellington. 
Proportion 
1.0% 
0.6% 
1.7% 
1.3% 
1.2% 
1.3% 
0.7% 
0.2% 
0.5% 
85 Peters, VTC to Thomson, Minster of State Services, March 1984. AAOC, W3473, 21111, NA, Wellington. 
86 Department of Labour, Summary of Apprenticeship Trends to 31 March 1983,6. 
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'Try a Trade' Days 
Other examples of positive action initiatives were the 'Try a Trade' days held at 
various polytechnics throughout the country from 1986 to 1990. These were organised by 
women in the polytechnics with the support of the Labour Department's Women's 
Employment Officers, the VTC Women's Executive Officer, Jan Churchman, and liaison 
people in the polytechnics. Schools in the surrounding areas of the polytechnic were invited to 
send a number of fourth and fifth form girls who had the ability and an interest in a non-
traditional occupation. For example, Alison Kuiper, the Women's Liaison Tutor at 
Christchurch Polytechnic, organised 'Try a Trade' days from 1986 to 1990. The title of the 
1990 day was 'Women into Technology' and offered the girls a taste of the furniture, meat 
handling, computing, science, electronic and automotive trades (see Illustration 8 for an 
example of promotional material). The day began with an overview ofthe Polytechnic, 
followed by some 'hands-on' experience in the various workshops and laboratories. Women 
who were working in non-traditional trades, an apprentice carpenter and a professional 
engineer, then addressed the girls. The response to the day was overwhelmingly positive, with 
many of the girls wanting to explore the trades further. 87 
Illustration 8: Christchurch Polytechnic Poster: 'Entering a Non-Traditional Job', 1986 88 
~ C/vistchurch 
~ Polytechnic 
t)epwt,,*,1 01 Art l Cornml,ln!ry 81udIM 
Entering 
a Non-Traditional ..lob 
A ,woodsy COUIlMI for girl. aod women Interelted In entering apprwntlCNhlp,1 and 
non-tradltlon.I ...... of wo~ forwom"', Ioc:u .. 'ng on Job leuen and Interview sklll8. 
9.00 am -..1.00 pm 
Monday. 1" Apr11 
Tueeday, 16 April 
eoa'SI.OO 
To enrol phone the Enrolment Centr., N8-160, ext 8019, EnQulriu 10 7ga·150, ext 
8149 or 8126. 
87 Kuiper, personal papers, 1986-1990. 
88 Ibid. 
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A study carried out by Alison Kuiper in 1986 provided an empirical basis for an 
understanding of the factors involved in women taking up and remaining in apprenticeships. 
Fourteen women aged between nineteen and twenty-seven were interviewed, five who had 
recently completed an apprenticeship, four who were currently apprentices and five who had 
given up an apprenticeship. Kuiper found that family encouragement, familiarity with males, 
supportive employers and a strong will to succeed made it more likely that the women would 
complete the apprenticeship. Conversely, poor work conditions, an excess of work that was 
tedious, heavy or unrelated to the apprenticeship, a lack of family support and difficult 
employers appeared to discourage women from completing their apprenticeships. Clearly, 
these factors would also discourage male apprentices from remaining in their apprenticeships, 
and Kuiper's recommendations focussed as much on improvements that could be made to the 
apprenticeship system in general, as on those pertaining just to women apprentices. 89 
By 1987, 'positive action' programmes began to fall victim to economic and political 
changes. Deregulation of the economy and pressure to reduce government spending resulted in 
are-evaluation of the role of government. Employment patterns were altered by economic 
restructuring and new technologies.9o The Department of Labour in 1987 changed the 
emphasis of its 'positive action' programme, integrating the features and activities of the 
programme "into normal and routine operations within employment centres".91 Many 
feminists began to question the validity of putting so much energy into encouraging women 
into apprenticeships in the traditional trades. It was felt that the limited success rates (see 
Table 12), coupled with the downturn in many of those trades, meant that effort was better 
placed in encouraging women into new occupational areas.92 The 1987 Probine/Fargher 
report on continuing education was clear about limitations of some aspects of the 'positive 
action' programme: 
Efforts to increase the number of young women in apprenticeships have made little 
progress. Indeed, given the shrinking base of the workforce in the traditional trades, 
there may be advantage in directing effort to ensuring increased participation at all 
levels in the expanding information technology industries. 93 
89 Alison Kuiper, Women in Apprenticeships (Christchurch: Christchurch Polytechnic, 1986). 
90 AJHR, 1988, G-l, 4. 
91 AJHR, 1987, G-l, 50. 
91 Alison Kuiper, personal communication, June 2000. 
93 Probine & Fargher, The Management, Funding and Organisation of Continuing Education and Training, 15-
16. 
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Table 12: Females as a Percentage of Apprentices in the Private Sector, 1984-1988 94 
Year Ended 31 1984 1986 1988 
March 
Percentage of 9.2% 10.25% 10.78% 
Female Apprentices 
(Contracts in Force) 
Percentage of 2.3% 2.9% 3.3% 
Female Apprentices 
(excluding 
Women's 
Hairdressing 
Percentage of 77.3% 73.8% 71.7% 
Female Apprentices 
in Women's 
Hairdressing 
The minutes of the Women's Advisory Committee of the VTC in the late 1980s show 
a note of quiet desperation creeping into some of the discussion, fuelled no doubt by 
tightening economic conditions and the resilience of the male domination of some 
occupations. For example, at a meeting in August 1988, the Committee expressed its concerns 
about some of the findings ofa pilot programme studying senior secondary students: "the 
report still showed the same trends in subject selection after decades or more of providing 
encouragement for girls to widen their horizons".95 Nevertheless, the Committee continued 
with its endeavors right up to the disestablishment of the VTC in early 1989. 
Thus, although there were small pockets of support from some employers, bureaucrats 
and educationalists, the role of individual feminists in driving positive action projects through 
to realisation must be acknowledged.96 Initiatives designed to promote women into non-
traditional occupations depended largely upon the efforts of motivated women, who were 
linked through extensive formal and informal networks. Many organisations contributed ideas 
and skills, and often a project would have input from different sources, with much cross-
fertilisation occurring. 
94 Department of Labour, Annual Apprenticeship Statistics, 1984-1988. 
95 Vocational Training Council, Minutes of the Women's Training Advisory Committee, August 1986-November 
1988 (Wellington: VTC, 1988). 
96 Davies, Women's Labour Force PartiCipation in NeJY Zealand: the Past 100 Years, 48. 
. -' - :.: ; ~ - . ;.: -
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The 1990s 
A 1994 NACEW report, Women's Access to Industry Training. aimed to assess the 
success of the government's industry skills training strategy in improving the quantity and 
quality of training opportunities for women. The report began with a discussion of women's 
. position in the labour market, based on the 1991 census. These figures showed that women 
continued to work in a narrow range of occupations, with four out of five employed women 
. working in the service sector, and 46 per cent of employed women working as clerical, service 
or sales workers. Women continued to be poorly represented in the senior levels of all 
occupations, were more likely to work part-time and on average earned less than men.97 
With regard to apprenticeship, while by 1992 the incidence of female apprenticeship 
contracts had risen to 17 per cent of the total, 80 per cent of all female apprenticeship contracts 
were still in women's hairdressing (see Table 13). Very few women were represented in the 
administration of apprenticeship, and the FAIR recruitment scheme had met with only limited 
success, due to the low level of the subsidy, and entrenched attitudes. 98 These statistics seem 
grim indeed, twenty years after the introduction of equal pay, and in light of two and half 
decades of positive action. The total numbers of young people beginning formal apprentices 
had also declined dramatically, from 9117 new contracts (1123 females) in the year ended 
March 1986, to 2468 (502 female) in the year ended June 1993.99 
Table 13: Females as a Percentage of Apprentices in the Private Sector, 1989-1993 100 
Year Ended 31 1989 1991 
March 
Percentage of Female 11.8% 14.1% 
Apprentices 
(Contracts in Force) 
Percentage of Female 3.4% 3.8% 
Apprentices 
(excluding Women's 
Hairdressingl 
Percentage of Female 73.5% 75.7% 
Apprentices in 
Women's Hairdressing 
97 NACEW, Women's Access to Industry Training (Wellington: NACEW, 1994), 3-4. 
98 Ibid., 5. 
99 Department of Labour, Annual Apprenticeship Statistics, 1986-1993. 
100 Department of Labour, Annual Apprenticeship Statistics, 1989-1993. 
1993 
18.0% 
3.5% 
83.6% 
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The report was also less than enthusiastic about the chances of success of the 
industry training strategy in improving women's access to industry training. At the time of the 
report, the "essentially voluntaristic" nature of training framework meant "three of the four 
industries employing the largest numbers of women remain( ed) largely outside the industry 
training framework". 101 Within those industries where ITOs had been formed, the report had 
reservations about whether the training offered would 'fit' women, who were often support 
staff. The report was concerned that neither ETSA or NZQA had a responsibility to monitor 
the quality of the training offered, and also pointed to the lack of data available on industry 
training. 
The 1997 Skill New Zealand 'stocktake' provided reassurance on some of these issues, 
although it remains difficult to obtain disaggregated data which would give a fuller picture. 
Formal training had been extended to a broader range of industries. Of the 51 ITOs in place as 
at December 1997, 31 had little or no formal structured industry training before the Industry 
Training Act 1992. Women represented 120,400 (or 47.8 per cent) of all those participating in 
NQF qualifications, and of the 396 qualifications registered on the NQF, 74 per cent 
incorporated core generic standards. 102 The figures for structured industry training (as opposed 
to the previous figures that included Training Opportunities Programme participants 103), 
however, were less encouraging. Of the 42,799 industry trainees at March 1998, only 16 per 
cent were women. I04 
Concern about this figure, which indicated little improvement in the numbers of 
women in industry training during the time span of the new framework, prompted the 
establishment of an Equity proj ect. This was a j oint venture between ETSA and the Ministry 
of Women's Affairs. The project examined two quite different industries; the electro-
technology and the seafood industry, to determine barriers to women's participation. The 
project resulted in the development of a manual of best practice, Increasing Women's 
PartiCipation, which was intended to facilitate the involvement of more women in structured 
industry training. 105 
101 NACEW, Women's Access to Industry Training, 17; 1. 
102 Skill New Zealand, Skill New Zealand: A Stocktake as of December 1997 (Wellington: ETSA, 1998), 18-19. 
103 Ibid., 2. (Training Opportunities Programme: a fully funded programme administered by ETSA, targeted 
towards people with low qualifications, predominantly recent school-Ieavers and long-term unemployed.) 
104 Skill New Zealand, "Equity Afloat," Skills Magazine, September 1998. 
!O5 ETSA, Annual Report 1997198, 9. 
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It would be easy to end this chapter on a rather depressed note. In many ways, it 
seems that little has changed in the opportunities that women have to participate fully in the 
world of work. Women remain largely in a narrow range of occupations, are more often on the 
periphery of the workforce as part-time or casual workers, and are paid on average 
significantly less than men. Their restricted access to training perpetuates and legitimises this 
disadvantage. Indeed, when we focus on how far there is to go, it would be easy to become 
discouraged. Nevertheless, when we look at far women have come, there is cause for 
celebration. My daughters have the chance to take a wide range of subjects at school. They 
have fewer practical or societal barriers to their occupational choice than their mother did 25 
years ago. They are better equipped to deal with harassment in the workplace, and already 
accept that they will train and retrain throughout their lifetime. For this, we owe a huge debt of 
gratitude to the many women who worked so hard to push the barriers of what was deemed 
'acceptable' for women. The struggle is not over, but the course of the stream has been 
irrevocably altered. 
CHAPTER TEN 
1990s: THE SKILLS CRISIS? 
The information revolution isn't going to do us much good if we can't get our 
plumbing attended to. 
(Paul Shannon, "Skills Shortage Scandal," New Zealand Business, 8, 1994 : 12-19) 
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The 1980s had seen a revolution in many aspects of life in New Zealand, not least in 
the way vocational training was regarded. Apprenticeship, the 'traditional' means of entry to 
skilled trades, was the subj ect of an entire government report in 1980; by the end of the decade 
apprenticeship barely rated a small section in many of the reports written on post compulsory 
training and education. The focus of vocational training had moved from it being regarded as 
an accompaniment to paid work to a substitute for it, in many cases. This chapter will ask to 
what extent this was the result of philosophical changes, and to what extent was it a cover for 
the lack of available jobs, especially for young people. It will also examine the shape of the 
new industry training system, the assumptions behind the new regime, and some critiques of 
those assumptions. 
The New Broom? 
After two terms of revolutionary changes in economic policy from the fourth Labour 
government, a National government was elected with a strong majority in October 1990. 
Tucking firmly under its wing the deregulation and restructuring of the previous government, 
the new government moved to consolidate and extend those economic changes, and then set 
about with the same determination to reform the social infrastructure. Benefits were 
substantially cut in the 1991 budget, and the age for youth rates to apply was raised from 20 to 
25. Other social spending was rigorously examined, and, where possible, the funding and 
provision of social services was separated. The labour market was deregulated (although not to 
the extent that many wished) with the Employment Contracts Act 1991. I 
The neo-liberal ideology informing these changes also underpinned many changes to 
the education system, both at the compulsory and post-compulsory levels. Education was 
1 Jonathan Boston, "New Zealand's Welfare State in Transition", in RedeSigning the Welfare State in New 
Zealand, ed. J. Boston, P. Dalziel and S. St John (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-19. 
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increasingly seen as an investment required to support the 'enterprise culture' , rather than 
as a 'good' in its own right. The idea of the ' enterprise culture' was a legacy from Thatcherite 
Britain, and attempted to answer the question of how a country could survive and compete in 
the global marketplace. This involved: 
remodelling social institutions along commercial lines and encouraging the acquisition 
and use of so-called 'enterprising qualities' .... at the heart of this notion of an 
'enterprise culture' is the need to reconstruct education so that it will deliver the 
research, skills and attitudes required for New Zealand to succeed in an increasingly 
competitive international economy. 2 
Alongside the rhetoric, however, was the undeniable reality of a depressed economy and high 
rates of unemployment, especially youth unemployment. The average growth rate, based on 
real per capita gross domestic product, declined markedly between 1987 and 1992.3 The 
number of registered unemployed passed 200,000 in 1992 (see Figure 25), and unemployment 
in the fifteen to nineteen year age group throughout the period was more than double the total 
rate of unemployment (see Figure 26).4 
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2 Michael Peters and Mark Olssen, "Compulsory Education in a Competition State", in Redesigning the Welfare 
State in New Zealand, ed. 1. Boston, P. Dalziel and S. St John (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 195. 
3 Paul Dalziel, "Macroeconomic Constraints", in Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand, ed. 1. Boston, P. 
Dalziel and S. St John (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999),62. 
4 Statistics New Zealand, Labour Market Statistics 1998 (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand, 1999), 67-70. 
S Martin, Holding the Balance, 383. 
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The plethora of reports directly concerned with, or touching upon, vocational 
education continued into the new decade. The theme was generally that of a crisis situation in 
the labour market, with New Zealand portrayed as having a relatively lowly skilled and 
unproductive workforce. The decade began with the 'New Directions' Conference on Industry 
Based Training for the 1990s and Beyond held in June 1990. This was organised by the newly 
established Education and Training Support Agency (ETSA), which was chaired by Ron 
Fargher (co-author of the 1987 ProbinelFargher report). The conference brought together 
ETSA, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the New Zealand Employers 
Federation, and its aim was to consider the future directions of apprenticeship training and the 
widening of structured training to increase training opportunities.7 
The conference report identified what it viewed as the 'training crisis'; problems both 
with attitudes to training in general, and with the delivery of training. There was concern that 
large areas of industry had little or no systematic training, and that those individuals who were 
6 Statistics New Zealand, Labour Market Statistics 1998. 
7 New Directions: Summary of New Directions Conference on Industry Based Training for the 1990s and Beyond 
rN ellington: ETSA, 1990). 
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in training were not representative of the population as a whole. Barriers to increasing the 
numbers in training were discussed. These included the idea that off-job training was often 
seen as solely the responsibility of formal education institutions, the fact that many employers 
regarded training as cost, rather than an investment, and the absence of an overall training 
strategy. Problems with the delivery of training included course structures that hampered the 
acquisition of additional skills and retraining, and concerns about the erosion of national 
standards. It was felt that training tended to be dominated by education structures at the 
expense of industry-led systems. Restrictive training legislation was examined, and it was 
argued that both unions and employers needed to break free of the historical rigidities of 
industry classifications, job classifications, skill demarcations, award relativities and 
. . 8 
restnctIve entry systems. 
The conference report considered that there was a high degree of consensus among the 
conference participants. The importance of an industry-led system was reinforced, as was the 
need for the display of flexibility by all parties, aided.by enabling, rather than restrictive 
legislation. Ideas for improving the delivery of training included making provision for stair-
casing and introducing modular training, although this raised concerns with union 
representatives about the deskilling of jobs. The notion of competency-based training was 
supported, but it was felt that minimum periods of on-job training should be incorporated, and 
the maintenance of national standards ensured. The conference supported the expansion of 
systematic training into new areas, and saw the need for a wide marketing programme to 
publicise and extend systematic training. 9 
The Taskforce on Skills Development, chaired by Roberta Hill, was set up in April 
1990 under the Ministry of Education to consider current and future skill requirements, and to 
make proposals on systems and strategies for a nation-wide skills policy. Such an advisory 
committee had been sign-posted in the 1989 Learning/or Life Two. Membership of the 
taskforce included Bob Bubendorfer, the Principal of Wellington Polytechnic, and union, 
industry and employer representatives. The policy analysis was provided by officials from the 
Ministry of Education and NZQA 10 The December 1990 report of the Taskforce repeated the 
claim that there was a skills crisis, arguing that the workplace training base had been 
"seriously eroded in recent years, from levels which were already low by international 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Taskforce on Skills Development, The Skills Imperative: Towards a Learning Culture for New Zealand 
(Wellington: Taskforce on Skills Development, December 1990). 
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standards".l1 The barriers to skill fonnation were delineated yet again, but this report 
added under-resourcing and a lack of government leadership to the list of factors inhibiting the 
growth of a skilled work force. The report was also harsh on the apprenticeship system, 
despite the changes that had been made through the late 1980s. It argued that the 
Apprenticeship Act 1983 focused only a narrow band of vocational education restricted 
largely to young people: "the Apprenticeship Act is coercive, prescriptive, rigid, segmented 
and process oriented" .12 
A 1990 report written by Paul Callister for the New Zealand Planning Council, 
Tomorrow's Skills, couched the debate in terms of the "new economy". 13 The report argued 
that the major growth in the economy would be in the 'service sector', that is, in tourism, 
education, health, information and financial services, transport and intellectual property. Two 
options for the future of New Zealand were presented. The country could become a low cost 
producer of resource-based commodities, or concentrate on producing high value products 
aimed at niche markets, competing in the highly competitive global market. The second option 
would require a highly skilled, flexible workforce, with the emphasis on quality and improved 
productivity, and would result in a high income, high employment society. The report 
considered that primary and manufacturing industries would remain vital to the economy, but 
argued that changing technology would limit employment growth in these areas. It was 
predicted that by 1997, nearly 70 per cent of jobs would be in the service sector, with a move 
to 'information-intensive jobs' and a requirement for higher levels of education. Thus, the 
report argued, there was a need to improve post-compulsory education participation results 
and to make what was taught in all education sectors more relevant to the 'new economy'. 14 
The 1991 Porter Project, which analysed New Zealand's competitive advantage, was 
generally scathing about the skill level of the workforce, and the ability of the education 
system to remedy this. The Project was a study of the New Zealand economy based on a 
framework developed by Michael Porter of Harvard University. Porter believed that economic 
success was dependent upon knowledge and innovation, rather than the traditional factors of 
land, labour and capital investment. There was disagreement among those involved in the 
Project on the methodology used, the industries selected and the applicability of the 
framework to New Zealand. 15 Nevertheless, the Porter Project was influential, with the report 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid., 25. 
13 Paul Callister, Tomorrow's Skills (Wellington: New Zealand Planning Council, 1990), 2. 
14 Ibid., 7-8. 
15 Peters and Olssen, "Compulsory Education in a Competition State", 195. 
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claiming that New Zealand "faces fundamental human-resource challenges ... [the] ... rate of 
participation in the workforce is low as are the levels of training and skills ... [and it has] ... one 
of the lowest levels oflabour productivity in the industrialized world". 16 The apparent 
disjunction between the education system and the needs of industry was blamed for much of 
the malaise. The report accused the education system of having an academic and theoretical 
bias, and of focusing on social objectives at the expense of subjects with "direct economic 
'value such as sciences, engineering, mathematics and management".l7 The result of this lack 
was: 
widespread and deep-seated dissatisfaction in industry with the contribution that our 
education system is making to New Zealand's economic development ... [it] is not 
equipping people with the skills necessary to compete successfully in the global 
economy. 1 
With regard to the apprenticeship system, the Porter Project claimed that there was 
extensive discontent with the existing structure from both apprentices and employers, with 
new apprenticeship contracts declining from 9117 in 1986, to 5611 in 1989 (see Figure 27). 
This dissatisfaction, according to the report, sterinned from apprenticeship being restricted to 
traditional trades, the wide variation in the quality of on-job instruction and supervision and 
from the failure of the system to keep pace with the introduction of new technologies. 19 While 
there is no doubt that apprenticeship numbers declined during this time, it has previously been 
argued that it is spurious to connect a drop in the number of apprentices with dissatisfaction 
with the system (Chapter 8, p.174). Apprentice numbers correlate very clearly with the state of 
the economy, and dissatisfaction is as likely to be with the difficulty in a tight economy of 
committing to taking on an apprentice (from employers) or the lack of apprenticeships 
available (for young people), rather than with the system itself. 
16 G. Crocombe, M. Enright & M. Porter, Upgrading New Zealand's Competitive Advantage (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press [in association with the New Zealand Trade Development Board], 1991),99-100. 
17 Ibid., 102, 105. 
18 Ibid., 105. 
19 G. Crocombe, M. Enright & M. Porter, Upgrading New Zealand's Competitive Advantage, 162. 
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The Porter Project suggested an apprenticeship system based more on the German or 
Swiss model as a remedy for these failures. This idea must be viewed as ironic, given the 
reliance of the German system on a strong tripartite ethos, and the passing, also in 1991, of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, which decimated the union movement in New Zealand. The 
Project also suggested closer links between education and industry, and a better balance 
between practical and theoretical training. The report argued that investment in new 
technologies and worker training was limited by strained labour relations in New Zealand. 
Findings from the 1990 International Institute for Management Development World 
Competitiveness Report, which surveyed countries on various criteria of economic soundness, 
ranked New Zealand eighteenth out of the twenty-one countries surveyed in terms of the 
willingness of the workforce to accept the introduction of new technology. 21 
20 Department of Labour, Annual Return of Apprentices, 1984-1993. 
21 G. Crocombe, M. Enright & M. Porter, Upgrading New Zealand's Competitive Advantage, 1991, 107. 
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Thus, the 'experts' painted a fairly dismal picture ofthe state of New Zealand's 
skill base and its potential for improvement. The apprenticeship system, in particular, was 
accused of being too rigid, discriminatory and of being unable (or unwilling) to accommodate 
training in new technologies. The impression given is of a country full of frustrated 
entrepreneurs, brimming with technological innovations, ready and willing to leap into the 
'new economy' and make millions of dollars, but being unable to because of an unskilled and 
unco-operative workforce, made that way by an 'airy-fairy' education system and the straight-
jacket of adversarial industrial relations. Peters and Olssen argued that: 
The Porter Project was used to legitimise the government's market-orientated 
macroeconomic policy framework ... justify(ing) a new culture of enterprise and 
competition in the curriculum ... and an emphasis on skills development at the expense 
of a traditional concern for knowledge and understanding. 22 
Critique of Reports 
Although this view of New Zealand as "an economy in which skill requirements 
[were] rising continually and the workforce [was] struggling to keep up" was certainly the 
'policy orthodoxy' of the time, there were important critiques of this position.23 A 1992 article 
by Gordon and Snook examined the "arguments behind the view that Aotearoa (New Zealand) 
is undergoing a fundamental change in the structure of the labour market and work practices 
which has specific and major implications for education and training".24 The article argued 
that there was little evidence to support either the view that technologIcal advances were the 
main driving force behind the movement from the production sector to the service sector, or, 
indeed, the view that the movement itself was as pervasive or as inevitable as was claimed. 
The article emphasised that the undoubted changes that were taking place must also be 
understood in terms of social, political and economic factors. As an example, the article 
acknowledged that there had been a growth in the service sector during the speculative boom 
years between 1984 and 1987, but pointed to the decline in the service sector after the 1987 
share-market crash and the resulting recession.25 
The main point of the article was to question the assumption made by many education 
and training policy-makers that a (disputed) level of growth in the service sector automatically 
translated to the need for more highly skilled workers, and that the education system of the 
22 Peters and Olssen, "Compulsory Education in a Competition State", 188. 
23 Higgins, "Skills and Schemes: the Training Response to Youth Unemployment", 196. 
24 L. Gordon & 1. Snook, "Education, 'Skills' and Technological Change: the Politics of the New Economy," 
New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 17 (1992), 86. 
25 Ibid., 89. 
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day was incapable of producing those workers. The article argued that large areas of the 
'service sector' were likely to be "only minimally affected by the technological revolution", 
and that the distinction between 'manual' production sector workers and 'non-manual' service 
sector workers was spurious. 26 
All in all, the documents reviewed fail to adequately define the 'new economy' or the 
kinds of workers it requires. They imply but never demonstrate that service industries 
will require higher levels of skill than the primary or manufacturing sectors did or that 
non-manual jobs (as defined) will need more knowledgeable workers than many of the 
manual jobs (as defined) which they will supercede?7 
Given the constant criticism ofthe apprenticeship system as not turning out 
appropriately trained workers, the article's discussion about the gratuitous nature of the claim 
of a 'skills deficit' is crucial. The article points to the "major disjuncture" between demands 
on the education and training system to produce workers for the 'new economy' and the 
"reality of high levels of unemployment in the existing economy". 28 Thus, it can be argued 
that the claim of what was becoming the 'orthodox' position, that increased unemployment 
was caused by the higher skill requirements of jobs, must be turned on its head; in fact, the 
economic downturn meant fewer employers willing or able to train workers to any level of 
skill. It is surely no coincidence that criticisms of the apprenticeship system are generally 
minor when the economy is booming, but when it is not, apprenticeship, along with any other 
system of training, provides a convenient scapegoat for the contraction of the training of 
employees. 
The notion of a 'skills deficit' is also questioned by Higgins in a 1994 paper. She 
accuses the New Zealand Planning Council and similar bodies of carrying out their analysis at 
the level of national aggregate data, and thus ignoring what was happening in the workplace 
and at the local labour market level. Her analysis of the Christchurch youth labour market 
between 1976 and 1991 showed that, while skill requirements had risen since 1970, those 
changes were "readily incorporated into training courses".29 The real 'deficit' was in the loss 
of jobs in the apprenticed trades, due to a combination of technological and macro-economic 
changes. Thus, when suitable young applicants outnumbered both the training places, and the 
jobs available, the idea of a 'skills deficit' "falls a little flat ... young people in Christchurch 
26 Ibid., 90. 
27 Ibid., 91. 
28 Ibid., 92. 
29 Higgins, "Skills and Schemes: the Training Response to Youth Unemployment", 199. 
have thus experienced diminished access to formally recognised skilled work, and have 
found few attractive opportunities opening up in other traditional youth occupations".3o 
The New Industry Training Structure 
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It was against this policy background that the Industry Training Act 1992 was passed. 
The National government elected in 1990 found that the previous government had already 
carried out most of the groundwork for a major change of emphasis in education. The 
devolution of responsibility for education to local boards (albeit coupled with greater state 
control via requisite charters, and national curriculum guidelines and assessment) and 
increased emphasis on market forces and user-pays were already under action. Proposals 
aimed at ensuring greater equity in education contained in the blueprint for these changes, 
Tomorrow's Schools (Department of Education, 1988), however, "fell by the wayside 
following the election of the National government in 1990".31 
Lockwood Smith became the new Minister of Education in November 1990. He aimed 
to "reinvigorate the reform process" begun by the Labour government, favouring further 
devolution of power and increased freedom of choice for parents and' consumers' of 
education.32 One of Smith's major interests was "curriculum reform, and the need to integrate 
the curriculum with qualifications ... breaking down the barriers between different types and 
levels of educational institution and the qualifications they offered".33 This integration was 
characterised as 'seamless education' by Smith in the 1993 report, Education/or the 2pt 
Century.34 One of the overarching themes of policy development through the late 1980s and 
early 1990s was thus the need for cohesion between workplace training and traditional forms 
of education. 
The implementation of the Industry Training Act 1992 was overseen by ETSA, which 
had been charged with administering and servicing apprenticeship under the Education 
Amendment Act 1990, until such time as a new legislative basis for apprenticeship was put in 
place. Thus, it was required to provide an independent chairperson for each of the 36 national 
apprenticeship committees, and for the local committees as weU.35 ETSA was also responsible 
30 Ibid., 199-200. 
31 Mark Olssen and Kay Morris Matthews, eds., Education Policy in New Zealand: The 1990s and Beyond 
(Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1997), 18-19. 
32 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 209. 
33 Ibid., 210. 
34 Peters and Olssen, "Compulsory Education in a Competition State", 185. 
35 ETSAAnnual Report, 1991,22. 
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for administering the Access scheme and the Primary Industry Cadet schemes.36 The 1990 
Act also established the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (initially named the National 
Education Qualifications Authority), the body charged with developing and administering the 
much vaunted national qualifications framework. All these components of change to 
vocational training were brought together in the National government's Industry Skills 
Training Strategy, announced in the 1991 budget, and designed to elucidate the reasoning 
behind the forthcoming Industry Training Bill. 37 
There were five main areas to the Industry Skills Training Strategy. First, it was 
envisaged that the new'training system would be industry-led. The Industry Training 
Organisations (ITOs) that were to be set up for each industry or group of industries would be 
"responsible for the design, management, and delivery of training for their industries".38 The 
i····-····,··········v.·,·, 
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ITOs would also be self-funded, although there was provision for contracting with the ~ ... " .. 
government for the use of state funds. The second component of the strategy was NZQA, 
which would work in partnership with industry to develop training programmes. Thirdly, the 
government foresaw funding for apprenticeship training being transferred gradually to 
industry control on a contestable basis. A Training Development Fund, holding $2.1 million 
dollars for 199111992, was provided to assist ITOs to carry out training needs analysis and 
develop new training. The legislative basis for the strategy was to be the Industry Training 
Act, which would replace the Apprenticeship Act 1983 and the Technicians Training Act 
1967. The final component of the strategy was two other training schemes; a Youth 
Traineeship programme and the Training Opportunities Programme (TOP), which was to 
progressively replace the Access scheme?9 
The Industry Skills Training Strategy preceded the Industry Training Act 1992, and 
was thus also used by the government as a basis for consultation on the final details of the Act. 
In particular, the government requested submissions about the criteria that should be used to 
recognise ITOs, and on the best way to ensure that ITOs were industry-funded. 40 The 
government was clear that it did not wish to have an "overly intrusive role in the establishment 
ofITOs".41 Thus, in the 1992 Act, the mechanism that had been used to set up the statutory 
Industry Training Boards (ITBs), the Vocational Training Act 1982, was repealed and the 
36 ETSAAnmw/ Report, 1992,6. 
37 The Government's New Industry Skills Training Strategy (Wellington: ETSA, 1991), 14, 
38 Ibid., 15, 
39 Ibid., 15-18. 
40 Ibid" 30. 
41 Ibid., 33. 
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ITBs dissolved. The Board ofETSA was given the power to recognise an ITO for any 
industry if it was satisfied that the ITO could set and administer appropriate skill standards, 
organise training delivery and that the organisation was broadly representative of a cohesive 
and rational industry grouping. There was no direct mechanism in the Act for the ITOs to 
collect levies from firms within the industry, although there was provision for levies collected 
by the disbanded ITBs under the repealed Industrial Training Levies Act 1978 to be 
. distributed to the appropriate ITO. 42 The industry training reforms, whose two components 
were the Industry Training Strategy and the National Qualifications Framework, were branded 
by the government as Skill New Zealand 43 The Minister of Employment and Labour, Bill 
Birch, called a conference of interested parties in November 1992. The conference included 
employer, union and education sector representatives, and officers from ETSA and NZQA. Its 
aim was to ease the transition to the new framework. 44 
Industry Training Organisations 
The transfer of the administration of apprenticeships to the relevant ITO was begun by 
ETSA in late 1992 and 1993. By the end of June 1993 there were 39 recognised ITOs, 
covering approximately 43 per cent of the workforce, and by June 1994, seventeen of those 
organisations had taken control of their training. 45 There were, however, some problems with 
the transfer of responsibility. One of the most crucial changes to take place under the Industry 
Training Act was the replacement of the apprenticeship contract with an employment contract 
under the terms of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. This Act placed the onus for 
negotiating the 'employment contract' on to the individual, breaking 'the historical link 
between union membership and negotiating authority" and "withdraw(ing) the state from its 
century-old involvement in the extensive prescription of bargaining and representation".46 
Thus, the triumvirate of union, employer and state that had protected and supported the 
apprenticeship system was broken. 
42 New Zealand Statutes, 1992, NO.55. 
43 Prime Ministerial Taskforce on Employment, Employment: The Issues (Wellington: May 1994), 72. 
44 Industry Training Act Conference (Auckland: AIC Conferences, 1992). 
45 ETSA Annual Report, 1994. 
46 Pat Walsh and Peter Brosnan, "Redesigning Industrial Relations", in Redesigning the Welfare State in New 
Zealand, ed. J. Boston, P. Dalziel and S. St John (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 119-121. 
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The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) criticised the new 
environment, arguing that "it is not acceptable to leave apprentices and other workers under 
training to the mercy of their individual power in the· current environment" .47 They called for a 
minimum standard training contract, underpinned by legislation that outlined the rights and 
responsibilities of both parties to the training contract.48 Employers, too, in their own way, 
recognised the threat that losing the specialist nature of the apprenticeship contract posed. The 
: managing director of an Auckland boat-building firm was quoted as saying; 
Apprenticeships are history since the Employment Contracts Act. Now don't get me 
wrong, I think. the Employment Contracts Act is the best thing that's ever happened to 
this country, but it's really dealt to apprentices. 49 
The structure of many of the ITOs was also a cause for concern from various quarters. 
At the most basic level, the record keeping and communication with ETSA of some of the new 
ITOs was less than desirable. Participation levels in industry training became difficult to track 
accurately, with a range of sources providing data that was not always comparable. 
It is thus impossible to obtain a complete picture of industry training skills in this 
country. Moreover, there are large gaps in the information available. Statistics from 
ITOs, for example, are woefully incomplete, making any clear picture of 
apprenticeship impossible. 50 
It was acknowledged that part of the reason for the incompleteness of data collected was the 
state of' flux' in industry training, as apprenticeship files were transfe)Ted from ETSA to the 
relevant ITO, and as the new qualification framework was developed. The transfer of 
apprenticeship contracts was completed by the end of 1994. Figure 28 paints a fairly dismal 
picture of the numbers of young people entering apprenticeships, and of the total number of 
apprenticeships; again, clearly correlating with economic conditions. The difficulty in 
obtaining ac~urate figures is illustrated by the fact that the December 1993 figures are 
approximations, based on the number of apprenticeship files transferred by ETSA. 51 From this 
point on, ETSA statistics are based on those in 'systematic training contracts' , encompassing 
apprentices, cadets and any others fitting the classification. Long-term comparisons thus 
become problematic. 
47 New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU), Building a Better Workplace, Policy Paper No. i 0 
(Wellington: NZCTU, 1993), 12. 
48 Ibid., 12. 
49 Paul Shannon, "Skills Shortage Scandal: Why are our Training Systems Failing Employers?", New Zealand 
Business 8 (2) (1994) : 15. 
50 Fiona Sturrock, industry Training and Pre-employment Programmes in New Zealand (Wellington: 
Demographic and Statistical Analysis Unit, Ministry of Education, 1995),9. 
51 Ibid., 20. 
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Figure 28: New and Existing Apprenticeships, 1990-1993 52 
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The 1994 Prime Ministerial Task Force on Employment was established across party 
lines to search for "practical and sustainable solutions" to unemployment: the "major 
economic, social and community problem of our time".53 The group, comprising union, 
business, education, Maori and government representatives, and chaired by John Anderson, 
the Chief Executive of the National Bank of New Zealand, was also charged with evaluating 
skills training. The Taskforce expressed concern about the "relatively fragile" state of many 
ITOs, arguing that in some cases industry groupings tended to be small and narrowly based, 
with concomitantly narrow funding bases. It appeared that while employers may have been 
prepared to purchase training from the appropriate ITO, they were not necessarily prepared to 
supply the funding required to establish that ITO.54 In 1995, for example, approximately 90 
per cent of the income of the ITOs still came from government funding, with industries 
directly investing only around five million dollars per year. The government contribution was 
in the form of three separate funds, all administered by ETSA; the Industry Training 
Development Fund for the assessment of training needs and design, the Industry Training 
S2 Ibid., 15. 
S3 Prime Ministerial Task Force on Employment, Employment: The Issues. 
S4 Ibid., 73 . 
Support Fund to assist ITOs to take over the administration of existing apprenticeships, 
and the Off-Job Training Fund to purchase polytechnic courses. 55 
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The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions was unhappy with parts of the ITO 
structure. There was no requirement in the Industry Training Act for ITOs to include either 
union or worker representation. While some prospective ITOs, for example, the Plastics ITO, 
included a joint union and employer body, this was at the discretion of those involved in the 
establishment process. 56 The NZCTU was also concerned at the narrow definition of the 
majority of ITOs. The ability of ITOs to "self-define", it argued, could lead to duplication of 
coverage, fragmentation of logical industry groupings, added expense for employers and 
providers and difficulties with the portability of qualifications.57 Examples of some of these 
problems were clear in the initial shakedown period of ITO formation. The Electro-technology 
ITO was reportedly involved in "border skirmishes" over coverage with the Engineering ITO, 
while concerns about 'competitive advantage' inhibited the formation of an ITO for motor 
vehicle assemblers.58 The building industry had two ITOs; the Federated Builders and 
Contractors and the New Zealand Contractors' Federation, while other industries had no 
formal training mechanism. 59 
The government's concern about the scarcity of apprenticeship training prompted the 
offering of the Skill Start recruitment incentive from July 1993. This was designed to 
encourage employers to take on and train young people aged between 16 and 21 years, and 
provided an incentive payment of $1 000 for recruitment of trainees inihe target group. This 
payment, $700 at the start of a training agreement and $300 after six months of employment,60 
was considered an acknowledgement of the high initial costs of taking on an apprentice or 
other trainee.61 Of the 2490 new apprentices recorded at February 1994, around 1870 were 
Skill Start Trainees. The government, however, was disappointed with the number of 
employers taking part in the scheme. It was considered unlikely that the target of 5000 places 
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set for June 1994 would be reached. This was explained in part by the limit of three incentive .: c:. .:. 
payments to each employer. The government also argued that the slow up-take provided 
"additional evidence that the reluctance of employers to employ young people is based on 
55 Simon Smelt, IndustryTraining Organisations (Wellington: Education Forum, 1995),6. 
56 NZCTU, BUilding a Better Workplace, Policy Paper No. 10, 22. 
57 Ibid., 22. 
58 Smelt, Industry Training Organisations, 28-29. 
59 Shannon, "Skills Shortage Scandal: Why are our Training Systems Failing Employers?", 12. 
60 AGB McNair, Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Skill Start Scheme (Wellington: AGB McNair, 1994), l. 
61 ETSA Annual Report, 1996, 19. 
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more than the up-front costs associated with hiring new staff,.62 Skill Start was phased out 
in 1996, officially because of the 'sizeable' increase in the number of trainees, and the fact that 
it had been superceded by the Skill New Zealand Strategy.63 An assessment of the scheme one 
year from its inception, however, pointed to the "significant deadweight cost" associated with 
the scheme.64 The research showed that of the sample surveyed, 88 per cent of employers 
would have taken on the same number of apprentices regardless of the subsidy. 65 
A 1995 report by economist Dr Simon Smelt, commissioned by the Education 
Forum,66 questioned the reasoning behind the development ofITOs.67 Smelt had been the 
manager of the education sector of the Treasury from 1984 to 1986, and had represented 
Treasury on the Picot Taskforce.68 The aim ofthe government in setting up the ITO structure, 
Smelt argued, was to facilitate 'bottom-up' industry training, that is, industries identifying, 
organising and funding training appropriate to their members. Smelt delineated the broad 
assumptions that appeared to be driving government policy; that the development of industry 
training was essential to international competitiveness; that this development should be 
industry-led; and that the role of the government was to facilitate this development by 
assisting industry to overcome market failures hindering development. Smelt suggested 
several areas that could be considered potential market failures that government policy may 
have been expected to address. For example, the 'public good' nature of some of the benefits 
of training, equity problems, 'free-riding' and poaching by some firms leading to under-
investing in training by others, and compliance costs, were all factors-that could at some level 
be mitigated by government actions. Smelt argued, however, that in fact there was a lack of 
clear analysis of the 'training problem' by the government: 
(while) the outcomes to which ITOs will, hopefully, contribute are mentioned in 
various government documents, the nature of the market failure(s) they are intended to 
counter is not. .. ITO policy appears to be a specific solution in search of a specific 
problem. Attributes such as 'quality', 'relevance', 'accessibility', and 'portability' may 
well be desirable in training. But, identifying them does not identify the factors which 
may inhibit their achievement, or the government's role in overcoming such 
inhibitions, or the balance of costs and benefits in so doing. 69 
62 Prime Ministerial Task Force on Employment, 1994, 74. 
63 ETSA Annual Report, 1996,20. 
64 AGB McNair, Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Skill Start Scheme, 10. 
65 Ibid. 
66 The Education Forum is an educational group associated with the New Zealand Business Roundtable. 
67 Smelt, Industry Training Organisations. 
68 Butterworths, Reforming Education, 52; 77. 
69 Smelt, Industry Training Organisations, 15. 
1:- .". 
226 
Indeed, Smelt claimed that many of the factors driving policy and practice "were 
remote from market forces or any analysis of market failure or public benefits".7o The 
implication was that the historical development and current agendas of each of the 
stakeholders in industry training precluded any chance of unhampered market forces working 
their 'magic'. Further, instead ofITOs helping to expose training to the market, Smelt claimed 
that they would, in fact, exacerbate the unresponsive nature and complexity of industry 
. training. This was because of the monopoly position that the ITOs were given by the 
government as designer, purchaser and possible assessor of training, and the fact that much of 
their funding was publIc. Smelt's underlying assumption appeared to be that if all the social 
and political influences on training were stripped away, then the pure market forces would 
provide just the right combination of training, trainees, and jobs. This, however, ignores the 
reality that 'the market' is inextricably situated within a social and political context. In fact, 
during the times when political and social constraints have been at their weakest, during 
recessions, for example, industry training has been the most compromised. 
The National Qualifications Framework 
Smelt's report also questioned the other component of Skill New Zealand, the National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF), administered by the New Zealand Qualifications Authority. 
The idea of a national, integrated qualification system had been gaining momentum 
throughout the 1980s, both at the philosophical and practical level. Irapprenticeship training 
was to successfully move to assessment based on competency, rather than timeserving, then 
some form of national standards were viewed as essential. In 1987, Tom McCool, the chief 
executive of the Scottish Vocational Educational Council (Scotvec), was invited to New 
Zealand to explain the Scottish system of standards-based assessment for technical and 
vocational areas.71 The ideas found a willing audience among many educationalists, in 
particular, by David Hood, a secondary school principal who was active in the Post Primary 
Teachers' Association. Hood went on to become the secretary and co-author ofthe 1988. 
Hawke Report, and was instrumental in developing the national qualifications framework 
proposed in the resultant 1989 policy document, Learningfor Life Two. The framework was 
extended, in the New Zealand setting, to include academic courses, a move that engendered 
much controversy. Hood chaired the working party that established the new authority, and was 
70 Smelt, Industry Training Organisations, 16. 
71 Jenny Chamberlain, "Standard Debasement," North & South, February 2000, 87-94. 
appointed as the founding chief executive of the National Education Qualifications 
Authority, which was retitled the New Zealand Qualifications Authority in 1991. 72 
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The building blocks of the NQF are unit standards. Each standard "explicitly states in a 
list of performance criteria what a person has to know, do and be able to understand to be 
considered competent in an area of skill and knowledge".73 Each unit standard sits on one of 
the NQF's eight levels of achievement, and is of a varying size and credit level. Qualifications 
. are thus made up of packages of credits that accumulate towards either a National Certificate, 
at levels one to four of the framework, or a National Diploma, at levels five and Up.74 The 
rationale behind the NQF is that credit for skills and knowledge should have national 
currency, be portable across industries, and be able to be gained from any accredited provider. 
Industry advisory groups, some of which evolved into ITOs, initially carried out the 
development of unit standards for industries. NZQA was the 'gatekeeper' for the 
qualifications framework, assisting with development of unit standards, and having the final 
say on the acceptability of both the unit standards, and of the qualifications that they 
constituted. The copyright of each registered unit standard was held by NZQA, which also 
determined, in consultation with ITOs, the accreditation of providers. 75 Table 14 shows the 
growth in the purchasing and providing of unit standards. 
Table 14: Delivery of Industry Training, 1993-1997 76 
Year ITOs Receiving ITOs Purchasing ITOs Accredited 
Training Support Off-Job Training to Register 
Funding Assessors 
1993 15 4 
-
1994 21 9 6 
1995 21 13 16 
1996 28 ITOs receive Industry Training 28 
Fund (ITF) Subsidies 
1997 36 ITO receive ITF Subsidies 43 
72 Ibid., 89-90. 
73 Skill New Zealand, Skill New Zealand: A Stocktake as of December 1997, 2. 
74 Ibid., 2. 
75 Smelt, Industry Training Organisations, 2. 
76 Skill New Zealand, Skill New Zealand: A Stocktake as of December 1997, 16. 
Accredited 
Providers 
-
153 
477 
757 
946 
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An example of how the NQF works in practice is the training provided by the 
ElectroTechnology Industry Training Organisation (ETITO). The packages of credits for 
which providers are accredited are divided into four levels. These are field, sub-field, domain 
and unit standard accreditations. Thus, the ETITO has accreditation to provide various 
components of the relevant industry qualifications, whilst other components are sourced from 
outside providers, such as polytechnics. Table 15 illustrates variation in subjects and the 
. interesting mix of core and generic skills provided by the ETITO.77 
Table 15: Examples ofETITO Accreditations 78 
Field Sub-field Accreditations Domain Unit Standard 
Accreditations Accreditations Accreditations 
Business (to level Computing (to level 4) Core Driving Core Construction: 
6) Knowledge and 2138 Use portable 
Skills (to level 4) power tools (to level 
3) 
Core Generic (to level Occupational Health Legal Studies: 8545 
4) and Safety Practice Describe crime and 
(to level 4) its consequences (to 
level 2) 
Electricai Engineering Physics: 6370 
(to level 7) Describe and 
construct simple 
-
electrical systems (to 
level 1) 
Dissatisfaction with the NQF, and its delivery by the NZQA, was both practical and 
philosophical. As early as 1994, the Prime Ministerial Taskforce on Employment was 
concerned at the slow speed of the implementation of the NQF. This was seen as delaying 
progress in policies that were dependent upon the framework, such as the Industry Training 
Strategy. The potential proliferation of unit standards, and the resultant complexity and 
possible umesponsiveness of the NQF was also noted.79 Another complication was the 
differences in funding levels for various course providers. It was argued that this could cause 
77 ElectroTechnology Industry Training Organisation (ETITO), 10 March 2000. Provider Site Details. 
http://www.nzga.govt.nzlsite/providers (3 October 2000). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Prime Ministerial Task Force on Employment, 1994, 72. 
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trainees to "select courses on the basis of the Government support available, rather than 
the educational appropriateness of the course".80 
Smelt also examined some of the assumptions underlying the adoption of the NQF. 
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The first assumption, he argued, was that there is a clear set of outcomes in each area of skill 
and knowledge that can be "identified, specified and agreed" across an industry (or, in the case 
of generic skills, across industries). The second assumption is that those outcomes can be 
. assigned to one of eight levels in a consistent way across industries, can be updated quickly in 
response to change, and can be set independently from the need to teach to produce the 
outcome. The third assumption is that the identification and specification of those outcomes 
will lead to "more and better training, improved skills and higher productivity".81 Clearly, 
there are major flaws in these assumptions, and Smelt argued that if they had been questioned 
more rigorously, the shape of industry training might have developed quite differently. 
Smelt proposed that the underlying assumptions resulted in the NQF being 
conceptualized as a grid "with ITOs licensed by the NZQA to fill in the appropriate bits of the 
grid ... (and with each qualification fitting) ... uniquely into one place in the grid".82 Thus, the 
notion of an industry-led 'bottom-up' development of unit standards is shown to be 
misleading; "the qualifications grid assumed to exist by the NZQA implies that somebody (the 
NZQA) possesses a map of the grid and ensures that each piece is placed in the appropriate 
slot".83 The concept of a "functional map of industries" was also challenged by the reality of 
how the industrial sector worked.84 Internal divisions within industrie-s, and boundaries 
between industries, had historical and social significance that would potentially defy attempts 
at 'rational' classifications of skills within those industries. The differing interests of 
employers and workers would also complicate industry mapping; as employers strove to 
maintain a competitive advantage, and workers to maintain property rights in their skills. The 
power in the monopoly rights given to the ITOs could rapidly become a barrier to any sense of 
industry mapping being an objective process. There was also a tension between the mapping 
of specific and generic skills, and between mapping specific skills shared by two or more 
industries. Thus, the role of NZQA in avoiding competition in setting standards and the 
duplication of standards was always under challenge. Smelt concluded "the assumption of the 
80 Ibid., 73. 
81 Smelt, Industry Training Organisations, 8-9. 
82 Ibid., 22. 
83 Ibid., 23. 
84 Ibid., 23. 
existence of a unique grid of qualifications and of a unique structure of ITOs to fill that 
grid is a doubtful one".85 
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Concern at the lack of progress by some industries in moving towards the new training 
structure prompted Lockwood Smith, the Minister of Education, to establish the Skill New 
Zealand Development Project in September 1994. This was a joint ETSA and NZQA 
initiative, and was designed to hurry along industries in developing training arrangements 
. linked to the NQF. It had been argued that the funding structures favoured industries where 
training was already established. This anomaly was resolved in 1994 as the Skill New Zealand 
Development Project provided targeted assistance for those industries attempting to set up 
structured training for the first time. 86 The project was considered successful and was extended 
into 1996.87 The project was funded from the Industry Training Fund (replacing the Training 
Support Fund and the Off-job Fund), which was established in 1996 to enable the government 
to co-purchase training for workers to national qualifications standards.88 The ITF funding was 
contestable, with ITOs being funded on a per trainee basis, and then negotiating with 
polytechnics or private providers for off-job training. 89 By 1996, 52 ITOs were recognized by 
ETSA. Co-training was purchased from 31 ITOs, twelve of which had little or no formal 
training before the Industry Training Act. 
Assessment of the Industry Training Strategy 
While the increasing numbers taking part in structured industry training was 
encouraging (see Figure 29), there remained areas of concern. These focused on equity and 
access issues regarding training, the funding and delivery of industry training, and wider 
concerns regarding the ability of the new strategy to deliver a skilled workforce. Despite much 
effort over the preceding years to attract women into non-traditional occupations, they 
remained substantially under-represented in industry training. Of the 42,799 industry trainees 
at March 1998, only 16 per cent were women.90 The age distribution of industry trainees was 
also of concern. Since 1992, employers had tended to put more emphasis on training current 
workers, rather than taking on young people, rewarding perhaps the loyalty and familiarity of 
older workers in a restrictive economic situation.91 Thus, in December 1999, only 10 per cent 
85 Ibid., 25. 
86 Ken Harris, "Staying in Step with ITOs," The Evening Post, 4 April 1994, 15. 
87 ETSA Annual Report, 1995, 9. 
88 ETSA Annual Report, 1995, 8. 
89 Fiona Cassie, "On the Verge or Off the Track?," New Zealand Education Review 3(11) 1998 : 14-16. 
90 Skill New Zealand, "Equity Afloat," Skills, September 1998. 
91 Kim Ulberg, Skill New Zealand, interview by author, 16 August 2000. 
>.-.• - , 
231 
of industry trainees were aged 16 to 19 and only 24 per cent were aged 20 to 24.92 While 
learning throughout the lifespan was a policy goal, there were clearly barriers to young people 
accessing industry training. 
Figure 29: Numbers in Structured Industry Training, 1993-2000 93 
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The funding of industry training was a contentious issue throughout the 1990s. The 
voluntary nature of the training framework meant that ITOs were unable to compulsorily levy 
their industry members, being thus dependent on ETSA funding, charging fees for their 
services, or the good will of the industry they represented. The long-range view of ETSA was 
that industries would gradually take more responsibility for funding their training needs, with 
government funds to be used mainly for seeding and development of structures to allow this. 
The ITOs, on the other hand, argued that increasing trainee numbers, and the reluctance of 
many within the industries to contribute financially, meant that greater government -funding 
was essential if industry training was to continue. 
92 Skill New Zealand, "Prime Minister Launches Modem Apprenticeships", Skills, April 2000, 3. 
93 Skill New Zealand, Skill New Zealand: A Stocktake as of December 1997, 16; Skills, September 1998; Skills, 
April 2000. 
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The Building and Construction Industry Training Organisation (BCITO) was 
particularly vocal on funding issues. In October 1995, BCITO claimed that of the $8 million it 
required to carry out training, it had received only $6 million from the government. The 
number of building industry trainees had more than doubled, from 1000 in 1992 to 2400 in 
1995 and the ITO stated that unless the government met the funding shortfall, it would be 
forced to axe courses, or increase the fees charged by up to 300 per cent. Indeed, BCITO 
. announced in Noveinber 1995 that in 1996 it would fund only nine of the sixteen off-site 
building courses that had been offered in 1995.94 ETSA countered BCITO's claims by arguing 
that total ITO funding had been boosted by 80 per cent, to $56 million for the 1995-96 year, 
and that it was the responsibility of industry to meet any funding shortfall by charging fees, or 
by increasing the amount that the industry contributed.95 The issue was again raised in 1998, 
when BCITO sought control of all government-subsidised training in its industry. BCITO' s 
executive director, Trevor Allsebrook, argued that the industry and its trainees were not 
prepared to meet the "ever-widening" difference between government funding and the cost of 
providing training. He also argued that tradespeople working in the industry were better placed 
to judge the competency of a trainee than "a bunch of academics in polytechnics". 96 
Funding issues thus impacted on the delivery of industry training. The Motor Industry 
Training Organisation (MITO), for example, also felt pressured by the perceived lack of 
government funding. This ITO, which had 3900 trainees in 1997, claimed that its funding for 
off-job training had been more than halved over the three years up to-1997. This resulted in the 
MITO halving its polytechnic training contracts for 1998, and in the organisation rethinking its 
long-term training structure to reduce formal polytechnic training to a minimum. This action, 
part of a general trend, caused polytechnics to devise measures to ensure their survival as 
deliverers of trade training. One of the measures was the fierce marketing of trade courses, 
with polytechnics prepared to move out of their traditional catchments to entice both students 
and ITO funding. For example, in late 1997 Southland Polytechnic set up the Southern 
Institute of Technology in Christchurch, offering automotive engineering, paint and panel and 
carpentry course for 120 apprentices and pre-apprentices.97 The new campus was established 
in response to an approach from the MITO to Southland Polytechnic, asking them to run 
94 Nicholas Maling, "Money Woes Hit Building Courses," The Evening Post, 25 November 1995, 5. 
95 Nicholas Maling, "Work Training Under Threat," The Evening Post, 23 October 1995, 1. 
96 "Building Industry Training at Risk, say Polytechs," The Dominion, 12 December 1998,2. 
97 Mike Crean, "Trade Courses for Wigram," The Press, 2 December 1997, 6. 
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motor trade courses in Christchurch because of the MITO's dissatisfaction with the cost 
and quality of the courses offered by Christchurch Polytechnic. 98 
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Polytechnics also discovered, after policy clarification from the Ministry of Education, 
that they had the option to move outside of the ITO structure and offer trade training on their 
own behalf. Students opting for this alternative were funded out of the standard tertiary 
funding system. In 1998, for example, Christchurch Polytechnic had about 35 non-MITO 
. 'apprentice' mechanics and about 15 non-BCITO 'apprentice' carpenters enrolled. ETSA saw 
no inconsistency in the. conte stability of training funding, arguing that different industries 
would make choices based on their needs.99 Thus, it could be argued that the voluntaristic 
nature of the government's industry training policies led in some cases to a proliferation of 
providers, uncertainty in the trade training sector, and a financial incentive to industries to 
minimise the amount of formal, off~ob training offered to trainees. The contestability of 
training funding contributed to an "explosion" of ITOs competing for a slice of the funding 
cake. In 1997, for example, there were 53 ITOs in New Zealand, compared with 18 in 
Australia, which were based upon broad industry groupings. 100 
The funding and delivery of trade training aside, there remained throughout the 1990s 
a shortage of skilled workers. The contraction of the economy after the 1987 stock market 
crash translated to a contraction in training, exacerbated by the disembowelment of the public 
sector, which in the past had helped to level out falls in private sector training. 
The handling of this crisis has been a disaster. When we finally got the new training 
regime up and running ... it was too late. We had lost one-eighth of the previously 
trained skilled workforce and not replaced them by 1991. 101 
Skill shortages were identified, for example, in the main centres in 1995,102 in the 
telecommunications industry in 1996,103 and in the retail, small engineering and 
manufacturing, clothing and building trades in 1997.104 
There are thus a variety of unresolved issues in industry training as the new millenium 
begins. Some of the issues, such as who should pay for training, how that training can best be 
organised and what the role is of each of the stakeholders, have changed little throughout the 
history of apprenticeship in New Zealand. Other issues, while not exactly new, have become 
98 "Motor Industry Body Backs Southland Way," The Press, 27 November 1997,4. 
99 Cassie, 1998, 14. 
100 Mark Henderson, "Skills Crisis Warning Bells were Ignored," Sunday Star Times, 27 April 1997, 10. 
101 Michael Law, cited in Henderson, 27 April 1997, 10. 
102 Adam Shelton, "Apprentice Enrolment Up but Shortage Remains," The Dominion, 16 August 1995, 3. 
103 Paul Rubens, "Telecomm Industry Faces Staff Shortage," The Dominion, 26 August 1996, 7. 
104 Henderson, 27 April 1997, 10. 
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more pressing because of technological and social changes. There is no doubt that some 
industries have changed beyond recognition, and that an 'apprenticeship' may no longer be the 
most appropriate way in which to train for them. The rapid changes in electronics, for 
example, often mean that unit standards become obsolete as soon as they are developed. 105 We 
must also acknowledge that the notion of a 'job for life' is gone, in fact, the whole definition 
of 'work' is changing as paid employment alters and contracts. 
This chapter has described the changes in apprenticeship policies through the 1990s 
and examined some of the theoretical underpinnings for those changes. The decade was 
perhaps the most notable for the removal of apprenticeship from the industrial relations arena 
(in fact, for the removal per se of industrial relations as they had long been understood in New 
Zealand). The apprenticeship contract became in most cases an individual contract between 
employer and apprentice, subject to few of the controls that the award and apprenticeship 
committee system had provided. The impact of this is difficult to assess without further 
research. The other main features of the decade were the development of a national 
qualification system, considered essential for increasing the flexibility of industry training, and 
for providing the means for competency-based assessment. Pre-apprenticeship training 
became the norm in many industries, providing useful training for those wishing to take up a 
trade, but also raising questions about the cost and efficacy of that training, and about the 
employer/apprentice relationship. Finally, the emphasis on a voluntaristic framework of 
industry training has resulted in concerns about equity issues and access to training, in wide 
variations between industries in the quantity and quality of training, and in a proliferation of 
training providers. And, as we enter the new century, there are still skill shortages in many 
crucial areas. 
105 Ulberg, August 2000. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION: 
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME 
This thesis has traced the changes in apprenticeship policy in New Zealand since the 
first piece of legislation, the Master and Apprentice Act 1865. The goals of that policy for 
subsequent governments have remained remarkably similar throughout the years; that of 
ensuring a skilled workforce and of easing the transition of young people from school to 
productive work. The impediments to achieving those goals have also remained similar, 
although the economic, technological and social backdrop may have changed. The main 
barriers to achieving the optimum number of skilled tradespeople are fourfold: first, employers 
regard training as a cost, and will generally try to minimise that cost; second, young people 
who wish to be trained must also be prepared to pay a cost (opportunity or actual); third, there 
is an inevitable time-lag between commencing training and becoming productive (during 
which anything may happen), and finally; the education system will never be perfectly tuned 
to the needs of the economy. This is partly because there tends to be a disjuncture between the 
theoretical and the practical, and partly because there is an ongoing tension between the social 
and economic goals that our society expects the education system to fulfil. 
Over the last 150 years the apprenticeship system in New Zealand has remained the 
main route for entry into the skilled trades. What has changed, of course, is both the nature and 
extent of those skilled trades, and the organisation of the system for becoming a tradesperson. 
Nevertheless, there is enough left of both to argue that apprenticeship has shown a great deal 
of resilience in New Zealand. I have attempted in this thesis to draw out some of the reasons 
that account for this resilience. New Zealand's peculiar economic and industrial relations 
climate explain to a degree the persistence of apprenticeship, but it must also be argued that 
apprenticeship contains within itself the seeds of its continual reproduction. The socialisation 
process embodied in the system remains powerful. The comments of a Skill New Zealand 
employee when discussing the 'industry training' regime ofthe 1990s were very telling: "the 
worst thing we did was to lose the term 'apprenticeship'''.] 
1 Kim Ulberg, Skill New Zealand, interview by author, 16 August 2000. 
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Summary 
The settlers who colonised New Zealand in the mid nineteenth century brought with 
them the ethos, if not the legalities, of apprenticeship. Despite the relatively fluid nature of 
society in the new colony, the idea of a young person 'serving their time' with a tradesperson 
was retained in many trades by the settlers. This tendency was encouraged by the demands for 
skilled labour that settlement engendered and by the vulnerability of the colonists to economic 
. hardship, exposed by the recession of the 1880s. This highlighted the need for a fonnal way of 
training young people, protecting them from the vagaries of economic fluctuations. 
In light of these concerns, several attempts were made to place apprenticeship on a 
legislative basis during the first years of the Liberal government. Apprenticeship, however, 
became subsumed in the wider industrial relations legislation of the period. This radical 
legislation, which earned New Zealand the title of the 'social laboratory' , circumvented the 
need for specialist apprenticeship regulation by placing the system under the award system, 
which was governed by the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. The price that 
was paid for the relative industrial hannony promised by this Act was a limitation of the range 
of issues that could be brought to the Arbitration Court. Apprenticeship, therefore, became an 
important part ofthe bargaining process, and was often a symbol of deeper struggles that 
could not be articulated in the industrial arena. 
As technological advances and the accompanying industrialisation changed the nature 
of work in New Zealand at the beginning of the twentieth century, the apprenticeship system 
could easily have become obsolete. Some trades disappeared; others changed dramatically, 
while some were completely new. Apprenticeship survived this threat for four reasons. First, 
the power of the skilled worker, buttressed by the exclusive nature of apprenticeship, meant 
that often changes could be negotiated, rather than enforced. Second, both employers and 
workers became increasingly aware of the need for fonnal education in many of the 'new' 
trades. Third, the growth of an independent labour movement, coupled with disenchantment 
with the arbitration system, intensified the divide between employer and worker, and 
reinforced the importance of apprenticeship as a bargaining tool Finally, although the details 
of the system were certainly debated fully and frankly, apprenticeship itself as a means for 
training young people was rarely called into question by either employer or worker. 
237 
The changes to industry over these years were reflected in the call for specialist 
apprenticeship legislation, which was enacted in the Apprenticeship Act 1923. This set in 
place an apprenticeship bureaucracy, and formalised the technical education requirements 
necessary for the 'modern' apprentice. Again, most of the debate about the legislation was 
over the detail. Apprenticeship was challenged through the Depression years, as numbers fell 
severely and economic conditions and inroads on the arbitration system threatened the 
sacrosanct nature of the apprenticeship contract. The system, however, was robust enough to 
ride out these challenges. Economic recovery and the Second World War also saw 
modifications to the apprenticeship system, necessary because of shortages of skilled labour 
and wartime regulations. 
The post-war years were the height of apprenticeship in New Zealand. Full 
employment and a booming economy marked this time. Skilled labour was scarce and, even 
though wages were high for unskilled work (raising issues of the appropriate margins that 
should be paid for skilled work), there were many benefits and a degree of social status 
associated with 'having a trade'. A formalised nationwide apprenticeship bureaucracy was put 
in place by the Apprenticeship Act 1948, and technical education became the norm for most 
apprenticeships. Maori trade training schemes were initiated in the late 1950s to aid the 
transition of Maori to an urban life style. These halcyon days were numbered, however, as 
changes in the international economy began to impact on the previously sheltered New 
Zealand. 
Although the apprenticeship system was given the 'stamp of approval' by the 1965 
Commission of Inquiry into Vocational Training, the short recession of 1967-68 and the 
National Development Conference that it precipitated, began a process of questioning of the 
shape of the apprenticeship system that would continue until the early 1980s. The main points 
of debate were the rigidity of the system, the low status of trades and the most efficient way of 
organising the formal component of apprentice training. Accompanying this debate was the 
paradox of shortages of skilled workers at the same time as unemployment was beginning to 
increase. The result of the fifteen year-long discussion process was the essentially 
conservative Apprenticeship Act 1983. While the Act attempted to streamline apprenticeship, 
and put many new initiatives in place to both rationalise the system and extend it to a wider 
range of people, responsibility for developing those initiatives was placed largely with 
industries, with minimal funding commitment from the government. It was also during these 
years that the low number of women apprentices, and the narrow range of industries in which 
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they were concentrated, became of concern. While there were many valiant attempts to 
rectify this, they met with little success, stymied by the 'resistance-to-change' factor of 
employers and wider social attitudes, and by economic changes that reduced the number of 
apprenticeship available to anybody. 
The election of the fourth Labour government in 1984 saw a radical restructuring of 
much of New Zealand society. The education sector (within which apprenticeship was 
gradually seen more and more to fit), in particular, was 'reviewed to within an inch of its life'. 
Despite a general move towards deregulation and lessening of the role of the state, in its first 
term the Labour government attempted to realise the changes suggested in the Apprenticeship 
Act 1983 by using the 'carrot' of an apprenticeship subsidy tied to training reform. The main 
thrust of this reform was to move to assessment based on competency, rather than on time 
served. Increasingly, however, the contraction of the manufacturing sector, growing 
unemployment and changes in the wider education sector meant that the apprenticeship 
'problem' became not one of reforming the system, but of questioning the whole validity of 
apprenticeship as a means of training. 
Many of the reforms to post compulsory education suggested during the myriad 
reviews carried out through the 1980s were enacted by the 1990 National government. If 
apprenticeship were to end, or to be changed beyond recognition, it would have been at this 
point. The Industry Act 1992 removed the term 'apprentice', replacing it with 'industry 
trainee'. The broadening of structured training to a wider range of industries (while 
commendable in itself) raised the possibility of diluting the prestige of having a trade. The 
apprenticeship contract was replaced with an employment contract, removing much of the 
protection for the apprentice given by union and state involvement. Assessment was to be 
carried out under a national qualifications framework, ostensibly to encourage flexibility, but 
with the possibility of compromising the integrity of a 'trade' qualification. Pre-apprenticeship 
training became the norm in many industries, and some industries formed organisations to 
employ and hire out apprentices; again, not bad things in themselves, but damaging to 
traditional notions of apprenticeship. Another threat to industry training over this period was 
the proliferation of compliance regulations and costs which, while not always pertaining 
directly to training, were the last straw for many tradespeople when considering taking on an 
apprentice. 
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Indeed, many people are of the opinion that apprenticeship is 'dead'. They are very 
surprised to hear that the system is alive and well, albeit under a different name, often in a 
modified fonnat, and certainly in a lesser number of industries. It is testimony to the robust 
nature of apprenticeship that it has survived the 'disembowelling' of the 1990s. What remains 
of concern, however, is the fragmentary and varied nature of both the quantity and quality of 
industry training that is carried out. The voluntaristic framework put in place by the National 
. government throughout the 1990s has meant that some industries do little or no training. Other 
industries have a strong ethos of training, supervised and promoted by industry bodies, but 
ultimately, I fear, vulnerable to economic conditions and dependent upon the goodwill of 
individuals within the industry who feel strongly about the importance of such training. 
It seems fitting to end this section with the announcement in 2000 of the 1999 Labour-
Alliance government's Modern Apprenticeships scheme. This scheme aims to "provide 
systematic, high quality workplace learning" and is aimed primarily at sixteen to twenty-one 
year olds. 2 The essence of the scheme is the appointment of Modern Apprenticeship Co-
ordinators3, who will be charged with recruiting and placing apprentices, supporting and 
facilitating their training, and mentoring the apprentices.4 It is hoped that the use of co-
ordinators will remove some of the barriers to taking on a young apprentice by reducing the 
costs and risks that employers face. Whether this scheme will resolve the difficulties and 
contradictions surrounding the best way to train young people for work remains to be seen, but 
it is of great interest that the government has chosen to reclaim the tenn 'apprenticeship'. I 
believe that this shows the power of the word; the notion of a young person learning skills 
through workplace training, reinforcing those skills through fonnal education, and being 
socialised into the world of work by mentors, has as much currency today as it did in 1901. 
Themes 
It has been the stated aim of every government in New Zealand's history to facilitate a 
skilled workforce (either through state intervention or by 'clearing the way' so that the market 
can perfonn), but this laudable aim seems to be constantly thwarted. The factors that stand in 
the way of achieving a skilled workforce are sometimes not within the government's control, 
but even when they are, it seems to be very difficult to achieve the correct policy mix required 
2 Skill New Zealand, Modem Apprenticeships News 7, January 2001 (Wellington: Skill New Zealand, 2001). 
3 Ibid., Issue 2, May 2000: Co-ordinators could be ITOs, polytechnics, private training establishments or 
community-based organisations. 
4 Ibid., Issue 2, May 2000. 
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to obtain the right mix of skills, at the right time, at an acceptable price. Throughout this 
study, several themes relating to this problem have risen repeatedly. These ongoing issues are 
seemingly impervious to changes in the wider social and economic climate; the language in 
which they are expressed may change, but the essential problems remain the same. While 
these issues are of course equally applicable to the workforce as a whole, this thesis has 
examined them in relation to the skilled trades. 
The first of these themes is the question of who should pay for training. Historically, 
the arrangement between employer and apprentice was finely-tuned, with the cost to the 
employer of an unproductive young apprentice being balanced by the older apprentice's ability 
to carry out the work of a tradesperson, but still only be paid apprentice wages. Economic and 
social changes, however, upset this balance, and as the role of the state increased and 
(especially in New Zealand) industrial relations muddied the transactions, the apportioning of 
costs and benefits became rather opaque. As the formal educational component of 
apprenticeship increased, costs alternated more between the employer and the state, with the 
apprentice 'paying' implicitly with a discounted wage during the term of the apprenticeship. 
Recent developments, however, have seen the apprentice expected to pick up a larger share of 
the tab, as pre-apprenticeship courses become more common. 
The notion of training as an investment, rather than a cost, has not gained a lot of 
currency in New Zealand. Despite the rhetoric of employer organisations (and the undeniable 
initiatives of some industries and individual employers), the main imperative of most 
employers has been to pay the least amount for training that they possibly can. This has 
impacted on the quality, quantity and continuity of training over the years. Thus, throughout 
this thesis we have seen resentment from some employers at having to contribute (through 
paying apprentice wages or directly) to the formal component of apprentice training. 
Apprentice intakes have fluctuated in direct correlation with economic conditions, with many 
employers seeming to see little contradiction in contracting training when the economy is 
tight, and then complaining that they are unable to get skilled staff when the economy 
recovers. One of the constant excuses for not training apprentices has been the problem of 
'poaching'. This would perhaps be less of an excuse, and improve the continuity of training, if 
employers would regard the staff that they have trained as contributing to a pool of skilled 
labour for the whole industry, from which they could draw as required. 
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Another recurring theme has been the tension between educationalists and industry, 
(part, I would argue, of the ongoing debate about the social and economic goals of education). 
Throughout the history of apprenticeship in New Zealand there has been a deep-seated distrust 
of those organising the theoretical side of apprenticeship training from those in the 'world of 
work'. It is expressed in many ways: a contempt of book-learning and 'office wallahs'; 
resentment of any perceived interference in industry matters by those in the 'ivory towers' ; 
. disapproval of 'liberal studies' being taught during time paid for by the employer, and so on. 
The discourse surrounding the tension is revealing; it is structured around the 'practical, 
hands-on bloke' being constrained and meddled with by 'airy-fairy teachers who have no 
knowledge of the real world'. Conversely, there is (expressed less often and more mildly), the 
views of the educators; a sense of frustration with the conservatism of many of those in 
industry, and with their inability to see the 'big picture' of skill formation, and not just the 
needs of their particular work-shop. 
The increase in the formal education component of apprenticeship has exposed the 
contradictions contained in this debate. Apprenticeship, and being a tradesperson, is firmly 
associated in New Zealand with being 'practical' and not strongly academic. Yet this 
association has raised three problems over the years. First, it has contributed to the low status 
of the trades, an issue that has been raised periodically throughout this thesis. Second, the 
increasing technical requirements of some trades have meant that a greater degree of academic 
ability is required. While the prestige of having a trade is still strong in some sectors of our 
society, the association of being a tradesperson with being less academic may be a barrier to 
some young people who have contemplated beginning an apprenticeship, or it may mean that 
it is not even considered by others. One of the paradoxes of apprenticeship over the years has 
been the lower scholastic achievement level of some apprentices, while at the same time 
others do not complete their training as they are over-qualified and do not find the work 
stimulating. The final problem identified in this research is that in recent years higher levels of 
unemployment and fewer job opportunities have combined to raise the benchmark for entry to 
apprenticeship in some trades. Thus, a cohort of young people who would traditionally have 
entered a trade (and become exemplary tradespeople) are often excluded because their school 
or pre-apprenticeship course marks are not good enough. All these factors combine to impede 
the development of an appropriately skilled workforce, in which ability and interest correlate 
sensibly with occupational choice. 
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A third common theme throughout this thesis has been the tendency to blame the 
apprenticeship (or industry training) system for both shortages of skilled workers and 
unemployment. Apprenticeship is by no means a perfect system. There are difficulties inherent 
in the system, such as the time-span required to train, the tension between the theoretical and 
the practical aspects of learning and the generally conservative nature of the system. There are 
also difficulties caused by abuse of the system: employers using apprentices as cheap labour 
and neglecting comprehensive training; apprentices not complying with educational 
requirements; and educational institutes taking advantage of captive students and failing to 
ensure the relevance of educational material to the industry, for example. It is, however, a long 
reach to blame the apprenticeship system itself for skill shortages when they are clearly more 
often caused wider economic factors, the reluctance of employers to train, or by sweeping 
technological changes that would try even the most flexible of training systems. It is also 
difficult to see how the blame for high levels of unemployment can be the fault of any training 
system. The elasticity of entrance requirements for various occupations is a clear indication 
that numbers in training are a function of the state of the labour market, rather than that the 
availability of skilled workers determines the level of employment. 
The final theme to be discussed in this concluding chapter is the role of the state in 
organising apprenticeship. Clearly, this is connected with the preceding issues; the state in 
New Zealand has always to some degree been involved in apportioning the cost of 
apprenticeship training, in the organisation and administration of apprenticeship and in the 
provision of post compulsory education. If we are to assess the state's role, it is also necessary 
to ask the question 'if not the state, then who or what?' The market has been offered for the 
last fifteen years or so as the answer to this, thus, we should also attempt to assess the ability 
of the market to organise the provision of a skilled workforce. 
It would be hard to imagine in the New Zealand context a situation where either the 
state or the market would be handed the complete responsibility for organising industry 
training. The problem seems to be rather one of working out the most efficient and equitable 
balance between state and market provision. The optimal organisation of industry training can 
be thought of as occurring at two levels. First, there is a need for some mechanism to 
determine the type of skills that are needed, and the number of people required with those 
particular skills. Both the state and the market have been spectacularly unsuccessful at this 
(although no doubt 'New Right' aficionados would argue that true market forces have never 
been exercised in New Zealand); what is required is clear analysis, the ability to take a long 
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term view, the setting aside of sectional interests, a healthy dose of pragmatism and a 
certain amount of luck. There is thus a clear case for a strong partnership between the state and 
industry, coupled with (if Germany is to be used as a model) much greater involvement from a 
revitalised union movement. 
The second level of industry training, once the variety and quantity of skills required 
have been established, is the delivery of that training. When the state was the main provider of 
industry training, it was roundly criticised for being sluggish, unco-ordinated and inefficient. 
Training organised by the state, however, was generally consistent and accessible. When 
training was opened to market forces, and organised on a voluntaristic, user-pays basis, 
training often stopped altogether, or became fragmentary and exclusive, and of variable 
quality. Competition certainly provided opportunities for innovative courses to be established, 
and for a greater degree of responsiveness to demand. The notion of' demand' ; however, 
remains problematic, with the expansion of popular (if not necessarily useful) courses, while 
other occupational areas languish without structured training. Again, a partnership between the 
state, industry and unions, with an acknowledgement of strengths and weaknesses of each 
party, would appear to be the optimum way to organise industry training. 
In this thesis, I have described the development of apprenticeship policy in New 
Zealand and placed those policies in the social and economic context in which they were 
formed. Policies governing apprenticeship have, at one level, organised the mechanisms 
required to train skilled tradespeople. At another level, they have often been a 'short-hand' for 
deeper debates within our society. The resilience of apprenticeship can be accounted for by 
factors at both of these levels. The strength of the socialisation process embodied in the 
mechanics of apprenticeship, and the distinctive nature of understandings about work and 
education held in New Zealand, have created conditions that have enabled the persistence of 
apprenticeship. I believe that apprenticeship remains a viable and effective means of training. 
The cornerstones of apprenticeship; work-based learning, a recognised career path and 
mentoring from older tradespeople are as relevant and necessary in today's society as ever 
they were. 
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